

**Praxis,
international
edition, 1970, no.
3-4**

**Veljko Korać, Gajo Petrović
(ed.)**

PRAXIS

A PHILOSOPHICAL JOURNAL

πρᾶξις

IN MEMORIAM – Lucien Goldmann
(1913–1970) ● MARX, MARXISME,
MARXOLOGIE – M. Marković: Critical Theory in Marx, J. Arandelović: Philosophy and Dogmatism, E. Paci: Fenomenologia e dialettica, E. Grassi: Marx und der italienische Humanismus, D. Grlić: Literaturkritik und Marxismus, B. Bošnjak: Marxismus im holländischen Katechismus
● PENSEE ET REALITE – R. Bojanović: Lucifer and the Lord, S. Vračar: Le monopole de parti, S. Stojanović: Student Movement, N. Popov: Streiks, J. Čemernik: Stalinisme tchécoslovaque ● DISCUSSION – D. C. Hedges: Socialism without Socialists, K. Axelos: Sur la révolution sexuelle ●
SUPPLEMENT SPECIAL – MILAN KAN
GRGA: ETHIK UND FREIHEIT

MARX, MARXISME, MARXOLOGIE

3/4 • 1970



PRAXIS

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INTERNATIONAL EDITION

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HRVATSKO FILOZOFSKO DRUŠTVO
JUGOSLAVENSKO UDRUŽENJE ZA FILOZOFIJU

International Edition printed at the Printing-house of the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts (Tiskara Jugoslavenske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti), Zagreb, Gundulićeva 24. Distributed by Industrijski radnik, novinsko-izdavačko poduzeće, Zagreb, Ilica 28.

PRAXIS

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Zagreb, Gundulićeva 24. Distributed by Industrija knjiga
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EDITION INTERNATIONALE

ZAGREB, 3^e ET 4^e TRIMESTRE 1970

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LUCIEN GOLDMANN

(1913-1970)

*Une triste nouvelle est venue de Paris justement quand on finissait l'impression de ce numéro de *Praxis*: «Hélas, j'ignorais en vous écrivant la dernière fois que j'aurais peu de temps après à vous annoncer cette catastrophe. Lucien est mort hier, le 8 octobre, à 5 heures de l'après-midi. Il était à l'hôpital depuis samedi dernier, car l'hépatite s'était compliquée d'un ulcère qui a provoqué des hémorragies internes. Il n'a pas souffert, seulement cessé de respirer; et je pense qu'il est resté lucide jusqu'au dernier quart d'heure».*

*La pensée marxiste philosophique et sociologique a subi une grave perte. Un de ses plus éminents représentants est parti de ses rangs dans la plénitude de ses forces créatrices. Lucien Goldmann a été un des penseurs les plus significants qui se sont levés résolument au milieu du vingtième siècle contre la dénaturation stalinienne du marxisme et pour le renouveau de son esprit humaniste et révolutionnaire. Il a donné son apport durable à ce renouveau. Ses nombreux livres et études, en particulier *Sciences humaines et philosophie* (1952), *Le Dieu caché* (1955), *Recherches dialectiques* (1958), *Pour une sociologie du roman* (1964), traduits en beaucoup de langues (y compris croato-serbe), ont exercé et exercent une influence large et féconde. Ses deux derniers livres qui sont justement sous presse, appartiennent au domaine de la sociologie de la littérature. Dans ce domaine Goldmann est devenu l'incontestable autorité mondiale. Mais Goldmann lui-même a considéré ses études sur les problèmes contemporains du marxisme et du socialisme plus significantes que ces travaux spéciaux, en tant qu'expression la plus adéquate de ses préoccupations les plus intimes. Partisan enthousiaste du socialisme humain et d'autogestion, Goldmann tâchait de toutes ses forces de lui donner son sens théorique et d'aider sa promotion pratique. De là sort son intérêt particulier et son amour pour la Yougoslavie, qui est devenue, auprès de la Roumanie où il est né et a fréquenté l'école, et de la France où il a étudié et a développé son activité créatrice, sa troisième patrie.*

Sad news came from Paris just as we were finishing the printing of this issue of Praxis: "Alas, I did not know when writing to you the last time that I would have shortly afterwards to announce this catastrophe to you. Lucien died yesterday, October 3, at 5 o'clock in the afternoon. He had been in the hospital since last Saturday; because the hepatitis was complicated by a single ulcer which caused internal bleeding. He did not suffer, only stopped breathing; and I think he remained lucid until the last quarter of an hour".

Marxist philosophical and sociological thought has suffered a serious loss. One of its most eminent representatives left its ranks in the fullness of its creative forces. Lucien Goldmann was one of the most significant thinkers who rose up resolutely in the middle of the twentieth century against Stalin's distortion of Marxism and for the renewal of its humanist and revolutionary spirit.

He gave his lasting contribution to this revival. His many books and studies, in particular *Science humaine et philosophie* (1952), *L'Education* (1955), *Recherches dialectiques* (1958), *Pour une sociologie d'uraman* (1964), translated into many languages (including Croatian Serbian), have exercised and continue to exercise a broad and fruitful influence. His last two books, which are just in the press, belong to the field of the sociology of literature. In this field Goldmann has become an indisputable world authority. But Goldmann himself considered his studies of contemporary problems of Marxism and socialism more significant than these special works, as the most adequate expression of his innermost concerns. An enthusiastic supporter of human socialism and self-management, Goldmann strove with all his fervor to give it its theoretical meaning and to help its practical promotion. From Id comes his particular interest and his love for Yugoslavia, which has become, alongside Romania where he was born and attended school, and France where he studied and developed his creative activity, his third homeland.

La mort de Goldmann représente un coup particulièrement dur pour tous les philosophes et les sociologues autour de la revue Praxis et de l'Ecole d'été de Korčula. En tant que participant de la première session de l'Ecole d'été de Korčula et de la plupart des autres, Goldmann donnait par ses brillantes conférences et sa participation intense dans la discussion, un apport précieux au niveau et à la réputation de l'Ecole. Il a participé aux discussions qui ont précédé la fondation de la revue Praxis, nous aidant avec ses conseils et son appui, et au cours de toute la parution de la revue jusqu'à présent il était son collaborateur actif. Le Comité de soutien étant formé, nous l'avions prié d'être membre du Comité, ce qu'il a naturellement accepté. Nous savions que la revue Praxis et l'Ecole de Korčula pouvaient compter à son appui sans réserve dans tous les moments difficiles.

Il nous est difficile, à nous, ses camarades et ses compagnons de combat depuis de longues années, d'écrire aujourd'hui sur Lucien. Il n'était pas seulement un grand théoricien et combattant, mais aussi un homme exceptionnel. Il est difficile de trouver un homme de telle humanité et bonté, toujours prêt à aider. La vie ne l'a pas choyé. Constraint de quitter son pays natal devant le danger fasciste, il souffrait dans un milieu nouveau, longtemps ignoré, attaqué et même insulté par les adversaires du marxisme et des pseudomarxistes staliens. Tout cela n'a nullement ébranlé son optimisme vital et sa compréhension pour les autres. Toujours orienté vers l'essence, vers le contenu, il ne se souciait pas de la forme extérieure et ne cherchait pas une estime, une appréciation ou une reconnaissance formelle. L'été dernier il a participé aux deux réunions internationales importantes: au symposium sur la sociologie de la révolution à Cabris (mi-juillet) et à la session à Korčula consacrée à Hegel (fin août). Goldmann était à toutes les deux un des plus actifs participants, incitant par ses interventions lucides à la réflexion et à la discussion. Ses amis ont pourtant remarqué une ombre de fatigue et d'épuisement sur son visage. Il a avoué avoir travaillé beaucoup les derniers temps. Justement avant le symposium à Cabris, il a terminé un livre, entre Cabris et Korčula un autre.

Et maintenant les machines tournent pour lancer bientôt deux livres nouveaux de Lucien Goldmann, deux nouveaux témoignages durables d'un honneur intellectuel et de la pensée vivante. Et aux coeurs des amis de Lucien restent un vide durable et une blessure jamais refermée.

The death of Goldmann represents a particularly hard blow for all the philosophers and sociologists around the review *Praxis* and the Summer School of Korčula. As a participant of the first session of the Korčula Summer School and of most of the others, Goldmann gave by

his brilliant lectures and his intense participation in the discussion, a valuable contribution to the level and reputation of the School. He took part in the discussions that preceded the founding of the journal *Praxis*, helping us with his advice and support, and during the entire partition of the journal until now he was its active collaborator. The Support Committee having been formed, we asked him to be a member of the Committee, which he naturally accepted. We knew that the journal *Praxis* and the School of Korčula could count on his unreserved support in all difficult times.

It is difficult for us, his comrades and his companions in combat for many years, to write about Lucien today.

He was not only a great theoretician and fighter, but also an exceptional man. It is difficult to find a man of such humanity and kindness, always ready to help. Life is not going to be pampered.

Forced to leave his native country in the face of the fascist danger, he suffered in a new environment, long ignored, attacked and even insulted by the adversaries of Marxism and the Stalinist pseudo-Marxists. None of this has shaken his vital optimism and understanding for others. Always oriented towards the essence, towards the content, he was not concerned with the external form and did not seek formal esteem, appreciation or recognition.

Last summer he took part in two important international meetings: the symposium on the sociology of the revolution in Cabris (mid-July) and the session in Korčula devoted to Hegel (end of August). Oldman was both one of the most active participants, encouraging reflection and discussion with his lucid interventions. His friends, however, noticed a shadow of fatigue and exhaustion on his face. He admits to having worked a lot lately. Just before the symposium in Cabris, he finished a book, between Cabris and Korčula another.

And now the machines are turning to soon launch two new books by Lucien Oldman, two new enduring testimonies of intellectual honor and living thought. And in the hearts of Lucien's friends there remains a lasting void and a wound never closed again.

CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY IN MARX

Mihailo Marković

Belgrade

Whenever man expresses his sensual or intellectual powers in the form of an object, this object might be (although need not necessarily be) alienated. That a theory as a linguistic objectification of human thoughts, experiences and feelings can also be alienated and become subject to a process of interpretation and practical application which is entirely independent from the intentions of the author, from the historical situation and from the cultural climate in which it was born, Marx did not consider explicitly. But he has shown such a possibility by his exclamation in 1882 that he was not a Marxist.

In the decades which followed his theory was increasingly misinterpreted and misused.

It became ideology of a whole powerful international movement; in order to perform that function successfully it had to be reified and given sacrosanct mythological qualities.

Marx's theory also became an important part of contemporary social science, consequently it was very often interpreted and evaluated in the light of the most influential philosophy of positive science-empiricism.

On the other hand, whatever empirical philosophers found obscure, utopian and metaphysical, especially Marx's anthropological considerations, became a source of inspiration for modern speculative and humanist philosophy.

Each of these particular groups had their own criterion of what is alive and still relevant in Marx, each made their own selection and projected their own needs and preoccupations into Marx's texts. They all failed to realize the basic novelty of his theory, i. e. the fact that Marx created a theory which is both objective and critical. However, in most interpretations and further developments of his thought one of these two essential characteristics has been systematically overlooked. Among those who speak in the name of Marx or consider themselves his intellectual followers some accept only his radical

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criticism of the society of his time, some lay emphasis only on his contribution to positive scientific knowledge about contemporary social structures and processes.

To the former group belong, on the one hand, various apologists of post-capitalist society who develop Marxism as an ideology; on the other hand, those romantically minded humanists who consider positive knowledge a form of the intellectual subordination to the given social framework and who are ready to accept only the anthropological ideas of the young Marx.

To the latter group belong all those scientists who appreciate Marx's enormous contribution to modern social science, but who fail to realize that what fundamentally distinguishes Marx's views from Comte, Mill, Ricardo and other classical social scientists, as well as from modern positivism, is his always present radical criticism both of existing theory and of existing forms of social reality.

Thus a return to Marx and a reinterpretation of his thought is needed in order to restore and to further develop a critical method of theoretical thinking. Three basic questions should be asked: (1) Is Marx's theory an ideology? (2) Is it philosophy? (3) Is it a science in some sense of the term?

I. MARX'S THEORY AND IDEOLOGY

If by »ideology« we mean any rationalisation of values, needs and interests, any theory about an accepted ideal, any choice of a general value-orientation, any projection of future for which we are ready to engage, and consequently a critical attitude toward existing social realities – then there definitely is a moment of ideology in Marx's theory. Many of his key concepts are value-laden. For example the concept of man's species-being (*Gattungswesen*) is a normative, not a descriptive notion of man. The idea of praxis as a free human activity with definite esthetic qualities, in which man objectifies all his potential powers, affirms himself as a personality and satisfies the needs of another person – is a key concept of all his criticism of alienated labor in the conditions of market economy, and is by all means a value concept. The concept of *exploitation* is both a description in concrete, empirical terms of wages and prices of produced commodities, and the expression of revolt against a certain structure of social relationships. *Communism* is the projection of an ideal future, not the simple scientific prediction of an inevitable outcome of historical process. In *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* there are even three different descriptions and evaluations: (1) »crude communism« to which »the domination of material property looms so large that it aims to destroy everything that is incapable of being possessed by everyone as private property,« (2) communism (a) still political in nature, (b) with the abolition of »the state, yet still incomplete and influenced by private property, that is by, alienation of men,« (3) communism »as positive abolition of private property, of human self-alienation.«¹

¹ Marx, *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (Marx's Concept of Man,* edited by Erich Fromm, New York, 1961, p. 126–127).

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To the former group belong, on the one hand, various apologists of post-capitalist society who develop Marxism as an ideology; on the other hand, those from anti-critically minded humanists who consider positive knowledge a form of the intellectual subordination to the given social framework and who are ready to accept only the anthropological ideas of the young Marx.

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1 Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts (Marx's Concept of Man, edited by Eric H. Fromm, New York, 1961, p. 126-127).

However, what distinguishes sharply Marx's theory from any existing ideology is the *universal* character of values assumed and smuggled into his »essences,« and apparently purely factual expressions. Marx speaks always as the member of the species *man* and even when he appears as the advocate of one particular social class – proletariat, he means by »proletariat« an idealized social group which *an sich* has no particular interests clashing with the interest of mankind as a totality.

And that is not what is usually being meant by »ideology.« This term usually covers an entirely different structure of thought and behaviour for which it is characteristic that our *particular* group interests are expressed and disguised in form of indicative statements making the impression that they refer to obvious facts, being therefore, accepted as indubitable truths. All ideologies in this sense are dangerous because they create illusions and prejudices and they are all conservative both because their function is to rationalize and preserve the particular interests of various social elites, and because they are too static and necessarily lag behind the facts. Being based on interests, emotions and sometimes most irrational, blind unconscious drives, rather than on objective observation and critical thinking, ideologies tend, time and again, to reproduce dualistic pictures of the society and the world, with extremely sharp distinctions between white and black, good and evil. Such an extremely simplified dualism is not only the result of obvious bias and the lack of objectivity of those whose interests and needs it should promote but also the consequence of the simple psychological fact that very large groups of people can be moved to act solely by very simple, easily understandable and emotionally loaded ideas.

Marx's theory is certainly not an ideology in that sense. It condemns capitalism from a universal humanist point of view, it explores the possibilities of building a classless society in which domination of any particular group would be impossible; it is very complex and articulate, requiring a very high level of education to be grasped. Furthermore, Marx explicitly condemns ideology: according to him ideology is false, perverted social consciousness; all genuine theory is a critical self-consciousness and it must play an essential therapeutic role; it must break the mighty intellectual shackles of a reified world and demystify hidden social relationships.

2. MARX'S THEORY AND PHILOSOPHY

Previous considerations already indicate that Marx's theory both *is* and *is not* a philosophical theory in the classical sense.

It is philosophical because it is universal. It is no longer only philosophical, or it is not purely philosophical, because pure philosophy, being too general and abstract, cannot do much to demystify social relationships and offer practically relevant solutions to the concrete historical problems embraced by the broad idea of human alienation.

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appears as the advocate of one particular social class -

proletariat, he means by »proletariat« an idealized social group which in itself has no particular interests clashing with the interest of mankind as a totality.

And that is not what is usually being meant by »ideology.« This term usually covers an entirely different structure of thought and behaviour for which it is characteristic that our particular group interests are expressed and disguised in form of indicative statements making the impression that they refer to obvious facts, being therefore, accepted as indubitable truths. All ideologies in this sense are dangerous because they create illusions and prejudices and they are all conservative both because their function is to rationalize and preserve the particular interests of various social elites, and because they are too static and necessarily lag behind the facts. Being based on interests, emotions and sometimes most irrational, blind unconscious drives, rather than on objective observation and critical thinking, ideologies tend, time and again, to reproduce dualistic pictures of the society and the world, with extremely sharp distinctions between white and black, good and evil. Such an extremely simplified dualism is not only the result of obvious bias and the lack of objectivity of those whose interests and needs it should promote but also the consequence of the simple psychological fact that very large groups of people can be moved to act solely by very simple, easily understandable and emotionally loaded ideas.

M arx's theory is certainly not an ideology in that sense. It condemns capitalism from a universal humanist point of view, it explores the possibilities of building a classless society in which domination of any particular group would be impossible; it is very complex and articulate, requiring a very high level of education to be grasped.

Futhermore, M arx explicitly condemns ideology: according to him ideology is false, perverted social consciousness; all genuine theory is a critical self-consciousness and it must play an essential therapeutic role; it must break the mighty intellectual shackles of a reified world and demystify hidden social relationships.

2.

M A R X ' S T H E O R Y A N D P H I L O S O P H Y

Previous considerations already indicate that M arx's theory both is and is not a philosophical theory in the classical sense.

It is philosophical because it is universal. It is no longer only philosophical, or it is not purely philosophical, because pure philosophy, being too general and abstract, cannot do much to demystify social relationships and offer practically relevant solutions to the concrete historical problems embraced by the broad idea of human alienation.

There are two essentially new philosophical moments in Marx's theory. One is philosophical anthropology, which is at the same time a philosophy of history. Another one is a new method of thought-dialectics.

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It is worth mentioning here that *quasi*-Marxist philosophy which passes under the name of »dialectical materialism« completely overlooks the former and thoroughly distorts the latter.

Apart from some very general phrases about the greatness of man, alienation (in capitalism only), freedom as knowledge of necessity, and practice as a criterion of truth, the philosophers of dialectical materialism did not develop any conception about human nature, praxis, true human needs and basic capacities, positive freedom alienation and human emancipation – all those great themes from Marx's philosophical works. This is partly a result of ignorance. »Dialectical materialism« became a rigid ideological system at a time when some of the most important Marxist philosophical works have not yet been known. But there is also a method in this neglect: it involved deliberate rejection of these problems for obvious ideological reasons. Only in the light of Marx's humanism one can have an overall critical view of the whole, half a century long history of socialist society, and only comparing the present-day reality with Marx's humanist project one can fully grasp how much the former is still far from the latter and how little resemblance there is between present-day bureaucratism and Marx's free associations of producers who themselves regulate production and all social life. Knowing what *alienated labour* and *political alienation* are, it would not be difficult to find them in a society which claims to have built socialism a quarter of a century ago. That is why early philosophical Marx's writings have been classified as Hegelian and not yet Marxist. However, in a number of books and articles (for example in the journal »Praxis«) Yugoslav philosophers and other contemporary Marxian humanists have conclusively shown that Marx's philosophical ideas from earlier writings underlie all his mature works (such as *Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Oekonomie* and *Das Kapital*) although they have sometimes been expressed in a different, less speculative language. (For example, man's alienation from the products of his work has been expressed in the first volume of *Kapital* in terms of »fetishism of commodity production.«)

Dialectics within this humanist framework becomes a philosophical method of a radical social criticism. To be »radical« in Marx's words means to take things from the root, and »the root for man is – man.« Human situation had to be critically examined in its totality and human emancipation had to embrace all its particular dimensions: liberation from toil, political liberation, cultural self-actualisation, elimination of superrepression in the instinctual sphere of human life.

Such a radically critical philosophical method hardly has anything in common with pseudo-Marxist, dogmatic version of dialectics in the sense of a set of universal »laws« of the development of nature, so-

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society and human mind. Such a dialectical theory is in fact a set of vaguely formulated postulates, illustrated by arbitrarily selected examples from the natural sciences or from the history of the socialist movement. This theory had to be learned and applied in a most dogmatic way, without any mediation, in order to explain what there is and how what happened under the wise leadership of bureaucracy was necessary. In the work of Marx, however, the function of dialectics was to help to see how what there is might be superseded and transformed into something better, more humane.

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Paradoxically enough, Marx did never find time to develop in a systematic, theoretical form either his anthropological theory or a dialectical methodology. The reason is not, I think, the lack of time, even less the lack of necessary intellectual power. The real reason seems to be Marx's conviction that pure philosophy is, at best, an alienated form of disalienation. He learned this lesson by studying Hegel, Feuerbach, and young Hegelians, who all, in a more or less brilliant way, first reduced man to an abstract being (*Absolute Spirit*, *Generic Being* or *Self-consciousness*) then showed how he can be emancipated within the framework of pure thought only.

And still, those who took some of Marx's statements at their face value, who neglected the study of philosophical background of Marx's theory and came to seriously believe that genuine, mature Marx was only economist and social scientist – did not have the slightest chance to understand even his seemingly pure economic works. Already Lenin said (in his *Philosophical Notebooks*) that nobody has understood Marx's *Capital* who did not study whole *Logic* of Hegel. But this holds even more for those who are ignorant of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. These writings are the necessary background against which one can properly understand Marx's conception of man and history and his dialectics. They are presupposed in virtually every text he ever wrote.

However, the fact that Marx was a Faustian type of thinker, a philosopher of revolution, precluded the possibility of developing a purely philosophical anthropology.

Man who is the creator of an open historical process cannot himself remain an ahistorical, fixed entity, as in Feuerbach. And if in every historical epoch he sets to himself the task to discover and to supersede essential social limitations, he will ultimately find them in alienated and reified forms of his own practical activity. Therefore, the creation of a more rational and more humane surroundings is, at the same time the self-creation of man's own nature, the abolition of some inner tensions and conflicts, and the production of new senses, new powers, new needs, new relationship with the other person.

Thus theory becomes historical and practical. It can no longer remain purely philosophical – it must become concrete.

Without a general philosophical vision one surely does not see the contradictions and limitations of the whole »prehistory«, one does not see possibilities of the way out of the whole epoch of alienated labour.

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But in order to make a single really important practical step out toward a freer and richer life of each individual, one has to find out which are specific contradictions and limitations of his own specific historical situation.

The choices are then:

To preserve a critical theory at the level of pure transcendental thought – in which case it remains practically irrelevant and, at best, a powerless romantic expression of revolt against the existing forms of human degradation.

Or, to supplement philosophy with concrete empirical knowledge, to incorporate an *a priori* anthropological vision within a concrete, practically relevant theory.

Marx did not hesitate to choose the second alternative. That is why he had to make the step from *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* to *Grundrisse* and *Das Kapital*.

3. MARX'S THEORY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

In a sense Marx's theory is scientific. That both he and Engels considered their conception of socialism »scientific« and held science the most powerful weapon against ideology, that in mature works, especially in *Capital* Marx deliberately avoided use of anthropological conceptual apparatus, developed in earlier works, that he sometimes belittled those writings – should not be of decisive importance. Marx himself said that one is what he does, not what he thinks he is. When we analyse Marx's doings, then there is no doubt that most of his lifetime he devoted to a kind of work which had some definite features of scientific research, even in the strictest empirical sense. There is ample empirical evidence to support his general statements, a most detailed description provides a concrete, historical dimension to his theoretical analysis, many of his concepts have been given an exact form and operationalized, and, in the best scientific tradition of his time he tends to establish laws which govern social processes, independently from human will.

And still Marx's theory is *not* scientific in the sense of empiricist philosophy of science (of Russell, Carnap, Popper, Hempel etc.). In some important respects it is not scientific at all.

Its specific features in contrast to empiricist notion of a theory are the following:

First, it contains a highly articulated *a priori* element, and this *a priori* is not only logic, with its deductive and inductive postulates and rules, but a whole philosophical vision about the man and his world, a vision in which the ontological is permeated by the axiological. This *a priori* is not an absolute, it has a definitely historical character and crystallizes previous experiences, feelings and intellectual discoveries. But, on the other hand, it precedes the collection of new empirical data, provides a criterion for their selection and endows them with a complex meaning which is both intellectual and

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emotive. That is why Marx did not need explicit moralistic phrase: even the dryest of his descriptions contain an implicit moral connotation.

Second, empirical data cannot be the starting position of inquiry because they are scattered and refer to isolated phenomena. According to Marx, theory must be the study of *whole* structures, of historical situations taken in their *totality*. Therefore he does not care for the division of work in the process of cognition. Marx's critical social theory does not know about any sharp boundaries among social disciplines, branches and special sciences. *Das Kapital* belongs not only to economic science but also to sociology, law, political science, history and philosophy. Nevertheless, although the category of totality plays such an overwhelming role in the methodology of Marx, his approach cannot be properly described as a purely synthetic one. He knows that any attempt of direct grasp of a totality without previous analytical mediation usually has a mythological character. That is why analysis is a necessary phase in his inquiry. However, the results of analysis must be reintegrated and taken only as particular moments within the structure of a whole. By proceeding in the process of research from unanalysed given concrete phenomena (such as population, wealth etc.) toward abstract universals (such as commodity, labour, money, capital, surplus-value etc.) and from them back towards (this time) analysed empirico-theoretical concreteness, Marx succeeds in overcoming the traditional dualism between the concrete and the abstract, between the empirical and rational (speculative, »metaphysical«) approach.

Third, Marx created a conceptual apparatus of social critique which far transcends the limits of a concrete, empirical reality (even if it is taken as a whole). The function of this apparatus was not reduced to the analysis and explanation (although some of his notions are more or less value-free and neutral). Marx's key concepts invariably refer either to structure which *there are*, but *could be abolished*, or to those which *there are not yet*, but *could be created*.

To the former belong the concepts of *commodity*, *abstract (alienated) labour*, *value*, *surplus-value*, *profit*, *capital*, *class*, *state*, *law*, *politics*, *ideology* etc.

To the latter belong the concepts of *species-being* (or *social man*), *praxis*, *human production*, *community*, *freedom*, *history*, *communism* etc.

For example: *commodity* is a product alienated from man, an object which was not made by man in order to objectify one of his individual capacities, to satisfy his immediate needs or needs of another concrete individual, but which is lost for the producer the very moment when it was produced. *Capital* is not only objectified, stored-up labour in the form of money, buildings, machines and raw materials. It is the objectified labour which, at the sufficiently high level of technological progress, appropriates the surplus value (the difference between the prices obtained for produced goods and wages paid for labour which produced those goods). The objective, thing-like form of capital conceals and mystifies a structure of social relationships beyond it, the object (invested money) mediates between those who

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To the former belong the concepts of commodity, abstract (alienated) labour, value, surplus-value, profit, capital, class, state, law, politics, ideology etc.

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rule and grab the unpaid labour, and those who produce and who are completely devoid of any rights either to participate in decision-making about the process of production, or to share in produced property. Another example: *the state* is not any social organisation which directs social processes and takes care of order and stability of the society. The typical feature of the state is its coercive character. State is an instrument of the ruling class, therefore it is institutionalized alienated power. Therefore Marx believed that the labour movement must abolish the institution of the state very soon after victorious revolution and replace it by the associations of workers. A network of worker's councils would no longer be a state because it would not need professional political rulers and a professional apparatus of coercion.

To the other group belongs the concept of *social man*. It does not refer to the individual who lives together with other individuals or who simply conforms to the given norms of a society. Such a person can be very far from reaching the level of a social being. On the other hand a person may be compelled to live in relative isolation and still profoundly need other persons and carry in his language, thinking and feeling all the essential characteristics of human generic being. In this sense Marx distinguishes between man who regards woman as »prey and the handmaid of communal lust«, »who is infinitely degraded in such an existence for himself«, and man whose »natural behaviour towards woman has become human«, and whose »needs have become human needs.« This »most natural immediate and necessary relationship shows to what extent man «is in his individual existence at the same time a social being.«²

Freedom never meant for Marx only choice among several possibilities, or »the right to do and perform anything that does not harm others.« Freedom in Marx's sense is ability of self-determination and of rational control over blind forces of nature and history. »All emancipation is restoration of the human world and the relationships of men among themselves.«³

Consequently, *history* is not just a series of social events in time; it is a process of permanent overcoming certain limits in the given natural and social surroundings, a process of creating new situations which preserve most of the favourable features of the previous situations which preserve most of the favourable features of the previous situation but also contain some new features (new institutions, new social structures and patterns of behaviour), which offer better opportunities for human survival, development and self-realization.

Thus, all his most important concepts refer to a possible radical change. In so far as change presupposes something *given*, these concepts have an ordinary empirical component of their meaning: also, they presuppose some neutral, descriptive concepts. However a change which is not only quantitative but qualitative presupposes *negation* of the given. On the other hand, it implies the projection of an *ideal* possible future.

² *Ibid* p. 126-127.

³ Marx, »On the Jewish Question« (*Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society*, ed. by Loyd Easton and Goudet).

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3 Marx, »On the English Question« (Writing(s) of the Young Marx on Phenomenology and Sociology, cd. by Loyd Easton and Goodwin).

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In such a way, in difference from an empiricist, value-free social theory here we have three different types of concepts:

- (1) concepts-negations,
- (2) descriptive, neutral concepts, and
- (3) concepts-projects.

The easiest way to grasp this triplicity is to take concepts which belong to the same category. Thus within the category of *human activity* we should distinguish between (a) alienated (abstract) labour, (b) work and (c) praxis. Within the category of *human nature* we should distinguish (a) one-dimensional man (*homo faber, homo consumens, homo politicus etc.*) (b) man in the sense of the totality of social relationships, (c) man in the sense of *species-being* (*Gattungswesen*).

Alienated (abstract) labour is the activity in the process of which man fails to be what he is i. e. fails to actualize his potential capacities and to satisfy his basic needs. Marx distinguished the following four dimensions of this type of alienation: (1) one loses control over produced commodities. The blind forces of market enslave man instead of being ruled by him. (2) In his struggle for more property and power man becomes estranged from his fellow man. Exploitation, envy, mistrust, competition, conflict dominate relationships among individuals. (3) Instead of employing his capacities in a creative, stimulating work, man becomes an appendage of machine, a living tool, a mere object. (4) As no opportunity has been offered to him to fulfil his potential abilities, to develop and satisfy various higher level needs, his whole life remains poor, one-sided, animal-like, his existence remains far below the actual possibilities of his being.

Work is a neutral concept. It refers to an activity which is a necessary condition of human survival and development in any type of society. In volume I of *Kapital*, Marx defines work as a permanent »exchange of matter with nature.⁴ Even at a much higher level of technological and social development, when all present-day forms of toil and drudgery would be replaced by the manipulation of machines, when the division into workers, managers and owners of the means of production would disappear, when socially necessary labour would be reduced to a minimum and lose compulsory character – man would still have to make efforts in order to produce indispensable goods and services. Work need not be a commodity, need not be meaningless and degrading from the point of view of the worker, but still, it involves a considerable degree of organization, order, discipline, and even when fully meaningful, it could only be a means to reach some other end which is entirely outside the sphere of work (competence as such, prestige, admiration, high social status, power, love).

Praxis is *ideal* human activity, one in which man realizes *optimal* potentialities of his being, which is therefore an *end in itself*. Marx has never given any exhaustive definition of this notion, although it

⁴ Marx, *Das Kapital*. B. 1, K. 5, § 1.

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»exchange of matter with nature.«⁴ Even at a much higher level of technological and social development, when all present-day forms of toil and drudgery would be replaced by the manipulation of machines, when the division into workers, managers and owners of the means of production would disappear, when socially necessary labour would be reduced to a minimum and lose compulsory character - man would still have to make efforts in order to produce indispensable goods and services. Work need not be a commodity, need not be meaningless and degrading from the point of view of the worker, but still, it involves a considerable degree of organization, order, discipline, and even when fully meaningful, it could only be a means to reach some other end which is entirely outside the sphere of work (competence as such, prestige, admiration, high social status, power, love).

Praxis is ideal human activity, one in which man realizes optimal potentialities of his being, which is therefore an end in itself. Marx has never given any exhaustive definition of this notion, although it 4 M arx, Das K apital. B. 1, K. 5, § 1.

plays a key role in his anthropology and is the fundamental standard of his social criticism. Nevertheless, from various scattered fragments one might conclude that, in the opinion of Marx, *praxis* has the following characteristics:

(1) It is the objectification of *specific potential* capacities and powers; in the process of *praxis* man affirms his personality and experiences himself as a subject who can change those features of his surroundings which do not satisfy him. What is specific for *praxis* in contrast to work and labour is not objectification (or externalization) of human subjective powers in itself but an entirely different nature of objectification. In *labour* the worker uses only those abilities and skills which he can sell, which are needed in the process of commodity production: sometimes this is sheer physical energy or ability to perform continuously one single simple physical operation, which does not require use of thinking, imagination, communication or of any other worker's capacities. There are many kinds of *work* which need not cripple the worker that badly. And still from the very fact that work as such need not be the end but only a means to reach some other end, it follows (a) that the worker might be compelled to employ only those capacities which are relevant to the achievement of the given end, possibly neglecting those in which he is especially gifted, which are potentially most creative; (b) that, as a consequence of a professional division of work, he might continue to employ his abilities quite one-sidedly for an indefinite period of time. In *praxis* self-realization is one of the essential moments: it is the activity in which one actualizes full wealth of his best potential capacities, an activity profoundly pleasurable for its own sake, no matter how much effort and energy it might require, no matter how pleasant its secondary effects (success, prestige etc.) might be. (2) Another essential characteristic of *praxis* is that, while involving self-affirmation, it also satisfies a need of other human beings. In the process of *praxis* man is immediately aware that, through his activity and/or its product he enriches other man's life and indirectly becomes part of him. In *labour* and *work* this direct concern for other man's needs might be completely absent. The worker can be either completely self-oriented or concerned only about wages and success (his own or of the whole group to which he belongs). Or he may entirely leave to the other to worry about human needs (to the management, political bureaucracy). Or the needs of others might be artificial, produced by manipulation and pressure. *Praxis* involves therefore a basic intuitive distinction between true and false, genuine and false needs. It also involves creativity, but in the broadest possible sense: creative might be not only writing poetry, painting, dancing, designing new architectural forms, composing music, doing scientific research, but also teaching, playing, cooking, designing cloths, entertaining people, loving, raising children etc.

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(4) Praxis is *universal* in the sense that man is able to incorporate in his activity modes of action and production of all other living beings: man has learnt from the bird how to fly and from the fish how to swim and dive; a man who belongs to a particular nation, class, race, region, civilization is able to learn and assimilate in his activity the elements of activity of all other human beings, no matter to which social group, region and historical period they belonged.

(5) Praxis is *rational*: man does not only act by instinct and by the method of trial and error; he is able to discover the structure of natural and social processes in which he takes part, he can make extrapolation for future, project goals and look for the most adequate means to satisfy them. Work and labour are also rational but there might be an essential difference in the purpose for which reason is being employed. (In Carnap's formulation the *utility function*, which is a necessary component of the concept of rationality, might be different). In one case the purpose is self-realization and satisfaction of human needs, in the other case it might be maximization of income, increase of power etc.

(6) Praxis is *free* and in a double sense. It is free *from* external coercion, from compulsion to do always the same kind of things, in the same way, under the pressure of some external physical force, or authority, or any kind of necessity. It is free *for* self-fulfilment.

(7) Praxis has definite *esthetical* qualities, it is an activity which, among other things, »obeys the laws of beauty.« There can hardly be any beauty in labour and there need not be any beauty in labour and there need not be any in work. If there is, it is only a secondary concern, again a means only. With some element of beauty in their surroundings workers might produce more, prettier goods would bring more profit, hard work might be easier bearable with some beautiful music in the background etc. When beauty becomes an end in itself an activity approaches the level of praxis.

Such a concept of praxis is clearly an ideal limit, a possibility of being toward which man naturally strives. It is not the ideal in the sense of some pure *Sollen* (*ought*), which exists only in platonic sense. It is a real historical possibility in double sense: (a) it has existed in history as a mode of behaviour of the most developed individuals, (b) all people, at least in some better moments of their life, act in that way. However for the vast majority of mankind those better moments are rare and reduced to leisure time only. Their best time and energy are being wasted in a process of imposed, dull, routine work which hardly offers any gratification, which is no value in itself but only a means to secure survival and reproduction of labour force.

Marx did not think that man can be fully liberated from any work of that kind. The sphere of material production remains a sphere of necessity, of inevitable human metabolism. But he believed, and this belief becomes increasingly well supported by the advance of modern technology – that the working hours could be substantially reduced, and that his leisure time would be a time for *praxis*.

Another good example for the distinction among three kinds of concepts in Marx is the category of *human nature*.

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Homo faber, homo ludens, homo oeconomicus, homo politicus are concept-negations: they refer to various dimensions of a split man, disintegrated under the impact of unfavourable historical conditions.

Man in the sense of a »totality of social relations« is a neutral, descriptive notion. Man is and will always be a historical being, conditioned by existing institutions, and by various social roles that he more or less freely accepts to play. He is acquisitive, possessive, greedy, egoistic under certain historical conditions characterized by private property, commodity production, market competition, professional politics. A qualitative change of these conditions would bring about different patterns of human behaviour and there is no reason to think that quite different potential traits of human nature would not eventually prevail.

The notion of man as *being of praxis* is clearly a concept-project. Once all those social structures which produce enormous social differences would be removed, man would increasingly act as a free, rational, social, creative, universal being. Such a normative concept of man, which refers to the optimal historical possibility of human being, becomes the basic standard of all social criticism.

The conceptions of *negativity* and *ideal* might be interpreted in various ways. Within the tradition of transcendental idealism they can be constructed as synonymous of pure, unconditional *Sollen* and *Nicht-Sollen*. The other extreme would be an empiristic attempt to completely eliminate the value component from them: *Negative* would then be that which deviates from the »normal,« prevailing trend of events. *Ideal* would, consequently, be such a course of events which perfectly corresponds to the theoretical formulations of scientific laws.

Both extreme interpretations do not leave any room for human choice and practical engagement. Both presuppose a world in which all standards of evaluation are external and alien to men, be it values *in themselves* of idealist axiology, or reified formulae of scientific laws. However, the standards which take the form of external powers - are human *forces propres*, general patterns of human behaviour, objectified and projected into a transcendental sphere of values or into material world, taken in itself. In contrast to this, the *negative* which is present in Marx's concepts means an essential limitation in an historically given structure of human praxis.

Fourth difference between Marx's and empiricist conception of science:

The dialectical notions of *negation* and *ideal* as the result of a superseded (*aufgehoben*) negation cannot be properly understood within an empiricist philosophy of science. But in difference from their use in Hegel's philosophy, in Marx they have a meaning which is not anti-scientific, which even presupposes a flexible scientific determinism, therefore a clear recognition that there are *social laws*. This recognition is implied by the very idea of *historical* possibility. Historical process has a certain structure, certain tendencies and regularities which overlap and cancel each other. Historical possibilities are all those future states which can be projected on the basis of these tendencies.

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However Marx's conception of a social law differs from the empiricist one in four important respects.

(1) According to Karl Popper and all other leading empiricist philosophers the statement of a law has to be considered falsified if a single contrary instance has been found. According to Marx, a social law is tendency only, i. e. in individual cases we must expect considerable deviations from it.

(2) The conception of science as positive knowledge only implies a definite emphasis on the continuity and stability of the given social form. Social study becomes, then, a study of the conditions of preservation, of maximum harmony and quantitative growth of the given society. Within this frame of mind any search for laws will be a search for permanent static relations among classes of phenomena.

Marx's conception of science as critical knowledge lays much more emphasis on discontinuity, disfunction and internal conflicts of a social formation. Social study is not only a study of the conditions under which the existing social forms would function in the optimal possible way but also and primarily, a study of the conditions under which a radical, qualitative change is possible. Hence the task of the discovery of both static and *dynamic laws*, both conservative and destructive forces within a given system. The example of a destructive tendency is Marx's law of decreasing average rate of profits in capitalist society.

(3) Empiricism tends to reify laws. Laws are construed as permanent, fixed relations among certain variables of social life. These variable are construed as things although they ultimately refer to human behaviour. Thus the objectivity of social life becomes comparable to that of natural laws. This whole approach has certain merits in relation both to arbitrary ideological rationalization on the one hand, to subjectivism of *Geisteswissenschaften* on the other. The fact is that human individuals often behave in an utterly conventional and stereotyped way – like things – and that, in addition, unorganized, unco-ordinated activity of isolated individuals without a common will and clear awareness of the purpose really resembles processes of unconscious, natural agents. And still, patterns and habits of human behaviour are not things. Once men realize what are the essential limits of their activity, once they organize their individual efforts into a common will and decide to engage collectively for a common ideal, the historical process does no longer depend on what is most probable according to the previous law, but on the qualities of this new practice and the character of changes introduced into the whole social situation.

(4) Thus, there is nothing inevitable in history. Laws hold under certain conditions. But men can change the conditions and thus create a new situation in which some new laws will hold. That is what happens in every true social revolution.

It is clear now why empiricism cannot have a real theory of radical social change i. e. of revolution. It can only describe, classify, analyze past revolutions, it can only clarify the concept of revolution.

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2 PRAXIS

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It will propose only modifications leading to the better functioning of the given social form. Or it will propose the method of trial and error (Popper in *Open Society*). Only a critical, dialectical science can explain the concrete nature of future possible revolutions and show the real possibility of a radical social change of a society.

4. THE NATURE OF MARX'S THEORY

The criticism of the previous sections leads to the following conception about the nature of Marx's theory.

Marx's theory is the result of a critical study of historical possibilities. It is a model, the symbolic expression of an idealized structure – not an empirical description. A theory of this type does not immediately say anything about a concrete segment of reality; however, it establishes tendencies which *under certain conditions* might be manifested *everywhere*. The theoretical structure expounded in Marx's *Capital* is a model in the sense that it does not describe what actually happens in a certain country at a certain moment; it establishes what might happen in all developed capitalist countries under following conditions (among others):

- (a) pure commodity production;
- (b) the existence of a class which, under conditions of commodity production *is exploited* and *an sich* is a potential revolutionary force, but which need not necessarily be aware of its social being and thus become a class *für sich*;
- (c) perfect market with the balance of demand and supply and without such disturbing factors as monopolies and the intervention of the state;
- (d) closed national economy, without developed international economic collaboration and influences of the international market;
- (e) investments for profit without taking into account huge non-profit investments, such as investments into armaments, space programmes etc.

Marx's laws are consequently not expressions of empirically established statistical regularities. They are parts of the theoretical model and they express relations which are expected to hold universally *whenever* the conditions stated explicitly for the model are actually fulfilled. For example, Marx's law of decreasing average rate of profit states that (under conditions assumed in his model) increasing growth of productivity of work leads to the change of the organic composition of capital, a trend which is unfavourable to capitalists and which can be counteracted only by squeezing out of workers more unpaid labour. This leads to growing revolt, to open class conflicts and eventually to the collapse of the whole system.

Necessity of this process is relative to the assumed conditions, ultimately it is relative to certain assumed regularities of the behaviour of workers and capitalists. Only in this relative sense can we speak about truth or falsity, about confirmation and refutations of this law

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and in general of Marx's system. Theory is true if people behave in a certain way, and they will behave in this way if they become conscious of certain possibilities. But nothing guarantees that they will.

Such a type of theory which speaks about possible trends and optimal possible outcomes of the historical process under certain conditions would clearly be metaphysical, devoid of any empirical information, if the conditions were not specified and operationalized. Further, if they are stated explicitly but if there is no reason to believe that they can ever be met, the theory would be entirely uninteresting and practically irrelevant. On the other hand, if the conditions are specified and fulfilled but the course of events is different than anticipated, the theory would be refuted. Neither of these has been the case with essential parts of Marx's theory.

There can hardly be any doubt that Marx's theory taken as a whole is still present among us to such an extent, and who is still being so the subject of so much study and controversy a whole century after it was created. There is hardly any other of his contemporaries who is still present among us to such an extent, and who is still being so widely read and discussed.

The reason is, first, that the historical possibilities envisaged by his theory are still open, and second, that the humanist criteria of evaluation and practical choice among possibilites presupposed in his critical anthropology best correspond to contemporary humand needs and best express a widespread revolt against contemporary human condition.

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THE CONFLICT BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND DOGMATISM IN CONTEMPORARY MARXISM

Jovan Arandželović

Belgrade

The destiny of dogmatism in no way depends on its ability to withstand the conflict with philosophy. It is therefore illusory to believe that the secret of its stubborn survival and even an occasional lunge forward lies in philosophy's inability to triumph over it and to beat it on theoretical grounds. The fate of dogmatism is decided by society's ability to stand face to face with philosophy and, generally, with the critical spirit of the time.

What, however, justifies a theoretical interest in dogmatism is the actual ability of this weed to smother philosophy. On the other hand, this discussion is necessary because of those forces which see in a showdown with dogmatism an opportunity to have a go at philosophy if it is critical, if it builds upon the foundations of Marxian thought.

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Dogmatism presents itself to philosophy as a viewpoint which contains nothing that will determine it. What determines it is found not within but outside it. It does not establish its own principle but finds it externally – there where it draws force and sustenance. Furthermore, as a principle or the basis for building up thought, it requires to be fully in accordance with that which is external. The latter is not only determining but also the only thing in this relationship which has full freedom and independence and so, since it finds its principle ready-made in that which is outside it, dogmatism must necessarily be devoid of any internal determination and firmness. It is only owing to this absence of its own internal criterion that dogmatism can achieve the sensitiveness and flexibility which permit it to constantly adjust itself to those external conditions which make it possible. Without this sensitivity dogmatism would lose its attraction. Whether

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What, however, justifies a theoretical interest in dogmatism is the actual ability of this weed to smother philosophy. On the other hand, this discussion is necessary because of those forces which see in a showdown with dogmatism an opportunity to have a go at philosophy if it is critical, if it builds upon the foundations of Marxian thought.

I

Dogmatism presents itself to philosophy as a viewpoint which contains nothing that will determine it. What determines it is found not within but outside it. It does not establish its own principle but finds it externally - there where it draws force and sustenance. Furthermore, as a principle or the basis for building up thought, it requires to be fully in accordance with that which is external. Therefore it is not only determining but also the only thing in this relationship which has full freedom and independence and so, since it finds its principle ready-made in that which is outside it, dogmatism must necessarily be devoid of any internal determination and firmness. It is only owing to this absence of its own internal criterion that dogmatism can achieve the sensitiveness and flexibility which permit it to constantly adjust itself to those external conditions which make it possible.

Without this sensitivity dogmatism would lose its attraction. Whether 298

these external conditions are theology or politics or something else, it is always essential that they should have a certain social power, sufficient to make parasitism possible.

The deficiency of this power, which engenders fear of philosophy, is the source of the social need for dogmatism. In view of its dependence, it is obvious that to overcome it is not so much a matter for theory as it is for social transformation. Devoid of any support in those external conditions which determine its fate, dogmatism cannot jeopardize critical thought because far from offering any satisfaction to thought itself, it leaves it without any room for action.

II

What we have just said about the principle of dogmatism amounts to stating that this viewpoint is not a philosophical one. The adoption of such a principle forces dogmatism to continuously set limits to each of its fundamental ideas. The purpose of this limitation is to emasculate the idea or to subject it, not to the external conditions as such, but to those where dogmatism finds its own principle. Here already, at its very beginning, we find the essential feature of this way of thinking. To this way of thinking, the external sunders into two – completely independently of what its actual nature is. This doubling of the external, whereby it divides itself into what is »ours« or God-given and »theirs«, is not a result of research but its actual beginning. This partition is followed by the shattering of the unity of thought and the loss of its universality.

If a dogmatist makes bold to adopt the ideas of alienation, for example, then his first aim is to destroy its universality, to limit its validity, to deprive it of its philosophical sense. The idea is then strait-jacketed in order to restrict its relevancy to what is »theirs«. The consequence of this is, of course, the torpidity of the idea, its inability to participate in the effort of recognizing and changing that which exists. The idea is subjected to hatred, transformed into its tool, freed from the attempt to attain the truth however bitter it might be.

The same fate behoves the idea of philosophy as a criticism of *everything* that exists, of dialectics as an endeavour to understand *every* given form according to its transient side, etc. We say the same, because all these ideas, philosophical ideas, are concerned with existing reality as such – without any further determinations and limitations. Whether it resembles the world of Leibnitz's *Theodicea*, which is the best of all possible worlds, should be revealed in the result of the free intercourse of these ideas as philosophical ideas. What would happen to dialectics if there was no nature and no possibility of approaching man and the human world in exactly the same way as nature itself? What would happen to the ideas of alienation and criticism of the existing had there been no bourgeois world? Would these ideas completely disappear? And, finally, what would remain of philosophy?

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The torpidity and importance of dogmatic thought reveals its indifference to the fate of the external reality which apparently it cares for most of all. Maintaining always an uncritical and apologetic attitude towards it, dogmatism leaves it to its own fate. This attitude to the existing reality is not necessarily bad, because if the latter is on the right road, dogmatism cannot be an obstacle to its progress. What is certain, however, is that dogmatism can be of no help if the road leads nowhere or if it does not lead where men want to go. On the contrary, in such a case dogmatism, as a method of thinking, aids insistence on staying on the wrong road. At any rate, this has been revealed in practice and it can be expected to help speed up the process where instead of dogmatism preference will be given to positivism as a more successful tool of smothering and uprooting even the very thought and desire of thinking in a critical and philosophical fashion.

An impulse to critical thought is its passion for setting limits, which is directed onto the object of knowledge and practical action. Here the revelation of truth is inseparable from uncovering limits within the existing. Thought, consequently, reveals limits within the existing reality, it goes beyond them and heralds something new. In order to be able to distinguish the limits in the existing world, it is necessary for freedom of thought to be outside its framework – to be on the standpoint of the »impossible«, the unseen, the new, which is shut in, hobbled, frustrated within these limits. Critical thought must then overcome the fear which »the unknown« inspires even in what was be-gotten as »the impossible«.

In a complete contrast to this, dogmatic passion for limitation strikes at the thought of the existing rather than the latter itself. Dogmatism's entire concern is to set limits upon thought so that it would have one kind of attitude to the existing which maintains this thought and another, completely different kind, to that which differs from the existing, which opposes it, independently of the nature of the standpoint from which this is done.

Here then the limit, that great theme of philosophy, is viewed as something which can only be set down, and not as something that should be disclosed in order to be removed. Here the limit is what determines the framework of thought, rather than that which thought should transcend. Here the existing can in no way be limited, – in this sense it is regarded as a divine creation. But the establishment of such a prejudice is not a matter for thought – unless thought itself becomes limited. There need be no exaggeration in the statement that dogmatism is the standpoint of limited thought. That is what it literally is – according to the principle upon which it relies.

III

By limiting ideas, by destroying their philosophical sense, they are made to be obedient. The thought which these frustrated, strait-jacketed ideas should move becomes the handmaiden of theology, politics, of anything else that comes to replace the truth, anything that appro-

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priates for itself its power. Having lost all independence in relation to the existing – indepedence which derives only from a relentless aspiration to reach the truth – the dogmatic thought idealizes it, identifying it with that which not only must but also ought to be. Thus the value or the goal fuse and lose themselves in what is, what is achieved, and so the thought remains unsupported, without any base for a critical appraisal.

Here dogmatism reveals its concern for an internal order of thought, and for its consistency, because if the existing were so much ideal and necessary, then it could really become the pattern of the truth itself. Conformity between thought and the existing so conceived would in fact be a condition of its truthfulness. Passion for truth would coincide with the desire to properly reflect the existing in thought.

By removing the tension between that which is and that which ought to be, man's attitude to the existing, that which is engendered through his own practice, is identified with his possible attitude to nature itself. This then means that a complete impotence of human value judgements in the face of the most destructive, uncontrolled acts of nature, becomes the distinguishing mark of their attitude to the existing. In other words, by identifying the existing with nature or with that which is given in the way of things, the critical thought loses its sense and is left without any support.

This is obviously an absurd supposition of dogmatism, but it is exceptionally significant not only for the theoretical elaboration of this viewpoint but also for the complete understanding of its nature.

First of all it should be pointed out that without this supposition the dogmatists would not be able to apply dialectics to the socio-historical reality which makes their thought possible and sensible. We said »to apply« because they generally see dialectics in that way, as a *method*, as something which is external in relation to the object of thinking, as something which is only applicable to the latter. What they are trying to achieve is that in this application or in this form, dialectics should lose its peculiarity, i. e. any critical sense. In order to realize this, it is necessary to bring dialectics into such a relationship vis-à-vis the existing that would in no way be distinguished from its relationship to nature. Hence it is necessary that dialectics should have the same relationship towards essentially different »things«.

To destroy this feature is to deprive dialectics of what makes its essence – the critical and revolutionary sense which permits it to understand every existing form in the course of movement, hence in its transitory aspect. For this reason one problem of the dogmatists is how to extend the dialectics of nature to the actual socio-historical reality, how to conceive this reality in order to apply to it or to see appearing in it the tamed, torpid dialectics of nature which neither can nor does carry in itself violence and destruction – features which dialectics stubbornly maintained and deepened, features because of which it has always given rise to »anger and horror«. If we bear in mind this historical fate of dialectics or the destruction of the destructive within it, then Lukáč's denial of the sense of applying dialectics

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to the knowledge of nature, is a dignified, philosophical challenge to dogmatism, at a time when such a challenge is fully sensible and justified.

On the other hand, following the example of this identification of nature and the existing, the identification for which it is analytically revealed that it presupposes a dogmatic denial of a philosophical sense of dialectics and criticism, there is a general feature of this standpoint, the need to make an abundant use of assumption in building up its theses.

This saturation of thought with assumptions or its inability to progress without their help was the feature of the medieval, theological dogmatism, and so, in the modern philosophy, especially the Cartesian philosophy, attempts are made for a complete renewal of thought, abandoning all suppositions, building upon a foundation which will be clear and distinct. The liberation of dogmatism implied the ability of philosophy to accept doubt as one of its principles, which first struck at philosophy itself, or rather at its dogmatic torpidity and laziness. This meant that the foundation of thought cannot be that which is clear, but only that which thought can show up as being clear, not that which is generally accepted but that which reveals itself to thought as being worth general acceptance, not that which is regarded as indisputable but that which the judgment of thought passes as such, which withstands its free examination.

However, in the contemporary dogmatism assumption is not what is invariably viewed unbelievingly, that which always arouses doubt, disquiet and misgiving, that which is constantly reappraised. On the contrary, here it appears as a certainty, as something which is well-known, inviolable, holy, and is made to serve as a reliable foundation for further building. Beside this form, assumptions within a dogmatic viewpoint also appear as attitude which are simply understood as a matter of course, which are tacitly accepted, or, even, as a remote basis of thought which remains unclear and concealed even to the dogmatism himself – but the base without which he could not carry out the elaboration of its theses. To spell out these suppositions, which are not immediately apparent to an ordinary observer, and to reveal their absurdity – is the job of philosophy whenever it is called upon to deal with dogmatism.

Here, however, an attempt is made to find a reason for this complete openness toward different forms of suppositions. A confrontation with this problem permits a complete insight into the *entirety* of dogmatic viewpoint which we have already mentioned when discussing its principle.

If dogmatism is called upon to justify and elucidate the existing reality, demonstrating its various forms as necessary, no matter how irrational or untenable they might be, it is then understandable that this viewpoint must have an exceptional »freedom« in *selecting* the base from which to laud the existing. If the totality were built into a system of ideas with a clearly determined sense, it would then considerably limit the possibility for thought to always act defensively vis-à-vis the existing world on which it is fully dependent, or on the other hand, to act in a completely opposite manner, i. e. denying just

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as strongly what it once glorified, or conversely, denouncing that which it lauds here when it appears elsewhere, even at the same time, etc.

The insufficiency or absence of freedom, which is seen in the relationship of thought to the existing reality, appears elsewhere as an abundance or exaggerated freedom in the relationship of thought to itself, to its own foundation or to that which could and should be its basis.

A complete dependence of thought upon the external world is, therefore, followed by a complete arbitrariness, or »freedom« in its internal movement. This movement of thought is not a natural one, it does not progress from its principium to its result where a judgment is made on its object. Here the result of thought is not determined by what should represent the basis of the thought. On the contrary, the result is given in advance, it is known and the movement of thought begins with it. The purpose of this movement is to make the result a plausible one. For this reason thought is designed to find a base which will help to demonstrate as its result, i. e. as something rational, that which is already known and accepted in advance as truth. Thought must be able always to shape the base according to the result which it assumes ready-made and which is imposed upon it from outside.

In order to achieve plausibility, that external thing with which thought begins, which is in fact its base, must be represented as its result and as a matter of act, the result of the thought itself.

Here lies the secret of dogmatism's insatiable need for making assumptions. Here, on the other hand, is the explanation of the possibility for dogmatism to recognize the authority of any philosophy – especially such as Marx's philosophy is. Philosophy provides no help in the search for truth because the dogmatist knows it in advance. He searches around in philosophy in order to find something that can serve as a base for his conclusions. The real sense of that philosophy upon which he »relies« can only bind him up. The dogmatist's first concern is, therefore, to break the unity of that philosophy, to shatter it and to fragment it, to write off as outdated anything that he is unable to make use of for his own purposes. If we bear in mind this relationship to the substance of a philosophy, it is then understandable why any theoretical combatting of dogmatism must begin with the *revival* of the original sense or spirit of that philosophy, with the establishment of its unity. On the other hand, it is becoming understandable why it is possible for a hard-core dogmatist to easily abandon »his own philosophy« starting again from scratch – most frequently by surrendering himself completely to positivism. This transformation is understandable because it is quite easy for man to »renounce« that which he was never able to accept, for the simple reason that the true sense of it had always remained a complete secret. In order to comprehend this, it is sufficient to look at that »criticism« of philosophic ideas which is generated by the positivism of a »transformed« and »freed« dogmatist.

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IV

That same hostility to the general and philosophical sense of various ideas, individually taken, reappears, therefore, also on the level of these ideas taken as a whole, which should compose the »system« of a dogmatic viewpoint. The same torpidity and stupor applying to individual ideas is now transferred to their entirety, because it too is completely impotent before the external world, is subjected to it and dependent upon it.

If we now think of that which may stand in the way of such a heap of impotent, limited ideas, it should not be surprising to find out that this is also something which is impotent, devoid of any vitality. Referring to the »critical and revolutionary« character of his method and theory, the dogmatist candidly reveals how we can use them: »They subject to destructive criticism and revolutionary transformation all the superannuated special forms, they boldly change old-fashioned forms and methods of activities, outdated policies and conclusions of the Marxist-Leninist theory, which ceased to meet the new historical conditions and the achieved level of scientific knowledge.«¹

Although the purpose of this paper is to throw philosophical light upon some facets of contemporary dogmatism, irrespective of whether it appears here or there, whether it is attempting to present itself as a philosophy or views the latter with scorn and contempt, yet it is worth taking a second look at this quotation, because it can clarify some important features of dogmatism. Incidentally, this »textual« examination usually has little value if it attempts to reveal the essence of a viewpoint which cares less for its theoretical background and much more to meet the demands from »practice« and »life«. In fact, such an examination allows us to see what dogmatism *looks like*, how it wishes to appear, rather than as it really is, as it must be in terms of the principle upon which it is founded. Philosophical examination, however, does not deal with that which appears to be the case, but with that which must be and of necessity is. In other words, what we are trying to find out is not whether dogmatism has created important or great deeds, but whether it is altogether capable of doing it, not whether it is radical, but whether it can be so at all.

This examination, which hits out at the substance, may look like a »construction«. However, what is basic is for the substance of thought to be properly laid out.

In the determination of methods and theory of the dogmatic »philosophy« there is an immediately apparent attempt to present themselves as something full of vitality, something with a »destructive power,« something designed to bring about »revolutionary transformation« and »changes«. On the other hand, it would also appear that this viewpoint is a very comprehensive one and that its enormous power hits out at various forms of human practical activity and creativity.

¹ D. I. Chesnokov's editorial in *Uoprosy filosofii*, 12/1968.

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1 D. I. Chasnokov's editorial in Vosnossyfili, 12/1968.

However, on taking a closer look at this torrent of »radical« words we reveal that this mighty and immeasurable power of thought is channelled onto something that is already outdated. It should not be surprising, of course, that in this case methods and theory are designed to deal with what is outdated. They indeed can deal with it if it should have any real power to call upon us as something live. What surprises us however, despite good will and the endeavour not to present the dogmatist as a gravedigger of what is already dead, is that methods and theory are explicitly limited in their »critical and revolutionary« direction to that which is outdated and obsolete.

All this, however, is less important: what we must note in the example of our dogmatist is that his method and theory are dealing with something which we somehow already know to be obsolete. This is the basic, a new limitation put upon dogmatism. Not only that it, as a »critical and revolutionary« viewpoint, cannot deal with anything but that which is obsolete, but it also reveals itself to be incapable of establishing the obsolescence of that which it is dealing with. This, too, must be shown to the dogmatist. Criticism finds »its« result already made. Here, at the beginning of the »investigation« we are given that which should have been achieved or concluded at its end. Criticism, therefore, starts from that point which should be its conclusion or result.

Furthermore, a judgment of value of the subject is determined according to its relationship vis-à-vis the »new historical conditions« or vis-à-vis the existing thing which determine the fate of dogmatism.

It is important to note here that the true base for comparison is provided by not real but idealized »new historical conditions«. To an ordinary observer the switchback of this base is concealed and unclear. This switchback is achieved on the assumption that what exists is the realization of the ideal images given in its ideology. In other words, this changeover implies neglect for or the »overlooking« of differences between that which actually is and the illusory notion about what »in fact« it is or it »must and ought to be«. However, an investigation which takes into consideration also that which is »only« tacitly assumed, usually reveals that precisely these ideal images, i. e. the existing thing taken not in its actual form but imagined in terms of those notions, make up the actual basis for comparison.

This form of dogmatic criticism is based on the illusion that an appraisal of that which it is levelled at is achieved simply by comparing it with the existing which this criticism idealizes, thus presenting it in a false light. Through this switchback of the base, criticism becomes not only a sharp denial of the »obsolete«, but also an arbitrary divinization of that which that criticism idealizes.

That concealed supposition, through which the existing is regarded as the realization of the ideal, permits dogmatism to show up its criticism as an investigation based on »firm« foundations – namely, not upon the »uncertain« system of value ideas, not upon an idea, but upon »new historical conditions« which are the sample appraisal of this criticism or the base from which it reliably evaluates anything that can be the subject of its investigation. It is understandable that these »conditions« cannot be a subject of dogmatic thought if it is »critical

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»conditions« cannot be a subject of dogmatic thought if it is »critical

and revolutionary». On the contrary, they are its criterion. Strictly speaking, this criticism is based, on the one hand, on a comparative analysis and, on the other hand, on the uncritically accepted assumption that the »new historical conditions« are the realization of ideal human values. If this assumption – which dogmatism builds into its own foundations – held good, then indeed any distinction from the ideal sample could be regarded as insufficiency or internal restrictedness of the object of criticism.

The existing which gives criticism its model appraisal or criterion of evaluation is no less generous to the »scientific knowledge of the world«. To this knowledge it offers the criterion of truthfulness. Description or the correct reflexion of the existing is made out to be the truth about it. Furthermore, that reflexion is regarded as correct which »corresponds to new historical conditions«. When truth is viewed in this manner, it is then not surprising that even a historical description of something that has actually happened can be adapted so that it corresponds not to memory but to the demands put up by the new, changing conditions.

Although scientific knowledge is essentially dependent on the present, it is nevertheless in a better position than philosophy because the latter is subordinated to it. This precedence of science is understandable if we bear in mind that – at least according to its proclaimed basic principle – it provides a reliable, neutral value, »objective« investigation, in contrast to »philosophy« which is not denied the possibility of also being a »criticism«. This possibility imposes the need for it to be strictly limited externally so as to make it »correspond« to the existing. In respect of this subjugation of philosophy not only to the existing but also to the positive and above all natural sciences, there is no essential difference between dogmatism and positivism. In fact the difference lies in the manner in which these two influential, uncritical viewpoint of our time achieve their common goal – to smother philosophy and any independent critical thought in general.

If we now ask what »philosophical« thought should do by itself, without »lessons« and »assistance« from outside, the answer is – nothing. Simply nothing, unless the act of thought, which is supposed to be something, is taken to mean its obligation to make that which is »known« and »generally accepted« psychologically convincing. This is where all trace is lost of truth and the endeavour to reach it. Dogmatic thought is not directed towards it – it departs from it, trying only to make it convincing and acceptable. Since truth is not the result of this thought, it is obvious why this truth has no inherent plausibility and why this plausibility must be subsequently grafted to it. Truth is deprived of self-sufficiency and in this sense it can be said that it is natural that, for a dogmatic viewpoint, plausibility of thought does not derive from its truthfulness nor does it depend on it. Here plausibility is not dependent on truth, it is not an insufficient, dependent determination of thought, but, on the contrary, »truth« is that which seeks support and assistance from thought which must make it convincing, inspire a breath of life after it has been born.

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However, logically viewed, plausibility is inseparable from truth. Their »fusion« is made in the process of concluding and consolidating an idea. Consequently, we cannot add to truth that which is its feature, which it must possess. But if truth cannot be made logically convincing – because it is so – then »truth« is reached by deception or self-delusion which the thought must make at least psychologically convincing, if this transformation is to have any sense at all.

V

The manner in which dogmatism, in accordance with its basic principle, subordinates thought to the existing, making it completely dependent and inadequate, is peculiar to and remains concealed from that approach which, without penetrating to the fundamental assumptions of this non-philosophical viewpoint, abides by the notions it holds about itself.

If we base ourselves on the dogmatic interpretation of the theory of reflexion, it seems then that this peculiarity is simply reflected in the fact that thought, by determination of truth, must correctly express its object while at the same time remaining within its framework. The object carries within itself, ready-made, a criterion according to which it establishes the truthfulness of knowledge, and so it is dependent on the criterion which determines it fully.

However, in order to understand the significance of this admission, it is necessary to penetrate to a much more fundamental form of subordination of thought, of which the dogmatist does not speak willingly. If we neglected this fundamental form, which directly derives from the fundamental principle of dogmatism, we shall then not reach the understanding of that on which this viewpoint basically differs from the traditional philosophies which accepted the idea of reflexion. On the other hand, it will not be possible to understand the possibility of the idealization of the existing, which gives rise to the »involvement« of dogmatism, its faithfulness to certain values, and conversely, such a complete nihilism to anything which differs from the existing, nihilism where the »critical and revolutionary« character of this viewpoint is expressed.

The question is, therefore, how dogmatism can take over a theory which cannot be denied philosophical origin and sense, and which was accepted by important thinkers in the past.

If dogmatism should abide by its principle, then it must subtract from this theory its original *philosophical sense*, not in order to overcome it but in order to be able to accept it at all. The theory of reflexion is insufficient to achieve that which it is hard to attain without its help – namely, to subordinate the thought completely to the object and at the same time to expect truth about it.

A full dependence of thought vis-à-vis that which exists is arrived at by determining the aim which it must implement in this relationship. Thought is expected to provide sense but also justification of that which exists and which it expresses. In order to »express it correctly«, in order to arrive at the »truth« about it, it must provide it with

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sense. This is the *raison d'être* of human deed, that which can be appended, that which is brought into it from outside. The problem of dogmatic thought is not to determine the deed itself in the light of its idea, but rather the question what deed was taken together with that idea or conceived as the realization of the idea, i. e. what kind of integrity has been arrived at by allowing idea to provide a deed with sense. This incorporation of idea with the deed leaves thought without support, without the idea which would enlighten the deed and give insight into its real sense. But when the idea has been brought into such a position, there is then nothing that could justify and vindicate thought. That which Democritus called »good speech« has sufficient power to alter the actual meaning of the deed.

The requirement of supplying sense fully subjects thought to the existent on which it depends. By fulfilling such a requirement it becomes the slave or handmaiden of the external. At the same time this is the limit which philosophy cannot transcend without risking turning into something other than or even different from what it is.

Within the framework of philosophical and, generally speaking, of any critical viewpoint, thought has a full autonomy in this respect. It cannot be expected to give sense to that which exists because its aim is to uncover its real meaning. If the external thing is meaningless or absurd, then thought can avoid its destiny, in other words can remain meaningful, only if it presents it in its real form. Democritus states: »neither will good speech obscure a bad deed, nor can a good deed be cancelled out by slanderous speech«.² Philosophy abides by its appreciation of this ancient wisdom. Idea is not designed to give meaning to the external thing it deals with, but its purport is to enlighten it and permit the disclosure of its actual meaning. It is expected to reveal that which exists in its naked essence. This means that the relationship of idea toward that which exists is not that of subordination, but on the contrary that of a constant tension, unless it is completely dead, deprived of any strength.

Critical thought, scientific and philosophical, cannot reveal the true meaning of that which exists if autonomy engendering this tension is denied to it, if it is denied the right to level criticism at that which it deals with. This is the inexorable requirement of critical thought, inexorable because it is engendered from the endeavour to find out truth. It is impossible to find a meaning to that which exists if one is to remain exclusively within its framework, if it is not conceived of as a part of a more comprehensive whole which reveals its inadequacy, which demonstrates its internal limits, by the overcoming of which both the thought and reality itself move towards this whole. True thought cannot arrive at the meaning of that which exists, nor can it comprehend it as something meaningful, if it is denied the possibility of being critical towards it. If thought is denied this possibility, then the only way out for it, where it can preserve its dignity, is to accept the fate of Minerva's owl which, to quote Hegel, »begins its flight only at sunset.« All that is left to it is to resign itself, to devote itself to superannuated forms of life or to that which cannot

² Leucipus and Democritus, Fragments 19.

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2 Leucippus and Democritus, Fragmenten 19.

be rejuvenated, that which has fulfilled its course of development.⁸ Consequently, dogmatism and positivism are not the only thing that remains if thought is forced to reject criticism, to seek truth without its help.

The purpose of this discussion on criticism and its relationship to knowledge is to arrive at the point where the exceptionally attractive power of the theory of reflexion becomes visible, the power with which it conquers all forms of dogmatic and, generally speaking, common-sense reasoning. Dogmatism makes a sharp distinction between criticism and knowledge. Criticism is simply a means of showdown and can only be levelled at something which is »superannuated«. For this reason the earlier quoted dogmatist refers in his editorial to the »wickedness of the demand for 'freedom of criticism'«. Dogmatism cannot survive without criticism – but the latter is not nor can it be designed to reveal the true meaning of that which is the object of research, but is rather reduced to become a tool of a showdown and of expressing hatred. The theory of reflexion should permit a sharp distinction between knowledge and criticism, should break their unity, should confront one with the other. It permits the question of truth about that which exists to be separated from its demand for the uncovering of its meaning. Within the framework of this theory, it is assumed that the object of knowledge bears within itself already made sufficient bases upon which to determine its truthfulness. This foundation is conceived of as something given and formed which is placed in opposition to reasoning at its object. Everything that is needed to arrive at the truth is contained within it and the effort of knowledge is therefore reduced to the »disclosure« or a correct »reflexion« of this basis. Here, as Hegel said, truth is a »minted coin« which can be »given and received«.⁴

The aforesaid is sufficient to outline the framework within which dogmatism lays down the traditional theory of reflexion, completely neglecting that development of philosophy from Kant to Marx which implied the endeavour to outdo this theory, not by fully subordinating the thought to its object but, on the contrary, by preserving its autonomy. In the process of finding out truth it approaches its object not as something external to it, quite independent from it, but on the contrary, in order to comprehend it, to penetrate into its essence, it must propose it itself. Here the recognition of the object, in other words not the object itself but the truth about it, begins by the ratiocination of the thought which recreates it. Cognition presupposes the power of thought to reveal the object to itself as its own result. In contrast to Hegel, Marx regards this proposal of the object as »the reproduction of the concrete through thinking« and not as a »process of engendering that which is concrete«. That which is given to thought as its object cannot be its point of departure but, on the contrary, the result which it achieves by way of investigation.

Thus we come to the question which modern philosophy has faced since Descartes – namely, the question about what can be the point of departure of philosophical reasoning which is at the same time

⁸ G. W. F. Hegel, *Preface to Philosophy of Right*.

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Failure to recognize this difference between investigation and exhibition necessarily produces the situation where the results of thought acquire the form of a story. It becomes a »storytelling«, the putting together of ideas devoid of foundation or that which is essential not only for comprehending their meaning but also for determining their validity.

All this, however, represents only one facet of that activism with which modern philosophy vanquishes the contemplativism of the traditional theory of reflexion. This is the facet where we find the need for cognition to break through the framework of that which exists or that which is the immediate object of its inquiry penetrating into its past. In this relationship the object of cognition is to »recreate« and repropose its own object. However, in order to arrive at its meaning, it must also »destroy it«, which means to project into its future. In other words, it must comprehend it from the viewpoint of the totality of its development in which this object appears not only as something which has come into being and is maintaining itself, but also as something which must be vanquished. Hence, the point at issue is not only to arrive at the root of that which thought deals with, but also to regard it as the root of something new and different. Without this freedom of thought to be *outside* the framework of that which it is immediately dealing with, in other words, to rely on that which common sense fails to perceive, which to it is non-existent, there is no possibility for it to arrive at the truth. Thus it transpires that the recognition of the »non-existent« is a precondition for a deeper comprehension of that which is existent. If that which is non-existent is at the same time something that has never existed, if it is something which has not been experienced, in other words if it is only accessible to vision, then any endeavour to arrive at the truth about that which exists and which be comprehended is futile without the aid of criticism.

Viewed historically, in the philosophical refutation of contemporary dogmatism especially significant was the refusal of its conception of truth. This is understandable if we bear in mind that this refusal came as a result of the revival of original Marxian thought. The theoretical incompatibility between this thought and dogmatism became especially evident to philosophy in the conception of the nature

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The method of such research shall remain external to the content upon which it is »applied.«

Failure to recognize this difference between investigation and exhibition necessarily produces the situation where the results of thought acquire the form of a story. It becomes a »storytelling«, the putting together of ideas devoid of foundation or that which is essential not only for comprehending their meaning but also for determining their validity.

All this, however, represents only one facet of that activism with which modern philosophy vanquishes the contemplativism of the traditional theory of reflexion. This is the facet where we find the need for cognition to break through the framework of that which exists or that which is the immediate object of its inquiry penetrating into its past. In this relationship the object of cognition is to »recreate« and repropose its own object. However, in order to arrive at its meaning, it must also »destroy it«, which means to project into its future. In other words, it must comprehend it from the view point of the totality of its development in which this object appears not only as something which has come into being and is maintained in itself, but also as something which must be vanquished. Hence, the point at issue is not only to arrive at the root of that which thought deals with, but also to regard it as the root of something new and different. With out this freedom of thought to be outside the framework of that which it is immediately dealing with, in other words, to rely on that which common sense fails to perceive, which to it is non-existent, there is no possibility for it to arrive at the truth. Thus it transpires that the recognition of the »non-existent« is a precondition for a deeper comprehension of that which is existent. If that which is non-existent is at the same time something that has never existed, if it is something which has not been experienced, in other words if it is only accessible to vision, then any endeavour to arrive at the truth about that which exists and which is comprehended is futile without the aid of criticism.

Viewed historically, in the philosophical refutation of contemporary dogmatism especially significant was the refusal of its conception of truth. This is understandable if we bear in mind that this refusal came as a result of the revival of original Marxian thought. The theoretical incompatibility between this thought and dogmatism became especially evident to philosophy in the conception of the nature 310

of cognition. This process of acquiring self-consciousness was followed by relating the basic ideas of Marxian thought with its philosophical sources, mainly with Hegel but also with Fichte. This about-turn in approach to Marx, the significance of which was appreciated by Lenin, this endeavour to penetrate into the essence of a great philosophy by making the point of departure not from its followers, not from its historical destiny, but from its historical sources, was decisive in revealing the real truth about dogmatism. As dogmatism was theoretically built up, so strengthened philosophical criticism of this viewpoint, criticism whose basic meaning was the beginning and development of consciousness about the futility of endeavour to show up dogmatism as a teaching based on the ideas of Marxian philosophy.

VI

Should the dogmatist come to the realization that the doubling of the external is a theoretically untenable basis of his viewpoint engendering the basic weaknesses of his unphilosophical teaching, then he as a dogmatist has two ways of »redeeming« himself. He may see a way out either in the *extension of his uncritical relationship* to that form of that which exists to which he previously had a »critical and revolutionary« stand, or, on the other hand, in the *extension of the nihilist relationship* to that external condition where previously he had found his principle and support and which had been idealized. These extensions reestablish the unity of the external. On the other hand, they open up the possibility for thought to have an equal – either uncritical or nihilistic – attitude to the external as such, to both forms in which it had presented itself. Having reached this generalization, the dogmatist will see his viewpoint transformed into a philosophical one.

Thus the passion for limiting is curbed by the passion for generalizing which appears to the transformed dogmatist as the only possible basis for abandoning his earlier viewpoint, and at the same time, the precondition without which it could not be transformed into a »true philosophy».

However, that which is generalized – the uncritical or the nihilistic attitude to that which exists – has proved itself as an inadequate basis for thought even when it relied on both of these attitudes. The dogmatist does not realize that the inadequacy of his viewpoint arises not only from the endeavour to found it on both of these attitudes, but also that they arise from themselves separately. To abide by only one of them allows him to abandon extreme subjectivism (or that »freedom« of thought permitting different attitudes to the same thing) and also to redeem the destroyed unity of the external. However, this does not do away with the restrictedness of the accepted attitude which had been present earlier and which now – within the framework of the new viewpoint – is seen only in the relationship of thought vis-à-vis a part of the external but by extension also spreads upon its totality.

The inadequacy of dogmatic thought arises not only from the fact that it is contradictory, that it is related to one form of the existing

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uncritically and to the other nihilistically, but also from the fact that it assumes such attitudes to it. In other words, the trouble is not only in the »internal« inconsistency of dogmatic »thought« but also in the very nature of its attitude towards the »external« world.

The two mentioned ways of transforming dogmatism are the »pure« forms in which this standpoint – theoretical, »speculatively« viewed – can be changed. (These then are not the real forms, drawn from experience, into which dogmatism would necessarily break up in the process of its transformation. The new standpoint usually is neither »purely« uncritical nor exclusively nihilistic. Most frequently, it is mostly or essentially either uncritical or nihilistic. The separation of these »pure« forms is a necessary condition for »reproduction of the concrete through thought«. Without these forms, the new which is engendered by the breaking up of dogmatism, the concrete which can be examined through experience, remains undetermined and abstract, impossible to understand – and it may create only a chaotic representation about it.) In reality, this reformation of dogmatic teaching brings us to the viewpoint where the factors of the uncritical and nihilistic attitude to that which exists are differently related. This synthesis brings us to the »mean«, conciliating viewpoint which is based on the requirement not to exaggerate, that the most important thing is to remain reasonable, sober, moderate – in other words the widespread view whose wisdom is consummated in the realization that life is one and our wishes and illusions something else. It does not deny meaning to criticism, but the most important to it – even more important than the search for truth – is not to exaggerate, not to go too far. The essential is to be considerate toward everything and also to our own aspirations. This is what man is taught by life and experience. Thought which demands and expects more from criticism is seen in this view as gone wild and berserk.

This insight into the possibilities which the dogmatic teaching leaves to the endeavours to overcome its basic difficulties and contradictions, is sufficient to arrive at the whole without which the »life of matter« – into the meaning of which we must penetrate – would not be »reflected in the idea«. It is evident that dogmatism cannot be a basis for creating philosophical thought because, on the one hand, its nihilism denies it the necessary peace and serenity without which it is difficult to arrive at the truth, on the other hand, its uncritical standpoint deprives it of passion without which, according to Hegel »nothing great has been achieved in the world«.

If man is forced by destiny to start off as a dogmatist, it seems that the only way for him is to start again from scratch. It is futile to believe that redemption is achieved by overcoming the onesidedness and inadequacy of one's earlier standpoint. The way out is not to build up on the ruins of the previous teaching a new one, that will be consistent, better founded and properly reasoned out. A completely new start must be made. But to begin anew, means to start there where the development of philosophical reasoning attained its climax. Whatever the dogmatist may believe, it is quite certain that he never has nor could begin in that manner.

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FENOMENOLOGIA E DIALETTICA MARXISTA

Enzo Paci

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In sede di fenomenologia non si parla mai direttamente di dialettica. Husserl, di fatto, si trova fuori della tradizione hegeliana e i suoi maestri, come Brentano e Weierstrass, non erano certo più adatti per condurlo sul piano del corso dialettico delle idee o degli eventi. Gli altri filosofi che Husserl conosceva, come Lotze, Stumpf, o Natorp, sono anch'essi fuori della tradizione hegeliana. Dalle critiche di Natorp Husserl è portato a servirsi del termine »trascendentale« ma questo termine già in *Idee der Phänomenologie* (Nijhof, Den Haag, Husserliana, II) non ha un significato neokantiano e la sua assunzione nel 1906, anno in cui è stato la prima volta, è quella di aprire ad Husserl un vasto campo di ricerche per cui egli si richiama ad una critica della ragione sia teoretica che pratica, nella quale rientra anche la *Dingvorlesung* o il problema della costituzione delle cose materiali. Il programma non fu eseguito nella forma in cui è stato delineato nel 1906-1907, tuttavia si può trovare nelle lezioni di Husserl di quel periodo una certa inconsapevole dialettica tra l'esperienza e la ragione, nonché tra la materialità e l'*eidos*. Di fatto le strutture percettive materiali e passive sembrano in contrasto con la struttura eidetica e il contrasto si verifica in modo più chiaro quando la costituzione della »cosa« non è più, come in *Ideen II* la costruzione della cosa »fisicalistica«, ma la ricerca di una struttura di *base comune* a tutte le scienze. E' la struttura che nella *Krisis* viene denominata *Lebenswelt*. Husserl non concepisce il rapporto tra le operazioni pre-categoriali della *Lebenswelt* e le categorie delle scienze (in modo particolare della fisica) come un rapporto dialettico. E' però molto importante notare che, anche se Husserl non usa il termine »dialettica«, di fatto esso funziona quando le categorie vengono prese come realtà, mentre non sono che costruzioni conoscitive basate sulle operazioni concrete della *Lebenswelt*. Queste operazioni vengono misconosciute o rimosse dalle scienze categoriali o puramente teoriche.

Per capire in che senso può porsi in un rapporto dialettico il piano della scienza categoriale con quello della *Lebenswelt* bisogna, come di solito accade quando si parla di dialettica, introdurre la *negatività*.

In the context of phenomenology we never speak directly of dialectics. Husserl, in fact, is outside the Hegelian tradition and his teachers, such as Brentano and Weierstrass, were certainly no longer suited to lead him on the level of the dialectical course of ideas or events.

The other philosophers that Husserl knew, such as Lotze, Stumpf, or Natorp, are also outside the Hegelian tradition. From Natorp's criticisms Husserl is led to use the term »transcendental« but this term already in Idee der Phanomenologie (Nijhof, Den Haag, Husserliana, II) does not have a neo-Kantian meaning and its assumption in 1906, the year in which was the first time, and to open up to Husserl a vast field of research for which he refers to a critique of both theoretical and practical reason, which also includes Dingvorlesung or the problem of the constitution of material things. The program was not carried out in the form in which it was outlined in 1906-1907, yet one can find in Husserl's lectures of that period a certain unconscious dialectic between experience and reason, as well as between materiality and Yellos. In fact, the material and passive perceptive structures seem to be in contrast with the eidetic structure and the contrast occurs more clearly when the constitution of the »thing« is no longer, as in Ideen II, the construction of the »physicalistic« thing, but the research of a basic structure common to all sciences. It is the structure that in the Krisis is called Lebenswelt. Husserl does not conceive the relationship between the pre-categorical operations of the Lebenswelt and the categories of the sciences (particularly of physics) as a dialectical relationship. However, it is very important to note that, even if Husserl does not use the term "dialectic", in fact it works when the categories are taken as realities, while they are only cognitive constructions based on the concrete operations of the Lebenswelt. These operations are misunderstood or removed from categorical or purely theoretical sciences.

To understand in what sense the level of categorical science can be placed in a dialectical relationship with that of the Lebenswelt, it is necessary, as usually happens when we speak of dialectics, to introduce ncgativila.

In forma elementare: se le operazioni del soggetto umano, che sono operazioni fondanti, sono considerate come astratte o negate, viene a mancare la concretezza del fondamento di base e il concreto passa come astratto. Se poi si considerano i risultati categoriali di una scienza come concreti viene preso per concreto quello che a buon diritto deve funzionare come astratto. Le operazioni del soggetto, non considerato nella sua completezza, fanno sì che venga misconosciuto l'operare soggettivo. Si comprende molto bene il rapporto possibile con Marx se il termine »soggettivo« non viene usato come qualcosa di personale e di non scientifico, ma è rettamente compreso come il carattere che ha l'uomo lavoratore e produttore quando, proprio lui, soggetto psichico e corporeo, lavora e trasforma la materia. In senso ancora più tipico il soggetto per antonomasia è l'operaio. Si capisce allora che cosa vuol dire considerare la *Lebenswelt* come *regione* delle operazioni e produzioni soggettive, il che vuol dire *regione del lavoro*. E' chiaro che se la regione del lavoro viene obliata e si tien conto solo dei suoi risultati o prodotti ci troviamo di fronte ad una *alienazione* delle operazioni di base e, alla fine, dello stesso uomo. In questo caso l'approfondimento delle posizioni di Husserl ci fa capire che l'oggettivazione della scienza, che si verifica quando sono rimosse le operazioni fondanti coincide con l'alienazione nella forma in cui Marx ne parla non solo nel 1844, ma anche in manoscritti, come quelli del 63-65, immediatamente precedenti al *Capitale*. Questa osservazione che può essere filologicamente documentata, mira a criticare una divisione netta tra il Marx giovane e il Marx maturo. Il terzo volume del *Capitale* non fa che riprendere, nonostante le difficoltà che incontra (si ricordi la formula trinitaria), i temi inerenti all'alienazione e cioè al misconoscimento del soggetto. Nei *Manoscritti del 1863-1865* Marx definisce in forma scultorea l'alienazione caratteristica del mondo borghese come »rovesciamento del soggetto nell'oggetto« (letteralmente: *die Verkehrung des Subjects in das Object*, cfr. K. Marx, *Manoscritti 1863-1865* (testo e trad. russa), »Archiv Marxa i Engelsa pod redaktei V. Adoratzkovo« II (VII) Moskva 1933, p. 34. Per una trattazione più completa su tale tema vedi: E. Paci, *Funzione delle scienze e significato dell'uomo*, Milano, 1963, pp. 420-438).

Da un punto di vista generale la dialettica in Husserl è inerente alla oggettivazione della scienza. Si potrebbe anche dire che l'oggettivazione della scienza comporta l'oggettivazione dell'uomo, e in modo particolare, l'alienazione dell'operaio. Ad un primo aspetto l'alienazione è dovuta ad un preteso uso neutrale della scienza stessa mentre di essa, dal punto di visto storico e sociale, si fa un uso capitalistico. Da questo punto di vista la prospettiva fenomenologica non è diversa dall'analisi marxiana dell'uso capitalistico delle macchine. Ora, per quanto sia verificabile l'uso capitalistico, la scienza diventa oggettivante anche in un senso più profondo. Husserl dice che lo svolgimento dei rapporti umani diretto verso un *telos* inerisce alla storia come *entelechia*: di conseguenza la pretesa del neutralismo scientifico e il reale uso capitalistico della scienza, si pongono come forze anche storiche nel senso che tendono a distruggere l'entelechia immanente alla storia e, di conseguenza, il significato teleologico della storia che contiene in sé il significato della vita umana. Qui apparirebbe un sin-

In elementary form: if the operations of the human subject, which are founding operations, are considered as abstract or denied, the concreteness of the basic foundation is missing and the concrete passes as abstract. If we then consider the categorical results of a

science as concrete, what must rightfully function as abstract is taken as concrete. The operations of the subject, not considered in its entirety, cause the subjective work to be misunderstood. The possible relationship with Marx is very well understood if the term »subjective« is not used as something personal and non-scientific, but is exactly understood as the character that the worker and producer man has when, he , psychic and bodily subject, works and transforms matter. In an even more typical sense, the subject par excellence is the worker. We then understand what it means to consider Lebenswelt as a region of subjective operations and productions, which means a region of work.

It is clear that if the region of work is forgotten and only its results or products are taken into account, we are faced with an alienation of the basic operations and, in the end, of man himself. In this case, the deepening of Husserl's positions makes us understand that the objectification of science, which occurs when the founding operations are removed, coincides with alienation in the form in which Marx talks about it not only in 1844, but also in manuscripts, such as those of 63-65, immediately preceding the Capital. This observation, which can be documented philologically, aims to criticize a clear division between the young Marx and the mature Marx. The third volume of Capital does nothing but resume, despite the difficulties it encounters (remember the trinitarian formula), the themes inherent to alienation and that is to the misrecognition of the subject. In the Manuscripts of 1863-1865

Marx defines in sculptural form the characteristic alienation of the bourgeois world as the »reversal of the subject into the object« (literally: die Verkehrung des Subjects in das Object, cf. K. M arx, Manuscripts 1863-1865 (text and transl, Russian), »Archiv M arx ai Engelsa pod redaktcei V. Adoratzkovo« II (VII) Moskva 1933, p. 34. For a more complete treatment of this topic see: E. Paci, Function of sciences and meaning of man, Milan, 1963, pp. 420-438).

From a general point of view, dialectics in Husserl is inherent in the objectification of science. One could also say that the objectification of science entails the objectification of man, and in a particular way, the alienation of the worker. In the first place, the alienation is due to an allegedly neutral use of science itself, while a capitalist use is made of it from the historical and social point of view.

From this point of view, the phenomenological perspective is no different from Marx's analysis of the capitalist use of machines. Now, however verifiable the capitalist use is, science becomes objectifying

even in a deeper sense. Husserl says that the development of human relationships directed towards a telos is inherent in history as entelchy: consequently the claim of scientific neutralism and the real capitalist use of science also appear as historical forces in the sense that they tend to destroy entelchy immanent to history and, consequently, the teleological meaning of history which contains in itself the meaning of human life. A sin-314 would appear here

golare aspetto della dialettica. Per sua natura una volta che l'evoluzione è arrivata all'uomo, e una volta che l'uomo è diventato cosciente del fine della sua vita e di quella dei suoi simili, inherente allo sviluppo storico, la direzione storica offre un'indicazione che permette la realizzazione di una società sempre più razionale nel senso, però, che in tale società ogni uomo è soggetto e non oggetto. Al limite tale società è l'ideale di una società comunista. Si deve notare che, in questo caso, solo il compito graduale di realizzazione di una società comunista dà un significato alla vita dell'uomo e un senso alla storia. Marx direbbe che prima della via che conduce al comunismo, non si può parlare di storia ma solo di preistoria. Di fatto, una volta apparsa l'*eidos* di una società senza sfruttamento, e cioè di una società di soggetti, tale *eidos*, anche se non realizzato alla perfezione, «funge», per usare un termine husseriano, nello sviluppo storico della società. Indubbiamente sarebbe possibile, entro certi limiti, considerare la perfetta società comunista come una legge trascendentale (nel senso nekoantiano di Natorp) dello svolgimento storico. Tuttavia non è questo né il caso della fenomenologia, né il caso di un marxismo che tenga conto del punto di vista fenomenologico. Ci troviamo qui, piuttosto, in seno al problema delle due dialettiche: una che attraverso il feudalesimo, la borghesia e il proletariato conduce alla dittatura del proletariato stesso, e alle prime forme di una società socialista, l'altra che si attua soltanto a partire dalla forma più elementare di socialismo, e si sviluppa secondo modi dialettici che noi non possiamo prevedere, o, per lo meno, che lo stesso Marx è restio a descrivere. In questo caso ci sarebbe, tra l'altro, la dialettica tra preistoria e storia, oltre che la dialettica inherente alla preistoria e quella che sarà inherente alla storia, che avrà inizio dal primo grado del socialismo. Husserl ignora la distinzione tra preistoria e storia e, naturalmente, è ben lontano dal pensare ad una dialettica che comincia con la dittatura del proletariato. D'altra parte egli sa bene che le scienze contemporanee sono in crisi rispetto alla realtà dell'esistenza umana e della sua storia, mentre non lo sono, considerate a sé nel loro puro formalismo. Dal punto di vista fenomenologico la crisi inerisce non solo alle scienze della natura, ma soprattutto alle scienze dello spirito e in modo particolare alla psicologia. Si può facilmente affermare che Husserl comincia, nei *Prolegomena*, a porsi il problema del rapporto tra psicologia e logica, per finire, nella *Krisis*, a porsi il problema del rapporto tra crisi delle scienze naturali e crisi della psicologia. Fino agli ultimi anni della sua vita Husserl ha tentato una sintesi fenomenologica che fosse anche una sintesi psicologica. In quest'ultimo caso la psicologia però corre il rischio di non essere una scienza, ma di coincidere con la fenomenologia. In realtà assistiamo ad una lotta tra la *Lebenswelt* come fondazione e la psicologia che, se è fondata, dipende dalla *Lebenswelt*, ma necessariamente non deve essere la scienza della *Lebenswelt* in generale. Questo problema è risolvibile se nella *Lebenswelt* si scoprono le operazioni che fondano tutte le scienze a partire, però, dal rapporto tra economia e psicologia.

La vita implicita alla *Lebenswelt* dà luogo all'economia quando la *Lebenswelt* stessa, cosa che Husserl non fa, è considerata come una struttura di bisogni che devono essere soddisfatti con il lavoro pro-

aspect of dialectics. By its nature, once evolution has come to man, and once man has become conscious of the purpose of his life and that of his fellows, inherent in historical development, historical direction offers a an indication that allows the creation of an increasingly

rational society in the sense, however, that in this society every man is a subject and not an object. At the very least, this society is the ideal of a communist society. It should be noted that, in this case, only the gradual task of realizing a communist society gives meaning to human life and meaning to history.

Marx would say that before the road that leads to communism, one cannot speak of history but only of prehistory. In fact, once the eidos of a society without exploitation appeared, that is, of a society of subjects, this eidos, even if not realized to perfection, »functions«, to use a Husserlian term, in the historical development of society. Undoubtedly it would be possible, within certain limits, to consider the perfect communist society as a transcendental law (in the Nekoantian sense of Natorp) of historical development. However, this is neither the case of phenomenology, nor the case of a Marxism that takes into account the phenomenological point of view. We find ourselves here, rather, at the heart of the problem of two dialectics: one which through feudalism, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat itself, and to the first forms of a socialist society, the other which only takes place starting from the most elementary form of socialism, and develops in dialectical ways that we cannot predict, or, at least, that Marx himself is reluctant to describe.

In this case there would be, among other things, the dialectic between prehistory and history, as well as the dialectic inherent in prehistory and that which will be inherent in history, which will start from the first degree of socialism.

Husserl ignores the distinction between prehistory and history and, of course, is far from thinking of a dialectic that begins with the dictatorship of the proletariat. On the other hand, he knows well that the contemporary sciences are in crisis with respect to the reality of human existence and its history, while they are not, considered in themselves in their pure formalism. From a phenomenological point of view, the crisis pertains not only to the natural sciences, but above all to the spiritual sciences and especially to psychology. It can easily be said that Husserl begins, in the Prolegomena, to pose the problem of the relationship between psychology and logic, to end up, in the Krisis, to pose the problem of the relationship between the crisis of natural science and the crisis of psychology. Until the last years of his life, Husserl attempted a phenomenological synthesis that was also a psychological synthesis. In the latter case, however, psychology runs the risk of not being a science, but of coinciding with phenomenology. We are actually witnessing a struggle between the *Lebenswelt* as a

foundation and psychology which, if founded, depends on the Lebenswelt, but need not necessarily be the science of the Lebenswelt in general. This problem can be solved if in the Lebenswelt we discover the operations that underlie all the sciences starting, however, from the relationship between economics and psychology.

The life implied by the Lebenswelt gives rise to the economy when the Lebenswelt itself, which Husserl does not, is regarded as a structure of needs which must be satisfied by pro-social work.

duttivo di beni adatti. Ma se il lavoro interessa sostanzialmente la struttura corporea e materiale dell'uomo e della natura, non è detto che non interessi anche la psicologia, e ciò proprio perché non è possibile una distinzione metafisica tra corpo e anima. Tolta però tale distinzione, l'inteso soggetto umano – come corpo che vive in un ambiente naturale e sociale, come psiche individuale e come spirito e *Geist*, inteso non in senso spiritualistico ma in quanto insieme delle operazioni culturali che permettono la scienza, l'arte, il diritto e ogni operazione umana tendente a dare un significato o un valore ai rapporti intersoggettivi tra gli uomini e quindi ai rapporti sociali intesi anche come rapporti »spirituali« – si presenta in una molteplicità di rapporti dialettici che vanno dalle forme più semplici di movimento e di lavoro alle forme più alte della cultura. In un certo senso Hegel aveva anticipato alcune di tali forme dialettiche parlando, nell'*Encyclopédia*, dei rapporti tra fenomenologia e psicologia. Husserl non tiene presente né lo Hegel della *Fenomenologia dello spirito*, né lo Hegel dell'*Encyclopédia*. Tuttavia Husserl parla, per esempio, di una scienza della sensibilità e della corporeità, e cioè dell'estesiologia e della somatologia, scienze che, se ben si guarda, sono alla base della *Lebenswelt*. Tutto questo è vero specialmente nel 1912–13. In questi anni però Husserl non è in grado, e lo si vede nei capitoli pubblicati di *Ideen III*, di descrivere un *corpus* delle scienze. Il tentativo di presentare un'ontologia per ogni scienza è poco persuasivo, nonostante che Husserl si serva del temine »ontologia« anche nel '29, e cioè in *Formale und transzendentale Logik*. Già nel 1925–26 Husserl si era trovato di fronte al problema della psicologia come ad un problema di fondo. Nell'articolo *Fenomenologia*, pubblicato nell'*Encyclopédia Britannica*, la fenomenologia si presenta come una psicologia *sui generis*. In tal caso, però, il pericolo è di perdere le basi sensibili e materiali della psicologia, in quanto queste sembrerebbero appartenere alla psiche e non al corpo. Il problema si presenta anche in sede di analisi temporale e cioè di fenomenologia della coscienza del tempo. La presenza, nel senso di *Gegenwart*, è sia la realtà corporea del centro spaziale e temporale, sia la localizzazione di tutte le sensazioni in un corpo presente nella sua qualità. Il corpo, in quanto io corporeo e vivente, in quanto *Leib*, è al centro, e funziona come totale punto di riferimento. Ma per riconoscersi come punto di riferimento deve riflettere e quindi non solo trovarsi in uno spazio e in un tempo, ma essere consapevole di tale trovarsi. Il trovarsi, appare come una *situazione materiale*, il riflettere, come una situazione di coscienza. C'è qui un rapporto tra il corpo e l'anima che, pur ponendo da un lato la materia e dall'altro la riflessione della materia, dovuta al fatto che non c'è una materia in sé, ma una materia sempre localizzata e presente in un punto di riferimento attuale, fa sì che corpo ed anima non siano, come si è detto, in un dualismo metafisico, ma in una comprensione precisa. La riflessione è la presenza localizzata in una attività e la materia su cui si riflette è una materia che non può essere distinta dai corpi in cui si individualizza. In altri termini materia e spirito sono due astrazioni, come sono due astrazioni il mero corpo e la pura anima. Noi »viviamo«, e cioè abbiamo l'*Erlebnis*, di un centro di riferimento localizzato e localizzante, che è anche una presenza presen-

conductor of suitable goods. But if the work essentially concerns the bodily and material structure of man and nature, it does not mean that it does not also interest psychology, and that is precisely because a metaphysical distinction between body and soul is not possible.

However, with this distinction removed, the intended human subject - as a body that lives in a natural and social environment, as an individual psyche and as a spirit and Geist, understood not in a spiritualistic sense but as a set of cultural operations that allow science, art, law and every human operation tending to give meaning or value to rap -

intersubjective relationships between men and therefore to social relationships also understood as "spiritual" relationships - is presented in a multitude of dialectical relationships ranging from the simplest forms of movement and work to the highest forms of culture. In a certain sense, Hegel had anticipated some of these dialectical forms when speaking, in the Encyclopaedia, of the relationship between phenomenology and psychology. Husserl does not keep in mind either the Hegel of the Phenomenology of the Spirit, or the Hegel of the Encyclopaedia. However, Husserl speaks, for example, of a science of sensibility and corporeity, that is, of aesthesiology and somatology, sciences which, if one looks closely, are at the basis of the *Lebenswelt*. All this was especially true in 1912-13. In these years, however, Husserl was unable, and this can be seen in the published chapters of Ideen 111, to describe a corpus of the sciences. The attempt to present an ontology for each science is not very persuasive, despite the fact that Husserl uses the term »ontology« also in 1929, i.e. in *Formale und transzendentale Logik*. Already in 1925-26 Husserl had found himself faced with the problem of psychology as a fundamental problem. In the article *Phenomenology*, published in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, phenomenology is presented as a *psychology sui generis*.

In this case, however, the danger is of losing the sensible and material foundations of psychology, as these would seem to belong to the psyche and not to the body. The problem also arises in the context of temporal analysis, i.e. of phenomenology of the consciousness of time. Presence, in Gegenwart's sense, is both the bodily reality of the spatial and temporal center and the localization of all sensations in a body present in its quality. The body, as a bodily and living ego, as *Leib*, is at the centre, and functions as a total point of reference. But in order to recognize itself as a point of reference, it must reflect and therefore not only find itself in a space and time, but be aware of this finding itself. Finding oneself appears as a material situation, reflecting as a situation of consciousness. There is here a relationship between the body and the soul which, while placing matter on one side and the reflection of matter on the other, is due to the fact that there is not a matter in itself⁶, but a matter always localized and present in a current point of reference, means that body and soul are not, as has been said, in a metaphysical dualism, but in a precise understanding.

Reflection is the localized presence in an activity and the matter on which it is reflected is a matter which cannot be distinguished from the bodies in which it individualizes. In other words, matter and spirit are two abstractions, just as the mere body and the pure soul are two abstractions. We »live«, and that is we have VErlebnis, of a localized and localising reference center, which is also a present presence.

tificata e presentificante: la complessità della fenomenologia deriva tutta dalla impossibilità di lasciare al di fuori della presenza spaziale e spazializzante, qualcosa che sia totalmente e metafisicamente contrario a tale presenza. Se analizziamo a fondo la presenza troviamo che essa è *Erlebnis di attività* (per esempio lavoro attivo o trasformatore o creativo), ma che essa è anche ineluttabile riconoscimento di passività, di condizionamenti, di inerzia da vincere, di durezza, impenetrabile dal movimento del soggetto qualora il soggetto non tenda a smuoverla e a plasmarla secondo determinate forme, che devono tener conto del tipo di materia manipolata. A questo punto nasce il bisogno di strumenti e la necessità della tecnica. Il rapporto diventa tra mondo psicologico del soggetto e passività che il soggetto deve vincere. Quando per vincere la materia si inventano tecniche e strumenti, questi strumenti diventano attivi e duttili in quanto sono il *prolungamento del corpo proprio* o del *Leib* del soggetto. Come quando diventati esperti della guida di un'automobile sentiamo il volante, il cambio, il freno, come prolungamenti della nostra persona corporea. Si impone qui il problema dell'automaticismo, poiché il vero automatismo è proprio la trasformazione di un lavoro meccanico a noi esterno, in un lavoro meccanico che *appaertiene al nostro corpo*. Guidiamo o lavoriamo con la stessa facilità con cui camminiamo – sempre che non accadano incidenti.

Le osservazioni che precedono riguardano, nella fenomenologia, il rapporto tra *attività* e *passività*. Sarebbe errato pensare che Husserl non si sia interessato dei modi della passività o, come egli dice, delle »*sintesi passive*« (si veda in proposito: *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis*, Nijhoff, Den Haag, 1967). A questo punto si rivelà il fatto che i modi fondamentali della dialettica, si presentano in Husserl come dialettica tra l'attivo e il passivo, tra il lavoro e la resistenza, tra la possibilità di trasformare e l'inerzia che resiste alla trasformazione. E' curioso che, in un contesto analogo, nella *Critique de la raison dialectique*, Sartre abbia parlato di »materia inerte«, quando non conosceva ancora i testi fondamentali di Husserl su questi argomenti. A questo punto il problema della dialettica risulta implicare tutto quello che finora si è detto e che si può presentare come dialettica tra la passività materiale, data od imposta, e l'attività psicologica che, fin dall'inizio, è sempre inherente al corno vivo, al *Leib*, e quindi a tutte le azioni miranti a plasmare, a trasformare e a finalizzare ogni inerzia e ogni resistenza. Si deve tuttavia notare che il tipo di dialettica indicato non è facilmente afferrabile secondo termini troppo statici e precisi, data la grande quantità di forme e di contenuti in cui si può rivelare.

Un aspetto molto importante inherente al problema della dialettica è proprio il *rapporto tra situazione e riflessione*, visto come rapporto tra dati inconsci, o non coscienti, e coscienza. La coscienza è il luogo della riflessione, nel quale deve diventare chiara la nostra posizione nei riguardi dell'ambiente perché sia possibile una *praxis* orientata. Ma non tutto l'ambiente, a cominciare dal nostro corpo che in esso agisce, arriva alla soglia della coscienza. Si può usare qui il termine di »inconscio«. Tutti i processi biologici e fisiologici che avengono nel mio corpo durante il lavoro o durante il riposo, sono processi che

typified and presentifying: the complexity of phenomenology derives entirely from the impossibility of leaving outside the spatial and spatializing presence something that is totally and metaphysically contrary to this presence. If we analyze presence in depth, we find

that it is the Erlebnis of activity (for example, active or transforming or creative work), but that it is also the ineluctable acknowledgment of passivity, of conditioning, of inertia to overcome, of hardness, impenetrable by movement of the subject if the subject does not tend to move it and shape it according to certain forms, which must take into account the type of material manipulated. At this point the need for tools and the need for technique arises. The relationship becomes between the subject's psychological world and the passivity that the subject must overcome.

When techniques and tools are invented to overcome matter, these tools become active and ductile as they are the prolongation of the subject's own body or of the Leib. Like when we become experts in driving a car we feel the steering wheel, the gearbox, the brake, as extensions of our bodily person. Here the problem of automatism arises, since true automatism is precisely the transformation of a mechanical work that is external to us, into a mechanical work that belongs to our body. We drive or work as easily as we walk - as long as no accidents happen.

The preceding observations concern, in phenomenology, the relationship between activity and passivity. It would be wrong to think that Husserl was not interested in the modes of passivity or, as he says, in the

»passive synthesis« (see: Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Nijhoff, Den Haag, 1967). At this point the fact is revealed that the fundamental modes of dialectic appear in Husserl as a dialectic between the active and the passive, between work and resistance, between the possibility of transformation and the inertia that resists transformation.

It is curious that, in a similar context, in the Critique de la raison dialectique, Sartre spoke of »inert matter«, when he did not yet know Husserl's fundamental texts on these topics.

At this point the problem of dialectics turns out to involve everything that has been said so far and that can be presented as a dialectic between material passivity, given or imposed, and psychological activity which, from the outset, is always inherent in how I live , to the Leib, and therefore to all actions aimed at shaping, transforming and finalizing every inertia and every resistance. However, it must be noted that the type of dialectic indicated is not easily grasped in terms that are too static and precise, given the large number of forms and contents in which it can be revealed.

A very important aspect inherent in the problem of dialectics is precisely the relationship between situation and reflection, seen as the relationship between unconscious, or non-conscious, data and consciousness. Consciousness is the place of reflection, in which our position towards the environment must become clear for an oriented praxis to be possible.

But not all of the environment, starting with our body that acts in it, reaches the threshold of consciousness. The term »unconscious« can be used here. All the biological and physiological processes that take place in my body during work or rest are processes that 317

non arrivano alla soglia della coscienza, ma senza i quali la stessa coscienza non esisterebbe. Diciamo allora che i processi biologici e fisiologici - e magari anche fisici come, per esempio, la gravità - sono già in me stesso processi materiali. Ma non c'è nell'io una distinzione tra materiale e psichico. Tutta la parte che in me agisce a livello del sistema nervoso e del sistema vegetativo, posso indicarla come materiale ma non come cosciente. Dirò allora che in tale parte la coscienza inerisce come inconscio il quale, in casi particolari, può passare sul piano della coscienza. Per esempio, io no mi accorgo o non faccio attenzione al mio battito del cuore o al ritmo del mio respiro: però se in fabbrica sono costretto a un lavoro particolarmente pesante, questo fa sì che io mi accorga di processi che altrimenti non arriverebbero alla coscienza. Sviluppando questa tesi si può arrivare ad una concezione della materia nella quale la coscienza è presente come inconscio. Questo punto è stato in parte trattato nel paragrafo 37 di *Funzione delle scienze e significato dell'uomo*, paragrafo che ha per titolo: »L'analisi fenomenologica della materia. La natura esterna, l'alterità e l'inconscio«. Nel paragrafo 38, che segue, viene posto il problema del »materialismo«. Si profila qui una dialettica tra la coscienza, o consapevolezza delle operazioni compiute in un certo ambiente rispetto a certi fini, e l'aspetto materiale di tali operazioni. Questa dialettica non è l'opposizione tra lo spirito e la materia, ma il sorgere o il venir meno della praxis consapevole in una operazione materiale, o in un tipo di più operazioni materiali, o in più tipi di operazioni materiali collegati secondo vari rapporti. Questa dialettica è anche stata vista come dialettica tra l'interno e l'esterno: qui bisogna notare che un esterno senza interno, e viceversa, non esistono. Nell'ambiente naturale e materiale ci sono le radici che poi si sviluppano nell'uomo come coscienza per cui io non ho solo il mio corpo proprio, ma anche un corpo che appartiene a tutti gli uomini e questo corpo è, prima di tutto, il pianeta nel quale tutti abitiamo. Di questo fatto mi rendo conto proprio con il lavoro e con le complesse relazioni di lavoro che intercorrono non solo tra lavoratori di una sola regione e nazione, ma anche tra lavoratori di regioni e nazioni diverse in quanto il lavoro si svolge in ambienti diversi o, meglio, in quanto l'ambiente di lavoro è sempre pluridimensionale. Sappiamo dunque che ci sono differenze di ambiente geografico, come ci sono differenze di ambiente storico. La dialettica si muove in essi a cominciare dalla concretezza degli individui reali fino alla pianificazione, non secondo uno schema preconstituito, ma secondo svolte di strutture e opposizioni dialettiche che vanno via via rilevate. Ciò permette un'analisi storico-dialettica aderente alla realtà e tale da rendere possibile oggetti politici e pianificazioni di lavoro. In altri termini, un tipo di dialettica che si muova secondo la tesi l'antitesi e la sintesi, è troppo generico e schematico per seguire le complicazioni dialettiche nelle quali si trovano individui, gruppi e popoli. Per esempio, era molto difficile in Russia, dal 1905 al 1917, stabilire se la rivoluzione era o doveva essere una rivoluzione borghese, e cioè una rivoluzione che secondo lo schema feudalesimo-borghesia-proletariato doveva seguire al feudalismo zarista, o se la rivoluzione doveva se non saltare, per lo meno ridurre a pochi mesi o a poco più di un anno o due, la fase borghese. Da ciò la

they do not reach the goal of consciousness, but without which consciousness itself would not exist. Let us say then that the biological and physiological processes - and perhaps also physical ones such as, for example, gravity -

they are already in themselves material processes. But there is no distinction in the ego between material and psychic. All the part that acts in me at the level of the nervous system and "the vegetative system, I can indicate as material but not as conscious. I say then that in this part consciousness is inherent as unconscious which, in cases particulars, can pass onto the plane of consciousness. I become aware of processes that otherwise would not reach consciousness. Developing this thesis one can arrive at a conception of matter in which consciousness is present as unconscious. This point was partly dealt with in the p Section 37 of The function of the sciences and the meaning of man, section entitled: "The phenomenological analysis of matter. The external nature, otherness and the unconscious". aragraph 38, which follows, the problem of »materialism« is raised. Here a dialectic emerges between consciousness, or awareness of the operations carried out in a certain environment with respect to certain ends, and the material aspect of these operations.

This dialectic is not the opposition between spirit and matter, but the arising or waning of conscious praxis in one material operation, or in one type of several material operations, or in several types of material operations connected according to various relationships. This dialectic has also been seen as a dialectic between the inside and the outside: here it must be noted that an outside without an inside, and vice versa, do not exist.

In the natural and material environment there are the roots which then develop in man as consciousness for which I not only have my own body, but also a body that belongs to all men and women. this body is, first of all, the planet we all inhabit. I realize this fact precisely with work and with the complex work relationships that exist not only between workers of a single region and nation, but also between workers of different regions and nations since the work is carried out in many different environments or, better, because the work environment is always multi-dimensional. We therefore know that there are differences of geographical environment, just as there are differences of historical environment. The dialectic moves in them starting from the concreteness of real individuals up to planning, not according to a pre-established scheme, but according to twists and turns of structures and dialectical oppositions that are gradually revealed. This allows a historical-dialectical analysis adhering to reality and such as to make political objects and work planning possible. In other words, a type of dialectic that moves according to thesis, antithesis and synthesis is too generic and schematic to follow the dialectical complications in which individuals, groups and peoples find themselves. For example, it was very difficult in Russia, from

1905 to 1917, to establish whether the revolution was or should be a bourgeois revolution, that is, a revolution which, according to the feudalism-bourgeoisie-proletariat scheme, had to follow zharishta feudalism, or whether The revolution had to, if not skip, at least reduce the bourgeois phase to a few months or a little more than a year or two. Hence the 318

discussione se la rivoluzione era una o erano due. Secondo lo schema prefissato era necessario prima di arrivare a una rivoluzione socialista compiere una rivoluzione borghese: era questo il punto di vista dei menscevichi e, per un certo periodo, anche di Trotskij. Tale punto di vista correva il pericolo di farsi sfuggire l'occasione di un'organizzazione rivoluzionaria operaia che a Pietrogrado era ormai inevitabile. D'altra parte l'imporsi di un'avanguardia operaia poneva il problema dei contadini. Lenin stesso aveva posto come condizione fondamentale, per la riuscita della rivoluzione, l'appoggio dei contadini. Tuttavia il proseguire concreto nella dialettica nella quale operava lo costrinse non aspettare l'adesione dei contadini e ad agire in modo ben diverso da come aveva pensato. Qui l'intersecarsi delle forme dialettiche è molto evidente, ed ancora più evidente diventerebbe se esaminassimo a fondo l'azione e la reazione di tutte le forze in gioco. Spesso i processi dialettici si svolgono a un livello non consapevole, e altre volte presentano solo una piccola parte della propria natura, quasi nascondendo la loro autentica potenza. Se la dialettica non viene schematizzata, e se siamo disposti ad aprirci alla sua ricchezza di forme, acquistiamo quella sensazione di processi che appena appena appaiono alla superficie, sensazione e percezione che costituiscono la «sensibilità politica».

Un altro aspetto della dialettica che deve essere sottolineato è quello che in fenomenologia appare come rapporto tra centro di una situazione e periferia, o meglio, per usare i termini husseriani, tra *Kern* e *Abschattungen*. Il centro è quell'aspetto della situazione storico-dialettica nel quale un movimento trasformatore e rivoluzionario si trova. Ma rispetto all'accentramento della situazione che dà inevitabilmente luogo a un centralismo democratico, io mi devo rendere conto che, dalla situazione di centro, non tutto è analizzabile e visibile, e quindi che proprio la centralizzazione corre il rischio, nello sviluppo dell'azione, di non muoversi più in un centro reale pienamente chiaro e luminoso per chi agisce, ma in centri periferici che magari non sono ancora stabiliti come centri, ma che tuttavia sono visibili, se non proprio analizzabili, come punti di chiaroscuro o di penombra nella quale qua e là si accendono e si spengono dei punti luminosi di possibile guida. Al limite può accadere che il centro diventi penombra, e più centri periferici diventino direzioni luminose per possibili azioni. In un certo rapporto e in certe situazioni io posso parlare di un centro e delle ombre che lo accompagnano, ma la mia stessa azione può risolversi in uno spostamento delle ombre al centro e del centro nell'ombra. Ne risulta che il centralismo democratico non è mai *unidimensionale*, e quindi che la dialettica si attua in più punti che devono tener conto gli uni degli altri e della necessità, per esempio, di trasformare un posto di osservazione in un posto di lotta.

La pluridimensionalità riguarda anche gli individui, i gruppi e le classi. Sembra ormai chiaro che non si può delimitare in forma chiusa una data classe borghese e una data classe operaia. Le parole «borghese» e «operaio» sono evidentemente l'espressione di situazioni fondamentali, ma nell'interno di queste situazioni sono possibili molteplici metamorfosi. Proudhon era stato educato in un ambiente operaio: faceva il tipografo, ed era facendo il tipografo che aveva imparato l'e-

debate whether there was one revolution or there were two. According to the established scheme, it was necessary before arriving at a socialist revolution to carry out a bourgeois revolution: this was the point of view of the Mensheviks and, for a certain period, also of

Trotsky. Such a point of view ran the risk of missing out on the opportunity for a revolutionary workers' organization which was now inevitable in Petrograd.

On the other hand, the imposition of a workers' vanguard posed the problem of the peasants. Lenin himself had set the support of the peasants as a fundamental condition for the success of the revolution. However, the concrete continuation of the dialectic in which he operated forced him not to wait for the adhesion of the peasants and to act in a very different way from what he had thought. Here the intersection of dialectical forms is very evident, and it would become even more evident if we thoroughly examined the action and reaction of all the forces involved.

Dialectical processes often take place at an unconscious level, and other times they present only a small part of their nature, almost hiding their true power. If dialectic is not schematized, and if we are willing to open ourselves to its richness of forms, we acquire that sensation of processes that barely appear on the surface, sensation and perception which constitute "political sensibility".

Another aspect of the dialectic that must be underlined is what appears in phenomenology as the relationship between the center of a situation and the periphery, or rather, to use Husserlian terms, between Kern and Abschattungen. The center is that aspect of the historical-dialectical situation in which a transformative and revolutionary movement finds itself. But with respect to the centralization of the situation which inevitably gives rise to a democratic centralism, I have to realize that, from the center situation, not everything can be analyzed and visible, and therefore that it is precisely centralization that runs the risk, in the development of action, to no longer move in a real center that is fully clear and luminous for the one who acts, but in peripheral centers which perhaps have not yet been established as centers, but which are nevertheless visible, if not exactly analyzable, as points of chiaroscuro or penumbra in which here and there some luminous points of possible guidance come on and go off. In the end, it can happen that the center becomes penumbra, and more peripheral centers become luminous directions for possible actions. In a certain relationship and in certain situations I can speak of a center and the shadows that accompany it, but my own action can result in a shift of the shadows to the center and of the center in the shadow. It follows that democratic centralism is never one-dimensional, and therefore that the dialectic takes place in several points which must take into account each other and the need, for example, to transform an

observation post into a place of struggle.

Multidimensionality also concerns individuals, groups and classes. It now seems clear that a given bourgeois class and a given working class cannot be closed in a closed form. The words »bourgeois« and »worker« are evidently the expression of fundamental situations, but multiple metamorphoses are possible within these situations.

Proudhon had been brought up in a working-class environment: he was a printer, and it was by being a printer that he learned the e-319

braico, e poi poté studiare perché vinse una specie di borsa di studio: il suo ambiente era e restò sempre quello operaio. Marx, invece, era di famiglia borghese e pensava, in un primo tempo, di seguire il desiderio di suo padre che lo avrebbe visto volentieri professore di diritto. Ciò, come si sa, non impedì a Marx non solo di scrivere i suoi libri, ma un'azione politica concreta. Era possibile per Marx dire che il proletariato era l'erede della filosofia classica tedesca. Proudhon non aveva mai letto Hegel e dovette, da autodidatta, ma anche da operaio, porre le basi di una filosofia universale. Le varie possibilità di consapevolezza e di azione dialettica concreta si rivelano anche quando non sono realizzabili, e ciò vale sia per Proudhon che per Marx. Resta comunque vero il fatto che Marx insiste sulla positività di un'origine borghese quando si deve combattere dalla parte del proletariato, il che evidentemente non è una difesa della borghesia, ma è un invito a non rinchiudere individui, gruppi e classi, in forme cristallizzate che impedirebbero sia la riflessione che l'azione.

Nella situazione attuale si sta producendo una vicinanza sempre maggiore tra intellettuali e operai. Questa vicinanza diventa un fattore di massa nuovo tanto di più quanto di più gli intellettuali sono dei salaristi costretti, da una politica miope, a non dare alla società e alla causa del socialismo i risultati migliori e più aperti del loro lavoro. In misure diverse lo stesso discorso può essere fatto anche per gli studenti. I problemi inerenti agli intellettuali quando sono seriamente affrontati nell'interesse del socialismo, impediscono una seria e pericolosa distanza tra cultura e realtà sociale.

Abbiamo cercato di far notare che se si può, in via molto generale, parlare della dialettica come se essa fosse caratterizzata dalla contraddizione, dalla negazione della negazione e dalla trasformazione della quantità in qualità, in realtà questi tre punti sono molto elastici e molto più concreti quando si deve agire in situazioni determinate e che sono basate su una inegnabile realtà. Lo stabilire ciò che di fatto è reale e ciò che di fatto ci fa essere realistici nell'azione è un momento fondamentale dell'inserimento della dialettica nella politica. Tuttavia ciò non è possibile se, in rapporto alla realtà, non si tiene conto dei condizionamenti che aprono varie possibilità e, in queste, varie probabilità prevedibili o non prevedibili secondo una certa misura. Nel movimento dialettico è sempre decisivo distinguere i passi che sono inevitabili da compiere da quelli che possono essere evitati: il che è come dire che bisogna distinguere il necessario dal contingente. Rispetto alla realtà storica che si autodetermina e si apre la via del possibile attraverso il riconoscimento dell'impossibile e la soluzione delle aporie, l'autodeterminazione dialettica che tende all'autogestione da parte dell'uomo della propria storia, è continuamente in azione secondo la *possibilità*, la *realità* e la *necessità* e le loro negazioni, e cioè l'*impossibilità*, l'*irrealtà* e la *contingenza*. Come si può notare le categorie che caratterizzano la dialettica sono proprio le categorie della *logica modale*, che già Kant annoverava come quarto tipo delle categorie e che, sempre in Kant, nella seconda edizione della *Critica della ragion pura*, conducono alla critica dell'idealismo. I problemi della dialettica vanno dunque ripensati in base al trinomio *possibilità storica-realità storica-necessità storica*. Quando aggiungiamo l'ag-

Jewish, and then he was able to study because he won a sort of scholarship: his background was and always the working class one. Marx, on the other hand, came from a bourgeois family and thought, at first, of following his father's wish, who would have gladly seen him

as a law professor.

This, as we know, did not prevent Marx not only from writing his books, but from concrete political action. It was possible for Marx to say that the proletariat was the heir of classical German philosophy. Proudhon had never read Hegel and had to, as a self-taught man, but also as a worker, lay the foundations of a universal philosophy. The various possibilities of awareness and concrete dialectical action are revealed even when they cannot be realized, and this is true for both Proudhon and Marx.

However, the fact remains true that Marx insists on the positivity of a bourgeois origin when one has to fight on the side of the proletariat, which evidently is not a defense of the bourgeoisie, but an invitation not to lock up individuals, groups and classes, in crystallized forms which would impede both reflection and action.

In the current situation an ever greater closeness is being produced between intellectuals and workers. This closeness becomes a new mass factor all the more the more intellectuals are wage-earners forced, by a short-sighted policy, not to give society and the cause of socialism the best and most open results of their work. . To different extents the same discourse can also be made for the students. The problems inherent in intellectuals, when seriously addressed in the interests of socialism, prevent a serious and dangerous gap between culture and social reality.

We have tried to point out that if it is possible, in a very general way, to speak of dialectics as if it were characterized by contradiction, by the negation of the negation and by the transformation of quantity into quality, in reality these three points they are very flexible and much more concrete when one has to act in determined situations which are based on an undeniable reality. Establishing what is in fact real and what in fact makes us realistic in action is a fundamental moment in the introduction of dialectics into politics.

However, this is not possible if, in relation to reality, one does not take into account the conditions that open up various possibilities and, in these, various predictable or unpredictable probabilities to a certain extent. In the dialectical movement it is always decisive to distinguish the steps that are inevitable to take from those that can be avoided: which is like saying that we must distinguish the necessary from the contingent.

Compared to the historical reality that determines itself and opens the

way to the possible through the recognition of the impossible and the solution of the aporias, the dialectical self-determination that tends to self-management by the top of the pro history, and continuously in action according to the possibility, the reality and the necessity and their negations, that is, the impossibility, the unreality and the contingency. As can be seen, the categories that characterize dialectics are precisely the categories of modal logic, which Kant already included as the fourth type of categories and which, again in Kant, in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, lead to the critique of idealism. The problems of dialectics must therefore be rethought on the basis of the trinomial historical possibility-historical reality-historical necessity. When we add the ag-320

gettivo »storico« alle categorie, evidentemente ci rendiamo conto che sul piano degli eventi storici intesi come fondamenti precategoriali, ciò che conta non è la forma categoriale, ma la realtà precategoriale della *Lebenswelt* che ci presenta non dei titoli di categorie, ma delle operazioni politiche, una in rapporto o contro l'altra, secondo molteplici dimensioni. Non solo, ma non è possibile imporre uno schema dialettico categoriale alle operazioni sociali di base dalle quali non solo deriva ogni progetto e ogni piano, ma dalle quali soltanto il potere è autorizzato, nella misura in cui la sua rappresentanza categoriale viene a cadere per dar luogo ad una *presenza in prima persona* che, a sua volta, riprende l'autorità dalla base e dà un significato al centralismo democratico, che altrimenti, fissato in categorie ripetitive, può finire per perdere il fondamento e il significato della storia. Il centralismo democratico resta un'indicazione preziosa, ma esso non deve, se vuol essere vivo, scambiare le proprie argomentazioni con la realtà di base, e la struttura astratta con la concretezza della *Lebenswelt*.

"historical" attribute to the categories, we evidently realize that on the level of historical events understood as pre-categorical foundations, what matters is not the categorical form, but the pre-categorical reality of the *Lebenswelt* which presents us not with category titles,

but with political operations , one in relationship or against the other, according to multiple dimensions. Not only that, but it is not possible to impose a categorical dialectical scheme on the basic social operations from which not only derives every project and every plan, but from which only power is authorized, to the extent that its categorical representation fails to give gives rise to a first-person presence which, in turn, takes authority from the base and gives meaning to democratic centralism, which otherwise, fixed in repetitive categories, can end up losing the foundation and meaning of history. Democratic centralism remains a precious indication, but it must not, if it wants to be alive, exchange its arguments with the basic reality, and the abstract structure with the concreteness of the Lebenswelt.

MARX UND DER ITALIENISCHE HUMANISMUS

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I

1. DIE AUFGABE

Unsere Ausführungen sind von drei Voraussetzungen bestimmt: wir beabsichtigen die Erörterung eines theoretischen und nicht eines historischen Problems.

Wir rücken Marx' Auseinandersetzung mit Hegel in den Vordergrund. Allgemein legt der Marxismus auf diese Auseinandersetzung kein besonderes Gewicht. Sie wird mehr historisch-biographisch bewertet, und zwar als Übergang zu den Hauptgedanken, die Marx später im »Kapital« entwickelt hat.

Schließlich wollen wir zeigen, daß Marx in wesentlicher Weise eine neues Verständnis für den italienischen Humanismus eröffnet. Der Marxismus hat für diese Frage kein großes Interesse, was verständlich ist, wenn wir von der heute herrschenden Mißdeutung des italienischen Humanismus ausgehen. Marx selbst bildet in dieser Hinsicht eine Ausnahme: seine Beschäftigung und seine Hinweise auf die »Neue Wissenschaft« von Vico beweisen es.

Um unsere Probleme zu entwickeln, müssen wir eine doppelte Aufgabe erfüllen: einmal geht es darum, den Begriff der Wissenschaft und der Philosophie – wie er von Descartes bis zu Hegel gültig war – kurz zu bestimmen, damit wir die Kritik Marx' an Hegel genauer erörtern können; zum anderen wollen wir zeigen, wie der italienische Humanismus von der rationalistischen und idealistischen Tradition in seinen Grundzügen verdeckt worden ist. Dies beinhaltet wiederum, eine neue Deutung des italienischen Humanismus zu entwerfen.

Wie bekannt, richtet sich das Grundbestreben Descartes' darauf, eine erste Wahrheit zu finden, um – nach dem Zusammenbruch der Philosophie des Mittelalters – auf ihr eine neu begründete und gesicherte Auffassung der Wissenschaft und der Metaphysik aufzubauen. Leitende Motive sind dabei das Problem der Wahrheit und der Vorrang des Wissens. Die Wissenschaft – und ihr zuzuhören,

M u n c h e n

I

1.

D I E A U F G A B E

Our remarks are determined by three assumptions: we intend to discuss a theoretical and not a historical problem.

We bring Marx' controversy with Hegel to the fore. In general, Marxism does not attach particular importance to this argument. It is evaluated more historically and biographically, namely as a transition to the main ideas that Marx later developed in Capital.

Finally, we want to show that Marx essentially opens up a new understanding of Italian humanism.

Marxism has no great interest in this question, which is understandable if we start from the misinterpretation of Italian humanism that prevails today. In this way, Marx himself

There is one exception: his employment and his references to Vico's »New Science« prove it.

In order to develop our problems, we have to fulfill a double task: on the one hand, it is a matter of defining the concept of science and philosophy - as it was valid from Descartes to Hegel -

to be defined briefly so that we can discuss Marx's criticism of Hegel in more detail; on the other hand, we want to show how the basic principles of Italian humanism have been covered up by the rationalistic and idealistic tradition. This in turn involves creating a new interpretation of Italian Humanism.

As is well known, Descartes' basic endeavors are aimed at finding a first truth in order - after the collapse of the philosophy of the Middle Ages - to have a newly founded and secured conception on it of science and metaphysics. The main motives are the problem of truth and the priority of knowledge. Science - and belonging to it, 322

beansprucht die Philosophie – wird mit dem rationalen, logischen Prozeß identifiziert, der seine Schluß auf Grund einer ersten Wahrheit zieht. Es geht um den rationalen Prozeß des Begründens und Erklärens, durch den die Phänomene, die Sinneserscheinungen im Hinblick auf einen ersten, ursprünglichen Grund geklärt und bestimmt werden. Eine Auffassung, die dann auch für die Einzelwissenschaften maßgebend sein wird: das Experiment zeigt, ob die angeführten Gründe einen Teil der Erscheinungen ungeklärt lassen; in diesem Falle muß die Wissenschaft auf andere Gründe zurückgreifen und zu neuen Erklärungen gelangen.

Diese Auffassung – an der scheinbar nicht zu rütteln ist und die den Stolz des modernen rationalistischen Menschen ausmacht – bringt schwerwiegende Folgen mit sich: das Wissen bleibt auf diese Weise unvermeidlich in der *Anonymität*, da die Vernunftgründe – wegen der von ihnen geforderten Notwendigkeit und Allgemeingültigkeit – nicht an einzelne Individuen gebunden sein können. Die individuellen, biographischen, historischen Elemente, die im Verlauf eines wissenschaftlichen Prozesses auftreten, können zwar psychologisches oder historisches Interesse erwecken, stehen aber der eigentlichen rationalen Wissenschaft fremd gegenüber; sie gehören eigentlich zu deren psychologischer Vorgeschichte.

Philosophie und Wissenschaft beanspruchen darüberhinaus einen schlechthin »theoretischen« Charakter, sofern sie sich als eine Reflexion über die Realität gestalten: ihre Aufgabe ist die Klärung, die Einsicht. »Praxis« kann in diesem Zusammenhang nur als die Anwendung bzw. die Verwirklichung der Theorie aufgefaßt werden. Weil das Reale – d. h. die Geschichte, das Politische – das Gebiet des Möglichen, des Veränderlichen ist, so bleiben »Theorie« und »Praxis« radikal getrennt. Die Anwendung der »Theorie« ist Sache des Politikers; beginnt der Theoretiker zu politisieren, sich mit den konkreten, veränderlichen geschichtlichen Zuständen abzugeben, so verläßt er das Gebiet des Universalen und damit das der Wissenschaft.¹

Weiterhin: dieser Auffassung entsprechend erhebt die Philosophie den Anspruch, *Metaphysik* zu sein, vor den Einzelwissenschaften zu stehen, mit dem Auftrag, die ursprünglichen Gründe, die »Archai« der Einzelwissenschaften zu erschließen. Wie könnten sonst die Einzelwissenschaften den Anspruch auf Wissen erheben?

Es kommt folgendes hinzu: die rationale Struktur des Wissens duldet keinen pathetischen, leidenschaftlichen Aspekt. Bekanntlich trübt die Leidenschaft die Klarheit der Ratio. Demgemäß muß auch der

¹ »Sie (die traditionelle Auffassung der Theorie) reserviert ein vom Unsteten und Ungewissen gereinigtes Seiendes dem *Logos* und überläßt das Reich des Veränderlichen der *Doxa*. Wenn nun der Philosoph die unsterbliche Ordnung anschaut, kann er nicht umhin, sich selber dem Maß des Kosmos anzugleichen, ihn in sich nachzubilden. Er bringt die Proportionen, die er in den Bewegungen der Natur, wie in der harmonischen Folge der Musik anschaut, in sich zur Darstellung; er bildet sich durch Mimesis. Die Theorie geht auf dem Weg über die Angleichung der Seele an die geordnete Bewegung des Kosmos in die Lebenspraxis ein – Theorie prägt dem Leben ihre Form auf, sie reflektiert sich in der Haltung dessen, der sich ihrer Zucht unterwirft, im Ethos.« J. Habermas, Technik und wissenschaftliche Ideologie, Frankfurt/Main, 1969, S. 147.

»Nur als Kosmologie war Theorie zugleich der Orientierung des Handelns mächtig.« a. a. O., S. 152.

claims philosophy - is identified with the rational, logical process that draws its conclusions on the basis of a first truth. It is about the rational process of reasoning and explanation by which the phenomena, the sensory appearances, are clarified and determined

with regard to a first, original reason. A view that will then also be decisive for the individual sciences: the experiment shows whether the reasons given leave some of the phenomena unexplained; in this case, science must fall back on other reasons and arrive at new explanations.

This conception - which seems unshakeable and which is the pride of modern rationalist man - has serious consequences: knowledge inevitably remains anonymous in this way, since the reasons of reason - because of the necessity and universality required of them -

cannot be tied to single individuals. The individual, biographical, historical elements that appear in the course of a scientific process, while capable of arousing psychological or historical interest, are alien to rational science proper; they actually belong to their psychological history.

Beyond that, philosophy and science claim an absolutely "theoretical" character insofar as they take the form of reflection on reality: their task is clarification, insight. "Practice" in this context can only be understood as the application or realization of the theory.

Because the real - i. H. history, the political - the realm of the possible, of the changeable, "theory" and "practice" remain

radically separated. The application of the "theory" is up to the politician; When the theoretician begins to politicize, to concern himself with concrete, changeable historical conditions, he leaves the domain of the universal and thus that of science.¹

Furthermore: in accordance with this view, philosophy claims to be metaphysics, to stand before the individual sciences, with the task of examining the original reasons, the "Archai"

of the individual sciences. How else could the individual sciences lay claim to knowledge?

There is also the following: the rational structure of knowledge does not tolerate any pathetic, passionate aspect. It is well known that passion clouds the clarity of reason. Accordingly, the 1 »It (the traditional conception of the theory) must also receive a being cleansed of the unsteady and unknown to the logos and leaves the realm of the transient the D oxa. When the philosopher looks at the immortal order, he cannot help but adapt himself to the M afi of the cosmos, imitate it in himself. Brings the proportions that he sees in the movements of nature, such as in the harmonic sequence of music,

to represent : he forms himself through m imesis . T he theory enters the practice of life on the path of the assimilation of the soul to the ordered movement of the cosmos - theory imprints its form on life. she rc flexes herself in the pose. who submits to their breeding. in ethos.« J. H aberm as, T echnik und scientific Ideologic, F ra n k fu rt/M a in . 1969, p. 147.

»Only as cosmology was th e o ry powerful at the same time as the orientation of action.« a. a. O., p. 152.

Verlauf jeder wissenschaftlichen Abhandlung rein von der Logik, von der Stringenz des Schlusses bestimmt werden. Jedes »rhetorische« Moment muß ausgeschlossen werden.

In dieser Hinsicht gibt es kein Problem der »Form« der wissenschaftlichen Abhandlung – ein solches Problem tritt höchstens dann auf, wenn die Wissenschaft einer breiteren Masse verständlich gemacht werden soll. Damit ist das Problem der »Form« aber eigentlich nur eine Frage der »Popularisierung« und fällt also aus dem rein wissenschaftlichen Rahmen.

Endlich: Auch die Phantasie und die Kunst haben innerhalb der wissenschaftlichen Abhandlung keine Berechtigung: die rationale Klarheit darf nicht durch »literarische« Züge gestört werden.

2. DIE IDEALISTISCHE AUFFASSUNG DER WISSENSCHAFT

Die soeben angedeuteten Grundzüge des philosophischen Denkens bleiben für den deutschen Idealismus maßgebend. Wir weisen nur auf einige Elemente hin. Da die Philosophie die Untersuchung der ersten Gründe für sich in Anspruch nimmt, so muß sie auch – als Metaphysik, wie wir schon andeuteten – die Einzelwissenschaften begründen, bzw. rational ableiten. Fichtes Argumentation hebt hervor: wäre unser Wissen »kein *einziges* Wissen«, sondern ein Konglomerat vieler Wissenschaften, so »stünde unsere Wohnung dann zwar fest, aber es wäre nicht ein *einziges* zusammenhängendes Gebäude, sondern ein Aggregat von Kammern, aus deren keiner in die andren übergehen könnte; es wäre eine Wohnung, in der wir uns immer verirren und nie einheimisch werden würden.«²

Dementsprechend ist das Grundproblem der Philosophie die Erkenntnistheorie als Begründung und Voraussetzung der Metaphysik. Die Aufgabe, die sich Kant stellt, lautet: bevor wir philosophieren, müssen wir die Formen prüfen, in denen wir denken; es geht um die Prolegomena zu jeder zukünftigen Metaphysik.

Hegel leugnet nun die Erkenntnistheorie als Propädeutik zur Metaphysik mit folgendem Argument: Kants Erkenntnistheorie geht vom Dualismus des An-sich – der Wahrheit – und des Für-uns – der Formen des Erkennens – aus, um sich die Frage zu stellen, wie man vom Für-uns zum An-sich gelangen kann. Wenn aber das An-sich als nicht erkennbar vorausgesetzt wird (denn zu seiner Aneignung braucht man wiederum Formen des Erkennens), so wird man das An-sich nie erreichen; es wird immer nur in den und durch die Formen unserer Erkenntnis erscheinen. Die Bemühung, die Formen des Erkennens am Ende der Bemühung abzustreifen, um das An-sich zu erreichen, wird uns immer nur vor die ursprüngliche Unerkennbarkeit des An-sich führen. Geht man vom Dualismus aus, so ist die Folgerung nur Skeptizismus.

Hegels Lösung: die Dualität des An-sich und des Für-uns erweist sich als nicht primär, denn sie wird vom Denken selbst gesetzt und

² Fichte, Über den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre, 1794, Z. W. von J. H. Fichte, hg. I. S. 23.

The course of every scientific treatise is determined purely by logic, by the stringency of the conclusion. Any »rhetorical«

Moment must be excluded.

In this respect there is no problem of the "form" of the scientific treatise - such a problem arises at most when the science is to be made comprehensible to a broader mass. So the problem of "form" is really just a question of "popularization" and falls outside the purely scientific framework.

Finally: Even the imagination and art have no justification within the scientific treatise: rational clarity must not be disturbed by "literary" features.

2. D I E I D E A L I S T I S C H E A U F F A S S U N G D E R W I S S E N S C H A F T

The basic principles of philosophical thinking just indicated remain decisive for German idealism. We only point out a few elements. Since philosophy claims the investigation of the first reasons for itself, it must also - as metaphysics, as we have already indicated - found the individual sciences or derive them rationally. Fichte's argument emphasizes: if our knowledge were "not a single knowledge" but a conglomerate of many sciences, then "our dwelling would then indeed be firm, but it would not be a single coherent G ebaude, but an aggregate of chambers, from which none could pass into the others; it would be a dwelling where we w ill always get lost and never become native.«2

Correspondingly, the basic problem of philosophy is epistemology as the foundation and prerequisite of metaphysics.

The task Kant sets himself is: before we philosophize, we must examine the forms in which we think; it is about the prolegomena to any future metaphysics.

H egel now denies epistemology as a propadeutic to metaphysics with the following argument: Kant's epistemology starts from the dualism of the in-itself - the truth - and the for-us - the forms of cognition - out to ask the question how one can get from the for-us to the in-itself. If, however, the in-itself is presupposed as not recognizable (because one needs forms of cognition to acquire it), then one will never reach the in-itself; it will only ever appear in and through the forms of our cognition. The effort to shed the forms of knowing at the end of the effort to reach the in-itself will always only lead us before the original unknowability of the in-itself. If you start from dualism, the conclusion is only skepticism.

Hegel's solution: the duality of the in-itself and the for-us turns out to

be not primary, because it is posited by thinking itself and

* F ich te , O b e r d e n B e g riff d e r W isse n sc h a ftsle h re , 1794,
Z . W . v o n J . H . F ich te, hg. I, S. 23.

fällt daher in es. Das Denken selbst, in seinem Werden, in seinem dialektischen Prozeß, ist das Ursprüngliche. *Der Prozeß des Denkens ist daher die tiefste Wurzel der Erscheinung des Realen.*

Mit dieser Auffassung gelangt Hegel z. B. dazu, Kunst nur als eine Vorstufe der Philosophie zu betrachten, insofern, als in der Kunst die Idee noch eine sinnliche Form habe: »Das Bild nimmt seinen Inhalt aus der Sphäre des Sinnlichen und stellt ihn in der unmittelbaren Weise seiner Existenz, in seiner Einzelheit und in der Willkürlichkeit seiner sinnlichen Erscheinung dar.«³ Das Erscheinen der Idee im Sinnlichen – wie es für ihn bei der Kunst der Fall ist – nennt Hegel das »Ideal«, das der höheren Form des Denkens noch nicht entspricht. Gelangt die Idee zu der ihr zukommenden Form, die die des Denkens ist, dann wird auch die Kunst in der Philosophie aufgehoben. Daher Hegels Grundthese: die Kunst habe im Zeitalter der Philosophie keinen Platz mehr. »In allen diesen Beziehungen ist und bleibt die Kunst nach der Seite ihrer höchsten Bestimmung für uns ein *Vergangenes*.«⁴

Ebenso wird in der Philosophie nach Descartes die Rhetorik abgelehnt. In seinen »Untersuchungen über den menschlichen Verstand« schreibt Locke: »Ich gebe zu, in Erörterungen, bei denen es uns mehr auf *Vergnügen und Anregung* als auf Belehrung und Förderung ankommt, kann man Redeschmuck ... kaum als tadelnswert ansehen. Wenn wir indessen von den Dingen reden wollen, *wie sie sind*, so müssen wir anerkennen, daß alle Kunst der Rhetorik ... keinem anderen Zweck dient, als unzutreffende Ideen einzuschmuggeln, die Leidenschaften zu erregen und dadurch das Urteil irrezuführen.«⁵

Und bei Kant heißt es: »Ich muß gestehen, daß ein schönes Gedicht mir immer ein reines Vergnügen gemacht hat, anstatt die Lesung der besten Reden eines römischen Volks- oder jetzigen Parlaments- oder Kanzelredners – jecderzeit mit dem unangenehmen Gefühl der Mißbilligung einer hinterlistigen Kunst vermengt war, welche die Menschen als Maschinen in wichtigen Dingen zu einem Urteil zu bewegen versteht, das im ruhigen Nachdenken als Gewicht bei ihnen verlieren muß.«⁶

3. DIE MISSDEUTUNG DES ITALIENISCHEN HUMANISMUS

Die Beurteilung des italienischen Humanismus von seiten einer so aufgefaßten Philosophie wurzelt wohl in Descartes' Ablehnung sämtlicher humanistischer Fächer: Das geltende Kriterium, der Vorrang des Wahren und des Wissens – als rationaler Prozeß – schließt alle Elemente, die nicht der Wahrheit und logischen Vorgängen entspringen, von der Philosophie aus.

³ Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, hg. Glockner, W. W. XV, 128.

⁴ Hegel, *Vorlesungen über Aesthetik*, hg. Glockner, I, W. W. S. 30, 1927.

⁵ J. Locke, *Unters. über den mensch. Verst.*, übers. v. C. Winkler, Leipzig, 1911, Buch I, Kap. 10, S. 34.

⁶ I. Kant, *Kritik der Urteilstkraft*, Erster Teil, Berlin, 1790, S. 203.

therefore falls into it. Thinking itself, in its becoming, in its dialectical process, is the original. The process of thinking is therefore the deepest root of the appearance of the real.

With this view, Hegel arrives at e.g. B. to regard art only as a preliminary stage of philosophy, insofar as in art the idea still has a sensuous form: "The picture takes its content from the sphere of the sensuous and places it in the immediate manner of its existence, in its individuality and in the arbitrariness of its sensuous appearance."³ The appearance of the idea in the sensuous - as is the case for him in art - Hegel calls the 'ideal', which does not yet correspond to the higher form of thinking. If the idea attains its due form, which is that of thinking, then art is also sublated in philosophy. Hence Hegel's basic thesis: art no longer has a place in the age of philosophy. "In all these respects, art is and remains a thing of the past for us in terms of its highest purpose."^{*}

Likewise, in the philosophy of Descartes, rhetoric is rejected. In his "Investigations into the Human Mind"

Locke writes: "I admit that in discussions in which we are more concerned with amusement and stimulation than with instruction and demand, oratory ornaments hardly to be blamed.

If, however, we wish to speak of things as they are, we must recognize that all the art of rhetoric . . . serves no other purpose than to smuggle in inaccurate ideas, arouse the passions, and thereby mislead the judgement."⁵

And with Kant it says: "I must confess that a beautiful poem has always given me pure pleasure, instead of reading the best speeches of a Roman popular or current speaker of parliament or pulpit - always with the unpleasant feeling of the disapproval of an insidious one was mixed up with art, which understands how to move people, as machines, to a judgment on important matters, which in calm reflection must lose weight in them."⁶

3. D I E M 1 S S D E U T U N G D E S I T A L I E N I S C H E N H U M A N I S M U S

The assessment of Italian humanism by a philosophy conceived in this way is probably rooted in Descartes' rejection of all humanistic subjects: the applicable criterion, the primacy of truth and knowledge - as a rational process - excludes all elements that do not correspond to truth and logical processes arise from philosophy.

* Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, ed. Glockner, W. W.

4 Hegel, Vorlesungen über Ästhetik, hg. G. Lockner, I. W. W. S. 30, 1927.

* J. Locke, *Unters. about the美的cnsch. Vorlesungen*, first transl. v. C. Winkel, Leipzig, 1911, book I, chap. 10, p. 34.

* I. Kant, *Kritik der Urtheile des Geschmacks*, Erster Teil, Berlin, 1790, S. 203.

Wir stoßen auf die Ablehnung der Geschichte: sie ist nicht in der Lage, einen Beitrag zum Wissen und zur Wahrheit zu leisten, weil alle Erörterungen darüber, wie Ereignisse sich ereignet haben oder wie ein Autor eigentlich gedacht hat, im Rahmen der Wahrscheinlichkeit gefangen blieben.

Auch die Philologie kann keine philosophische Bedeutung beanspruchen: sie kann höchstens als ein der Kenntnisnahme antiker oder überhaupt fremdsprachiger Texte dienliches Mittel verwendet werden, obwohl der erwartete Nutzen fraglich ist, besteht doch die Gefahr, daß dadurch die Ursprünglichkeit des Philosophierens getrübt wird und sich alte Irrtümer fortsetzen.

Noch gefährlicher ist die Beziehung der Philosophie zur Kunst, insbesondere zur Dichtung, weil sie statt Wahrem nur Mögliches aufweist. Endlich wird bei Descartes auch die Rhetorik – eine Lehre, die im Humanismus eine prinzipielle Bedeutung erhalten hatte – negativ bewertet, und zwar aus denselben Gründen, die wir bei Locke und Kant fanden.

Diese Thesen wirken sich lange auf die Beurteilung des italienischen Humanismus aus. Hegel ist der Überzeugung, daß eigentlich erst durch Descartes die Philosophie der neuen Welt entsteht, denn sie »weiß, daß sie selbst aus der Vernunft kommt, und daß das Selbstbewußtsein ein wesentliches Moment des Wahren ist.«⁷ Was vor Descartes liegt, ist nur eine dunkle Vorahnung oder, wie Schleiermacher sagen wird, »einem Konglomerat ähnlich, die rohe Urgebirgsmasse in ein Bindemittel gehüllt, welche den Charakter der späteren Zeit trägt.«⁸

B. Spaventa hat am Ende des XIX. Jahrh. in seinen Vorlesungen über die italienische Philosophie in ihrer Beziehung zur europäischen, die These aufgestellt, daß das Denken der Humanisten seine Entfaltung eigentlich erst im deutschen Idealismus bei Kant, Fichte, Schelling und Hegel erfahren hätte. So konnte noch Cassirer sich vergeblich bemühen, das Wesen des italienischen Humanismus durch die Frage nach seinen erkenntnistheoretischen Problemen aufzudecken.

Wie wir sehen werden, wurde (und darauf kommt es uns hier an) auf Grund dieses historischen Urteils (wonach das humanistische Denken der Beginn jenes Philosophierens sei, das im deutschen Idealismus mündete) der Zugang zum Verständnis des Humanismus verbaut. Die originale Schöpfung des italienischen Humanismus richtet sich nämlich nicht auf die Theorie, auf den Logos, auf die Ratio, sondern auf die Probleme des konkreten Werdens des Menschen, auf seine pathetischen und phantastischen Fähigkeiten. Damit erhalten eben all jene Elemente Gewicht, denen der Rationalismus nichts abgewinnen konnte. Eines der Grundprobleme des italienischen Humanismus ist das Problem der Entstehung der menschlichen Gesellschaft.

⁷ Hegel, Gesch. d. Phil. III. Teil. W. W. hg. Glockner, XV, S. 328.

⁸ Schleiermacher, Gesch. der Phil. Nachlaß hg. v. H. Ritter, 1839, S. 292.

Nor can philology claim any philosophical significance: it can at most be used as a means of getting to know ancient or foreign-language texts in general, although the expected benefit is questionable, as there is a risk that it will as a result, the originality of philosophizing is clouded and old errors continue.

Even more dangerous is the relationship of philosophy to art, especially to poetry, because instead of being true, it only shows what is possible. Finally, in Descartes rhetoric - a doctrine that had acquired a fundamental importance in humanism - is valued negatively, for the same reasons that we found in Locke and Kant.

These theses have had a long impact on the assessment of Italian humanism. Hegel is of the conviction that the philosophy of the new world actually only arises through Descartes, because they

"know that it itself comes from reason, and that self-awareness is an essential moment of truth."⁷ What lies before Descartes is only a dark premonition, or what Schleiermacher will say, »similar to a conglomerate, the raw native masses wrapped in a bag that bears the character of the later time.«⁸

B. Spaventa hat at the end of the XIX. year rh. in his lectures on Italian philosophy in its relation to European philosophy, he put forward the thesis that the thinking of the humanists first experienced its development in German idealism with Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel had. So Cassirer could still try in vain to uncover the essence of Italian humanism by asking about its epistemological problems.

As we shall see, on the basis of this historical judgment (and this is what matters to us here) (according to which humanistic thinking is the beginning of that philosophizing that ends in German idealism), the Z access to an understanding of humanism blocked.

The original creation of Italian humanism is not aimed at theory, at logos, at reason, but at the problems of the concrete development of man, at his pathetic and fantastic abilities. In this way, all those elements gain weight that rationalism could not gain anything from. One of the fundamental problems of Italian humanism is the problem of the formation of human society.

⁷ Hegel, Gesch. d. Phil. III. T and the. W. W. hg. G. lo c k n e r, XV, S. 328.

⁸ Schlegel, Gesch. der Phil. Nachlaß hg. v. H. Ritter, 1839, p. 232.

II

I. MARX' DRANG ZUM KONKREten

Marx' Kritik an Hegel beruht auf der besonderen Bewertung sämtlicher konkreten, historischen, vorphilosophischen Faktoren der menschlichen Geschichte, und auf der Ablehnung der traditionellen Auffassung der Philosophie als reiner »Theorie«. Die menschliche Wirklichkeit, die menschliche Geschichte können nicht rational abgeleitet werden.

Bereits in den Jugendschriften kommt Marx' spontane und prinzipielle Abneigung gegen das abstrakte, apriorische Denken zu Wort. In seiner Abiturientenarbeit (»Betrachtungen eines Jünglings bei der Wahl eines Berufes«) stellt er die These auf, daß dem Menschen von Natur aus die Mittel gegeben seien, sich selbst und die eigene Welt zu veredeln. Diese These führt ihn dazu, die Wichtigkeit der Berufswahl zu begründen, wobei er mahnend darauf hinweist, daß man jede Sentimentalität, wie auch jede Phantasterei bzw. die Mißachtung der eigenen konkreten Fähigkeiten ausschließen müsse.⁹ Also Bejahung des Realen und Absage an alles Abstrakte und Unwirkliche. Aus dieser Einstellung geht Marx' weitere These hervor: »daß jene Stände, die *nicht in das Leben eingreifen* und sich mit abstrakten Wahrheiten beschäftigen, die gefährlichsten für den Jüngling sind.«¹⁰

Es sei noch auf die Epigramme aus dem Jahre 1837 hingewiesen; diese allgemeine Einstellung verdichtet sich in der Verulkung des Deutschen als eines Menschen, der immer der Abstraktheit verfällt, der abseits der Wirklichkeit bleibt und sich ihr gegenüber nur betrachtend verhält.¹¹ Die Wichtigkeit dieser Behauptungen darf nicht als subjektive Einstellung relativiert werden. Will Marx die Beziehung zum Realen in den Vordergrund stellen, so drückt sich dies schon in den ersten Äußerungen über das eigene Volk aus. Bereits im III. Epigramm kristallisiert sich seine Ablehnung aller Abstrakten, indem er sich satirisch vor Kant und Fichte als Vertretern einer rein theoretischen Philosophie absetzt.¹²

Im November desselben Jahres entsteht das erste aufführliche Dokument – der berühmte Brief an seinen Vater vom 10. Nov. 1837 – in dem Marx die eigene Abwendung vom deutschen Idealismus er-

⁹ Marx erklärt dabei mahnend: »... allein, wenn wir einen Stand gewählt haben, zu dem wir nicht die Talente besitzen, so vermögen wir ihn (den Beruf) nie würdig auszufüllen, so werden wir beschämt unsere eigene Unfähigkeit erkennen und sagen, daß wir ein nutzloses Wesen in der Schöpfung, ein Glied der Gesellschaft sind, das seinen Beruf nicht erfüllen kann.« K. Marx »Betrachtungen eines Jünglings bei der Wahl seines Berufes« in K. Marx, Texte zu Methode und Praxis, Bd. I, hg. v. G. Hillmann, Reinbek, 1966, S. 9.

¹⁰ a. a. O., S. 10.

¹¹ »In seinem Sessel, behaglich dumm, / sitzt schweigend das deutsche Publikum. / Braust der Sturm herüber, hinüber ... / da röhrt es nicht in seinem Sinn. / Doch wenn sich die Sonne hervorbegegnet / die Lüste säuseln, der Sturm sich legt, / dann hebt's sich und macht ein Geschrei, / und schreibt ein Buch: 'Der Lärm sei vorbei.'« K. Marx, a. a. O., S. 17.

¹² »Kant und Fichte gern im Äther schweifen. / suchten dort ein fernes Land, / doch ich such' nun tüchtig zu begreifen, / was ich auf der Straße fand.« K. Marx, III. Epigram, a. a. O., S. 26.

1. M A R X ' D R A N G Z U M K O N K R E T E N

Marx's critique of Hegel rests on the particular evaluation of all concrete, historical, pre-philosophical factors in human history, and on the rejection of the traditional view of philosophy as pure "theory." Human reality, human history cannot be rationally deduced.

Marx's spontaneous and fundamental aversion to abstract, a priori thinking was already expressed in his youthful writings.

In his final paper (»Considerations of a young man when choosing a profession«), he puts forward the thesis that people are naturally given the means to ennable themselves and their own world. This thesis leads him to justify the importance of the choice of profession, whereby he warns that one must rule out all sentimentality, as well as any fantasies or the disregard of one's own concrete abilities.⁹ So affirmation"

of the real and renunciation of everything abstract and unreal. From this attitude, Marx's further thesis emerges: "that those classes which do not intervene in the life and deal with abstract truths are the most dangerous for the young man."¹⁰

Reference should also be made to the epigrams from 1837; this general attitude condenses into the slander of the German as a person who always succumbs to abstractness, who remains aloof from reality and only behaves towards it in contemplation.¹¹ The importance of these claims must not be relativized as a subjective attitude. If Marx wants to put the relationship to the real in the foreground, this is already expressed in the first statements about his own people. Already in III. His rejection of everything abstract crystallizes in his epigram, in that he satirically sets himself apart from Kant and Fichte as representatives of a purely theoretical philosophy.¹²

In November of the same year, the first detailed document is created - the famous letter to his father of November 10, 1837 -

in which Marx realized his own turning away from German idealism

- Marx declares warningly: » . . . but if we have chosen a profession for which we do not have the talents, we will never be able to do it (the profession)

To fill out the dig, we will be ashamed of our own inability to recognize and say so. that we are useless beings in creation, a member of society that cannot fulfill our calling.« K. Marx »Considerations of a

young man when choosing his profession« in K M arx, Texts on M ethod and Practice, Vol. I, ed. v. G. H illm a n n , R einbek, 1966, p. 9.

10 a. a. 0 ., S. 10.

11 “In his chair. comfortably dumb , / the German audience sits sweating .

/ The storm roars over, over . . . / it doesn't move in his mind. / But when the sun comes up / the air whistles, the storm subsides, / then it rises and makes a scream, / and writes a book: 'The noise be pre- bci.'« K. M arx, a. a. O., p. 17.

'* »Kant and Fichte like to roam in the ether, / look for a remote one there

^

I am now trying to understand / what I found on the street.« K. M arx, III. Epigram , a. a. 0 ., p. 26.

4 p r a x i s

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klärt. Seine bisherige Einstellung sei falsch gewesen, so äußert sich Marx, weil er die Wirklichkeit nur als eine »verschwimmende, grenzenlose« Realität verurteilt habe und folglich »keine Angriffe auf die Gegenwart« hätte unternehmen können. Als zweiten wichtigen Fehler beklagt Marx hier, daß er immer von dem »völligen Gegensatz von dem, was da ist, und dem, was sein soll«, ausgegangen sei.¹³

Schon hier tritt ein zentrales Motiv auf, das es ihm ermöglichen wird, die traditionelle Auffassung der Philosophie als *Reflexion über* die Wirklichkeit, statt jeweils *aus der Wirklichkeit* entstanden, abzulehnen. Der Dualismus von dem, »was ist« und von dem, »was sein soll«, zwingt das philosophierende Subjekt – wie Marx sich ausdrückt – »an der Sache herumzulaufen, hin und her räsonieren, ohne daß die Sache selbst als sich reich Entfaltendes, Lebendiges, sich gestalte.«¹⁴ Mit anderen Worten: keine lebendige Philosophie kann die Dualität von Sache und Reflexion als ihre Voraussetzung gelten lassen, denn wenn die *Sache* die Realität ist, wie sie sich im Menschen offenbart, dann muß notwendigerweise die Philosophie, als reine Reflexion, sich von ihr trennen, würde doch jeder Verzicht auf Reflexion, um in die Praxis einzutauchen, unvermeidlich einen Verrat an der rein reflektierenden Tätigkeit bedeuten.

Erstaunlicherweise – und das ist gerade in unserem Zusammenhang mit den Problemen des italienischen Humanismus von größter Wichtigkeit – weist er schon in dieser frühen Zeit darauf hin, daß die wahre Philosophie *im Recht, im Staat* zu suchen ist. Er formuliert diesen Gedanken folgendermaßen: »Im konkreten Ausdruck lebendiger Gedankenwelt – wie es das Recht, der Staat, die Natur, die ganze Philosophie ist – hier muß das Objekt selbst in seiner Entwicklung belauscht werden, willkürliche Einteilungen dürfen nicht hineingetragen werden, die Vernunft des Dinges selbst muß als in sich Widerstreitendes fortrollen, und in sich seine Einheit finden.«¹⁵

Seine Hinwendung zum Konkreten bringt ihn in den »Vorarbeiten zur Dissertation« zu der These, daß die schöpferische Tätigkeit des Geistes nicht in abstrakten Formen gesucht werden darf, sondern gerade da, wo der Geist sich verwirklicht. Sich auf die griechische Philosophie beziehend, erinnert Marx daran, daß der bei Anaxagoras noch abstrakte Begriff des »Nous« bei den Sophisten schon konkreter hervortritt: »... und diese unmittelbare dämonenhafte Bewegung wird dann objektiv in den Daimon des Sokrates.«¹⁶

¹³ »Ein Vorhang war gefallen, mein Allerheiligstes zerrissen und es mußten neue Götter hineingesetzt werden. Von dem Idealismus, den ich, beiläufig gesagt, mit kantischen und fichteschen Ideen verglichen und genährt, geriet ich dazu, im Wirklichen selbst die Ideen zu suchen. Hatten die Götter früher über der Erde gewohnt, so waren sie jetzt das Zentrum derselben geworden. Ich hatte Fragmente der hegelischen Philosophie gelesen, deren Felsenmelodie mir nicht behagten. Noch ein Mal wollte ich hinabtauchen in das Meer, aber mit der bestimmten Absicht, die geistige Natur ebenso notwendig, konkret und festgebunden zu finden, wie die körperliche, nicht mehr Fechtkünste zu üben, sondern die reine Perle ans Sonnenlicht halten.« K. Marx, a. a. O., S. 46.

¹⁴ a. a. O., S. 46.

¹⁵ a. a. O., S. 46.

¹⁶ K. Marx, Texte zu Methode und Kritik, a. a. O., S. 106.

clears. Marx complains that his previous attitude was wrong because he only condemned reality as a “vague, limitless” reality and consequently could not have undertaken “any attacks on the present”. The second important mistake Marx complains about here is that he

always started from the "complete contradiction between what is there and what should be."¹³

A central motif already appears here, which will enable him to reject the traditional view of philosophy as a reflection on reality, instead of arising out of reality. The dualism of "what is" and "what ought to be" compels the philosophizing subject - as Marx puts it

- "running around the thing, arguing back and forth, without the thing itself shaping itself as something richly unfolding, alive."¹⁴ In other words: no living philosophy can understand the duality of thing and reflection as their presupposition, because if the thing is reality as it reveals itself in man, then philosophy, as pure reflection, must necessarily separate from it, since every renunciation of reflection, in order to immerse oneself in practice, inevitably mean a betrayal of purely reflective activity.

Astonishingly - and this is of great importance in our connection with the problems of Italian humanism - he pointed out even in this early period that true philosophy resides in law, in the state search is. He formulates this thought as follows: »In the concrete expression of a living world of thoughts - such as the law, the state, nature, the whole of philosophy - here the object itself must be overheard in its development, arbitrary divisions must not be carried in, the reason of the thing itself must roll on as something contradicting itself and find its unity in itself.«¹⁵

His turn to the concrete led him in the "preliminary work for the dissertation" to the thesis that the creative activity of the spirit must not be sought in abstract forms, but precisely where the Spirit realized. Referring to Greek philosophy, Marx recalls that the concept of 'nous', which was still abstract in Anaxagoras, emerges more concretely among the Sophists: '... and this immediate daemon-like movement then becomes objective in Socrates' daemon.«¹⁶

13 »Falling in V o r h a n g w a r g e , m ein Aller h e ilig s t e s z e
rrisse n u n d es mufiten n eu e G otter h i n e in g e se tz t w e r d e n
V o n dem Id e a l i s m us, then, be ila u figgesag t, w * TM n tische n u
" d fich tesch en Id ce n verg lichen u n d genahr t, ge rie t ich dazu ,
im w irk lichen selb st I was looking for the Idea. I had the G Stter
from above the Erdegewohnt, so I was now in the Centr um derse
lbenge word. I had Fragments

•er k eReIsch en Ph ilo so p h i c gelcsen, their F e lsen melodies do
not behave. N o c h ein M ai w o llte ich h i n a b t u c h e n i d a s M

eer, a b e r m i t d e r b e s t i m m t e n Ab sich t, die g e istig e
Nature rebenso n o twendig , c o n c r e t u n d face tg e b u n d e n zu
f i n d e n , w ie d ie k o r p e r l.ch e , nothing more F e ch tk iin ste
zu iiben, s o n d e r d ie re in e P e r l e an s Sonnen -

lic h t h a lte n .« K. M a rx , a. a. O., S. 46.

14 a . a. O ., S. 46.

16 a. a. 0 . , S. 46.

19 K. M a rx , T e x te zu M e th o d e u n d K ritik , a. a . 0 . , S. 106.

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In den »Anmerkungen« zur Dissertationen »Allgemeine prinzipielle Differenz zwischen der demokratischen und epikureischen Naturphilosophie« findet sich die nun für ihn entscheidend gewordene These: »allein die Praxis der Philosophie ist selbst theoretisch.«,¹⁷ d. h. dort, wo der Mensch sich selbst realisiert, begegnet er den Fragen, die sein Wesen angehen und die er beantworten muß. Die Realisierung seiner selbst wird zum Grund und Wesen des Philosophierens. Diese Realisierung bedeutet die Wechselwirkung zwischen Mensch und Natur; die Grundeinsicht besteht in der Erkenntnis, daß die schöpferische Tat des Menschen sich ursprünglich in der Arbeit – mit der er die Natur und sich selbst verändert – verwirklicht.

Daher die immer wiederholte Kritik an der traditionellen Philosophie als Reflexion über die Wirklichkeit: »Indem die Philosophie als Wille sich gegen die erscheinende Welt herauskehrt, ist das System zu einer abstrakten Totalität herabgesetzt, d. h. es ist zu einer Seite der Welt geworden, der eine andere gegenübersteht. Sein Verhältnis zur Welt ist ein Reflexionsverhältnis.«¹⁸ Etwas weiter heißt es: »Ihre (der Praxis) Freimachung der Welt von der Unphilosophie ist zugleich ihre eigene Befreiung von der Philosophie, die sie als ein bestimmtes System in Fesseln schlug.«¹⁹

2. MARX' KRITIK AN HEGEL

Viele Marxisten schreiben Marx' Auseinandersetzung mit Hegel keine besondere Bedeutung zu, bzw. sie bewerten sie, wie wir schon sagten, nur in Bezug auf seine weiter Entwicklung.

Wir glauben, daß die Wichtigkeit dieser Auseinandersetzung unterschätzt wird, wenn man sie nur historisch, biographisch sieht. Allein durch seine Kritik am Hegelianismus und am Vorrang der Philosophie als rein rationales, rein auf Reflektion beruhendes Wissen, gelangt man zur eigentlichen Absage an jenes moderne Denken, wie es von Descartes bis zum deutschen Idealismus bestimmt war. Nur infolge dieser Absage entsteht die Möglichkeit eines neuen Verständnisses für den italienischen Humanismus und für die römisch-lateinische Tradition, der – seit Descartes – keine philosophische Relevanz zugesprochen wurde.

In der »Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts« (1843) wirft Marx Hegel einen logischen Mystizismus vor: die konkreten Tatsachen – also die wirklichen Verhältnisse einer historischen Situation – werden bei Hegel durch eine apriorische, rationale, dialektische Ableitung als reine Phänomene der Ideen angesehen.

Um den Ursprung der Familie zu klären – wendet Marx ein – wird nicht die konkrete historische Entwicklung beachtet, sondern nur die Dialektik der Idee, als ob diese *in sich und von sich aus* nach einer bestimmten Absicht handle. »Die Tatsache, dies wirkliche Verhältnis,

¹⁷ a. a. O., S. 182.

¹⁸ ebenda, S. 182.

¹⁹ ebenda, S. 183.

In the "notes" to the dissertation "General fundamental difference between the democratic and Epicurean natural philosophy" is the thesis that has now become decisive for him:

"only the practice of philosophy is itself theoretical."¹⁷ d. H. where man realizes himself, he encounters the questions that concern his nature and which he must answer. The realization of oneself becomes the basis and essence of philosophizing. This realization means the interaction between man and nature; the basic insight consists in the knowledge that man's creative deed is originally realized in work - with which he changes nature and himself.

Hence the repeated criticism of traditional philosophy as a reflection on reality: "When philosophy as will turns itself out against the world as it appears, the system is reduced to an abstract totality, i. H. it has become one side of the world facing another. Its relation to the world is a relation of reflection."¹⁸ It goes a little further: 'Their (practice) liberation of the world from unphilosophy is at the same time its own liberation from philosophy, which shackled it as a specific system.'¹⁹

2.

M A R X ' K R I T I K A N H E G E L

Many Marxists ascribe no particular importance to Marx's confrontation with Hegel, or, as we have said, they value it only in relation to his further development.

We believe that the importance of this controversy is underestimated if one only looks at it historically, biographically. Alone through his criticism of Hegelianism and the primacy of philosophy as purely rational knowledge based purely on reflection, one arrives at the actual rejection of that modern thinking that was decisive from Descartes to German idealism. Only as a result of this rejection does the possibility of a new understanding arise for Italian humanism and for the Romano-Latin tradition, which - since Descartes - has not been ascribed any philosophical relevance.

In the "Critique of Hegel's Constitutional Law" (1843), Marx accuses Hegel of logical mysticism: in Hegel, the concrete facts - i.e. the real circumstances of a historical situation - are regarded as pure phenomena of ideas through an a priori, rational, dialectical derivation.

In order to clarify the origin of the family - Marx objects - the concrete historical development is not taken into account, but only the dialectic of the idea, as if it were acting in and of itself according to a certain intention. "The fact, this real relationship, 17 a. a. O., p. 182.

["] ibid., p. 182.

wird von der Spekulation als *Erscheinung*, als Phänomen ausgesprochen. Diese Umstände, diese Willkür, diese Wahl der Bestimmung, diese wirkliche Vermittlung sind bloß die Erscheinung einer Vermittlung welche die wirkliche Idee mit sich selbst vornimmt und welche hinter der Gardine vorgeht. Die Wirklichkeit wird nicht als sie selbst, sondern als eine andere Wirklichkeit ausgesprochen. Die gewöhnliche Empirie hat nicht ihr eigenes Gesetz, sondern einen Fremden als Gesetz «²⁰

Weil alles Reale rational und alles Rationale real ist, muß Hegel die Ideen in ihrer Dialektik konkretisieren, wobei das konkret historische unwe sentlich wird. »Familie und bürgerliche Gesellschaft sind die Voraussetzungen des Staates, sie sind die eigentlich Tätigen; aber in der Spekulation wird es umgekehrt. Wenn aber die Idee versubjektiviert wird, werden hier die wirklichen Subjekte, bürgerliche Gesellschaft, Familie, Umstände, Willkür etc. zu unwirklichen, anders bedeutenden, objektiven Momenten der Idee.«²¹

In humanistischer Terminologie würde man sagen, daß der aussichtslose Versuch Hegel darin besteht, das »Wahrscheinliche«, das »verosimile« – also etwa die Umstände, das Willkürliche – logisch zu deduzieren, bzw. nur als ein Resultat, ein Produkt der Idee zu zeigen. Weil sein Denken vom Vorrang des Wissens und der Wahrheit als Ergebnis einer rationalen Ableitung bestimmt ist, verfaßt Hegel statt einer Geschichte des Staatsrechts die Geschichte des logischen Begriffes; an ihm und nicht an der Willkür, an den Umständen, geht nach Hegel die eigentliche Entwicklung vor sich.

Im Gegensatz zu Hegel schreibt Marx: »Familie und bürgerliche Gesellschaft machen sich selbst zum Staat. Sie sind das Treibende. Nach Hegel sind sie dagagen *getan* von der wirklichen Idee: es ist nicht ihr eigener Lebenslauf, der sie zum Staat vereint, sondern es ist der Lebenslauf der Idee, die sie von sich dezerniert hat... Das Faktum ist, daß der Staat aus der Menge, wie sie als Familienmitglieder und Glieder der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft existiere, hervorgehe: die Spekulation spricht dieses Faktum als Tat der Idee aus, nicht als die Idee der Menge, sondern als Tat einer subjektiven, von dem Faktum selbst unterschiedenen Idee.«²²

Dadurch wird nichts konkret erklärt, denn das einzige Interesse Hegels richtet sich darauf, sei es im Staat, sei es in der Natur oder in der Kunst, die »Idee«, die »logische« Idee wiederzufinden, um sie in ihrem dialektischen Gang abzuleiten – während es umgekehrt sein müßte, denn aus den wirklichen Unterschieden müßten die Ideen entwickelt werden. In dieser Weise wird – wie Marx sagt – keine Brücke zwischen der Dialektik der Idee und der konkreten Dialektik des Geschehens geschlagen.²³ So behauptet Marx weiter, daß für

²⁰ K. Marx, Kritik des hegelschen Staatsrechts, Dietz, I. S. 206.

²¹ ebenda.

²² a. a. O., S. 207.

²³ Von Hegel sprechend, führt Marx aus: »Er entwickelt sein Denken nicht aus dem Gegenstand, sondern den Gegenstand nach einem mit sich fertig gewordenen

is expressed by speculation as an appearance, as a phenomenon. These circumstances, this arbitrariness, this choice of determination, this actual mediation are merely the appearance of a mediation which the actual idea undertakes with itself and which proceeds behind the curtain. Reality is not expressed as itself, but as another reality. Ordinary empiricism does not have its own law, but a foreign one as law"²⁰

■ Because everything that is real is rational and everything that is rational is real, Hegel has to concretize the ideas in their dialectic, whereby the concrete historical becomes irrelevant. »Family and civil society are the prerequisites of the state, they are the actual active ones; but in speculation it is reversed. But if the idea becomes subjectivie, the real subjects, civil society, family, circumstances, will etc. become unreal, differently significant, objective moments of the id eh.²¹

In humanistic terminology one would say that the futile attempt Hegel consists in the »probable«, that

> verosimile« - so about the circumstances to deduce the arbitrariness - logically, or only as a result to show a product of the idea. Because his thinking is determined by the primacy of knowledge and truth as the result of a rational derivation, Hegel composes the history of the logical concept instead of a history of constitutional law; According to Hegel, it is in him and not in arbitrariness, in the circumstances, that the actual development takes place.

In contrast to Hegel, Marx writes: "Family and bourgeois society make themselves the state. You are the driving force."

According to Hegel, on the other hand, they are done with the actual idea: it is not their own résumé that unites them into the state, but it is the résumé of the idea that devolved them from themselves. . . The fact is that the state arises from the multitude as they exist as family members and members of bourgeois society: speculation expresses this fact as an act of the idea, not as the idea of the crowd, but as an act of a subjective idea distinct from the fact itself.²²

This does not explain anything concretely, because Hegel's only interest is in finding, be it in the state, in nature or in art, the "idea", the "logical" idea, in order to derive them in their dialectical course - while it would have to be the other way around, because the ideas would have to be developed from the actual differences. In this way - as Marx says - no bridges are built between the dialectic of the idea

and the concrete dialectic of what is happening des He g l e s ta a ts r
e c h ts , D ietz, I. S. 206.

21 eb in d a.

22 a. a. O ., S. 207.

23 V on Hegel spread, fiih rt M a rx aus: » Ere ntwic kelt se in Den ken
nich taus dem G egen stand , so then the Gegen stand nach c in cm
mit sich f e r t i g g e w o r d e n

Hegel in seinem Staatsrecht nicht die Rechtsphilosophie sein eigentliches Interesse darstellt, sondern die Logik, aber *nicht die Sache der Sache*, vielmehr die Sache der Logik, die das philosophische Element bildet, wobei der Staat nur zum Beweis der Logik dient.²⁴

Hegel übersieht also, daß die Staatsgeschäfte und ihre Folgen nicht abstrakt für sich bestehen, daß sie von der Wirksamkeit besonderer Individualitäten her, von menschlichen Funktionen abhängen, die sozialen, leidenschaftlichen, willkürlichen Eigenschaften des historisch konkreten Menschen zeigen: das Gebiet des »Wahrscheinlichen«, wie es Vico nennt und das in seiner Selbständigkeit gegenüber dem rein Rationalen und Wahren, gegenüber der »kritischen« Philosophie Descartes, verteidigt.²⁵ So wird die konkrete historische Entwicklung zur Allegorie für die Dialektik der Idee. Hegel bemüht sich, das Allgemeine als Subjekt festzustellen, um die Bestimmung des logischen Begriffes überall wiederzuerkennen.²⁶

Die vollständige Apriorität, die nie zugestandene Selbständigkeit der historischen Welt gegenüber der Dialektik der Idee mußte zu jenem Phänomen führen, das Marx bestimmt als den »Verwesungsstand des Hegelschen Systems«, vergleichbar »dem Verfäulungsprozeß des absoluten Geistes.«²⁷

3. DIE RADIKALE REVOLUTION

Marx weist darauf hin, daß der erste geschichtliche Akt des Menschen nicht in der Tatsache besteht, daß er denkt, sondern daß er durch die eigene Arbeit die Welt verändert bzw. seine Lebensmittel produziert. Mit dieser Grundthese kann Marx seine Gegenstellung zum deutschen Idealismus in jenem berühmt gewordenen Satz formulieren: »Ganz im Gegensatz zur deutschen Philosophie, welche vom Himmel auf die Erde herabsteigt, wird hier von der Erde zum Himmel gestiegen.«²⁸

Denken. Es handelt sich nicht darum, die bestimmte Idee der politischen Verfassung ein Verhältnis zur abstrakten Idee zu geben, sie als ein Glied ihrer Lebensgeschichte (die Idee) zu rangieren, eine offbare Mystifikation.« K. Marx, a. a. O., S. 213.

²⁴ »Mit Auslassung der konkreten Bestimmungen, welche ebensogut für eine andere Sphäre, z. B. Physik mit anderen konkreten Bestimmungen vertauscht werden können, also unwesentlich sind, haben wir ein Kapitel der Logik vor uns.« K. Marx, a. a. O., S. 217.

²⁵ »Eben weil Hegel von den Prädikaten der allgemeinen Bestimmung statt von dem reellen Ens (Hypokeimenon, Subjekt) ausgeht, und doch ein Träger dieser Bestimmung da sein muß, wird die mystische Idee dieser Träger. Es ist dies der Dualismus, daß Hegel das Allgemeine, nicht das Wirkliche Wesen des Wirklich-endlichen Ens nicht als das wahre Subjekt des Unendlichen.« K. Marx, a. a. O., S. 225.

²⁶ In den »Briefen aus den deutsch-französischen Jahrbüchern« (1844) heißt es: »Es kindert und also nichts, unsere Kritik an die Kritik der Politik, an die Parteinahme in der Politik, also an wirkliche Kämpfe anzuknüpfen und mit ihnen zu identifizieren. Wir treten dann nicht der Welt doktrinär mit einem neuen Prinzip entgegen: Hier ist die Wahrheit, hier knei nieder: wir entwickeln in der Welt aus den Prinzipien der Welt neue Prinzipien.« K. Marx, a. a. O., I, S. 345.

²⁷ MEGA, Die deutsche Ideologie, Bd. III, S. 17.

²⁸ K. Marx, Die Deutsche Ideologie, Bd. III, S. 26.

In his constitutional law, Hegel does not represent his real interest in the philosophy of law, but rather in logic, but not in the logic of the matter, but rather in the matter of logic, which forms the philosophical element, with the state only serving to prove logic.²⁴

Hegel thus overlooks the fact that the affairs of the state and their consequences do not exist in the abstract, that they depend on the effectiveness of particular individualities, on human functions that show the social, passionate, arbitrary qualities of historically concrete man: the realm of the "probable," as Vico calls it and defends it in its independence from the purely rational and true, from the "critical" philosophy of Descartes.²⁵ Concrete historical development thus becomes an allegory for the dialectic of the idea. Hegel endeavors to establish the universal as a subject in order to recognize the determination of the logical concept liberali.²⁶

The complete apriority, the never conceded independence of the historical world in relation to the dialectic of the idea, must lead to that phenomenon which Marx defines as the "state of decomposition of the Hegelian system", comparable to "the process of decay of the absolute spirit."²⁷

3. D I E R A D I K A L E R E V O L U T I O N

Marx points out that man's first historical act does not consist in the fact that he thinks, but that he changes the world or produces his means of subsistence through his own work. With this basic thesis, Marx can formulate his opposition to German idealism in the sentence that has become famous: "Completely in contrast to German philosophy, which descends from heaven to earth, here one ascends from earth to heaven."²⁸

Think. It is not a question of giving the specific idea of the political constitution a relation to the abstract idea, of treating it as a part of your life story (the idea). greed , a manifest my stification.« K. M arx, op. a. 0 . , p. 213.

84 »With the omission of the concrete provisions which apply just as well to another sphere, e.g. B. Physics can be interchanged with other concrete determinations, i.e. are inessential, we have a chapter of logic before us.« K.

M arx, a. a. 0 . , S. 217.

** "Just because H egel starts from the predic ts of the general one determination instead of the real Ens (hypokeim enon, subject), and yet a bearer of this determination there be m ufi, the m ystic idea of this wearer w ill be. This is the dualism that H egel does not see the universal, not the real essence of the real finite being as the true sub ject of the infinite. « K. Marx, op. a. 0 . , p. 225.

u In d e n »Brufen aus d e n d e n g -French yearbooks« (1844) it says:

»It grows and therefore nothing, our criticism of the criticism of politics, of taking sides in politics, that is, of starting real fights and with them to identify. We n o t confront th e w o ld d o c trin ary w ith a new principle: H e r is the tru th , H e r kneel down: W e develop in th e w o rld new prin ciples from the prin ciples of the w o ld.« K. M arx, a. a. O., I, p. 345.

27 M E G A , D ie deutsche Ideologic, Bd. I I I, S. 17.

a K. M arx, D ie D eutsche Ideologic, Bd. I I I , S. 26.

Über den deutschen Idealismus und über seine hermetische Sprache spottend – und diese Sätze würde er heute auch gegen den abstrakten Existentialismus richten, wie gegen jede Philosophie, die abseits von der Wirklichkeit steht – schreibt Marx: »Wie die Philosophen das Denken verselbständigen, so müßten sie die Sprache zu einem eigenen Reich verselbständigen. Das ist das Geheimnis der philosophischen Sprache, worin die Gedanken als Worte einen eigenen Inhalt haben. Das Problem, aus der Welt des Gedankens in die wirkliche Welt herabzusteigen, verwandelt sich in das Problem, aus der Sprache ins Leben herabzusteigen.«²⁹

Um dem Anspruch der konkreten Verwirklichung der Idee zu entsprechen, entwirft Marx keine abstrakte revolutionäre Philosophie, die an der geschichtlichen Situation, in der er lebt, nichts ändern würde, sondern er stellt sich die Frage, wo die Probleme der eigenen Zeit tatsächlich hervordringen, wo die Konflikte zutage treten, wo der Mensch am Scheideweg steht, wo die Entscheidungen nicht aufgeschoben werden können. Die Theorie vermag die Menschen nur dann zu ergreifen, wenn sie radikal ist, d. h. wenn sie unmittelbar auftritt und nicht theoretisch demonstriert wird. Sich radikal zu verhalten, besagt, die Sache an der Wurzel zu fassen, und für Marx ist die Wurzel der Mensch selbst. »Die Revolutionen bedürfen nämlich eines *passiven* Elements, einer *materiellen* Grundlage. Die Theorie wird in einem Volke immer nur soweit verwirklicht, als sie die Verwirklichung seiner Bedürfnisse ist... Es genügt nicht, daß der Gedanke zur Verwirklichung drängt, die Wirklichkeit muß sich selber zum Gedanken drängen.«³⁰

Wo treten also für Marx – entsprechend der Zeit in der er lebt – die radikalen Bedürfnisse auf, die mit einer radikalen Revolution und einer radikalen Philosophie hervorbringen – zur Lösung der bestehenden Probleme? Im Proletariat als Ausdruck einer beginnenden industriellen Gesellschaft. »Wie die Philosophie im Proletariat ihre materiellen, so findet das Proletariat in der Philosophie seine geistigen Waffen, und sobald der Blitz des Gedankens gründlich in diesem naiven Volksboden eingeschlagen ist, wird sich die Emanzipation des Deutschen zum Menschen vollziehen... Die Emanzipation des Deutschen ist die Philosophie, ihr Herz das Proletariat.«³¹

²⁹ K. Marx, *Die Deutsche Ideologie*, S. 432.

In »Der leitende Artikel in Nr. 179 der Kölnischen Zeitung« (Marx-Engels, Band I, Dietz, S. 97) heißt es: »Allein die Philosophen wachsen wie Pilze aus der Erde, sie sind die Früchte ihrer Zeit, ihres Volkes, dessen subtilste, kostbarste und unsichtbarste Säfte, in denen philosophischen Ideen roulieren. Derselbe Geist baut die philosophischen Systeme in dem Hirn der Philosophen, der die Eisenbahnen mit den Händen der Gewerbe baut. Die Philosophie steht nicht außer der Welt, so wenig das Gehirn außer den Menschen steht, weil es nicht im Magen liegt; aber freilich, die Philosophie steht früher mit dem Hirn in der Welt, ehe sie mit den Füßen sich auf den Boden stellt, während manche andere menschliche Sphären längst mit den Füßen in der Erde wurzeln und mit den Händen die Früchte der Welt abpflücken, ehe sie ahnen, daß auch der 'Kopf' von dieser Welt oder diese Welt die Welt des Kopfes ist.« K. Marx.

³⁰ a. a. O., S. 386.

³¹ a. a. O., S. 391.

make language an independent realm. That is the secret of philosophical language, in which thoughts as words have their own content. The problem of descending from the world of thought into the real world turns into the problem of descending from language into life.«29

In order to meet the claim of the concrete realization of the idea, Marx does not design an abstract revolutionary philosophy that would not change anything in the historical situation in which he lives, but he poses the question , where the problems of one's own time actually emerge, where conflicts surface, where man stands at a crossroads, where decisions cannot be postponed. The theory can only grip people if it is radical, i. H. if it occurs directly and is not demonstrated to it theoretically. To behave radically means to get to the root of the matter, and for Marx the root is man himself. "R evolutions require a passive element, a material basis. The theory is realized in a people only to the extent that it is the realization of its needs. . . It is not enough that the thought pushes for realization, reality must push itself to the thought.«30

So where do Marx step - according to the time in which he lives -

the radical needs that bring about a radical revolution and a radical philosophy - to solve the existing problems? In the proletariat as an expression of an incipient industrial society. "Just as philosophy finds its material weapons in the proletariat, so the proletariat finds its spiritual weapons in philosophy, and as soon as the lightning bolt of thought has thoroughly struck this naive folk soil, the Em enact the anticipation of the German to become a human being. . . The e m anticipation of German is philosophy, its heart is the pro le ta ria t.«31

19 K. Marx , Die D e u tsc h e I d e o lo g ic , S. 432.

In » Depending on Article N r. 179 der Kölnschen Zeitung « (Marx - Engels, Band I, Dietz, S. 97) wrote: » Already the philosophers watched P.S ilz e aus d e r Erde , sie sin d die Fruch teihre r Z E it, ihres V olkes, drawing sub tilste , coastbars teund u n s i c h tbars te S afte , in d e n e n p h i l o so p h i s h e n Idea of role. Then Geist talked about the philosophical System in Himder's Philosophy, which Eisenbahn met with Handender Gewerbe about. D ie P h i l o so p h i e s te h t nich t au fier der Welt, so w e n i g d as G e h i m a u fier der M e n sch en steh t, w eil es nich t im M a g e n lie g t; a b e r fre ilic h , the Philosopher stood free with them in Him in the Wealth, and he sat with the F ufien sicha auf the Bodens tellt, w h a n d m a n c h e a n d r e m e n sch lic h e S p h a r e n l a n g s t m i t d e n Fiifcn in der

Erde w u rze ln u n d m i t d e H andendie Fruchte der Welt a b p
fliick en , ehe sie ahnen , d afi au ch der 'K o p f vondie s e r The
Wealth of this Wealth is the Wealth of the Copfest.« K. M a rx

39 a. a. 0 . , S. 386.

31 a. a. 0 . , S. 391.

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III

1. WESENSZUGE DER ITALIENISCHEN HUMANISTISCHEN TRADITION

Es gilt nun, Marx' Beziehung zum italienischen Humanismus zu untersuchen und zu zeigen, inwiefern gerade Marx' Grundkonzeption der Philosophie einen Zugang zu jener Welt eröffnet.

Wir sagten: die rationale Philosophie seit Descartes ist ein erneuter Versuch, die Metaphysik zu begründen, sie ist eine von der Praxis getrennte Spekulation, die aus sich heraus wiederum das System der Wirklichkeit begründen will. Deswegen ist die rationale Philosophie *anonym*, das Reich der für alle gültigen Ideen; *unabhängig von Ort und Zeit*, denn die Gesetze der rationalen Tätigkeit müssen überall und zu jeder Zeit gelten; in ihrem Wesen *unpathetisch* – es gibt *kein Problem der Form*, da diese von der Rationalität des Gesprächs bestimmt ist. Theorie und Praxis bleiben radikal getrennt. Alles Thesen, die Marx bei seiner Auffassung der Philosophie radikal ablehnt.

Die humanistische Philosophie ist stattdessen *persönlich*, an *Ort und Zeit* gebunden, sie wird von *pathetischen Motiven* getragen, und das Problem der Form der Rede erhält bei ihr eine prinzipielle Bedeutung, d. h. die *Rhetorik* enthüllt sich in ihrer ganzen Wichtigkeit.

Das Grundproblem des Humanismus ist *nicht das Wahre*, das Wissen, sondern *das Gute*, d. h. die Verwirklichung des Menschen: daher das Problem des Ursprungs der Gesellschaft bzw. die Bedeutung der Frage, wie sie entsteht, in welchen konkreten historischen Formen sie sich verwirklicht. Das Philosophieren gilt dem Humanismus nicht als ein Reflektieren *über* die Geschichte, sondern aus der Geschichte: Praxis ist keine Anwendung von abstrakten Theorien. Diese Deutung der Philosophie erweist sich als eine Umkehrung des rationalistischen Philosophierens und widerspricht dem Begriff der Wissenschaft, wie er seit Descartes gültig ist; eine solche Art zu denken, mußte sogar – Beispiele dafür gibt es genug – als »literarisch«, als unwissenschaftlich erscheinen. Humanismus gilt bis heute als Gebiet der Literaturhistoriker: Petrarca, Salutati, Landino, Pico della Mirandola, Polizian, Nizolius sind kaum in einer Geschichte der Philosophie zu finden. Erst in der Folge von Marx' positiver Bewertung des Konkreten und auf Grund der Kritik an der traditionellen Auffassung der Metaphysik, bekommen die Fragen des Humanismus einen neuen Sinn.

Vico meinte, daß die cartesianische Voraussetzung eines »ersten Wahren« dem Problem des »Wahrscheinlichen« und damit dem Problem der »Praxis« jede Berechtigung entziehen würde. Klammt man aber den ganzen Bereich des Wahrscheinlichen aus der Philosophie aus, dann hat sie nicht mehr Kunst, Redekunst, Geschichte oder politisches Denken zum Gegenstand, denn all das gehört in den Bereich des Wahrscheinlichen. »Praxis« wird dann nur als Anwendung der »Theorie« begriffen. Die humanistische Philosophie sieht das Wesentliche nun nicht in der Bestimmung eines ersten Wahren und in den daraus folgenden Schlüssen, sondern im »Finden«, in der »inventio« des Wahren und des Wahrscheinlichen, die immer konkret an Zeit und Ort und einzelne Menschen gebunden ist.

W E S E N S Z O G E D E R I T A L I E N I S C H E N H U M A N I S T I S C H E N T R A D I T I O N

It is now a matter of examining Marx's relationship to Italian humanism and showing to what extent it is precisely Marx's basic conception of philosophy that opens up access to that world.

We said: rational philosophy since Descartes is a renewed attempt to justify metaphysics, it is speculation separate from practice, which in turn wants to justify the system of reality out of itself. Therefore rational philosophy is anonymous, the realm of ideas valid for all; independent of place and time, since the laws of rational activity must apply everywhere and at all times; unemotional in nature - there is no problem of form, since it is determined by the rationality of the conversation. Theory and practice remain radically separate. All theses that Marx radically rejected in his conception of philosophy.

Humanistic philosophy, instead, is personal, tied to place and time, sustained by pathetic motives, and the problem of the form of speech acquires a fundamental importance, i. H. rhetoric reveals itself in all its importance.

The basic problem of humanism is not the true, the knowledge, but the good, i. H. the realization of man: hence the problem of the origin of society or the importance of the question of how it arises, in what concrete historical forms it is realized. For humanism, philosophizing does not mean reflecting on history, but reflecting on history: practice is not the application of abstract theories. This interpretation of philosophy turns out to be a reversal of rationalistic philosophizing and contradicts the concept of science as it has been valid since Descartes; such a way of thinking, even had to -

There are enough examples of this - appearing as "literary", as unscientific. Humanism is still considered a field of literary historians: Petrarch, Salutati, Landino, Pico della Mirandola, Polizian, Nizolius are hardly to be found in a history of philosophy.

Only as a result of Marx's positive evaluation of the concrete and on the basis of the criticism of the traditional view of metaphysics did the questions of humanism take on a new meaning.

Vico believed that the Cartesian assumption of a "first truth" would deprive the problem of the "probable" and thus the problem of "practice" of all justification. But if you exclude the whole realm of the probable from philosophy, then it no longer deals with art, rhetoric,

history, or political thought, for all of these belong in the realm of the probable. "Practice" is then understood only as the application of "theory." The humanistic philosophy does not see the essential in the determination of a first truth and in the conclusions that follow from it, but in the "finding", in the "inventio" of the true and the probable, which is always concrete in time and place and individual people is bound.

2. DIE HUMANISTISCHE ABLEHNUNG DES LOGIZISMUS: PETRARCA, SALUTATI

Wir müssen uns mit Andeutungen begnügen. Charakteristisch für alle Humanisten – von Petrarca bis zu Nizolius – ist die Ablehnung des Rationalismus, des Logizismus, wie er faktisch von der Pariser Schule, von der späten Scholastik vertreten wurde.

Petrarcas Äußerungen sind eindeutig: »Ich liebe nicht jene geschwätzige und windige scholastische Philosophie, auf die unsere Literaten in lächerlicher Weise stolz sind (illam loquacem scholasticam ventosum), hingegen die wahre Philosophie, die nicht nur in den Büchern, sondern im Geist wohnt (in rebus positam non in verbis).«³² In einem Brief steht: »Mit diesem (es handelt sich um einen scholastischen Philosophen) ist es töricht zu kämpfen, denn allein am Widerspruch findet er Gefallen, nicht aber daran, die Wahrheit 'herauszufinden' (non verum invenire): er nimmt sich nur vor zu diskutieren.«³³

Petrarcas rückt zum ersten Mal wieder das Bewußtsein in den Vordergrund, daß das »Werden« des Menschen sich nicht mit Erklärung und Kenntnisvermittlung deckt; ständig betont er, daß rationale Be trachtungen zur Verwirklichung des Menschen nicht ausreichen. Daraum greift er auch immer wieder in die Politik ein und glaubt, mit Cola di Rienzi die Gemeinschaft des römischen Volkes gegen die römischen Adeligen verteidigen zu müssen.

Trägt eine seiner Schriften den Titel »Über meiner und vieler anderer Unwissenheit« (*De suis ipsius et multorum ignorantia*), so darf das nicht als ein Bekenntnis der Demut mißverstanden werden; Petrarca bekennt in dieser Schrift, daß er in der Logik, in der Dialektik, und das heißt in der damals herrschenden rationalen scholastischen Philosophie, nicht zu den Wissenden gehöre; nun sei aber das Wissen der anderen eigentlich Unwissenheit, während die ihm vorgeworfene Unwissenheit seine Weisheit ausmache. »Es mögen mich hören, sage ich, alle Aristoteliker, und da Griechenland für meine Sprache taub ist, so mögen es die hören, die ganz Italien und Frankreich und das lärmende und streitsüchtige Nest zu Paris beherbergen: ich habe, wenn ich mich nicht sehr täusche, alle ethischen Bücher des Aristote-

³² Petrarca, *De remediis utriusque fortunae*, I. Dialog, XLVI, in *Opera omnia*, Tom. I, Basel, 1554, S. 57.

³³ Petrarca, *Familares*, I, 6.

»Du sprichst mir nur die Dialektik ab, die du Logik nennst, in der deine Syllogismen dein hervorragendes Können beweisen sollen. Oh Richter, hier liegt der Fehler! Denn wenn ich es beichten will, so kann ich berühmte Philosophen, wie die antiken Peripatetiker vorweisen, eine Sekte von hervorragenden Philosophen, die keine Dialektik kannten, jene Dialektik, die ich, wie du mir vorwirfst, nicht besitze. Aber, oh Dummler, mir fehlt sie nicht: ich weiß wohl, was bei ihr und den anderen freien Künstlern anzuerkennen ist und was nicht. Ich habe von den Philosophen gelernt, keine von ihnen ungebührlich zu überschätzen. Lobenswert ist es, sie gelernt zu haben, aber kindisch, in ihnen alt zu werden. Sie sind wohl Wege, aber sie sind weder Ziel noch Ende, höchstens für jene, welche umherirren und für den es keinen Hafen des Lebens gibt. Fü dich, der du dir ein erhabenes Ziel ausgewählt hast, ist es das Ziel, das du brauchst. Du glaubst das höchste Ziel der Glückseligkeit erreicht zu haben, wenn du mit der Anstrengung des Gehirns einen zerbrechlichen und zu nichts führenden Syllogismus die ganze Nacht, ohne Schlaf durchwoben hast.« Petrarca, *Invectiva contra medicum*, ed. G. Ricci, Rom, 1960, II, S. 341.

We have to content ourselves with hints. Characteristic of all humanists - from Petrarcha to Nizolius - is the rejection of rationalism, of logicism, as actually represented by the Paris school, by the late scholasticism.

Petrarcha's calls are unequivocal: »I do not love that garrulous and windy scholastic philosophy of which our writers are ridiculously proud (illam loquacem scholasticam ventosem), but the true philosophy, which not only lives in the books but in the spirit (in rebus positam non in verbis).«³²

In a letter it says: »It is foolish to fight with this (it is about a scholastic philosopher), because he finds pleasure in contradiction alone, but not in 'the truth' to find out' (non verum invenire): he only intends to discuss.«³³

For the first of May, Petrarch again brings the awareness to the fore that the "becoming" of man does not coincide with explanation and imparting knowledge; He constantly emphasizes that rational considerations are not sufficient for the realization of man. That's why he keeps getting involved in politics and believes he has to defend the community of the Roman people against the Roman nobles with Cola di Rienzi.

If one of his writings bears the title "Above my ignorance and that of many others" (De suis ipsius et m ulti orum ignorantia), this must not be understood as a confession of humility; Petrarch confesses in this writing that he does not belong to the wise in logic, in dialectics, and that means in the then dominant rational scholastic philosophy; but now the knowledge of others is actually ignorance, while the ignorance he is accused of constitutes his wisdom. "Let all Aristotelians hear me, I say, and as Greece is deaf to my language, let those who harbor all Italy and France and the noisy and contentious nest at Paris hear: I have , if I am not very mistaken, all the ethical books of Aristotle"³² Petrarcha , De remedium iis utriusque ratione , I. De logica , XLVII, in Opera omnia , Tom , I, Basel, 1554, p. 57.

33 Petrarcha, Families, I,

»D u sprich st mirn u r d ie Dia lectic ab, d ie d u Log i c n e n n st, in de i n e Syllogism-mende in hervorragendes Konnen beweisen so full Oh Richter, here liegt der Fehler! Dennewen ist he scheinbar w ill, so kann ich beruhmte Philosophie sein, wie die ein ancient Peripatetiker wissen, a Sekte von herren und den

P h i l o so p h e n , whose kind of Dia lectic can be used, such a Dialectical, which, with the d u m i r vorwirfst, does not besitze. But, oh Dummer, I felt nothing: my wifi whole, was be ih round de n d e r n fre ien K u n sten a n z u e r k e n n e n i s t u n d w a s n i c h t. I c h h a b e v o n d e n P h i l o so p h e n g e l e r n t L o b e n s w e r t i s s , they have learned to have , but kind of , in their own right Sie sin d w o h l Wege , ab e r sie sin d w e d e r Zie l noch E n d e , hochsten s fiir jene, welcheum herire und fur deneskein en Hafen des Lebens gib t F u d i c h , d e r d u d i r e i n e r h a b e n e s Zie l a usg c w a h l t h a st, is that Ziel, that d u b r a u ch st. D u g la u b s t d a s h o c h ste Zieler G liic k se lig k e i e t e r i c h t zu h a b e n , w e n d u m it der Anstreng u ng des Gehirn se in en zerbrech lichen und zu nich ts f u h re and the Syllogism of Dieganze Nacht, obtained by Schlaf Durch." Petra rc a, Invectivacontramedicum, ed. G Ricci, Rom, 1960, II, p.

teles gelesen, und bevor diese meine so große Unwissenheit enthüllt wurde, glaube ich auch, etwas davon zu verstehen. Ich bin durch diese Bücher *gelehrter, aber nicht besser geworden*, wie es sich gehört hätte. Ich habe es oft bei mir selbst und anderen gegenüber beklagt, daß jener Kernpunkt der Philosophie, den er selbst im ersten Buch seiner Ethik erwähnt, bei Aristoteles so wenig betont wird: daß wir nämlich nicht so sehr viel wissen als vielmehr besser werden sollen. Ich sehe wohl, daß er das Wesen der Tugend ganz vortrefflich erklärt und sehr scharf und eingehend die Eigenschaften der Tugend und des Lasters behandelt. Aber wenn ich das gelernt habe, so weiß ich ein ganz klein wenig mehr, als ich vorher wußte; ich selbst aber, meine Seele und mein Wille sind ganz dieselben geblieben wie zuvor. Es ist ein großer Unterschied, ob ich etwas weiß oder ob ich *es liebe*; ob ich es *verstehe* oder ob ich nach *ihm strebe*.«³⁴

Beispiele für diese Ablehnung des Vorranges der Logik könnten wir bei sämtlichen Humanisten auffinden. Wir begnügen uns einstweilen noch mit dem Hinweis auf Salutati, einen Schüler Petrarcas, den ersten Kanzler der Standt Florenz. In seinen »De laboribus Herculis« äußert er sich in ähnlicher Weise wie sein Lehrer: er ist traurig und verärgert über jene, die über alles und jedes zu diskutieren bereit sind (*de cunctis disputatio et garrula discutere sunt parati*); er weist daraufhin, daß deren Methode eine rein logische sei: »Den verwickelten Fällen, bei deren Hin- und Herwenden sie sich in der Antwort aufhalten, schicken sie vieles voraus (*quasi resumenda praetermittunt*), fügen Thesen hinzu (*propositione spargunt*) und setzen voraus, was als Schlußfolgerungen kommt (*corollaria adiiciunt, conclusiones accumulant*).«³⁵

Bei dieser Kritik an der Logik und des Logicismus tritt ein wesentliches Argument auf. Denken bedeutet »schließen«, wobei die Wahrheit der Schlüsse von der Wahrheit der Prinzipien der Prämissen abhängig ist. Die ursprünglichen Prämissen haben aber nun einen »inventiven« Charakter, denn sie können nicht rational abgeleitet, sondern müssen »gefunden« werden. Die traditionelle Rhetorik wies daraufhin, daß die »inventio« ihr erstes Fundament sei; auf dem Gebiet der Dichtung wird »inventio« mit dem Einfluß der Musen in Zusammenhang gebracht. So stellt sich schon Petrarca die prinzipielle Frage, ob eine Beziehung zwischen den Musen der Dichtung, der Rhetorik und der Philosophie besteht. »Die Musen gehören den Dichtern, was niemand bezweifelt. Aber auch die Philosophie hat ihre eigenen Musen (*Musae poetarum sunt, quod nemo dubitat. At philosophia suas illas musas*).«³⁶

Hieraus ergeben sich schwerwiegende Folgen: indem an Stelle der Ratio die »Inventio« den Vorrang übernimmt, erhalten alle zur »Inventio« gehörenden Momente wie Ort, Zeit, menschliche Beziehungen, biographische Komponenten, alles Konkrete und historisch Gebundene, d. h. in die Geschichte Eingewobene eine philosophisch be-

³⁴ Petrarca, *De suis ipsius et multorum ignorantia*, IV.

³⁵ C. Salutati, *De laboribus Herculis*, ed. Ullman, Turici, 1951, Buch I, Kap. I, Prgr. 2-4, S. 3-4.

³⁶ Petrarca, *Invectiva contra medicum*, III, a. a. O., S. 206.

teles, and before this great ignorance of mine was revealed, I also think I understand something of it. I learned more from these books but didn't get better than I should have.

I have often complained to myself and to others that the core point of philosophy, which he himself mentions in the first book of his Ethics, is so little emphasized in Aristotle: namely, that we do not know so much that we should rather get better. I can see. that he excellently explains the nature of virtue, and treats very sharply and thoroughly the qualities of virtue and vice. But when I've learned that, I know a tiny bit more than I knew before; but I myself, my soul and my will have remained exactly the same as before. There's a big difference between knowing something and loving it; whether I understand it or whether I aspire to it.«3*

We could find examples of this rejection of the primacy of logic in all humanists. We content ourselves for the time being with a reference to Salutati, a pupil of Petrarch, the first chancellor of Florence. In his "De laboribus Herculis" he presents himself in a manner similar to that of his teacher: he is sad and angry with those who are ready to discuss anything and everything (de cunctis disputatio et garrula discutere sunt parati); He points out that their method is a purely logical one: "To the complicated cases, turning back and forth in the answer, they dwell on, they preface many things (quasi resumenda praetermittunt), add theses (propositione spargunt) and presuppose what comes as conclusions (corollaria adiiciunt, conclusions accumulant.)»35

An essential argument emerges from this critique of logic and logicism. Thinking means "to conclude," whereby the truth of the conclusions depends on the truth of the principles of the premises. But the original premises now have one

"inventive" character, because they cannot be derived rationally, but must be "found." Traditional rhetoric pointed out that the "inventio" was its first foundation; in poetry, "inventio" is associated with the influence of the Muses. Petrarch already asked the fundamental question of whether there was a relationship between the muses of poetry, rhetoric and philosophy. »The muses belong to the poets, which nobody doubts. But philosophy also has its own muses (Musae poetarum sunt, quod nemo dubitat. At philosophia suas illas musas.«38

This has serious consequences: since the "inventio" takes precedence over the ratio, all the moments belonging to the "inventio" such as place, time, human relationships, biographical components, everything concrete and historically bound, i. H. woven into history a philosophically

*4 Pe tra rc a , De suis himself et multorum ignora n tia, IV.

M C. Salutati, De laboribus Herculis, ed. Ullman, Turkey, 1951,
Buch I, Kap. I, Prof. 2 -4, S. 3-4.

*• Peter, Invective against medicum, III, a. am. O., S.

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gründete Rolle. Weil die Philosophie – seit Descartes – auf Grund ihres Rationalismus diese Momente in ihrer philosophischen Bedeutung nicht erkennen konnte, hat sie ihnen nur eine »literarische«, biographische Bedeutung zugesprochen. Gerade jene Momente sind es, die – wenn auch in einem anderen Zusammenhang – Marx wegen ihres konkreten, historischen Charakters neu bewertete.

Ich kann hier nur andeuten, wie sehr Petrarca die »inventive« Funktion der persönlichen Beziehung zu Ort und Zeit betont. »Gib mir jenen Ort, jene Ruhe, jenen Tag, deine Aufmerksamkeit, jene damalige Haltung, dann werde ich auch heute das vollbringen, was ich damals leistete. Aber nun ist der ferne Ort, wo wir damals weilten, verloren auf immer jener Tag, verloren auf immer seine Ruhe.«³⁷ – Die Betonung des »Inventiven« – das ein Ausdruck des Ingeniums ist – bringt die positive Bewertung des Konkreten mit sich.

In diesem Zusammenhang gewinnt auch die Landschaft neue *philosophische* Bedeutung: Landschaft nicht als ein »literarisches Thema«, sondern als philosophisches Moment. Das V. Buch des »De suis ipsius et multorum ignorantia« beginnt mit folgenden Worten: »Während ich dies schreibe, fahre ich in einem kleinen Schifflein stromaufwärts auf den Fluten des Po. . . Mit all meiner Unwissenheit fahre ich auf den Wogen des großen Stromes, an dessen Ufer ich einst in jüngeren Tagen viel gedacht und viel geschrieben habe. . . Der Po selbst scheint mit mir zu leiden, als dächte er meiner alten Arbeiten und Sorgen und des Ruhmes, den ich einst als Jüngling genoß. . . Und mit lautem Gemurmel und starken Wellenschlag scheint er mich zu ernahmen, mein gutes Recht zurückzufordern.«³⁸

3. DER URSPRUNG DER MENSCHLICHEN GESELLSCHAFT: PHANTASIE UND JURISPRUDENZ

Ein weiters Bestimmungsmoment des Humanismus besteht darin, daß er statt der Probleme einer abstrakten Metaphysik das Problem des Ursprungs der menschlichen Gesellschaft in den Mittelpunkt stellt. Allerdings nicht wie es der Marxismus tun wird: erkennt Marx die schöpferische Tätigkeit des Menschen in der Auseinandersetzung mit der Natur, und zwar in der Herstellung dessen, was der Mensch braucht (Arbeit), so führt der Humanist jenes Schöpferische auf die Phantasie zurück.

Salutati stellt in »De laboribus Herculis« die verblüffende These auf, die menschliche Gesellschaft verdanke ihre Entstehung der Macht der Dichtung, und zwar aus zwei Gründen. Erstens, weil die Menschen durch die Dichtung, d. h. durch den Rhythmus und die Melodie des Wortes die Macht einer gemeinsamen Bindung erfahren; in ursprünglicher Weise werden durch Melodie und Rhythmus die Relativität und die Subjektivität der Leidenschaften eingedämmt. Zweitens – und hier liegt das theoretische Schwergewicht der These – weil der Mensch durch die Phantasie erfährt, daß den Sinneserschei-

³⁷ Petrarca, *Familiares*, VI, S. 18.

³⁸ Petrarca. *De suis ipsius et multorum ignorantia*.

established role. Because philosophy - since Descartes - due to its rationalism could not recognize these moments in their philosophical meaning, it has only ascribed them a "literary", biographical meaning. It is precisely those moments that - albeit in a different context - Marx

re-evaluated because of their concrete, historical character.

I can only indicate here how much Petra arca the »inventive«

function of the personal relationship to place and time. »Give me that place, that quiet, that day, your attention, that attitude then, and I will do today what I did then. But now the distant place where we used to stay is lost forever that day, forever lost its peace.«³⁷ -

The emphasis on the "inventive" - which is an expression of ingenuity - brings with it the positive evaluation of the concrete.

In this context, landscape also gains new philosophical significance: landscape not as a »literary theme«, but as a philosophical moment. Book V of the »De suis ipsius et multorum ignorantia« begins with the following words: »While I am writing this, I am sailing up the waters of the Po .. in a little river. With all my ignorance I ride on the waves of the great river, on the banks of which I once thought and wrote much in younger days. . . The bottom itself seems to suffer with me, as if thinking about old jobs and worries and the fame I once enjoyed as a young man. . . And with a loud murmur and strong waves he seems to persuade me to reclaim my right.«³⁸

3.

D E R U R S P R U N G D E R M E N S C H L I C H E N G E S E L L S C
H A F T : P H A N T A S I E U N D J U R I S P R U D E N Z

Another defining feature of humanism is that it focuses on the problem of the origin of human society rather than on problems of abstract metaphysics.

However, not as Marxism will do: does Marx recognize man's creative activity in dealing with nature, namely in the production of what man needs (work), so the Humanist traces that creative element back to the imagination.

In De laboribus Herculis, Salutati puts forward the startling thesis that human society owes its existence to the power of poetry, for two reasons. First, because through the poetry, i. H. experience the power of a common bond through the rhythm and melody of the word; originally, through melody and rhythm, the relativity and subjectivity of the passions are contained.

Second - and here lies the theoretical emphasis of the thesis -

because man experiences through phantasy that the sense-97 P e tra
rca , F ain ilia re s, V I, p. 18.

38 P e tra rc a . Of his own and m u lto ru m ig n o ra n tia .

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nungen mögliche Bedeutungen zugesprochen werden können, d. h. daß der Mensch nicht in einer »natürlichen«, vorgegebenen Welt – wie das Tier, das von der Macht eingebornerer Schemata geleitet wird – eingeschlossen ist. Wäre der Mensch nicht frei, so könnte und würde er nicht die Notwendigkeit empfinden, die Phänomene von sich aus zu deuten. Die Erfahrung der menschlichen Freiheit hat ihre Wurzel in der Phantasie. Genauer gesagt: der Mensch erfährt durch sie, daß er den Sinneserscheinungen ganz verschiedene Bedeutungen übertragen kann, Sinndeutungen, die sogar im Widerspruch stehen können zu den empirischen Feststellungen. Die menschliche, d. h. die geschichtliche Welt, entsteht aus der Übertragung menschlichen Bedeutung auf die Natur. Daher das humanistische philosophische Interesse für die Metapher – als Übertragung von Bedeutungen – die kein rein »literarisches« Phänomen darstellt, wie der Rationalismus glaubte, um ihr jede philosophische Bedeutung absprechen zu können.

Salutati sagt: die Dichter wollten die Volksmenge zur Bewunderung derer führen, die sie mit ihren Gesängen lobten (*volentes populari multitudinem in eorum quos laudabant admiratione inducere*), und zwar »nicht durch die platte Art der Rede, sondern indem sie Wort für Wort und Sache für Sache auf das süßeste auswechselten (*non plano orationis genere, sed verba pro verbis et res pro rebus suavissime commutantes*); dadurch führten sie die Zuhörenden derart von ihrer sinnlichen Erfahrung weg (*audientes populos a sensibus taliter traducebant*), daß sie glaubten, jene, die sie als Sterbliche gesehen hatten, seien nicht tot, sondern wegen ihrer Verdienste an Tugenden in den Himmel versetzt und die Leute vergaßen ihre Sterblichkeit.«³⁹

Phantasie als schöpferische Kraft des Menschen wird hier als Ursprungsort der Gemeinschaft und der Religion gedeutet, wobei man die Religion allerdings nicht – wie es gewöhnlich im Rationalismus geschieht – als Betrug der Phantasie wertet, durch den eine Klasse von Menschen eine andere unterjochen will. In der Erfahrung der Freiheit tritt die Frage des »Bindenden«, der »Religio« auf, die mit der Jurisprudenz – als Lehre der menschlichen und göttlichen Dinge (*divinarum humanarumque rerum*) – identifiziert wird. Wo der Mensch seine schöpferische Fähigkeit erfährt, tritt die Frage nach der Ordnung im Chaos der Möglichkeiten auf, eine Frage, die immer aus der konkreten historischen Begebenheit entsteht.

Jurisprudenz darf keineswegs als ein Ersatz betrachtet werden, den die Lateiner – wie man meistens behauptet – wegen ihrer Unfähigkeit zu philosophieren an Stelle der Metaphysik entwickelt hätten (dieses Urteil finden wir z. B. in der gängigen Geringsschätzung Ciceros von Seiten der Philosophen); sie ist vielmehr das konkrete Philosophieren, das bei der jeweiligen historischen Situation ansetzt. Jurisprudenz verwirklicht sich als »legere«, d. h. als wählen und ordnen, was nur durch die Auffindung des Bindenden, des Festlegenden möglich ist: »Ab eligendo et se ligando, tandemque legendo lex dicta est, tamque electa, ligans atque legenda.«⁴⁰

³⁹ a. a. O., Kap. I, Prgr. 9.

⁴⁰ Salutati, *De nobilitate legum et medicinac*, ed. Garin, Florenz 1957, XIX, S. 162, Zeile 25.

possible meanings can be ascribed to H. that man is not in a "natural," given world - like the animal, guided by the power of native schemes -

is included. Were man not free, he could not and would not feel the

need to interpret phenomena on his own. The experience of human freedom has its roots in the imagination. To put it more precisely: the human being learns from them that he can transfer completely different meanings to the sensory phenomena, meaning interpretations that can even contradict the empirical findings. The human, i. H. the historical world, arises from the transference of human meaning to nature. Hence the humanistic philosophical interest in metaphor - as a transmission of meanings - which does not represent a purely "literary" phenomenon, as rationalism believed, in order to be able to deny it any philosophical meaning.

Salutati says: the poets wished to lead the crowd to the admiration of those who praised them with their songs (*volentes popularem multitudinem in eorum quos laudabant admiratione indu-cere*), "not by the flat way of speaking, but by they exchanged word for word and thing for thing on the siifiesste (*non piano orationis genere, sed verba pro verbis et res pro rebus suavissime commutantes*); thereby they led the listeners away from their sensuous experience to such an extent (*audientes populos a sensibus taliter traducebant*) that they believed that those whom they had seen as mortals were not dead, but had been taken to heaven for their merits in virtues and people forgot their mortality.«39

Imagination as the creative power of man is interpreted here as the place of origin of community and religion, whereby religion is not, however, valued - as is usually the case in rationalism - as a deception of imagination, through which one class of people wants to enslave another . In the experience of freedom, the question of what binds, of religion, which is identified with jurisprudence - as the teaching of human and divine things (*di-vinarum humanarumque rerum*) - arises. Where man experiences his creative ability. the question of order in the chaos of possibilities arises, a question that always arises from concrete historical events.

Jurisprudence is by no means to be regarded as a substitute, which the Latins - as is usually said - developed for metaphysics because of their inability to philosophize (we find this judgment, for example, in the current contempt of Cicero on the part of philosophers); it is rather the concrete philosophizing that begins with the respective historical situation. Ju risprudence is realized as »legcre«. i.e. H. as choosing and ordering what is only possible by finding the binding, the determining: "Ab eligendo et se ligando, tandemque legendo lex dicta est, tamque electa, ligans atque legenda."40

, q c 7 v i v

40 Salutations, D e n o b ilita tc Icpum ct m cdicinac, cd. G a n n ,
Florcnz 1957, a i a , S. 162, Z eile 25.

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In der Erfahrung der Freiheit angesichts der Möglichkeiten, vor denen er steht, wird sich der Mensch bewußt, eine Welt aufzubauen; indem er dieser Notwendigkeit entspricht, bringt er die juristische, politische, soziale, kulturelle Ordnung hervor.

In dieser Einstellung – die Marx' Drang zum Konkreten und seiner Abneigung gegen jedes abstrakte Philosophieren ähnlich ist – kommt die humanistische Deutung von Cicero und Quintilian zum Zuge, die grundsätzlich mißverstanden wird, wenn man sie nur, wie üblich, auf einen »literarischen« Ciceronianismus der Humanisten reduziert.

In »De oratore« äußert sich Cicero über seine bei Sokrates ansetzende Ablehnung der griechischen Philosophie. »Während sie die Personen, die mit der Behandlung, Untersuchung und Lehre der Themen beschäftigt waren, die wir nun prüfen (gemeint ist die innige Beziehung von Jurisprudenz als konkretes Philosophieren und Rhetorik) mit einem einzigen Namen bezeichnen – da *das ganze Studium und die Praxis der freien Künste Philosophie genannt wurde* – beraubt Sokrates sie dieser allgemeinen Bezeichnung und trennt in seinen Diskussionen die Wissenschaft des *weisen Denkens* von der des *eleganten Sprechens*, obwohl sie in Wirklichkeit eng miteinander verknüpft sind.«⁴¹

Mit dieser Auffassung, so lautet Ciceros Vorwurf, sei Sokrates zu jener Quelle geworden, »woraus die ohne Zweifel absurde, und unvorteilhafte und tadelnswerte Trennung zwischen *Zunge* und *Gehirn* entsprang.« Beachtenswert ist, daß Cicero hier jene Verknüpfung von Rhetorik und Jurisprudenz vollzieht, die später zur humanistischen Bewertung der Redekunst – als der immer historisch gebundenen Rede – führt. »Die Nachfolger des Sokrates schnitten die Verbindung mit dem praktizierenden Gesetzgeber ab und *ent hoben sie des allgemeinen Titels der Philosophie*, obwohl die alten Meister eine wunderbare enge Bindung zwischen Redekunst und Philosophie angestrebt hatten.«⁴²

Der folgende Text Quintilians, – ein Autor dem seit langer Zeit kaum mehr eine Bedeutung zugesprochen sein dürfte, – erscheint in diesem Zusammenhang unter einem völlig neuen Licht: »Meine Aufrufung geht nicht darauf hinaus, daß ich möchte, der Redner sei ein Philosoph, weil kein anderer Bereich des Lebens weiter von den bürgerlichen Pflichten und von jeder Aufgabe des Redners entfernt war. Denn, wer unter den Philosophen war häufig bei Gerichtsurteilen anwesend oder machte sich die Mühe, an den Volksversammlungen teilzunehmen? Wer betätigte sich schließlich in der Verwaltung des Staates, worüber die meisten von ihnen doch recht häufig Vorschriften verfaßt hatten? Ich möchte, daß jeder Römer, den ich bilde, ein Weiser sei, der nicht in abgesonderten Disputen, sondern in den Bemühungen und in der Arbeit mit den Dingen sich als ein wahrhaft bürgerlicher Mann zeigt. Aber die Studien der Weisheit wurden von denen, die sich der Beredsamkeit zuwandten, aufgegeben, weil sie gar nicht mehr in der Öffentlichkeit betrieben wurden, sondern sich zuerst in die Säulenhallen und in die Gymnasien und dann in den abge-

⁴¹ Cicero, *De Oratore*, III, XVI, 59.

⁴² Cicero, a. a. O., III, XIX, 73.

In the experience of freedom in the face of the possibilities before him, man becomes aware of building a world; by responding to this necessity, it creates the juridical, political, social, cultural order.

In this attitude - which is similar to Marx's urge for the concrete and his aversion to all abstract philosophizing - the humanistic interpretation of Cicero and Quintilian comes into play, which is fundamentally misunderstood if one only, as usual, reduced to a "literary" Ciceronianism of the Humanists.

In »De oratore« Cicero opens up about his rejection of Greek philosophy, which begins with Socrates. »While they are the people who were engaged in the treatment, study and teaching of the subjects we are now examining (meaning the intimate relationship of jurisprudence as concrete philosophizing and rhetoric) with a single name - since the g a m e study and the practice of liberal arts was called Philosophy - Socrates deprives them of this general designation and separates in his discussions the science of wise thought from that of the ele -gantén speaking, although in reality they are closely linked.«⁴¹

With this view, Cicero charges, Socrates became the source »from which sprang the undoubtedly absurd, and unfavorable and blameworthy separation between tongue and brain.« It is worth noting that Cicero makes the connection between rhetoric and jurisprudence here that later leads to the humanistic evaluation of the art of rhetoric - as speech that is always historically bound. "The successors of Socrates severed the connection with the practicing legislature and stripped it of the general title of philosophy, although the old masters had striven for a wonderfully close bond between rhetoric and philosophy." ⁴²

The following text by Quintilian - an author to whom no meaning should have been ascribed for a long time - appears in this context in a completely new light: »M a A Demand does not go beyond my wanting the orator to be a philosopher, because no other area of life was further removed from civic duties and from any orator's duty. After all, who among the philosophers was often present at court judgments or bothered to take part in the popular assemblies? We reacted

finally in the

Administration

of the state, about which most of
you're right

h au fig V or-

had writings written? I would like every Roman I educate to be a wise man, not in isolated disputes, but in the endeavors and work with things, recognizing himself as a truly middle-class man shows. But the studies of wisdom were abandoned by those who turned to eloquence, because they were no longer pursued in public at all, but settled first in the pillared halls and in the G ymnasiums and then in the ab-41 C ice ro , D e O ra to re , I I I . X V I , 59.

45 *C icero , a. a. O . , III , XIX , 73.*

*schlossenem Verband der Schulen zurückzogen... So muß man die Autoren gründlich durchwälzen, die über die Tugend schreiben, damit das Leben des Redners mit dem Wissen von den göttlichen und menschlichen Dingen verbunden ist.*⁴³

Die Humanisten kehren die traditionelle Beziehung zwischen Theorie und Praxis um. Dieses Problem bildet das Schwergewicht der »Camaldolenser Gespräche« von Cristoforo Landino, eines Textes, der noch in keiner Geschichte der Philosophie gewürdigt wurde: er bleibt Gegenstand der romanistischen Literaturgeschichte. In diesen Gesprächen vertritt Leon Battista Alberti den Vorrang des theoretischen Lebens, während Lorenzo il Magnifico den Vorrang des praktischen Lebens vertritt. Aber anstatt bei dieser Alternative zu verharren, wirft man die Frage nach ihrer gemeinsamen Wurzel auf, die man schließlich im konkreten historischen, politischen und sozialen Werden des Menschen erblickt, wofür Aeneas zum Symbol wird.

4. DREI GRUNDTHESEN VICOS UND DER MARXISMUS

Wir wollen nun auf drei Grundthesen Vicos eingehen, weil bei ihm diese ganze Überlieferung in ihrer philosophischen Bedeutung mündet. Erstens: Gegenstand der Philosophie muß das Wesen des Menschen und sein Werden in der Gesellschaft sein; dadurch wird die traditionelle Metaphysik der Natur überwunden. »Doch in dieser Nacht voller Schatten, die für unser Auge das entfernteste Altertum bedeckt, erscheint das ewige Licht, das nicht untergeht, von jener Wahrheit, die man in keiner Weise in Zweifel ziehen kann: daß diese historische Welt ganz gewiß von den Menschen gemacht ist: und darum können (denn sie müssen) in den Modifikationen unseres eigenen menschlichen Geistes ihre Prinzipien aufgefunden werden.«⁴⁴

Zweitens: Bei der Selbstverwirklichung des Menschen spielt die Phantasie eine entscheidende Rolle. Der schöpferische Geist bekommt sich in der Fähigkeit zu transponieren, wodurch der Mensch seine Freiheit gegenüber der Natur behauptet. Die Stiftung der ersten Ordnung der Welt vollzieht sich, nach Vico, in einer phantastischen Metaphysik, Logik, Ethik, Physik und Geographie. »Die poetische Wahrheit, die die erste Weisheit des Heidentums war, mußte mit einer Metaphysik beginnen, und zwar nicht mit einer abstrakten und verstandesmäßigen, wie die der Gelehrten, sondern einer sinnlich empfundenen und durch Einbildungskraft vorgestellten, wie es solchen ersten Menschen entspricht, die gar kein Nachdenken, aber ganz starke Sinne und mächtige Phantasie besaßen.«⁴⁵

Drittens: Da die rationale Tätigkeit auf Schlüsse abzielt, syllogistisch vorgeht, fehlt ihr der eigentliche schöpferische Charakter. Deswegen braucht sie immer den Nährboden der Phantasie: verläßt sie sie, um autonom zu werden, so kommt es zur Barbarei des rationalen Zeitalters. Hier liegt der Sinn von Vicos Theorie über die Wieder-

⁴³ Quintilian, Inst. orat. II, 2, 5–10.

⁴⁴ G. B. Vico, Die neue Wissenschaft, 1744, übers. v. E. Auerbach, Reinbek, 1966, S. 51.

⁴⁵ a. a. O., S. 67 f.

*closed association of schools withdrawn. ... So one must thoroughly go through the authors who write about virtue, so that the life of the speaker is connected with the knowledge of divine and human things.*⁴³

The humanists reverse the traditional relationship between

theory and practice. This problem is the focus of the

"Camaldoiese Talks" by Cristoforo Landino, a text that has not yet been appreciated in any history of philosophy: it remains the subject of Romance literary history. In these conversations, Leon Battista Alberti asserts the primacy of the theoretical life, while Lorenzo il Magnifico asserts the primacy of the practical life. But instead of persisting with this alternative, one raises the question of their common root, which one finally sees in the concrete historical, political and social becoming of man, of which Aeneas becomes a symbol.

4.

D R E I G R U N D T H E S E N V I C O S U N D D E R M A R X I S M U S

We now want to go into three basic theses of Vico, because with him this whole tradition ends in its philosophical meaning. First: the object of philosophy must be the essence of man and his becoming in society; thereby the traditional metaphysics of nature is overcome. »But in this night full of shadows, which to our eyes covers the most distant antiquity, the eternal light that does not set appears, of that truth which can in no way be doubted: that this historical world is certainly of the *is* made by men: and therefore its principles can (for they must) be found in the modifications of our own human mind.«44

Second: Imagination plays a decisive role in human self-realization. The creative spirit manifests itself in the ability to transpose, whereby man asserts his freedom from nature. The founding of the first order of the world takes place, according to Vico, in a fantastic metaphysics, logic, ethics, physics and geography. "The poetic truth, which was the first wisdom of paganism, had to begin with a metaphysics, not abstract and intellectual, like those of the learned, but sensible, and imagined by the imagination, like it corresponds to those first human beings who had no thought at all, but possessed very strong senses and powerful imagination.«45

Third: Since rational activity aims at inferences and proceeds syllogistically, it lacks the actual creative character. That is why it always needs the breeding ground of imagination: if it abandons it in order to become autonomous, the result is the barbarism of the rational age. Here lies the meaning of Vico's theory about the re-43 Q u in *tilia n*, *Inst. orat. II*, 2, 5-10.

44 G. B. Vico, *The New Science*, 1744, trans. v. E. Auerbach, Reinbek,

1966, p. 51.

45 a. a. O., S. 67 f.

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kehr der Barbarei: »Zuerst fühlen die Menschen das Notwendige; dann achten sie auf das Nützliche, darauf bemerken sie das Bequeme, weiter erfreuen sie sich am Gefälligen, später verdirbt sie der Luxus, schließlich werden sie toll und zerstören ihr Erbe.«⁴⁶

Es ist einleuchtend, daß die Probleme des italienischen Humanismus nicht als philosophische Probleme anerkannt werden konnten, solange Philosophie als abstrakte Metaphysik galt, als apriorische Ableitung eines Gesamtsystems des Wissens. Im Marxismus nun taucht wieder die Auseinandersetzung mit jeder abstrakten Logik auf; Vorrang erhält wieder die Frage nach dem Werden des Menschen und nach dem Entstehen der Gemeinschaft, Vorrang erhält der Begriff einer Praxis, die sich als der konkrete Nährboden der theoretischen Fragen erweist. »Die Frage, ob dem Menschlichen Denken gegenständliche Wahrheit zukomme, ist keine Frage der Theorie, sondern eine praktische Frage. In der Praxis muß der Mensch die Wahrheit, i. e. Wirklichkeit und Macht, Diesseitigkeit seines Denkens beweisen.«⁴⁷

Zum ersten Mal, nachdem die Bemühungen des italienischen Humanismus verdeckt und vergessen worden waren, rückt wieder der Begriff der Praxis in den Vordergrund, verstanden als Vermenschlichung der Natur oder eigentlich als Theorie des Menschen als eines offenen Wesens, in dessen Offenheit die Wurzel seiner Geschichtlichkeit liegt. In der Praxis durchwebt sich die Verwandlung der Natur mit den mannigfaltigen konkreten Aspekten der individuellen menschlichen, leidenschaftlichen, sozialen, politischen Komponenten, deren Wichtigkeit und deren philosophische Bedeutung zum letztenmal im italienischen Humanismus erkannt worden waren.

Die Philosophie – entsprechend der humanistischen Überlieferung – darf nicht mehr den Anspruch erheben, über den Menschen zu reflektieren, sie soll sich in der konkreten Handlung ihre Fragen herausarbeiten und dadurch selbst Geschichte schaffen. Erst dann können die Sinneserscheinungen, die pathetischen Momente, die Phantasie, die Redekunst in ihrer ursprünglichen humanistischen philosophischen Bedeutung erschlossen werden.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ a. a. O., S. 101.

⁴⁷ K. Marx, Thesen über Feuerbach, II, in MEW, Bd. II, Berlin 1958.

P. Vranicki hat diesen Gedanken mit größter Klarheit hervorgehoben: »Es ist klar, daß die hegelische idealistische Dialektik, gerade weil sie eine Dialektik des Bewußtseins ist, im absoluten Moment des Selbstbewußtseins kulminieren mußte, und daß die Überwindung dieser idealistischen Beschränkung nicht einfach durch das naiv verstandene Hegel 'auf-die-Füße-stellen' – also dadurch, daß man den Ontologismus der Ideen einfach ersetzt durch einen Ontologismus der Materie – aufgehoben werden kann. . . Die bisher gründliche Einsicht in die hier beschriebene Problematik enthält die Konzeption vom Menschen als Wesen der Praxis – einer Praxis, die eine Einheit aus theoretischer und sinnlicher Tätigkeit darstellt. Hier treten zwei verschiedene Motive in den Vordergrund: die sinnliche Transformation der (materiellen und historischen) Wirklichkeit (Umbildung, Produktion, Veränderung) und die bewußte Tätigkeit des Menschen.« P. Vranicki, Mensch und Geschichte, Frankfurt/Main, 1969, S. 79.

⁴⁸ »Der Marxismus ist eine Philosophie der Tat, eine Philosophie, die aus dem Bewußtsein und der menschlichen Praxis, von der sie erzeugt und unaufhörlich bereichert wird, eine echte Wirklichkeit macht, die in der früheren Tätigkeit und in der Wirklichkeit unaufhörlich durch schöpferische Akte erweitert, die auf der

It is evident that the problems of Italian humanism could not be recognized as philosophical problems as long as philosophy was treated as abstract metaphysics, as the a priori derivation of a total system of knowledge. In Marxism the confrontation with every abstract logic reappears; Priority is again given to the question of human development and the emergence of the community, priority is given to the concept of a practice that proves to be the concrete breeding ground for theoretical questions . “The question of whether human thinking has objective truth is not a question of theory, but a practical question. In practice, man must accept the truth, i. e. prove the reality and power, this worldliness of his thinking.«47

For the first time, after the efforts of Italian humanism had been covered up and forgotten, the concept of praxis comes to the fore again, understood as the humanization of nature or, more precisely, as theory of man as an open being, in whose openness lies the root of his historicity. In practice, the transformation of nature interweaves with the manifold concrete aspects of the individual human, passionate, social, political components, whose importance and philosophical significance are discussed for the last time in the Italian Humanism us were recognized.

The philosophy - according to the humanistic tradition

- may no longer claim to reflect on people, it should work out its questions in the concrete action and thereby create history itself. Only then can the sensory phenomena, the pathetic moments, the imagination, the art of rhetoric be opened up in their original humanistic philosophical meaning. 48

46 a. a. O., S. 101.

47 K. Marx, Theseenbibliothek, II, in MEW, Bd. II, Berlin 1958.

P. Vranic k i t h i s e n G e d a n k e n m i t g r o f i t e r
Klarheitervorgehoben : *Es ist klar, dafi die Hegelsch cide alist sche Dia-
lect ic , g e ra d e w e il sie e in e D ia lect of the Bew uftseins ist, im a b s
o l u t e n M o m e n t of the Self stb e w u ftsein s c u l m i e re n m ufite,
u n d dafi d ie O b e rwin d u n g d ie seri d e a l s t i s c h e n Beschränk-
nichte in fach du rc h as naive verstandene Hegel 'auf -die - F u fie - s te lle
n ' - also dadurc h , define the Ontology of the Idea through the Ontology
of Matter -

*a u fg e h o b e n w o r d Die b i s h e r grün d lich e An
insight in his h i e r b e s c h e r e b e n e P r o b l e m a t i c e n t h a l t die
K o n z e p t i o n vom M e n s c h e n a l s W e s e n d e r P r a x i s - e i n e r
P r a x i s , die e ine E in heit aus theoretischer und innlicher T a tigkeit dars*

tellt. Hier tritt ein zwischenvorleschliche dene Motive in the Vordergrund: the sinnliche Transformation und der (material and historical) Wirklichkeit (Building, Production, Summer -

dern) und die bewußte Tätigkeit des Menschen. « P. Vranicki, Mensch und Geschichte, Frankfurt/Main, 1969, p.79.

48 » Der Marxismus ist eine Philosophie der Tat, ein Philosoph, die aus dem Bewußtsein und der menschlichen Praxis, von und erziegt und kann auf fruchtbar gemacht, die in der früheren Tätigkeit und der Wirklichkeit auf horlich durchschaupferische Achtung weitet, die auf der

Mahnend klingen die Worte Cristofor Landinos: »Wenn nun unter der Schar euer Philosoph auftaucht, der seine Muße liebt (*sapiens ociosus*), Maulaffen feilhält, nur für sich allein da ist, sich in seine Bibliothek verkriecht (*in sua solus bibliotheca delitescens*), niemals ausgeht, mit keinem Menschen verkehrt, niemand begrüßt und weder in privater noch in öffentlicher Tätigkeit etwas leistet: welche Rolle im Gemeinwesen sollen wir ihm geben? . . . 'Ich lebe geruhsam' – hält er uns entgegen – 'und erforsche in der tiefsten Stille das Wesen der Natur und strebe danach, in allen Dingen das Wahre zu finden' (vum *naturae speculator atque verum in rebus omnibus invenire contendo*). Fürwahr, du hast es gut! Aber hüte dich, deine natürliche Bestimmung zu vergessen (*sed cave ne tuae naturae oblitue videare*), wenn du allein lebst und von den anderen überhaupt nichts wissen willst.«⁴⁹

5. VORRANG DER PHANTASIE ODER DER KRITIK? PERMANENTE REVOLUTION UND INSTITUTIONALISIERUNG

Bei dem Aufleben humanistischer Grundgedanken ergeben sich verschiedene Probleme. Vor allem: für den italienischen Humanismus wird die Veränderung und Aneignung der Natur ursprünglich durch die Phantasie vollzogen. Wenn aber Marx behauptet, das die ökonomische Struktur der Gesellschaft und damit die Arbeit, ihre eigene reale Grundlage bildet, über der sich der geistige Überbau erhebt, bzw. daß die Produktionsweise der materiellen Güter die Prozesse der übrigen Sphären des gesellschaftlichen Lebens bedingt,⁵⁰ welche Rolle kann man dann noch der Phantasie zusprechen? Beide Momente – Phantasie und Arbeit – stehen allerdings als Zeugen für das schöpferische Wesen des Menschen. Es erhebt sich die Frage, wem wir den Vorrang zuerkennen müssen. Marx betont, daß die Arbeit unter allen Geschäftsformen der Existenzbedingung des Menschen eine ewige Naturnotwendigkeit ist: vor allem durch sie geschieht das, was er den »Stoffwechsel zwischen Mensch und Natur« nennt, also das, was das menschliche Leben vermittelt.⁵¹

Da Arbeit Freiheit voraussetzt – denn Arbeit setzt voraus, daß man die Natur verändert – und diese Freiheit vor allem durch die Phantasie erfahren wird, die die Offenheit des Menschen bekundet – bedeutet dann die These vom Vorrang der Arbeit – als schöpferische Haupttätigkeit des Menschen – nicht eine Einengung des kreativen Wesens des Menschen? Nun ist die Phantasie, als ursprüngliche Form des Transzendorierens d. h. des Übertragens – nicht nur Entstehungsort der Arbeit, sondern auch der Sprache, der Kunst, der Jurisprudenz, d. h. aller jener Tätigkeiten, durch die der Mensch seine Freiheit in der Gemeinschaft zelebriert. Arbeit ist *ein* Aspekt der kreativen menschlichen Tätigkeit.

Ebene der prähumanen Natur nicht existieren und deren Erfolg durch nichts im voraus garantiert ist.« R. Garaudy, *Der Marxismus im XX. Jahrhundert*, Reinbek, 1969, S. 72.

⁴⁹ C. Landino, *Disputationes camaldolenses*, Florenz, 1480, Blatt 17.

⁵⁰ vgl. K. Marx »Vorwort zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie«.

⁵¹ vgl. K. Marx, *Das Kapital*, Berlin, 1960, S. 47.

*The words of Cristofor Landino sound admonishing: "If your philosopher appears among the crowd, who loves his mufie (*sapiens ociosus*), sells mouth monkeys, is only there for himself, crawls into his library (*in sua solus bibliotheca delitescens*), never goes out, associates with no one,*

accepts no one, and does nothing in either private or public activity: what role in the community should we give him? . . . 'I live peacefully' - he holds out to us - 'and investigate the essence of nature in the deepest silence and strive to find the truth in all things' (*vim naturae speculator atque verum in rebus omnibus invenire contendo*).

Indeed, you have it good! But be careful not to forget your natural destiny (*sed cave nc tuae naturae oblitue videare*) if you live alone and don't want to know anything about the others at all.«

5. FOR RANG THE RPHANTASIO D E R D E R C R I T I ?

*P E R M A N E N T E R E V O L U T I O N U N D I N S T I T U T I O N A L
IS IE R U N G*

With the revival of humanistic basic ideas arise

*different problems. Above all: for Italian humanism, the modification and appropriation of nature is originally accomplished through the imagination. If, however, Marx asserts that the economic structure of society and thus work forms its own real basis over which the intellectual superstructure rises, or that the mode of production of material goods determines the processes of the other spheres of social life, 50 what role can one still assign to the imagination? However, both moments - imagination and work - stand as witnesses to the creative nature of man. The question arises as to whom we must give priority. Marx emphasizes that work in all forms of human existence is an eternal natural necessity: it is above all through it that what he calls the "metabolism between man and nature" occurs, that is, what human life mediates.*⁵¹

Since work presupposes freedom - because work presupposes that one changes nature - and this freedom is experienced above all through the imagination, which manifests the openness of man -

Doesn't the thesis of the priority of work - as the main creative activity of man - mean a restriction of the creative nature of man? Now the imagination, as the original form of transcending i. H. of the transmission - not only the place of origin of the work, but also of language, art, jurisprudence, i. H. all those activities through which man celebrates his freedom in the community. Work is an aspect of creative human activity.

level of p r a h u m an e n a tu r not cxisticren and whose success is not guaran teed in advance.« R. G a ra u d y , Der M arxism us im X X . Century, Reinbek, 1969, p. 72.

17.

40 vgl. K. Marx »Vorwort zu *r Critique of Political Economy*«.

41 vgl. K. Marx, *The Capital*, Berlin, 1960, p.47.

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Es ist allerdings nicht zu leugnen, daß die Rolle der Phantasie die Marxisten stets beschäftigt hat. Marx verweist auf die Phantasie als wesentliche Instanz für die Sprengung jeder Institutionalisierung, auch jener, die die Revolution hervorbringt: die Phantasie ist eigentlich die Wurzel der »permanennten« Revolution: »Wenn es nicht Vergnügen macht, aus eigenen Mitteln die ganze Welt zu bauen, Weltschöpfer zu sein, als in seiner eigenen Haut sich ewig herumzutreiben, über den hat der Geist sein Anathema ausgesprochen, der ist mit dem Interdikt belegt, aber mit einem umgekehrten, der ist aus dem Tempel und den ewigen Geunß des Geistes gestoßen und darauf hin gewiesen, über seine eigene Privatseligkeit zu träumen.«⁵²

Die Phantasie als Wurzel der »permanennten« Revolution ist wohl folgendermaßen zu verstehen: Innerhalb der Gesellschaft verwirklicht sich das menschliche, schöpferische Werden durch die Revolution, die immer wieder neue Formen des Miteinanderseins hervor bringt und die damit die »Offenheit« des Menschen beweist. Jede verwirklichte Revolution muß aber nun ihre Ergebnisse institutionalisieren; Institutionalisierung ist das Ergebnis der rationalem Tätigkeit, d. h. hier: von den durch die Revolution erzielten Ergebnissen werden bestimmte Folgen abgeleitet. Diese rationale Tätigkeit ist nichts Schöpferisches; sie setzt das schon Erreichte voraus. Die Institutionalisierung der erreichten Formen bringt daher immer auch die Gefahr mit sich, daß die weitere Entwicklung im Werden des Menschen verhindert wird. Institutionalisierung tritt auf, wenn die Revolution zum Stillstand gelangt, sie kristallisiert sie und läuft daher Gefahr, den immer neu auftretenden Anforderungen der Geschichte nicht mehr zu entsprechen. Das erneute Überschreiten der von einer Revolution erreichten Prämissen kann aber nicht Sache der Ratio, der Institutionalisierung sein. Die kristallisierten Formen stellen – sofern sie die Entfaltung des einzelnen verhindern – eine Entfremdung des Menschen dar: Verhinderung des weiteren revolutionären Werdens. Deswegen ist auch die Entfremdung kein Phänomen, das nur mit *einer Form* der Gesellschaft in Erscheinung tritt, denn sie gehört zur Entwicklung des Menschen. Das »inventive« Moment, das Über-die-Prämissen-Hinausgehen ist Angelegenheit der Phantasie als Einsicht und Entwurf neuer Möglichkeiten: Phantasie als höchste revolutionäre Instanz. Sache der Ratio ist dann die Ableitung aus dem neu Erreichten: Institutionalisierung.

Ein weiteres Problem: der Humanismus darf ebensowenig wie der Marxismus in einen Existentialismus umgedeutet werden. Der Existentialismus Heideggers hat niemals das konkrete geschichtliche Werden des Menschen berücksichtigt, denn sein Hauptproblem bezieht sich immer auf die Metaphysik als Seinslehre. Das erklärt, warum Heidegger selbst niemals die lateinische Tradition Ciceros oder die des italienischen Humanismus bewertet hat. Er bleibt stets im traditionellen Formschema des Theoretikers, dem es als solchem kommt, die wissenschaftliche Kultur zu bestimmen. Alle seine Untersuchungen verpflichten sich zu einer theoretischen Einstellung, die

⁵² K. Marx, Texte zur Methode der Praxis, Bd. I, Jugendschriften 1835–1841, hg. v. G. Hillman, Reinbek, 1969, S. 97.

R evolution: »If not for pleasure power to build the whole world with your own means, to be a world-creator, than to hang around in your own skin forever, the spirit has expressed its anathem about him, he is m Interdicted but with a reverse one, he is cast out of the temple and the eternal pleasures of the spirit and advised to dream about his own privacy.«52

Imagination as the root of the "permanent" revolution can probably be understood as follows: Within society, human, creative becoming is realized through the revolution, which again and again creates new forms of being together and who thus proves the »openness« of the human being. However, every realized revolution must now institutionalize its results;

Institutionalization is the result of rational activity, i. H. here: certain consequences are derived from the results achieved by the R evolution. This rational activity is not creative; it presupposes what has already been achieved. The institutionalization of the form that has been reached therefore always brings with it the danger that further development in the becoming of man is prevented. Institutionalization occurs when the revolution has come to a standstill, it crystallizes it and therefore runs the risk of no longer responding to the ever-evolving demands of history.

However, once again exceeding the premises achieved by a revolution cannot be a matter of reason, of institutionalization. The crystallized forms - insofar as they prevent the development of the individual - represent an alienation of man: prevention of further revolutionary development. That is why alienation is not a phenomenon that only occurs with one form of society, because it is part of human development. The »inventive« moment, going beyond the premises is a matter of imagination as insight and the design of new possibilities: imagination as the highest revolutionary instance. A matter of reason is then the derivation from what has just been achieved: institutionalization.

A further problem: humanism, like marxism, must not be reinterpreted as existentialism. H eidegger's existentialism never took into account the concrete historical becoming of man, because his main problem always relates to metaphysics as a doctrine of being. That explains why H eidegger himself never evaluated Cicero's Latin tradition or that of Italian humanism. He always stays in tra -

ditional formal scheme of the theoretician, who as such is responsible for determining scientific culture. All his investigations commit to a theoretical attitude that 52 K - M an f - T e x te zu r M e th o d e d o r P r a x e , Vol. I, J u g e n d w h i f t e n 1835-1841, ed. v. G . H illm a n , R e inbek, 1969, p. 97.

den Anspruch erhebt, die Theorie von der konkreten Geschichte, in der der Mensch lebt, zu befreien. Daher hat sich Heidegger bis zu seinem plötzlichen politischen Engagement für den Nationalsozialismus niemals über politische, soziale Fragen geäußert. Für Heidegger geht es – trotz seinem Existentialismus – darum, Praxis nach der Maßgabe der wissenschaftlichen Vernunft, also in der Entsprechung zu Wahrheitsnormen durchzuführen: Selbstverantwortung auf Grund theoretischer Einsichten, nicht auf Grund von Fragen, die sich aus der konkreten Geschichte ergeben. Die Wissenschaft muß die Objektivität ihrer Aussagen gegen den Druck und die Verführung partikularer, geschichtlicher Interessen erringen.

Ein letztes Problem: Es ist notwendig, der Gefahr entgegenzutreten, daß die Soziologie die einzige wahre philosophische Instanz zu sein beansprucht. Gewiß, Marx bietet die Voraussetzung dafür, daß die Erkenntnistheorie des Idealismus sich in eine Gesellschaftstheorie verwandelt, in Soziologie, in der der Begriff der Arbeit als Verwandlung der Natur die zentrale Rolle spielt. J. Habermas bemüht sich, die Differenz zwischen dem Idealismus und Marx zu zeigen, um die soeben angedeutete These zu beweisen, daß an die Stelle der abstrakten Philosophie des Idealismus eine Theorie der Gesellschaft tritt. Habermas erinnert daran, daß »die Synthesis des Stoffes der Arbeit durch die Arbeitskraft ihre tatsächliche Einheit erhält unter Kategorien des hantierenden Menschen. Diese technischen Regeln der Synthesis nehmen als Instrumente im weitesten Sinne sinnliche Existenz an und gehören zum historischen veränderlichen Inventar der Gesellschaften.«⁵³

Habermas weist darauf hin, daß Fichte und Hegel an die transzendentale Logik anknüpfen, sei es, um aus der reinen Apperzeption die Tathandlung des absoluten Ich, sei es, um aus den Antinomien und Paralogismen der reinen Vernunft die dialektische Bewegung des absoluten Begriffes zu rekonstruieren. »Wenn sich hingegen Synthesis nicht im Medium des Denkens, sondern des Arbeitens vollzieht, wie Marx annimt, dann ist das Substrat, in dem sie ihren Niederschlag findet, das System der gesellschaftlichen Arbeit und nicht im Zusammenhang mit Symbolen.⁵⁴

Bestreitet man, daß sämtliche Faktoren, die dem Entstehen der Gesellschaft zugrunde liegen, nur auf die Arbeit zurückzuführen sind – wie Vico es mit der Hervorhebung der Rolle der Phantasie getan hat – so erscheint es sehr fraglich, ob eine rein soziologische Gesellschaftstheorie, die an die Stelle einer idealistischen Erkenntnistheorie tritt, zur Bewältigung der beim Entstehen der menschlichen Gemeinschaft auftretenden Probleme geeignet ist. Die soziologische Struktur des Menschen verweist auf Voraussetzungen, die nicht Gegenstand der Soziologie sind noch sein können.

⁵³ J. Habermas, *Erkenntnis und Interesse*, Frankf./M. 1969, S. 48.

⁵⁴ J. Habermas, *Erkenntnis und Interesse*, Frankf./M. 1969, S. 44.

»Nicht die regelrechte Verknüpfung von Symbolen, sondern die gesellschaftlichen Prozesse, die materielle Hervorbringung und Aneignung der Produkte, bieten dann den Stoff, an dem die Reflexion ansetzen kann, um die grundlegenden synthetischen Leistungen zum Bewußtsein zu bringen.«

claims to liberate theory from the concrete history in which man lives. For this reason, Heidegger never dwelt on political, social questions until his sudden political commitment to National Socialism. For Heidegger - despite his existentialism - it is about carrying out practice according to the

standards of scientific reason, i.e. in accordance with norms of truth: self-responsibility on the basis of theoretical insights, not on the basis of questions that arise from concrete history. Science must achieve the objectivity of its statements against the pressure and seduction of particular, historical interests.

A final problem: it is necessary to face the danger that sociology claims to be the only true philosophical authority. Certainly, Marx offers the prerequisite for the epistemology of idealism to be transformed into a social theory, into sociology, in which the concept of work as a transformation of nature plays the central role. J. Habermas endeavors to show the difference between idealism and Marx in order to prove the thesis just indicated that a theory of society takes the place of the abstract philosophy of idealism. Habermas reminds us that 'the synthesis of the substance of labor through labor power receives its actual unity under the categories of man in action. These technical rules of synthesis assume a sensuous existence as instruments in the broadest sense and belong to the historically variable inventory of societies.»⁵³

Habermas points out that Fichte and Hegel take up transcendental logic, either in order to reconstruct the action of the absolute ego from pure apperception or in order to reconstruct the dialectical movement of the absolute concept from the antinomies and paralogisms of pure reason. "If, on the other hand, synthesis does not take place in the medium of thought but of work, as Marx assumes, then the substrate in which it is reflected is the system of social work and not in the context of symbols."⁶⁴

If one denies that all the factors underlying the emergence of society can be traced back only to work -

as Vico has done in emphasizing the role of the imagination

- so it seems very questionable whether a purely sociological theory of society, which takes the place of an idealistic epistemology, is suitable for overcoming the problems arising in the emergence of the human community. The sociological structure of man points to assumptions that are not and cannot be the subject of sociology.

M J. Habermas, Work and Interest, Frank f./M . 1969, S. 48.

54 J. Habermas, Work and Interest, Frank f./M . 1969, p. 44.

» Not the regular linkage of symbols, but the social processes, the material production and appropriation of the products, then offer the material on which the reflection can start to bring the basic synthetic liberations to

consciousness.«

5 p r a x is

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LITERATURKRITIK UND MARXISTISCHE PHILOSOPHIE

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Stehen die im Titel angeführten Relate in irgendeinem Sinnzusammenhang? Wenn bereits eine »moderne« Literaturkritik jede Verbindung mit der Philosophie mehr oder minder entschieden ablehnt, wenn sie dieses Philosophieren über die Literatur oder dieses literarische Philosophieren als Verundeutlichung ansieht, die ein exaktes positives Erforschen des literarischen Werkes aus sich selbst und wegen seiner selbst vereitelt und dem Kunstwerk irgendwelche aprioristischen, ideellen, philosophischen Koordinaten aufdrängt – wie sollen wir dann erst rechtfertigen diese Relation mit der marxistischen Philosophie, die berüchtigt ist wegen ihrer soziologischen oder ideologischen Vulgarisierungen, Schablonen und Schemata, die sie allen ideellen und wirklichen Phänomenen aufzudrängen sucht? Wenn also die Rede von der Begründung der Literaturkritik in der marxistischen Philosophie ist, wäre es dann nicht nach all den unliebsamen Erfahrungen besser, von einer besonderen, aprioristisch-deduktiven, beziehungsweise pragmatistisch-politischen Kritik, im Grunde also von einer literarischen Pseudokritik zu sprechen? Diese Relate sind also unvereinbar, auch dann, wenn man von jenen rosafarbenen Apologien oder wütenden Verdammungen absieht die – abhängig davon, ob es sich um ein gesellschaftlich fortschrittliches oder ein »reaktionäres« Werk handelt – jeder marxistische literarische Quasikritiker im Namen des Marxismus austreiben muß. Meine Grundthese jedoch, die ich gleich zu Beginn aufstellen möchte und die ich dann breiter auszuführen versuchen werde, besteht darin, daß fast die gesamte negative Erfahrung, die aus dem Versuch der In-Verbindung-Setzung der angeführten Korrelate hervorgeht sowie alle wirklichen Mißverständnisse, die sich aus solch einer scheinbaren Mesalliance ergeben – in der falschen, pervertierten Auffassung davon, was als marxistische Philosophie bezeichnet werden kann und zum Teil auch in dem, was wir unter dem Begriff Literaturkritik zusammenfassen wollen, wurzelt. Um von vornherein jedes Mißverständnis auszuschließen: fast die gesamte bisherige konkrete Praxis der sogenannten marxistischen Literaturkritiker (mit Ausnahme nur weniger Namen) rechtfertigt eine radikale

Are the relations listed in the title related in any way? If a "modern" literary criticism more or less decidedly rejects any connection with philosophy, if it regards this philosophizing about literature or this literary philosophizing as clarification, the exact positive investigation of the literary work out of itself and for its own sake thwarts and imposes some *a priori*, idealistic, philosophical coordinates on the work of art - how are we then supposed to justify this relation with the marxist philosophy, which is notorious for its sociological or ideological vulgarizations, templates and schemes that it seeks to impose on all ideal and real phenomena? So if we are talking about the justification of literary criticism in Marxist philosophy, would it not be better, after all the unpleasant experiences, of a special, *a priori*-deductive, or pragmatist one -political criticism, basically speaking of a literary pseudo-criticism? These relations are therefore incompatible, even if one abstains from those pink apologies or raging condemnations - depending on whether it is a socially progressive or a »reactionary« work of art - every Marxist literary quasi-critic in the name of Marxism has to expel. However, my basic thesis, which I would like to set up right at the beginning and which I will then try to elaborate more broadly, is that almost the entire negative experience resulting from the attempt to connect the mentioned correlates, and all the real misunderstandings that result from such an apparent misalliance - in the wrong, perverted conception of what can be termed Marxist philosophy and, in part, in what we want to summarize under the term literary criticism, takes root. To rule out any misunderstanding from the outset: almost the entire previous concrete practice of the so-called Marxist literary critics (with the exception of only a few names) justifies a radical 344

Kritik an dieser Art der Literaturkritik. Wir werden uns also weniger auf konkrete Erfahrungen stützen können sondern vielmehr von den noch nicht realisierten Möglichkeiten einer solchen Kritik sprechen müssen.

Einleitend nur ein paar Worte zu dem schon so oft diskutierten und immer noch offenen Thema der Wechselbeziehungen zwischen Literaturkritik und Philosophie. Viele Literaturkritiker treten mit allem Nachdruck für die sehr verbreitete Meinung ein, derzufolge sich die Literaturkritik, um ihre Werturteile unmittelbar und unbewußt fällen zu können, vor allem von Begriffen, Definitionen und Systemen, kurz vor allem, was dieser volkstümlichen Vorstellung nach den Charakter der Philosophie haben könnte, in acht nehmen solle. Croce hat schon im Jahre 1918 in seinem Aufsatz »Literaturkritik als Philosophie« diesen Kritikern präzis und logisch überzeugend geantwortet. Trotzdem bin ich aber der Meinung, daß er hier und besonders in seinen weiteren Schlußfolgerungen das Gebiet der Philosophie, beziehungsweise der auf ihr fußenden Kritik auf ein begriffliches, rationales Denken eingegrenzt hat und dadurch eine transzendentale Kritik seiner eigenen Kritik an solchen antiphilosophischen Kritiken ermöglicht hat. Croce schreibt: »... Kritik heißt Urteil, das Urteil setzt das Kriterium der Beurteilung voraus, das Kriterium der Beurteilung das begriffliche Denken, und das begriffliche Denken setzt ein Verhältnis zu anderen Begriffen voraus; und das Verhältnis der Begriffe ist letzten Endes ein System oder die Philosophie«. Croces Hervorhebung des Bedürfnisses nach rationalen Begriffen oder Kriterien, oder mit anderen Worten, diese ein wenig allgemeinverständlich vereinfachte Logik, die, wenn es sich um die Wissenschaft handelt, nur auf Begriffen insistiert, birgt zweifellos in sich die Gefahr einer Beschränkung der Literaturkritik auf eine starre, kalte, inerte, ja sogar triviale Feststellung bestimmter begrifflicher Kriterien und Koordinaten, denen dann fast in der Regel der gesamte unermeßliche innere Reichtum oder das feine zarte Gewebe eines literarischen Werkes entgeht. Die Literaturkritik kann wirklich nicht – wenn sie der Literatur nicht nur einfach passiv folgen will, sondern wenn sie auch selbst selbstständige Schöpfung sein will – auf die bloße Analyse des Begrifflichen, Gedanklichen, Kategorien zurückgeführten werden, weil auf diese Weise aus ihr nicht nur die gesamte Sphäre des Gefühlsmäßigen, Intuitiven oder Imaginativen ausgeschlossen wäre, sondern auch die Fähigkeit, die Beobachtungsgabe, die oft ohne begriffliches Rüstzeug zu einem bestimmten geistigen Zustand führt, der in das allgemeine Wesen und die einzelnen Phänomene des künstlerischen Schöpfertums tief und existentieller eindringen kann. Selbstverständlich dürfte auch der Begriff der Philosophie oder Ästhetik nicht – und die ganze Geschichte der Philosophie spricht eigentlich davon, daß das nicht nur ein faktischer Mißverständnis sondern auch eine Verfälschung wäre – einzig auf das rationale Denken beschränkt werden, das ein präzises, wissenschaftliches Kriterium voraussetzt und unter das angeblich auch jedes Konzept der Literaturkritik subsumiert werden muß.

Wir wollen aber versuchen, die Frage anders zu stellen: Ist es nicht Aufgabe des Literaturkritikers, der sich unvoreingenommen mit einem Werk zu befassen wünscht, zumindest sich selbst eine Reihe anderer,

Criticism of this kind of literary criticism. We will therefore be able to base ourselves less on concrete experiences than we will have to speak of the as yet unrealized possibilities of such a critique.

To begin with, just a few words on the topic of the interrelationship between literary criticism and philosophy, which has been discussed so often and is still open. Many literary critics emphatically support the very widespread opinion that, in order to be able to make their judgments directly and impartially, literary criticism has to look above all to concepts, definitions and systems, in short to everything that, according to this popular idea, characterizes philosophy could have should be careful. As early as 1918, Croce gave a precise and logically convincing answer to these critics in his essay "Literary Criticism as Philosophy."

Nevertheless, I am of the opinion that here and especially in his further conclusions he narrowed the field of philosophy, or rather the criticism based on it, to conceptual, rational thinking and thereby made possible a transcendent criticism of his own criticism of such anti-philosophical criticisms. Croce writes: » . . . Criticism means judgment, the judgment presupposes the criterion of judgment, the criterion of judgment conceptual thinking, and conceptual thinking presupposes a relationship to other concepts; and the relation of concepts is ultimately a system or philosophy. Croce's emphasis on the need for rational concepts or criteria, or in other words, this somewhat simplistic logic which, when it comes to science, insists only on concepts, undoubtedly harbors the danger of limiting literary criticism to one rigid, cold, inert, even trivial establishment of certain conceptual criteria and coordinates, which then almost as a rule escape the entire immeasurable inner richness or the fine delicate fabric of a literary work. Literary criticism really cannot - if it not only wants to passively follow literature, but if it also wants to be an independent creation itself - can be reduced to the mere analysis of the conceptual, intellectual, categories, because in this way not only the entire Sphere of the emotional, intuitive or imaginative would be excluded, but also the ability, the power of observation, which often without conceptual tools leads to a certain mental state that can penetrate deeper and more existentially into the general essence and the individual phenomena of artistic creativity. Of course, the concept of philosophy or aesthetics should not - and the whole history of philosophy actually speaks of the fact that this would not only be a factual misunderstanding but also a falsification - be restricted solely to rational thinking, which presupposes a precise, scientific criterion and under which supposedly every concept of literary criticism must also be subsumed.

But we want to try to put the question differently: Isn't it the task of the literary critic who wants to deal with a work impartially, at least himself a number of others, 345

viel entscheidenderen Fragen zu stellen? Zum Beispiel: Warum er sich mit dem literarischen Werk befassen will, was er will, aufgrund wessen er sich mit Kritik befaßt, warum er überhaupt in der Öffentlichkeit spricht, was der Sinn seines theoretischen Tuns ist, was er als die Quelle des Künstlerischen ansieht, ob er sich selbst, seine Werte und Werturteile in Frage stellen muß, wenn er ein literarisches Werk bewertet? Er wird auch folgende Fragen nicht umgehen können: Welche sind die Voraussetzungen, die ihm ermöglichen, sich ohne Vorurteile und frei von den Fesseln der Tradition mit der Literatur zu befassen; was für theoretische, gedankliche Ziele und Methoden es ihm ermöglichen nicht konfus, oder inkonsequent zu sein? Was überhaupt für den Kritiker das Verhältnis zur Literatur bedeutet? Ob dieses Verhältnis durch die subjektiven Bestrebungen des Kritikers oder die sogenannten objektiven, im Werk enthaltenen Werte vorausbestimmt ist, ob es überhaupt objektive Werte gibt oder ob sie nur im Betrachter des Werkes begründet sind? Und schließlich und endlich eine der wesentlichen Fragen: hat nicht nur die Literaturkritik sondern auch die Literaturerzeugung überhaupt einen Sinn, – die obwohl immer in organischer Verbindung mit der Welt, zugleich als edle Aufführung gegen den Alltag verwirklicht wird – wenn die Welt dadurch kein bißchen verändert wird, wenn sie auch weiterhin unter nicht-künstlerischen und nichthumanen Bedingungen lebt, wenn die allgemeine Verdierung und die technisch-wissenschaftliche Gleichschaltung jeden auch noch so bescheidenen Versuch eines authentischen Ausdrucks der Menschlichkeit überdeckt und erstickt? Heißt das nicht, diese Welt bestätigen und in ihren Koordinaten leben, sogar auch dann, wenn wir dieser Welt gegenüber eine kritische Stellungnahme haben? Das alles sind meiner Meinung nach Fragen, die ein ernster Literaturkritiker zumindest sich selbst stellen muß und all das sind zugleich Fragen, auf die auch die Philosophie eine Antwort zu geben bestrebt ist. Die Frage muß also anders gestellt werden: nicht ob es überhaupt eine Relation zwischen Literaturkritik und Philosophie gibt, sondern ob sie besteht, wenn es sich um eine bestimmte Philosophie handelt? Denn indem der Literaturkritiker auf die angeführten und noch eine Unzahl anderer Fragen eine Antwort sucht, wird er sich zwangsläufig für eine Philosophie oder Weltanschauung oder Denkweise als Voraussetzung für seine Arbeit entscheiden müssen, auch dann – was oft vorkommt – wenn er sich für einen ausgesprochen antiphilosophisch eingestellten Kritiker hält. Es ist uns allen sehr gut bekannt (manchmal haben wir es sogar missbraucht), daß auch der Positivismus eine bestimmte Philosophie ist. Warum beharren wir aber auf irgendeiner Verbindung zwischen Literaturkritik und marxistischer Philosophie?

Denn, wenn man sagt marxistische Philosophie, dann hat man sofort die Vorstellung – auch wenn man von dem ein wenig simplifizierten Bild absieht, das unter den Begriff Marxismus das selbstherrliche Arbitrieren einer im Grunde primitivistischen, ökonomisch-deterministischen Doktrin subsumiert – man hat also doch eine, zwar etwas gemilderte Vorstellung eines politisierten und ideologisierten Konzepts, das nicht nur das Recht sondern sogar die ausschließliche Pflicht hat, auf die klassenbedingten, politischen, ideologischen Wurzeln aller

he has to question himself, his values and value judgments when evaluating a literary work? He will also not be able to avoid the following questions: What are the conditions that allow him to deal with the literature without prejudice and free from the shackles of tradition; what theoretical, intellectual goals and methods enable him not to be confused or inconsistent? What does the relationship to literature actually mean for the critic? Whether this relationship is predetermined by the subjective strivings of the critic or the so-called objective values contained in the work, whether there are any objective values at all or whether they are only established in the viewer of the work ? And finally, one of the essential questions: does not only literary criticism but also the production of literature have a meaning in general - which, although always in organic connection with the world, at the same time as a noble rebellion is realized against everyday life - if the world is not changed a bit by it, if it continues to live under non-artistic and non-human conditions, if the general v reification and the technical-scientific synchronization covers and suffocates even the most modest attempt at an authentic expression of humanity? Doesn't that mean affirming this world and living in its coordinates, even if we have a critical attitude towards this world? In my opinion, these are all questions that a serious literary critic must at least ask himself, and all these are at the same time questions to which philosophy also strives to give an answer. The question must therefore be posed differently: not whether there is a relation between literary criticism and philosophy at all, but whether it exists when it is a question of a specific philosophy? Because while the literary critic is looking for an answer to the above and countless other questions, he will inevitably choose a philosophy or worldview or way of thinking as a prerequisite for his work have to decide, even then - which often happens - if he considers himself a critic who is decidedly anti-philosophical. It is well known to all of us (sometimes we even misused it) that positivism is also a specific philosophy. But why do we insist on any connection between literary criticism and Marxist philosophy?

Because if you say Marxist philosophy, then you immediately have the idea - even if you disregard the somewhat simplified image that under the concept of Marxism is the autocratic arbitration of a person in G round prim itivist, economically-deterministic doctrine subsumed - one has a, albeit somewhat milder, idea of a politicized and ideologized concept that is not only the law but even the exclusive duty has, on the class, political, ideological roots of all 346

dem Anschein nach unabhängigen geistigen Erscheinungen hinzuweisen. Ist also nicht von einem Klischee die Rede, das in der Literatur alles andere hervorhebt nur nicht die Literatur selbst? Und warum wollen wir gerade das mit der Literaturkritik in Verbindung setzen? Sollten wir nicht lieber von solch einer Philosophie mit ihrer parteigebundenen Ausrichtung, politischen und politikantischen Belästigungen in Ruhe gelassen werden, um als Kritiker unsere Arbeit fachlich, unvoreingenommen und korrekt verrichten zu können?

Wenn aber schon, im Osten sowie im Westen, so oft behauptet wird, der Marxismus hätte ein unabwendbar und ausschließlich ideologisches und politisches Ziel, wenn der Marxismus einer im Grunde politisch-theoretischen Doktrin gleichgesetzt wird, und wenn immer wieder gesagt wird, daß unter seiner Lupe alles, sogar die Literatur und die Literaturkritik, einen doktrinär politischen Beiklang erhalte, dann möchte ich vor allem darauf hinweisen – was manche vielleicht absurd oder paradox anmuten wird – daß es meiner Meinung nach bis heute in der Geschichte des menschlichen Denkens keinen einzigen Denker gegeben hat, der so radikal an der Politik und der politischen Sphäre Kritik geübt hat wie Marx. Übrigens, er hat selbst das Wort Ideologie nur im negativen Sinne verwendet als Bezeichnung für ein deformiertes, pervertiertes und entfremdetes Bewußtsein. Es scheint mir, daß ein so umfassendes und tief schürfendes Entmystifizieren der politischen Entfremdung, wie es Marx durchgeführt hat, überhaupt nirgends mehr in der philosophischen und soziologischen Literatur nicht nur seiner Zeit sondern auch später anzutreffen ist. Die politische Entfremdung ist in Marx' Augen die völlige und totale Entfremdung. Selbst »die Grenze der politischen Emanzipation erscheint so gleich darin, daß der Staat sich von einer Schranke befreien kann, ohne daß der Mensch wirklich von ihr frei wäre, daß der Staat ein Freistaat sein kann, ohne daß der Mensch ein freier Mensch wäre.«¹ Marx weist besonders darauf hin, daß auch der ausgebildete politische Staat (also jene Entwicklungstufe der politischen Emanzipation, die in Wirklichkeit, in keinem der sogenannten sozialistischen Länder erreicht ist) seinem Wesen nach das generische Leben des Menschen im Gegensatz zu seinem materiellen Leben darstellt, also ein gespaltenes, entfremdetes Leben, »Wo der politische Staat seine wahre Ausbildung erreicht hat, führt der Mensch . . . ein doppeltes Leben . . . das Leben im politischen Gemeinwesen, worin er sich als Gemeinwesen gilt, und das Leben in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, worin er als Privatmensch tätig ist . . . Der politische Staat verhält sich ebenso spiritualistisch zur bürgerlichen Gesellschaft wie der Himmel zur Erde.«² Ja sogar die Religiosität gründet sich nach Marx' Meinung auf dem Dualismus, der immer wieder vom politischen Staat reproduziert wird: »Religiös sind die Glieder des politischen Staats durch den Dualismus zwischen dem individuellen und dem Gattungsleben, zwischen dem Leben der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft und dem politischen Leben, religiös, indem der Mensch sich zu dem seiner wirklichen Individualität jenseitigen Staatsleben als seinem wahren Leben verhält . . .«³ Marx,

¹ S. Marx: Zur Judenfrage, Ausgabe I. Fetscher, Frankfurt/M, 1966, Bd I, S. 37.

² Ibid., S. 39.

³ Ibid., S. 44.

to indicate apparently independent mental phenomena. So isn't there a cliché that emphasizes everything else in literature but literature itself? And why do we want to connect this with literary criticism?

Wouldn't it be better for us to be left alone by such a philosophy with its partisan orientation, political and political burdens, in order to be able to do our work professionally, impartially and correctly as critics?

But if it is so often asserted, both in the East and in the West, that Marxism had an inevitable and exclusively ideological and political goal, if Marxism is equated with a basically political-theoretical doctrine, and if it is repeatedly said that under everything, even literature and literary criticism, receives a doctrinaire political overtone with his magnifying glass.

then I would like to point out above all - what some may find absurd or paradoxical - that in my opinion there has not been a single thinker in the history of human thought who has criticized politics and the political sphere as radically as Marx. Incidentally, he himself used the word ideologic only in a negative sense to denote a deformed, perverted, and alienated consciousness. It seems to me that such a comprehensive and profound demystifying of political alienation as Marx carried out is nowhere to be found in the philosophical and sociological literature not only of his time but also later. In Marx's eyes, political alienation is the complete ur.-d total alienation. Even "the limit of political emancipation appears immediately in the fact that the state can free itself from a barrier.

without man being really free from it, without the state being able to be a free state, without man being a free human being'

*Marx particularly points out that even the developed political state (i.e. that stage of development of political emancipation which in reality has not been reached in any of the so-called socialist countries) essentially represents the generic life of man as opposed to his material life. thus a divided, alienated life, »Where the political state has reached its true development, man leads . . . a double life. . , life in the political community, in which he considers himself a community, and life in civil society, in which he is active as a private person. . The political state is just as spiritually related to civil society as heaven is to earth«.**

In Marx's opinion, even religiosity is based on the dualism that is repeatedly reproduced by the political state:

The members of the political state are religious because of the dualism between individual life and that of the species, between the life of civil society and political life, religious, in that man regards the state life that is beyond his real individuality as his true life . . . «3 Marx, 1 S. M arx: Z u r J u d e nfrage , Edition I. Fetscher, F r a n k f u rt/M , 1966, B d I, p. 37.

* *Ibid.. S. 39.*

dessen Meinung nach die politische Revolution die Revolution der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft ist⁴ und die Emanzipation des Menschen erst dann möglich ist, wenn er überhaupt »... die gesellschaftliche Kraft nicht mehr in der Gestalt der *politischen* Kraft von sich trennt« ...⁵ so daß sich demzufolge erst dann auch »... die Kritik der Theologie in eine Kritik der Politik verwandelt ...« Marx ist es also nicht bloß an der Kritik an einer bestimmten Politik gelegen, sondern an der Kritik der politischen Sphäre überhaupt als der entfremdeten Sphäre des menschlichen Daseins, weil durch das Politisieren des gesamten Lebens dieses Leben nicht nur gespalten sondern auch wesentlich verunstaltet und pervertiert wird. Der Begriff der Politik an sich, den Marx einer schonungslosen Kritik unterzieht, ist also ein viel weiterer Begriff als zum Beispiel die Politik gewisser Kreise oder gewisser Parteien, genauso wie Marx unter dem Begriff der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft nicht an eine bestimmte empirische geschichtliche Epoche denkt, sondern die gesamte, entmenschlichte, entfremdete, also politische Weise des Lebens und Wirkens versteht. Dem Begriff der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft können auch viele gesellschaftliche Formen gleichgestellt werden, die verschiedene klingende demokratische und sozialistische Namen tragen, die aber unterhalb (und nicht wie gemeinhin angenommen wird oberhalb) der entwickelten kapitalistischen Welt rangieren. Die Rede ist von vielen sogenannten sozialistischen Ländern, in denen die Politik nicht einmal als bürgerliche Politik ausgestattet mit einigen klassischen Formen der formalen Freiheit erscheint, sondern als skrupellose Mißhandlung eines kleinlichen pragmatistischen tagespolitischen Politikantentum, dem sowohl die ideelle als auch die materielle Sphäre als bloßes Mittel zu dienen hätten. Diese Politik wird nämlich oft durch die Abschaffung auch der formalen *Freiheiten*, an Stelle der Abschaffung ihres *Formalismus*, auf einen Despotismus zurückgeführt, dem wahrscheinlich auch jene bürgerlichen Politikern des 19. Jahrhunderts verständnislos gegenüber würden, die Marx als preußische Kasernengeiste, Polizeikonfidenten oder liberale Schwätzer mit ewig griffbereiter Knute bezeichnet hat. Diese Verabsolutierung des Politischen oder gar Politikasterschen, innerhalb dessen ein Gedicht, ein Musikstück, ein literarischer Versuch oder eine philosophische Abhandlung politische Resolutionen hervorufen kann, Sitzungen des Komitees, bekannte »Postanovljenije«, Verfolgungen mit polizeilichen Methoden – all das weist auf eine solche Stufe des Totalitarismus des Politischen, der in der gesamten Geschichte noch nicht vorgekommen ist. Und das alles im Namen des Marxismus und zu seinem Ruhme, obwohl es mehr als plausibel ist, daß jede auch noch so unschuldige Übertragung der an sich verhaßten politischen Kriterien auf das künstlerische Schöpfertum, ein Urteilen aufgrund politischer Maßstäbe über den künstlerischen Wert eines Werkes, nicht nur den gesamten Marxschen Bestrebungen und Wollen fremd ist, sondern daß sich auch der ganze Sinn seines theoretischen, ja auch seines praktischen Wirkens diesem pragmatistisch politischen Anschauungen entschieden und sehr konsequent widersetzt.

⁴ Ibid., S. 51.

⁵ Ibid., S. 53.

whose opinion is that the political revolution is the revolution of civil society⁴ and that the emancipation of man is only possible if he is at all >> . . . the social force is no longer separated from itself in the form of the political force" . . .⁵ so that consequently only then " . . . the critique of theology is transformed into a critique of politics. . ." Marx is not only interested in criticizing a specific policy, but in criticizing the political sphere in general as the alienated sphere of human existence, because through the politicization of life as a whole this life is not only divided but is also substantially defaced and perverted. The concept of politics itself, which Marx subjects to ruthless criticism, is therefore a much broader concept than, for example, the politics of certain circles or certain parties, just as Marx does not think of one under the concept of bourgeois society certain empirical historical epoch, but understands the entire, dehumanized, alienated, i.e. political way of life and work. Many social forms can also be equated with the concept of the bourgeois society, which bear different-sounding ocratic and socialist names, but which are below (and not, as is generally assumed, above) the developed capitalist ones rank the world. We are talking about many so-called socialist countries in which politics does not even appear as bourgeois politics equipped with some classic forms of formal freedom, but as unscrupulous mistreatment of a petty pragmatist daily political politic, which both the ideal and the material sphere had to serve as mere means. This policy is often led back to a despotism through the abolition of the formal freedoms instead of the abolition of their formalism, which probably also those bourgeois politicians of the 19th century would have no understanding for, whom Marx described as Prussian barracks ghosts, police confidants or liberal gossips with a knuckle always at hand.

This absolutizing of the political or even of the politic, within which a poem, a piece of music, a literary essay or a philosophical treatise can evoke political resolutions, meetings of the committee, well-known »postanovljenije«, persecutions with police methods - all this points to such a level of totalitarianism of the political that has not yet occurred in the entire history. And all this in the name of Marxism and for its glory, although it is more than plausible that every transfer, however innocent it may be, of the political criteria inherently held to artistic creativity, is a judgement due to political standards about the artistic value of a work, is not only alien to the entire Marxian aspirations and will, but that the whole meaning of his theoretical, yes also his practical work is devoted to this pragmatically political A Opinions decidedly and very consistently opposed.

4 Ibid., S. 51.

6 Id., S. 53.

Man könnte – ich glaube aber, daß es hier gar nicht nötig ist – eine Unzahl von Zitaten aus Marx' Werken anführen, die keine Marginalien sind sondern die Quintessenz seines revolutionären Gedankens darstellen, um festzustellen, in welchem Ausmaß die dogmatischen Literaturkritiker durch ihre politischen Predigten, die in Marx' Namen verfaßt waren, nicht nur die Marxschen ursprünglichen Tendenzen verfälscht haben, sondern gerade das getan haben, was Marx am radikalsten und leidenschaftlichsten kritisiert und negiert hat. Sie haben sich ihren ad absurdum verfälschten und für die eigenen Beamtenziele brauchbaren Marx geschaffen und ihn dann noch als unantastbares, alles seligmachendes versteineretes Dogma auf allen Gebieten angewandt, so auch auf dem Gebiet der Literaturkritik. Dieser Bodensatz ist – vielleicht mehr aus politischen denn aus theoretischen Gründen – nicht leicht wegzuspülen; das ist aber die erste Voraussetzung für jedes fruchtbare Gespräch über das Thema Literaturkritik und marxistische Philosophie. Da dieses Unterfangen zum Glück bereits vielerorts im Gange ist,⁶ und da eine gründlichere Bearbeitung dieses Themas die Grenzen des vorliegenden Vortrags sprengen würde, haben wir nur auf einige Elemente der groben Verfälschung der Marxschen Absichten in Bezug auf die politisierte Ideologie hingewiesen, also auf jene Falsifikate, die heute leider viel öfter in den Schriften der sogenannten marxistischen als der sogenannten bürgerlichen Theoretiker zu finden sind.

Wir wollen also von jenen primitiven, dogmatischen »marxistischen« Kritikern absehen, die irgendwelche fertigen, ein für allemale festgelegten pseudomarxistischen ideellen politischen Schemata deduktiv auf die Literaturkritik anwenden, applizieren wollen. Ich bin aber der Überzeugung daß auch jene Kritiker einer authentischen marxistischen Kritik unterzogen werden sollten, die zwar auf bestimmten Sondergebieten Resultate erzielt haben, wie beispielsweise Plehanov, Lukács und einige andere, die jedoch den sogenannten marxistischen Zugang zum Kunstwerk hauptsächlich nur auf ein einziges, und zwar unwesentliches Element der Deutung von Kunstwerken beschränkt haben.

Falls nämlich unter Marxismus ein spezifischer Ökonomismus oder Sozialismus verstanden wird, dann kann selbstverständlich nur eine soziale Kunstkritik als eine marxistische bezeichnet werden, oder wie das meistens ausgedrückt wird, die Erläuterung der ökonomischen Grundlage, der materiellen Determinanten, was an sich schon den gesamten »Überbau« erklären wird. Ich bin aber fest davon überzeugt, daß das kein Marxismus ist, oder um mich genauer auszudrücken, er könnte und sollte das auch seiner wesentlichen Ausrichtung und seiner ganzen geistigen Orientierung nach nicht sein. Dasjenige, was mir als das Wertvollste, größte im Marxismus und im Werk von Marx selbst erscheint und was sich eben jetzt auch als das Wirksamste erweist, ist die entschiedene Negation eines solchen automatischen Determinismus; das ist die völlige schöpferische Befreiung der Persönlichkeit bis

⁶ Neben zahlreichen einzelnen schöpferischen marxistischen Philosophen (Bloch, Sartre u. a.) sollten auf dieses Problem hin auch fünf Jahrgänge der Zeitschrift *Praxis* durchgesehen werden.

quintessence of his revolutionary thought, in order to determine to what extent the dogmatic literary critics through their political sermons, written in Marx's name, have not only falsified Marx's original tendencies, but have done precisely what Marx most radically and passionately criticized and negated. They have created their Marx, which has been falsified ad absurdum and can be used for their own official goals, and then applied it as an inviolable, petrified dogma that makes everyone happy, in all areas, including in the area of literary criticism. This dregs is not easy to flush away - perhaps for political rather than theoretical reasons; but that is the first prerequisite for any fruitful discourse on the subject of literary criticism and Marxist philosophy. Fortunately, since this endeavor is already under way in many places,⁶ and since a more thorough treatment of this subject would go beyond the limits of the present lecture, we have only pointed out some elements of the gross misrepresentation of Marx's intentions with regard to politicized ideology, i.e. on those falsifications which unfortunately are to be found far more frequently in the writings of the so-called Marxist than of the so-called bourgeois theorists.

So we want to disregard those primitive, dogmatic "Marxist" critics who want to apply some ready-made, once and for all pseudo-Marxist ideal political schemes to literary criticism. However, I am convinced that those critics should also be subjected to authentic Marxist criticism who, although they have achieved results in certain special areas, such as Plehanov, Lukacs and a few others, but who mainly apply the so-called Marxist approach to the work of art to only one single one , namely an inessential element of the interpretation of works of art.

Namely, if Marxism is understood as a specific economism or sociologism, then of course only a social art criticism can be described as a Marxist, or as it is usually expressed, the explanation of the economic basis, the material determinants, which in itself already the entire » Superstructure « will explain. However, I am firmly convinced that this is not Marxism, or to put it more precisely, it could not and should not be, in terms of its essential orientation and its entire intellectual orientation. What seems to me to be the most valuable, the greatest thing in Marxism and in the work of Marx himself, and what is now also proving to be the most effective, is the resolute negation of such automatic determinism; that is the complete creative liberation of personality bis

* In addition to numerous individual creative Marxist 'philosophers' (Bloch, Sartre et al.) five years of the journal *Praxis* should also be examined for this problem.

zu dem Punkte, daß sie als autonome Persönlichkeit imstande ist, aufgrund eines nonkonformistischen Verhältnisses zu allem, was sie umgibt demzufolge auch zum Kunstwerk, ihre persönliche Stellungnahme und ihr wahres durch nichts Äußeres, auch nicht durch eine nicht-künstlerische Stellungnahme zum Kunstwerk, persönliches Verhältnis auszudrücken. Heute ist es übrigens doch mehr oder weniger bekannt, daß eine der wesentlichen Komponenten des Marxismus eben die Forderung nach der vollen Befreiung und Desalienierung der Persönlichkeit ist. Wie könnten wir uns dann auf irgendeine Weise damit abfinden, daß alles, was bis jetzt unter diesem Titel in der Kritik proklamiert wurde, als Marxismus bezeichnet wird! Diese einseitige Soziologisierung aller Literaturprobleme ist jedoch nicht – und darauf muß besonders hingewiesen werden – für ein bestimmtes Konzept des Marxismus so unschuldig und unwichtig. Was heißt denn eigentlich die soziologistische, beziehungsweise ökonomisch-deterministische Interpretation des Marxismus? Vor allem bedeutet das, daß der gesamte sogenannte Überbau (und hier ist in erster Linie die Kultur gemeint) für den Marxismus nicht wichtig sei und es auch nicht sein könne, daß das vielmehr eine peripheräre, nebensächliche Begleiterscheinung sei, und daß demgemäß beispielsweise die Literatur, die – zugegeben – ebenfalls etwas Schönes und Ergötzliches für die Freizeit sei, im Wesentlichen eben nur etwas akzidentelles, für das Leben unwichtiges, für die grundlegenden materiellen Verhältnisse, also für die Determinanten des gesamten Lebens etwas mehr oder minder Nebensächliches darstelle, so daß sich auch die Kritik, die nur diesen Bereich kritisiert (und nicht wie es sein sollte, die soziologischen und ökonomischen Gesetzmäßigkeiten, die diese Sphäre bedingen *eo ipso* günstigstenfalls auf einem Nebengleis befindet, da sie ja etwas problematisierte, was kein echtes Problem sei. Sie befasse sich ex professo mit einem Teilgebiet, einer Sphäre, die diese Welt und dieses Leben nicht wirklich erschüttern können, auf sie keinen Einfluß ausüben und sie wesentlich nicht verändern könne. Deshalb ist die Kultur eigentlich (obwohl das die öffentlich zugegeben werden wird) in den Augen einer primitivistischen Mentalität, die zwangsläufig, sozusagen ihrem Habitus nach das Gebiet des Überbaus negieren muß, ein müßiges Spiel mit etwas an sich Unselbständigen, etwas Verachtungswürdigem, Bedauernswürdigem, etwas für ernsthafte materielle Fragen unwichtiges. Sowohl die Literaten als auch die Literaturkritiker könnten zwar eine nette Ausschmückung bilden, könnten als Beweis dienen, daß ein bestimmtes Kulturklima bestehe, daß auch wir Mächtigen uns um die ohnmächtige Kultur kümmern, ja daß wir sogar bestimmte Politiker für sie »verantwortlich« machen. aber dieses ganze literarische Pöbel war nie ein entscheidener Faktor, und wird es auch nie sein. Wenn man also bei einem solchen starren, nichtdialektischen Schema des Verhältnisses zwischen Basis und Überbau bleibt, dann ist es im Prinzip nicht wesentlich (für das Schicksal von Einzelpersonen allerdings im höchsten Maße), ob das mit Hilfe des bestialen Ždanovsystems des offenkundigen Diktats durchgeführt wird oder auf etwas verfeinerte Art mittels Überzeugung. Predigten, Vorladungen bestimmter Kulturarbeiter zu Konsultationen, die sich die vom politischen Zentrum gesetzten Thesen anzueignen und sie

to the point that, as an autonomous personality, she is able, due to a non-conformist relationship to everything that surrounds her, to the work of art, her personal statement and her true through nothing fancy, not even through a non-artistic comment on the work of art, expressing a personal

*relationship. Today, by the way, it is more or less known that one of the essential components of Marxism is precisely the demand for the full liberation and desalienation of personality. How could we then in any way reconcile ourselves to the fact that everything that has been proclaimed under this title in criticism up to now is called Marxism! However, this one-sided sociologization of all literary problems is not so innocent and unimportant for a specific concept of Marxism - and this must be particularly emphasized. What does the sociological or economic-deterministic interpretation of Marxism actually mean? Above all, this means that the entire so-called superstructure (and here culture is primarily meant) is not important for Marxism and it also cannot be, that it is rather a peripheral, secondary matter accompanying phenomenon, and that accordingly, for example, literature, which - admittedly - is also something beautiful and enjoyable for leisure time, is essentially just something accidental, unimportant for life, for the basic material circumstances, So for the determinants of life as a whole, something more or less irrelevant is represented, so that even the criticism that only criticizes this area (and not, as it should be, the sociological and economic laws that this sphere requires *eo ipso* at best to be on a siding, since it is indeed problematizing something that is not a real problem cannot exert any influence on them and cannot change them significantly. So culture is actually (although this will be publicly admitted) in the eyes of a primitivist mentality which must necessarily, by its habit, so to speak, negate the realm of the superstructure, a wasted game with something dependent on itself, something despicable, regrettable, unimportant for serious material questions. Both the literati and the literary critics could create a nice embellishment, could serve as proof that a certain cultural climate exists, that we, the powerful, also take care of the powerless culture, yes that we even hold certain politicians "responsible" for them.*

but this whole literary mob has never been a deciding factor, and never will be. Thus, if one sticks to such a rigid, non-dialectical scheme of the relationship between base and superstructure, then it is in principle not essential (albeit in the highest degree for the fate of individuals) whether that with H carried out with the help of the bestial Zdanov system of obvious dictation or in a somewhat more refined way by persuasion. Sermons, summonses of certain cultural workers to consultations, which appropriate the theses set by the political center and they 350

»selbständig auszuarbeiten« haben. Im Prinzip sind sowohl Grund als auch Folge meistens die gleichen: die wahren Entscheidungen werden materiellen gesellschaftlichen Fortschritt kümmern, müssen, also ganz wenigen Auserwählten, denen die Ehre zuteil wurde, den Politikern etwas sagen zu dürfen, nicht zugelassen sind. Die Politiker, beziehungsweise diejenigen, die sich der eigenen Ansicht nach um den materiellen gesellschaftlichen Fortschritt kümmern, müssen also aufgrund ihrer Position und aus Sorge um das Wesentliche, um die Basis, immer wieder auch Entscheidungen auf dem Gebiet der Kultur, Literatur, ja auch der Literaturkritik treffen, ihr eine Richtung geben, sie an der Hand führen, damit sie nicht von dem durch die Intersphäre der Realität bestimmten Kurs abweiche. Diese Politiker zwar von Natur aus wohlwollend und freigibig von ihrem Überfluß erteilen ein wenig Selbstständigkeit auch den Kulturarbeitern, aber solche wohlwollenden Geschenke können nur zu schablonhaften und blutleeren Produkten führen, schon aus dem Grunde, weil ihr Bereich durch eine, wesentlich andere entscheidende Sphäre begrenzt, beschränkt ist. So kommt es, daß sich eigentlich der Marxismus im allgemeinen – von allem Anfang an getragen von einem essentiell humanen Antrieb – wenn er auf dem Gebiet der Kultur als Oekonomismus interpretiert wird – in einen direkten Antihumanismus verwandelt, in dessen Rahmen an die Menschen das Maßstab der Dinge und der nutzbringenden Verwendbarkeit angelegt wird. Die Literaturkritik wird in diesem Soziologismus und Politizismus also entweder auf die Erforschung des materiellen Ursprungs der Literatur zurückgeführt oder sie wird zu einem Zeitvertreib der Professoren, zum Aesthetisieren der Träumer, der L'art-pour-l'artisten, derjenigen, die nicht einmal für das reale Dasein, geschweige denn für die echte Wissenschaft etwas bedeuten, deren Tätigkeit eine Zeitlang, besonders während der »liberaleren« Zeittabschnitte wohlwollend toleriert werden kann, der aber nie das Attribut oder der Habitus des vollen Ernstes beigemessen werden kann. Wenn bislang die sogenannte marxistische Kritik nur auf bestimmte soziale Momente der Kunst, auf eine sichtbare oder weniger sichtbare Tendenz einseitig hingewiesen hat, dann stellt sich die entscheidende Frage, ob jene Literaturkritik als marxistisch bezeichnet werden kann, die zwei Sphären, die ästhetische und die soziologische, miteinander vertauscht und verwechselt und die der Meinung ist, daß der Marxismus endgültig auf eine Analyse oder Verständnis und Erläuterung einer bestimmten gesellschaftlichen Komponente des Kunstwerkes zurückgeführt werden kann. Wenn der Marxismus wirklich sein ganzes Konzept nur auf dem eben erwähnten basieren würde, wäre er nicht nur wirklich arm, trocken und unoriginell, sondern vor allem auch ziemlich konfus. Dann brauchte der Marxismus auch auf dem Gebiet der Philosophie ebenfalls nur die sozialen Komponenten einer bestimmten Philosophie erklären und schon wären allein dadurch alle philosophischen Probleme der einzelnen Denker erläutert. Und darüber hat sich auf sehr geistreiche Art sogar Plechanov lustig gemacht – man müßte wenigstens seine »Grundlegenden Probleme des Marxismus« kennen – Plechanov, der sonst auch selbst oft in einen Soziologismus verfiel, um von der Tat- sache, wie fremd so ein Vorgehen Marx war, ganz zu schweigen. Und

have to »develop independently«. In principle, both cause and effect are mostly the same: the real decisions will have to concern material social progress, i.e. a very select few who have been given the honor of being able to say something to the politicians will not be allowed. Politicians, or those

who, in their own view, are concerned about material social progress, must therefore repeatedly make decisions in the field of culture, literature, yes, because of their position and out of concern for what is essential, for the basis of literary criticism, give it a direction, guide it by the hand so that it does not deviate from the course determined by the sphere of interest of reality. These politicians, benevolent by nature and generous from their superfluity, also grant a little autonomy to cultural workers, but such benevolent gifts can only lead to template-like and bloodless products, if only for the reason that their area is limited by a significantly different, crucial sphere , is restricted. So it comes about that Marxism in general - from the very beginning supported by an essentially human drive - when it is interpreted as economics in the field of culture - turns into a direct anti-humanism, within the framework of which people Mafitab of things and useful usability is applied. In this sociologism and politicism, literary criticism is either reduced to research into the material origins of literature, or it becomes a pastime for professors, for aestheticizing dreamers, l'art-pour-l'artists, those who are not even for real existence, let alone real science, whose activity can be benevolently tolerated for a time, especially during the more "liberal" periods, but which can never be given the attribute or habitus of full seriousness. If so-called Marxist critique has so far only pointed one-sidedly to certain social aspects of art, to a visible or less visible tendency, then the decisive question arises as to whether that literary criticism can be described as Marxist, the two spheres, the aesthetic and the sociological, mixed up and confused, which holds that Marxism can ultimately be reduced to an analysis or understanding and elucidation of a particular social component of the work of art.

If Marxism really based its whole concept on just the one just mentioned, it would not only be really poor, dry and unoriginal, but above all rather confused. Then, in the field of philosophy as well, Marxism only needed to explain the social components of a certain philosophy, and that alone would explain all the philosophical problems of the individual thinkers. And even Plekhanov made fun of that in a very witty way - one should at least have his

"Fundamental problems of Marxism" - Plekhanov, who otherwise often lapsed into sociologism himself, not to mention the fact how alien such an approach was to Marx. And 351

auch Engels, der in dieser Frage von Marx abweichende Ansichten hat, weil sein gesamtes Denken viel mehr naturwissenschaftlich-materialistisch ausgerichtet ist, vertritt, die Meinung, derzufolge das ökonomische Moment das einzig bestimmende sei, »eine abstrakte, absurde Phrase die völlig nichtssagend sei« (Brief von F. Engels an J. Bloch vom 21. Februar 1890). Vielleicht bedarf es heute keiner besonderer Beweise mehr, daß der marxistische Zutritt nicht nur zur Kunst sondern auch zur gesamten geistigen und geschichtlichen Wirklichkeit wesentlich ein anderer ist; als es ein simplizistischer Oekonomismus je sein könnte, der in den Köpfen einiger bedeutender westlicher Theoretiker noch bis vor kurzem mit dem Marxismus identifiziert wurde, während sich im Osten solche Interpretationen auch weiterhin unaufhaltsam und massenhaft vermehren.

Zugleich muß man aber auch Verständnis aufbringen für die Skepsis oder gar Ironie, mit der manche selbst dem Terminus Marxismus begegnen, weil diese Skepsis wirklich durch die vielen Formen desjenigen, was in diesem Zeichen veröffentlicht wurde und auch heute noch veröffentlicht wird, begründet ist. Aber wenn bei uns, und ganz besonders in der westlichen Welt, immer öfter davon die Rede ist, daß ein anderes philosophisches oder ästhetisches oder gar antiphilosophisches Konzept der Kritik viel wertvoller sei als der Marxismus (in letzter Zeit zum Beispiel der Strukturalismus), dann muß man sehen und vergleichen wieviele verdeckte oder gar proklamierte Rezepte und Denkschemata, die in dieser Kritik explizite oder implizite enthalten sind und die ein offenes, unmittelbares, schöpferisches, kritisches Verhältnis zur Literatur vereiteln. Man müßte einsehen, in welchem Maße der zeitgenössische antidogmatische Marxismus, so wie er und heute schon aus dem Werk vieler Denker entgegenwächst, zur Denkweise geworden ist, die, indem sie mit den alten und ihren eigenen scinderzeitigen Vorurteilen sehr radikal aufräumt, sich gegen alle starren, hypostasierten Konzepte und Formeln richtet. Es scheint mir, daß wir gerade auf diesem Wege einer offenen schonungslosen und prinzipiellen Kritik und kritischen Stellungnahme allem gegenüber, also einer Kritik die keine Tabus kennt zu einem Resultat kommen würden: in der Hinsicht zeigt sich schon heute der Marxismus konsequenter, klarer und schärfer als eine große Zahl anderer Konzeptionen, radikaler zum Beispiel als der Strukturalismus und eine ganze Reihe anderer Philosophien, die heutzutage in ganz Europa große Mode sind.

Was verstehen wir nun wirklich unter Marxismus, beziehungsweise marxistischer Literaturkritik? Wenn jemand das, was der Marxismus in der Kritik aussagen sollte (und was er im allgemeinen auf dem Gebiet der Literatur noch nicht getan hat), ausschließlich auf eine Ausarbeitung oder Vervollständigung (was meistens eine Verwässerung bedeutet) dessen zurückführen wollte, was zeitweilig die Klassiker des Marxismus über einen Schriftsteller gesagt haben, was jemand bei der Lektüre von Balzac notiert hat oder wie Marx die griechischen Kulturdenkmäler bewundert hat – dann muß völlig klar und unmissverständlich gesagt werden, daß über Balzac und die griechische Kunst viele oft Treffenderes und Tiefschürfenderes gesagt haben als beispielsweise Marx, von Lenin ganz zu schweigen. Eine Auswahl

and J. Bloch, February 21, 1890). Perhaps there is no longer any need for special proof today that the Marxist approach is essentially different, not only to art but also to the entire spiritual and historical reality; than there could ever be a simplistic economism, which until recently was identified with Marxism in the minds of some eminent Western theorists, while in the East such interpretations are expected to continue inexorably and en masse to honor.

At the same time, however, one must also understand the skepticism or even irony with which some people themselves meet the term Marxism, because this skepticism is really supported by the many forms of what was published in this sign and also today is still being published. But if with us, and especially in the western world, it is more and more often said that another philosophical or aesthetic or even anti-philosophical concept of criticism is much more valuable than Marxism (lately, for example, structuralism), then you have to look at and compare how many hidden or even proclaimed prescriptions and thought schemata that are contained in this criticism, either explicitly or implicitly, and that contain an open, direct, creative, thwart critical relations to literature. One should see to what extent the contemporary anti-dogmatic Marxism, as it is already growing out of the work of many thinkers today, has become a way of thinking which, by dealing with the old and very radically clears up its own early prejudices, against all rigid, hypostatized concepts and formulas. It seems to me that we would come to a result precisely on this path of open, unsparing and principled criticism and critical position on everything, i.e. criticism that knows no taboos: in this regard, Marxism is more consequential, clearer and sharper than a large number of other conceptions, more radical than, for example, structuralism and a whole range of other philosophies which are now in vogue throughout Europe.

What do we really mean by Marxism or Marxist literary criticism? If anyone asks what Marxism should say in criticism (and what it has not done in general in the field of literature) solely for elaboration or completion (which mostly means a watering down) of what the classics of Marxism have at times said about a writer, what someone noted while reading Balzac, or how Marx admired the Greek cultural monuments - then It must be said quite clearly and unmistakably that many often said more pertinent and profound things about Balzac and Greek art than, for example, Marx, not to mention Lenin. A choice 352

solcher »schöner« Stellen und Aphorismen kann nicht einmal eine erste Prämisse sein, die unmittelbar anregen würde, uns die Grundlagen einer marxistischen Kritik zu erarbeiten. Aus diesen aus dem allgemeinen Kontext gelösten Sätzen, aus Randbemerkungen über einzelne Künstler – die manchmal auch materiell ungenau und naiv sind – und solche Versuche sind in der Tat genauso zahlreich wie tragikomisch – eine allgemeingültige marxistische oder ästhetische Kritik ableiten zu wollen – wäre nachgerade lächerlich.

Vielelleicht mag das abstrakt, gesucht oder dem Sinn und den Aufgaben der Literaturkritik nicht angemessen scheinen, aber ich bin doch der Meinung, daß die philosophischen oder besser transphilosophischen Fundamente des Marxschen Gedankens viel konkreter und adäquater zur Erleuchtung des künstlerischen in der Kunst dienen können als alle seine sogenannten positiven, konkreten Aeußerungen über einzelne Kunstwerke. Marx' grundlegende Bestrebungen, den Menschen zu vermenschlichen, die wirklichen menschlichen Möglichkeiten neu zu bewerten, die Philosophie, wie auch das Schöpferische in einer neuen schöpferischen und menschlichen Atmosphäre zu verwirklichen, jenen Gedanken, der die Menschen von dem unumgänglichen tierischen, den Uebergang aus dem animalischen Reich der Notwendigkeit in das menschliche Reich der Freiheit, also der Vorgeschichte in die Geschichte zu ermöglichen, die Rehabilitierung des Subjektiven vor der amorphen, statischen Objektivität zu bewerkstelligen, all das ist für den marxistischen Sinn der Bestimmung eines Kunstwerkes viel entscheidender als es alle Marxschen Erklärungen oder seine Bewertungen einzelner Künstler zusammengenommen sind. Das Marxsche und marxistische schöpferische Konzept bei einigen von seinen authentischen Nachfolger bietet in der Tat, als eine Art Prolegomena einer neuen Vision der Welt und des Menschen, Anregungen für wirklich freie, nichtsimulierte menschliche Entscheidungen in dem Bereich des Künstlerischen. In diesem Kontext sollten wir uns überlegen, was eigentlich Marx damit gemeint hat, als er an einer Stelle⁷ (die ich als die genialste, leider aber als eine sehr wenig bekannte, bezeichnen möchte), der These Ausdruck verliehen hat, daß man beginnen sollte, künstlerisch zu leben. Die Welt des Menschen ist nämlich nicht deshalb für den Menschen da, damit sie schön geschmückt werde durch irgendwelche geschickten Berufsdekoratoren, und daß anderseits das Werk und die Arbeit des Menschen, das heißt das Leben des Menschen, dieser Welt fremd, nichtschöpferisch bleibt, daß der Mensch auch weiterhin in einem Klima vegetiert, in dem sich als Ergebnis ständiger Konzessionen an alles und alle auch das menschliche Erzeugnis in ein bloßes Ding verwandelt, in etwas, was den Menschen beherrscht, in einem politischen Mechanismus der Manipulation oder aber eine Geschäftswelt, in der der Mensch verloren ist in seiner eigenen Ergebenheit und dem Dienst an anderen, dem Massenhaften, dem Standard, dem Nichteigenen und deshalb Mächtigeren. Gerade jene Literatur und Literaturkritik, die auf der Marxschen Forderung nach der Freiheit des einzelnen fußt (die erst auf diesem Wege auch eine freie Gesellschaft bilden kann), muß auf die imperativische Notwen-

⁷ In »Grundrisse der Kritik des politischen Ökonomie«.

Such "beautiful" passages and aphorisms cannot even be a first premise that would immediately stimulate us to work out the foundations of a Marxist critique. From these sentences, which are the yellowest from the general context, from marginal notes on individual artists - which are sometimes

also materially imprecise and naive

- and such attempts are in fact as numerous as they are tragic-comic - to want to derive a generally valid Marxist or aesthetic critique - would be downright ridiculous.

It may seem abstract, sought-after, or not appropriate to the purpose and tasks of literary criticism, but I believe that the philosophical, or rather transphilosophical, foundations of Marx's thought can serve much more concretely and adequately to illuminate the artistic in art than all his so-called positive, concrete statements about individual works of art. Marx's fundamental aspirations to humanize man, to reassess real human possibilities, to realize philosophy as well as the creative in a new creative and human atmosphere, that thought which separates human beings from the inevitable animal. the transition from the animal realm of necessity to the human realm of freedom. i.e. to enable prehistory into history, to bring about the rehabilitation of the subjective void of amorphous, static objectivity, all of this is much more decisive for the Marxist sense of the definition of a work of art than all of Marx's explanations or his evaluations of individual artists are put together. Indeed, the Marxian and Marxist creative conception in some of his authentic successors, as a sort of prolegomena to a new vision of the world and of man, offers stimuli for genuinely free, non-simulated human choices in the realm of the artistic. In this context, we should consider what Marx actually meant by expressing in one passage⁷ (which I would call the most ingenious, but unfortunately very little known) the thesis that one should begin to live artistically. The world of man is not there for man so that it can be adorned by some skilful professional decorator, and on the other hand man's work and work, i.e. man's life, remains alien to this world, non-creative , that man continues to vegetate in a climate in which, as a result of constant concessions to everything and everyone, even the human product is transformed into a mere thing, into something that dominates man, into a political mechanism of manipulation or else business world in which man is lost in his own devotion and service to others, the mass, the standard, the non-own and therefore more powerful. Precisely that literature and literary criticism which is based on Marx's demand for the freedom of the individual (which can only form a free society in this way) must respond to the imperative necessity of the political economy ie».

digkeit der Rückkehr zur so oft unterdrückten und doch nie zerstörten menschlichen individuellen Intimität hinweisen. In einer Zeit, da die Standardideologien das ideelle Vacuum füllen sollen, in einer Zeit, in der immer mehr Leute das gleiche denken und in der die administrativen Planer sogar die Entwicklung der Kunst und die literarische Produktion planen, sprühen gerade aus dieser menschlichen Intimität Funken der nichtunterdrückten Eigenheit, Funken der authentischen Literatur. Die Literatur und die Literaturkritik rehabilitiert solcherart die menschliche Personalität, kündigt dem Menschlichen die Möglichkeit an, als eigenständiges und selbstbewußtes Wesen in dieser Zeit, in der es immer weniger Zeit für die wahre menschliche Zeit gibt, das Wort zu ergreifen, um trotz der allgemein angenommenen Normen als Mensch zu sprechen, der sich seines elementaren Rechts auf sein Wert, sein Erlebnis, seine Intimsphäre, seine Mühsal, seine Einsamkeit, seine Liebe, ja auch seine Verirrungen bewußt ist. Das heißt eigentlich anfangen, künstlerisch zu leben, das heißt ohne tierische Dressur leben, ohne verdinglichte Normen, nichtgeplant, frei, schöpferisch, einfach menschlich zu leben.

Deshalb kann das wesentliche Problem der Kunst weder aus seelosgerischen Ratschlägen, wie geschrieben werden sollte, noch aus partei-politischen Anweisungen, wie die Kunst aussehen sollte, bestehen; diese Frage befindet sich vielmehr nicht einmal in der Sphäre irgendwelcher äußerer Bedingungen oder gesellschaftlicher Annehmlichkeiten oder pädagogischer Mittel oder Tagesbedürfnisse, sondern das ist das Problem des menschlichen Lebens als des primären Verhältnisses des Menschen zur Welt. Alle sogenannten literaturkritischen Ratschläge und Verordnungen sowie allgemeine erzieherisch-bildenden, kultурpädagogischen Mittel und Rahmen hören nähmlich dort auf, wo der Mensch erst beginnt, als Wesen, das sich selbst konstituiert in seiner schöpferischen Tat, als etwas, was offen ist, was seinem Wesen nach eine Fahrt ins Unbekannte ist, was nicht gesetzt und nicht gegeben ist, sondern ein Entdecken und deshalb zugleich eine Herstellung der eigenen Welt als der wirklich freien Welt ist. Deshalb ist auch das Leben Literatur, die nicht nur ein Leben der Formen sondern auch eine Form des Lebens ist, nicht nur eine bloß periphere Frage der objektiven und nicht voreingenommenen Fachleute der Literaturkritik, sondern es ist eine Frage nach der Möglichkeit des authentischen, nichtsimulierten Lebens überhaupt. Daß sich das Leben als Kunstwerk konstituiert, das heißt als offenes Leben ohne Einschränkungen und Rahmen, als ständige Schöpfung und nicht als ein Sich-im-Kreisedrehen, nicht als fruchtlose Kontemplation, Korrektur von Fehlschlägen oder Machtlosigkeit und Angst vor Zukünftigem, nicht als Schablone des Vegetierens, sondern als Zerstörung von allem was die Spontaneität hemmt, also nicht als Palliativ oder Lebensersatz, sondern als das Leben selbst in seiner Ganzheit – das ist eine der Thesen, die Marx vor Augen schwebte und die ich als wesentliche erachte sowohl was die Kunst, beziehungsweise Literatur in ihrer Ganzheit anbelangt, als auch für die kritische Beurteilung der Literatur. Es scheint uns jedoch, daß diese Dimension des Marxschen Gedankens – die hier nur stichwortartig angedeutet werden konnte – fast keiner von den Literaturkritikern, die sich selbst als Marxisten

the need to return to the human individual intimacy that has been so often suppressed and yet never destroyed. At a time when the standard ideologies are meant to fill the ideal vacuum, at a time when more and more people are thinking the same thing, and when the administrative planners are even

planning the development of art and literary production are spraying from this human intimacy sparks of unrepressed individuality, sparks of authentic literature. Literature and literary critique rehabilitate human personality in this way, announces to the human the possibility of being independent and self-confident beings in this time when there is less and less time for the when there is human time to speak up, to speak as a human being, despite the generally accepted norms, who are aware of their elementary right to their value, their experience, their intimacy, their awareness of his misery, his loneliness, his love, even his aberrations. That actually means starting to live artistically, that means living without animal training, without reified norms, unplanned, free, creative, simply living humanly.

Therefore, the essential problem of art can consist neither of pastoral advice on how art should be written, nor of party-political instructions on how art should look like; rather, this question is not even in the sphere of any external conditions or societal acceptance.

opportunities or pedagogical means or daily needs, but that is the problem of human life as the primary relationship of man to the world. All so-called literary-critical advice and regulations as well as general educational, cultural-pedagogical means and frameworks were taken up there, where man only begins, as a being that constitutes itself in its creative act, as something that is open, that by its very nature is a journey into the unknown, that is not set and not given, but a discovery and therefore at the same time a creation of one's own world as the truly free world it is. Therefore also the life of literature, which is not only a life of forms but also a form of life, is not only a mere peripheral question of the objective and unbiased experts of literary criticism, but it is one Question about the possibility of authentic, non-simulated life at all. That life is constituted as a work of art, that is, as an open life without restrictions and frames, as constant creation and not as going in circles, not as fruitless contemplation, correction of failure or impotence, and so on. Fear of the future, not as a template for vegetating, but as the destruction of everything that inhibits spontaneity, i.e. not as a palliative or a substitute for life, but as life itself in its entirety - that is one of the theses that Marx floated in front of my eyes and which I consider to be essential both in terms of art and literature in their entirety and for the critical assessment of literature. It seems to us, however, that this dimension of Marx's thought - which could only be indicated here in a nutshell

bezeichnen, nicht nur nicht methodisch verwertet haben, sondern daß sich ein Großteil der sogenannten Marxisten, solch einer Denkweise direkt und frontal widersetzt.

An dieser Stele sollte man meiner Meinung nach viele Literaturkritiker, die ein bestimmtes Bild des Marxismus in sich tragen, darauf aufmerksam machen, daß man den Marxismus in seinem wesentlichen Teil, wodurch er eben eine Neuerung im Vergleich mit anderen Philosophien seiner Zeit darstellt, nicht aus allgemeinen Schemata, versteinerten Skelletten, Konzepten, irgendwelchen definitiven Schlüssen oder fixierten theoretischen Prämissen ableiten kann (wie das leider oft getan wurde), um ihn dann erst auf etwas an sich Bestehendes, Tatsächliches, Faktischen anzuwenden, zu applizieren. Sogar ein Garaudy, der eine Zeitlang von der Notwendigkeit besessen war, sich an bestimmte Normen und Gesetzmäßigkeiten des dialektischen Materialismus halten zu müssen, aus denen dann auf deduktive Weise alles bewiesen werden kann und die Richtigkeit oder Unrichtigkeit eines bestimmten Phänomens beurteilt werden kann, hat in dem Buch *D'un réalisme sans rivage* geschrieben: »Genauso wie man den Wert einer wissenschaftlichen Forschung nicht von den bereits bekannten Gesetzen der Dialektik ausgehend beurteilen kann, kann man auch den Wert eines Kunstschaffens nicht beurteilen, wenn man mit Kriterien, die aus bereits bestehenden Werken gewonnen sind, arbeitet«. Aber auch Garaudy und viele andere marxistischen Kritiker des Apriorismus und seiner deduktiven Anwendung sehen nicht immer ganz klar, daß sich dieser pseudomarxistische Standpunkt auf der Gleichsetzung des Marxismus mit der Abbildtheorie gründet und in dieser theoretisch verwurzelt ist.

In dem Fundament der Abbildtheorie befindet sich nämlich die Voraussetzung, daß der Mensch, beziehungsweise sein Werk – eine mehr oder minder gelungene, mehr oder weniger subjektive oder objektive – aber eben immer eine *Widerspiegelung* der Wirklichkeit, der Faktizität, der tatsächlichen, an sich bestehenden Welt sei. Alles, was einen Erkenntniswert oder einen künstlerischen Wert habe, gründe diesen Wert auf eine adäquaten *Widerspielung*, Abbildung jener materiellen Welt, die von dem Subjekt der Erkenntnis völlig unabhängig sei. Ein Ich erkenne ein an sich bestehendes Nicht-Ich, indem es dieses Nicht-Ich als einzige Quelle und einzige Möglichkeit der eigenen Erkenntnis auffasse. Das Objekt werde nicht zum Ich, sondern die Welt das Ich. Weder Literatur noch Kunst könnten dieser allgemeinen Gesetzmäßigkeit entgehen, so daß es logischerweise die Aufgabe der Literatur sei, diese Wirklichkeit möglichst adäquat abzubilden, aufzuzeichnen, zu memorieren und dann zu reproduzieren. Der Literaturkritiker sei demzufolge berufen, aufgrund dieses Schlüssels den Grad dieser Adäquation zu messen, das heißt letzten Endes, wie und in welchem Maße die Literatur diese Welt abbilde, in welchem Maße sie ihr die wirklichen, um sie so zu nennen, progressiven Strömungen ablausche und in welchem Maß sie dann richtig, treu, angemessen diese Strömungen in eine literarische Form bringe. Selbstverständlich bedeutet in diesem Verhältnis für die Literatur die künstlerische Sphäre des Literarischen eigentlich nichts, weil sie ja

not only have not used it methodically, but that a large part of the so-called Marxists oppose such a way of thinking directly and head-on.

In my opinion, this stele should be used to draw the attention of many

*literary critics who carry a certain image of Marxism within themselves, to the fact that Marxism in its essential part, which is precisely what makes it an innovation compared to other philosophies of its time, should not be dismissed general schemes, petrified skeletons, concepts, any definitive conclusions or fixed theoretical premises (as has unfortunately often been done), only then to apply it to something existing, actual, factual. Even a Garaudy, who has for a time been obsessed with the need to adhere to certain norms and laws of dialectical materialism, from which anything can then be proved deductively and the rightness or wrongness of a particular phenomenon judged, wrote in the book *D'un realisme sans rivage*: "Just as one cannot judge the value of scientific research starting from the already known laws of dialectics, one cannot judge the value of artistic creation by starting with criteria derived from already existing works, works». But even Garaudy and many other Marxist critics of apriorism and its deductive application do not always see very clearly that this pseudo-Marxist point of view is based on and is theoretically rooted in the identification of Marxism with image theory.*

In the foundation of the image theory there is the presupposition that the human being or his work - a more or less successful, more or less subjective or objective one

- but always a reflection of reality, the factual quote, the actual world existing in itself. Everything that has a cognitive value or an artistic value bases this value on an adequate representation, depiction of that material world, which is completely independent of the subject of knowledge. An I recognizes a non-I existing in itself. by considering this not-I as the only source and only possibility of its own knowledge. The object does not become the I, but the world becomes the I. Neither literature nor art could escape this general law, so that it is logically the task of literature to depict, record, memorize and then reproduce this reality as adequately as possible. The literary critic is therefore called upon to use this key to measure the degree of this adequation, which ultimately means how and to what extent literature depicts this world, to what extent it gives it the real, to call it that, progressive currents eavesdrop and in which measure they then correctly, trcu, appropriately bring these currents into a literary form. In this context, of course, the artistic sphere of the literary actually means nothing for literature, because it is 355

immer nur Abbild, Schatten des Wirklichen ist. Deshalb muß die Ästhetik für die Soziologie der Kunst eingetauscht werden, wobei es sich bei dieser letztgenannten Disziplin nicht um ein wirkliches Erforschen von gesellschaftlichen Wurzeln bestimmter literarischer Phänomene handelt, sondern um eine ideologisierte gesellschaftliche Kritik, die ein bestimmtes fixiertes Modell der Gesellschaft vor Augen hat als das absolut beste, und dann danach und in seinem Dienste auch den Wert aller Sphären sowohl der Wirtschaft als auch der Biologie, der Astronautik als auch der Literatur oder beispielsweise der Musik pragmatistisch beurteilt.

Die Welt des Menschen, die einzige wirkliche Welt, ist jedoch weder gegeben noch gesetzt, fertig oder beendet; das heißt, daß sie für den Menschen nicht einfach präsent ist, so daß sie auch nicht von der Kunst einfach widergespiegelt oder abgebildet werden kann. Ein Künstler kann also nicht eine Wirklichkeit, die schon für ihn sowie für sein Werk fertig wäre, aber ohne ihn geschaffen, kopieren oder illustrieren, und noch weniger kann ein Literaturkritiker den Grad dieses Abbildens messen oder bewerten. Solch eine Wirklichkeit ist kein Kriterium, keine Dermakationslinie, innerhalb deren sich sowohl die Literatur als auch die Literaturkritik im Namen eines moralisierenden oder pseudophilosophischen sogenannten materialistischen Prinzips züchtig und bigott bewegen sollte. Und der Schriftsteller ist nicht einfach ein Kriegsberichterstatter noch ist der Kritiker der Kommentator dieses Berichtes: sowohl der eine als auch der andere sind Kämpfer, geschichtliche Anreger eines Kampfes für den Menschen, der sich mit der Gegebenheit nicht abfinden will, sie sind Kämpfer, die für diese Schlacht auch die historische Verantwortung zu tragen haben. Literarische Werke sind Herausforderungen, die eine bloß formal-kritische oder kultur-historische Verfolgung und Erläuterung nicht zulassen, ja nicht einmal eine bloße Bewertung, sondern es sind Anregungen, mit denen sich der Kritiker in einen schöpferischen Kampf einläßt, genauso wie auch der Schriftsteller seine Werke mühsam schaffen mußte, im Kampf mit sich selbst und der ganzen Welt. Denn der Künstler ist immer und in erster Linie ein Kämpfer für das Leben im weitesten Sinne des Wortes. Es ist eine neuzeitliche Vision des Lebens und des Kampfes für das Menschliche, daß auch die Dinge durch den Menschen subjektiv zu sprechen beginnen. Nur so können zwei einander fremde, einander abstoßende Welten zu einer einzigen werden: die Welt und der Mensch verwandeln sich in die vermenschlichte Welt. Als künstlerische Negation des bloßen Daseins und des Vegetierens, der Aussöhnung der Faktizität, als »Ohrfeigen dem Bestehen« (Camus) schafft das literarische Werk an sich eine neue Position und eine neue Realität, eine Veränderung, die die Abgestandenheit aufwirbelt, einen neuen Sinn des menschlichen Daseins. In der schöpferischen Sinngebung dieses neuen Sinnes, der in der wahren Literatur immanent enthalten ist, und nicht als bloße Begleiterscheinung, nicht als Fachdisziplin, die die literarischen, an sich abgetrennten Qualitäten wissenschaftlich und partial oder ihre Adäquation der Wirklichkeit gegenüber mißt, liegt der Sinn auch jener Literaturkritik, die sich immer mit vollem Ernst die Frage stellen muß, warum, in wessen Namen, aus welcher menschlichen Dimension, aus welchen

of society as the absolute best, and then afterwards and in his service also the value of all spheres of both economics and biology, astronautics and literature or, for example, the music pragmatically judged.

However, the world of man, the only real world, is neither given nor posited, finished or ended; that is, it is not simply presented to man, so that it cannot simply be reflected or depicted by art. So an artist cannot copy or illustrate a reality that was already finished for him and for his work but created without him, and even less can a literary critic measure the degree of this depiction or evaluate. Such a reality is not a criterion, not a demarcation line, within which both literature and literary criticism should move chastely and bigoted in the name of a moralizing or pseudo-philosophical so-called materialistic principle. And the writer is not simply a war reporter, nor is the critic the commentator of this report: both the one and the other are combatants, historical instigators of a struggle for the man who is with the fact that they don't want to accept the fact that they are combatants who also have to bear the historical responsibility for this battle. Literary works are challenges that do not permit a mere formal alcritical or cultural-historical pursuit and explanation, not even a mere evaluation, but they are suggestions with which the critics deal into a creative struggle, just as the writer had to painstakingly create his works, in the struggle with himself and the whole world.

Because the artist is always and first and foremost a fighter for life in the broadest sense of the word. It is a modern vision of life and the fight for the human that things also begin to speak subjectively through the human being. Only in this way can two mutually alien, mutually repulsive worlds become one: the world and man transform into the humanized world. As the artistic negation of mere existence and vegetating, the reconciliation of factuality, as a "slap in the face to existence" (Camus), the literary work in itself creates a new position and a new reality, a change that the A a new sense of human existence. In the creative meaning of this new meaning, which is immanently contained in true literature, and not as a mere concomitant phenomenon, not as a discipline that scientifically and partially or its a dequation the literary, intrinsically separate qualities In relation to reality, there is also the meaning of that literary criticism, which must always seriously ask the question why, in whose name, from which human dimension, from which 356

eigenen Möglichkeiten und Bestrebungen heraus sie diese schöpferische Arbeit der Sinngebung des Sinnes im literarischen Werk beginnt. Wenn wir sagen »Sinngebung« des Werkes, dann verstehen wir darunter selbstverständlich nicht eine rationale Deutung von Einzelheiten oder eine globale Antwort auf die Gesamtheit der Fragen, die einem Schriftsteller seine Zeit oder seine Kultur, die familiäre, religiöse oder gesellschaftliche Umgebung, seine persönliche Situation, seine psychologischen Interessen, seine persönliche Unruhe oder überhaupt die Totalität seines generischen oder individuellen Lebens stellt. Das Leben der Literatur, das von der Kritik beleuchtet werden soll, ist etwas anderes als die Summe der Bedingungen, aufgrund derer diese Literatur entstehen konnte, und demzufolge ist jede soziologische oder psychosozialistische Kritik selbstverständlich unzulänglich. Dabei ist es aber in einem ziemlich hohen Maße unwichtig, was für einer literaturkritischen Methode im engeren Sinne wir uns bedienen. Man kann jedoch kaum die Tatsache negieren, daß die Literaturkritik eine spezifische Literatur über die Literatur ist, d. h. daß sie im Grunde ein schöpferisches Werk ist (also nicht nur ein Werk *über* das Schaffen), das seinen Gegenstand, seine Präokkupation in der Literatur findet, genauso wie die Literatur ihren Gegenstand in irgendeinem finden kann, was die menschliche Welt darstellt. Aber gerade deshalb bedeutet alles, was zu Routine und Manier wird, den Tod des kritischen Schöpfertums. Denn in dem Moment, wenn man in der Literaturkritik eine bestimmte Formel herzubeten beginnt, wenn man nach fixierten methodologischen Kanons zu arbeiten beginnt, setzt nicht nur eine Unfruchtbarkeit, Ueberaltung, Trägheit, Mangel an Inspiration ein, sondern das ist das Ende der Kritik als schöpferischen Kritik. Der wahre Kritiker schafft genauso wie der Literat seine eigenen Gesetze, das heißt er zerbricht alte Gesetzestafeln, er wird vom Mißtrauen gegen die eigenen, einst aufgebauten Schemata getragen, bereit auch das anzuzweifeln, an das er noch gestern fest geglaubt hat, und seine Inspiration ist in diesem Sinne unabhängig von allen Vorschriften, Stilanweisungen, ja auch von ideologischen Diktaten, von welcher immer politischen, philosophischen, soziologischen, psychosozialistischen oder literaturästhetischen Schule sie kommen mögen. Denn alles Schöpfertum ist immer zugleich eine Suche nach etwas Neuem, und das Neue kann, wenn es wirklich frisch und neu sein will, nicht in alte Rahmen gesteckt werden. In Konflikt zwischen Routine und Abenteuer ist der Kritiker, so lange er Schöpfer und nicht seriössiger Wiederkäufer ist, ein unverbesserlicher Abenteurer. Es ist jedoch eine ganz andere Frage – und diese zwei Sphären dürfen nicht verwechselt werden – von was für einem Sinn dieses Abenteuer, dieses Neue getragen wird, was die Intentionen dieses Suchens und Wollens sind, was also der gedankliche Hintergrund dieses freien Schöpfertums ist und in welchem Maße es sich da auf eigene ideelle Voraussetzungen basiert und sich von allem befreit hat, was es hemmt, beschränkt, was diese selbständige Kreationzensuriert. Das soll aber kein Plädoyer für eine individuell impressionistische Literaturkritik sein, die jeder Verpflichtung enthoben wäre, sich selbst die Frage nach dem ideellen, ja meinetwegen auch nach dem philosophischen Sinn dieses Schöpfertums zustellt. Denn ich bin der Meinung, daß der

From her own possibilities and aspirations she begins this creative work of giving meaning to meaning in the literary work. When we say "meaning" of the work, we obviously do not mean a rational interpretation of details or a global answer to all the questions that a writer has to ask about his time or

his culture, his family, religious or social environment, his personal situation, his psychological interests, his personal turmoil, or indeed the totality of his generic or individual life.

The life of the literature which the critique seeks to illuminate is other than the sum total of the conditions on which this literature could come into being, and consequently any sociological or psychosociological critique is obviously inadequate. However, to a relatively large extent it is unimportant what kind of literary criticism method in the narrower sense we use. However, one can hardly deny the fact that literary criticism is specific literature about literature, i. H. that it is fundamentally a work of creation (not just a work of creation) that finds its subject, its preoccupation, in literature, just as literature can find its subject in anything that represents the human world. But precisely because of this, everything that becomes routine and manners means the death of critical creativity. For at the moment when one begins to pray to a certain formula in literary criticism. when one begins to work according to fixed methodological canons, not only does sterility, obsolescence, indolence and lack of inspiration set in, but that is the end of criticism as creative criticism. The true critic creates his own laws just like the man of letters, that is, he breaks old tablets of the law, he is sustained by distrust of his own, once constructed schemes, also raises doubts about what he still firmly believed in yesterday, and his own In this sense, inspiration is independent of all regulations, stylistic instructions, even of ideological dictates, regardless of which political, philosophical, sociological, psychosociological or literary-aesthetic school they may come from.

For all creativity is always at the same time a search for something new, and the new, if it really wants to be fresh and new, cannot be put into old frames. In the conflict between routine and adventure, the critic, as long as he is a creator and not a regular repeater, is an incorrigible adventurer.

However, it is a completely different question - and these two spheres must not be confused - what kind of meaning this adventure, this new thing is based on, what the intentions of this searching and wanting are, what is the intellectual background of this free creativity and in to what extent it is based on its own ideal presuppositions and freed itself from everything that inhibits it, limits what censors this independent creation. However, this is not intended to be a plea for an individually impressionistic literary criticism, which would be relieved of any obligation to ask itself the question of the ideal, yes, I mean even the philosophical meaning of this creativity. Because I am of the opinion that the 357

Marxismus und demzufolge die marxistische Literaturkritik jenseits der subjektivistischen, nichtbegründeten Impression ist, die unverbindlich und oberflächlich mit Eindrücken arbeitet, die keine wirkliche Begründung hätten, daß die marxistische Kritik aber genausowenig eines Gerüsts festgelegter ideologischer Koordinaten bedarf, die nie abgerissen werden dürfen, und die jede stärkere Individualität zügeln würden, der andernfalls, um ein Abschreckungseffekt zu erzielen, meist das Attribut »anarchoids« beigelegt wird.

Auf das wahre Medium der literarischen Kunstwerks konzentriert, d. h. auf die menschliche Aufgeschlossenheit für alles Menschliche, sollte die marxistische Literaturkritik vor allem die Nichtbedingtheit durch die Elemente irgendeines Zwanges imperativisch fordern, die Nichtunterwerfung unter die Herrschaft des Geldes und der Nützlichkeit und ebensowenig unter die herrschenden, lebensfremden und demagogischen Ideen oder unter die Unantastbarkeit irgendeiner Autorität, die politischen Drohungen und Verdammungen, unter den Lärm, der schockieren soll, die Schemata der toten Tradition, unter Päpste und Parteien, die blauen Ideen, die sogenannte harte Wirklichkeit, kurz sie kann, wenn sie wirklich eine Literaturkritik, und zwar eine kritische sein will, keinen Respekt vor irgendetwas haben. Wenn diese Befreiung von allen Schranken als grundlegendes negatives Prinzip gerade die marxistische Literaturkritik in höchstem Maße in sich beinhalten sollte, dann ist es tragisch, das tragischste von allem, daß gerade sie in diesem Sinne weder marxistisch noch Literaturkritik ist.

Man könnte dem entgegenhalten: das sei nur ein negatives und völlig abstraktes Prinzip, die Zerstörung von Schranken könne noch nicht positiv irgendeine Literaturkritik konstituieren, und gerade die gesamte bisherige marxistische Kritik zeige nicht die geringste Neigung dazu, konsequent wenn auch nur dieses negative Prinzip durchzuführen. Wenn dem so ist, müssen wir auch die Frage stellen, ob bis auf den heutigen Tag unter den Tausenden und Abertausenden von Kritikern, die täglich riesige Stöße von Aufsätzen, Essays und Analysen produzieren, nach einem Mechanismus der Manipulation, das sowohl die Literatur als auch sie selbst zu zermalmen droht und ungesunde zwischenmenschliche Beziehungen schafft, wenigstens dieses sogenannte negative Prinzip als conditio sine qua non einer jeden Kritik konsequent durchgeführt wurde. Ich fürchte, daß die Antwort mehr als entmutigend wäre. Ferner wäre noch zu betonen, daß die Negation von allem Negativen, das bewußt oder unbewußt die ungehemmte Aeußerung des Wollens und Denkens der Kritiker vereitelt, an sich nicht nur negativ ist. Zerstören bedeutet oftmals zugleich einen neuen Weg weisen, heißt eigentlich eher bauen als verbessern, flicken, die gebahnten Wege, deren Grundlagen schon sehr abgenutzt sind, beschönigen. Sogar auch dann, wenn man nicht weiß, was einen »Positiven« auf dem anderen Ufer erwartet.

Suchen und in dieser Suche nach der eigenen künstlerischen Wahrheit leiden, keinen unafrichtigen Lob singen, ist keine Nebensächlichkeit weder für den Schriftsteller noch für den Literaturkritiker. Aufrecht bleiben, in einer Zeit, in der schon viele in die Knie gegangen sind, bereit sein, sich der Unwahrheit zu widersetzen, den Zornaus-

are required, which must never be torn down, and which would encourage any stronger individuality, which otherwise, in order to achieve a deterrent effect, is usually attached to the attribute »anarchoid«.

Focused on the true medium of the literary work of art, i. H. On the human openness for everything human, the Marxist literary criticism should above all imperatively demand the non-conditionality through the elements of any compulsion, the non-submission to the rule of money and the Usefulness and just as little under the dominant, lifeless and agogic ideas or under the untouchability of any authority, the political threats and condemnations, under the noise intended to shock, the schemes of the dead tradition, among popes and parties, the blue ideas, the so-called hard reality, in short it can if it really wants to be a literary critique, and indeed a critical one , have no respect for anything.

If this liberation from all barriers as a fundamental negative principle is to be contained in the highest degree of Marxist criticism of literature, then it is tragic, the most tragic of all, that it is precisely this critique that w Neither is Marxist nor literary criticism.

One could object: this is only a negative and completely abstract principle, the destruction of barriers cannot positively constitute any kind of literary critique, and precisely all previous Marxist critique does not show the slightest inclination towards it , consistently if only to carry out this negative principle. If so, we must also ask the question whether, to this day, among the thousands and thousands upon thousands of critics who produce casual streams of essays, essays and analyzes every day, according to a Mechanism of manipulation that threatens to crush both the literature and itself and creates unhealthy interpersonal relationships, at least this so-called negative principle as a conditio sine qua non of any criticism was consistently carried out. I fear the answer w as more than discouraging. Furthermore, it should be emphasized that the negation of everything negative, which consciously or unconsciously thwarts the uninhibited expression of the will and thinking of the critics, is in itself not only negative. Z istoren often means showing a new way at the same time, it actually means building rather than improving, patching up the paved ways, the foundations of which are already very worn. Even when you don't know what "positive things" await you on the other bank.

Searching and suffering in this search for one's own artistic truth, not singing false praise, is not a trivial matter, neither for the writer nor for the literary critic. Stay upright, at a time when many have already fallen to their knees, be willing to resist untruth, the wrath-358

brüchen, dem hysterischen Geschrei derjenigen, die in der Rolle von übermenschlichen Richtern nur Apologien und Schönfarberei verlangen, sich auch den eigenen kleinlichen alltäglichen Sorgen um die liebe Existenz prinzipiell zu widersetzen, auch dann noch, wenn man resigniert einschen muß, daß es unmöglich ist, dieses Halali und diese andauernde Treibjagd zu bekämpfen, ist nicht immer leicht und einfach. Deshalb bin ich der Meinung, daß das nicht so oft von unseren und noch weniger von den ausländischen Facharbitern ignoriert werden darf, von den Literaturspezialisten, wissenschaftlichen Experten, Koriphäen der literaturkritischen Virtuosität und des Artismus, die über oder jenseits aller dieser in ihre Augen banalen Problemen stehen. Denn die Wahrheit will nicht immer mit einem Elektronenmikroskop gesucht werden, man kann sie manchmal auch mit bloßem Auge sehen, sie ist – wenn es jemandem wirklich an ihr gelegen ist – oft auch banal, aber deswegen nicht minder die Wahrheit. Denn, letzten Endes, was ist die Wahrheit – fragt sich Miroslav Krleža, kroatischer Schriftsteller und Literaturkritiker, der trotz einiger neueren politischen Diskreditierungsversuche beharrlich schon länger als fünfzig Jahre auf einem marxistischen und antidogmatischen Standpunkt steht. Und er selbst gibt die Antwort: »Die Wahrheit ist alles, was der Mensch fühlt, daß es nicht ratsam und nicht opportun ist auszusprechen, weil dieses ausgesprochene Wort nicht mit unseren kleinlichen, selbststüchtigen momentanen Interessen übereinstimmt. Das ist die Wahrheit! Die Wahrheit ist, wenn ein Mensch das Bedürfnis fühlt, etwas zu sagen, was er vom Standpunkt seines persönlichen Vorteils besser und klüger und einsichtiger verschweigen würde, das ist die Wahrheit! Hat man überhaupt irgendeinen Nutzen von der ausgesprochenen Wahrheit? Nein, denn nach der Wahrheit sind schon seit Jahrhunderten Steckbriefe erlassen.« Wahrlich, »der Kampf gegen negative Erscheinungen der Bestialität in dem menschlichen Bewußtsein ist sehr oft aussichtslos, er kann den Menschen entmutigen, dauert aber jahrelang. Die Literatur hat aber ihre Fahnen nicht gesenkt noch sich auf Gedeih und Verderb der Bestialität und Dummheit ausgehändigt, trotz allem.«

In diesem Sinne darf auch der Marxismus in seiner Suche nach der Rehabilitierung des Schöpferischen und der Negation des Unmenschlichen nicht die weiße Fahne hissen, ohne Rücksicht darauf, wie und in welchem Maße er sowohl von seinen falschen Verfechtern mit despatischen Manieren als auch von seinen gut eingespielten und geschulten Kritikern kompromittiert wird. Der Nonkonformismus in jeder Kritik, so auch in der literarischen, ist zwar eine überwiegend negative Bestimmung, er ist aber zugleich eine Bezeichnung, die wir nicht leichthin »überspringen« dürfen, weil uns dieser »Sprung« das Rückgrat brechen könnte und ohne Rückgrat sind wir zu gar keiner, nicht einmal zu einer streng fachlichen, verfeinerten oder sogenannten objektiven Kritik fähig. Ohne Rückgrat oder als diejenigen, die den lebenswichtigen Problemen aus dem Weg gehen, weil wir vor Zusammenstößen und Niederlagen Angst haben, sind wir immer, ohne Rücksicht auf die artistische Kunst und Sensibilität, nur Mediokritäten.

to resist the hysterical screams of those who, in the role before superhuman judges, only demand apologies and prettiness, to resist even their own petty, everyday worries about their dear existence on principle, even when one has to admit with resignation that it is impossible Fighting this halali and

this ongoing battue is not always easy and simple. Therefore, I believe that this should not so often be ignored by our and even less by the foreign skilled workers, by the literary specialists, scientific experts, luminaries of literary-critical virtuosity and artistry, who in their eyes are above or beyond all these banal problems. Because the truth does not always want to be sought with an electron microscope, you can sometimes see it with the naked eye, it is - if someone is really interested in it -

often banal, but no less true for that. After all, what is the truth - wonders Miroslav Krleža, Croatian writer and literary critic who, despite several recent attempts at political discrediting, has persistently maintained a Marxist and anti-dogmatic point of view for more than fifty years. And he himself gives the answer: "The truth is all that man feels, that it is not advisable and opportune to utter it, because that word spoken does not accord with our petty, selfish interests of the moment.

That's the truth! The truth is, when a man feels the need to say something which, from the point of view of personal gain, he would be better and wiser and more reasonable not to say, that is the truth! Is there any use at all from the spoken truth? No, because wanted posters have been issued according to the truth for centuries.» Truly, »the fight against negative manifestations of bestiality in human consciousness is very often hopeless, it can discourage people, but it lasts for years. But literature has not lowered its flags, nor given itself over to bestiality and stupidity for better or for worse, in spite of everything.

In this sense, Marxism, too, must not hoist the white flag in its search for the rehabilitation of the creative and the negation of the inhuman, regardless of how and to what extent it has been attacked both by its false advocates with despotic manners and by its also compromised by his well-rehearsed and go-trained critics. The non-conformism in any criticism, including literary criticism, is a predominantly negative definition, but at the same time it is a designation that we should not lightly "jump over" because this "jump" could break our backs and we are without backbones none at all, not even capable of a strictly technical, refined or so-called objective criticism. Spineless or those who avoid vital problems because we are afraid of collisions and defeats, we are always mere mediocrities, regardless of artistic skill and sensibility.

František Xaver Šalda, mit dem wir nicht immer übereinstimmen werden, dem aber ein ausßergewöhnlicher Sinn und Begabung für Literaturkritik schwer abzusprechen ist – hielt das Charaktermäßige und Charakteristische als das Wichtigste für den Kritiker, das heißt, daß darin »etwas Positives« sein muß, damit das Werk »nicht die Folge der bloßen Machtlosigkeit und Schwäche, Gleichmütigkeit und Müdigkeit sei«. Diese »zugesetzte Individualität des Kritikers ist nur dann etwas Fruchtbare und Schönes, wenn sie die Folge «einer Sehnsucht nach Charaktereinheit, und nicht die Folge einer abgestumpften Beobachtungsgabe und seelischer Trägheit ist, die Folge eines bequemen Mittelwegs«. (F. Šalda: Essays über Literatur, S. 14). In diesem Sinne ist Šalda – der sich nie Marxist nannte – viel mehr Marxist als die Unzahl von Kritikern, die marxistische Blumen im Knopfloch tragen und in der Tasche ein Büchlein, das ihnen alle marxistischen Türen öffnet. Und viele, die sich ausdrücklich als Antimarxisten bezeichnen, sind in diesem Sinne – das mag vielen paradox erscheinen – dem Marxismus viel näher als viele von seinen orthodoxen Dienern.

Selbstverständlich kann die Kritik einer solchen Kritik oder überhaupt der marxistischen kritischen Position – auch aufgrund der kruzialen Idee des Marxismus – in keinem Sinne ein Tabu-Thema sein. Bei einer solchen Kritik dürfen wir aber doch nicht vergessen, – und das ist der Sinn der vorliegenden Thesen – daß wir, wenn wir diese soziologisierende Kritik oder die Abbildtheorie oder die ideologisierte Kritik oder das politische Kriterium der Bewertung oder aber das oft so abstoßende Katzbuckeln vor der Macht kritisieren, daß wir dann überhaupt nicht den Marxismus kritisieren. Das heißt nur – allerdings mühe los und mit sehr guten Erfolgschancen, weil das heute auch schon durchschnittliche Oberschüler erfolgreich tun können – gegen einen unmenschlichen, falschen, pervertierten Marxismus ankämpfen, der sich auf unserem Planeten länger als hundert Jahre verbreitet, dem Tagesnutzen der Machthaber, Apologeten und Dogmatiker zum Ruhme. Dieser Marxismus unterscheidet sich übrigens nicht wesentlich von jenem Marxismus, den die strebsamen Stutzern des Antimarxismus als eigene Fiktion des »echten« Marxismus propagieren, um ihn dann tagtäglich, heldenhaft und spektakulär im Handumdrehen zu begraben.

František Xaver Šalda, with whom we are not always overwhelmed, but whose exceptional sense and talent for literary criticism is difficult to deny - considered the characteristic and characteristic as the most important thing for the critic, that means that there must be "something positive" in it

so that the work "is not the result of mere powerlessness and weakness, indifference and fatigue". This "pointed individuality of the critic is only something fruitful and beautiful if it is the result of "a longing for purity of character, and not the result of a dulled power of observation and mental lethargy, the result of a comfortable middle way». (F. Salda: Essays on Literature, p. 14). In this sense, S alda - who never called himself a Marxist - is much more a Marxist than the myriad of critics who wear Marxist flowers in their buttonholes and in their pockets a little book that opens all the Marxist doors for them . And many who profess to be anti-Marxists are in this sense - and this may seem paradoxical to many - much closer to Marxism than many of its orthodox servants.

Of course, the critique of such a critique or of the Marxist critical position in general - also on the basis of the Crucial idea of Marxism - can in no sense be a taboo subject.

In such a critique, however, we must not forget - and this is the meaning of the present theses - that we, when we use this sociologizing critique or the image theory or the ideologized critique or the political criterion Criticize the evaluation or the often so repulsive bowing down to power that we then do not criticize Marxism at all. This only means - albeit effortlessly and with very good chances of success, because even average high school students can do it successfully today - against an inhuman, false, perverted Marxism that has been on our planet for longer than a hundred Years spread, to the glory of the day-to-day use of rulers, apologists and dogmatists. Incidentally, this Marxism does not differ significantly from that Marxism which the striving supporters of anti-Marxism propagate as their own fiction of the "real" Marxism, in order to then present it every day, heroically and spectacularly in H an d u m turning to bury.

INTERPRETATION DES MARXISMUS IM HOLLÄNDISCHEN KATECHISMUS

Branko Bošnjak

Zagreb

Der holländische Katechismus* ist im Wesentlichen eine populär-philosophisch-religiöse Betrachtungsweise der menschlichen Existenz überhaupt. Da gibt es keine Definition von Dogmen, noch das traditionelle Fordern nach dem absoluten Glauben. Es ist von vielen Lebenssituationen die Rede, aus denen sich verschiedene Ansichten vergleichen und es wird auf die Vision der eschatologischen Zukunft geschlossen, die trotzdem dominant bleibt, und dies ist letztlich im Wesentlichen der Inhalt des christlichen Glaubens. Nun trägt das Leben so viele Unterschiedlichkeiten in sich, daß es nicht möglich ist, immer fertige Vorschriften zu finden. Deshalb geht es darum, das Phänomen der Religion als das Dauerhafte des Menschen zu betrachten, und jeder wird das seinem Gewissen folgend lösen.

Heute ist die breite Öffentlichkeit durch verschiedene Publikationen über die Neuheit dieses Buches informiert, ebenso wie über die Bemerkungen, die seitens des Vatikan gemacht wurden. Hierbei handelt sich um unterschiedliche Auslegungen einzelner Dogmen, wie zum Beispiel: die Jungfräulichkeit der Mutter Gottes, die Lehre von der Erbsünde, der Eucharistie, den Engeln, der Unsterblichkeit der Seele, die Geburtregelung, sowie über die Verhältnisse des katholischen und des evangelischen Glaubens. Um diese sieben Punkte entstand ein Zwist, den Kommissionen von Theologen lösen sollen.

Für einen marxistischen Anhaltspunkt dem Phänomen der Religion gegenüber stellt der holländische Katechismus eine Neuheit dar, und zwar in dem Sinn, als man sich dem religiösen Leben in der Form eines offenen Gesprächs näherte mit allen jenen Fragen, denen sich der zeitgenössische Mensch gegenüber sieht. Sicherlich wird in den Antworten eine christliche Lösung geboten, aber nicht aufdringlich, sondern im Vergleich mit vielen anderen Auffassungen. Aufmerksam

* DE NIEUWE KATECHISMUS, Geloofsverkondiging voor volwassenen, 1966. Zitiert nach: Glaubens-Verkündigung für Erwachsene. Deutsche Ausgabe des Holländischen Katechismus: Dekker et Van Vegt N. V. Nijmegen – Utrecht, 1968.

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The Dutch Catechism is essentially a popular-philosophical-religious way of looking at human existence in general. There is no definition of dogma, nor the traditional demand for absolute belief. There is talk of many life situations from which different views are compared and conclusions are drawn about the vision of the eschatological future, which nonetheless remains dominant, and ultimately this is essentially the content of the Christian faith. Now, life carries so many differences that it is not always possible to find ready-made regulations. That is why it is a question of regarding the phenomenon of religion as the enduring nature of man, and everyone will do so following their conscience.*

Today, through various publications, the general public is informed of the novelty of this book, as well as of the comments made by the Vatican. This involves different interpretations of individual dogmas, such as: the virginity of the Mother of God, the doctrine of original sin, the Eucharist, angels, the immortality of the soul, birth control, and the relationships between the Catholic and Protestant faiths. A dispute arose about these seven points, which commissions of theologians are supposed to resolve.

For a Marxist point of reference in relation to the phenomenon of religion, the Dutch catechism represents a novelty, in the sense that religious life was approached in the form of an open dialogue with all those questions which contemporary man faces. A Christian solution is certainly offered in the answers, but not in an obtrusive way, but in comparison with many other views. Attentive

* D E N I E U W E CATECHISMUS, G c loofsvcrkondiging voor volw assencn,

Cite again: Belief cn s-Verk i d ig u n g for adult. The German edition of the Dutch Catechism: D ekker et V an V egt N. V. N ijm e g en - U tre cht, 1968.

werden auch andere Anschauungen miteinbezogen, aber dennoch wird suggeriert, daß der christliche Glauben besser sei. In einer solchen toleranten Form wird dieses ganze Thema offener und informiert, sogar mehr über den Sinn einer solchen Auffassung als die Darlegung von Dogmen, wie das in Katechismen schon praktiziert wird. *Der holländische Katechismus hat in seinem Wesen im Zugang zu allen Fragen eine philosophisch-existentielle Struktur.* So vergrößert sich das Interesse an all dem, was damit in Verbindung gesagt werden wird, und es stellt auch eine Neuheit dar, daß man das Buch lesen kann, bei jedem Kapitel beginnend, ohne das Ganze zu verlieren.

Wenn ein Zwist zwischen Theologen und der offiziellen Kirche und Autoren des Katechismus entstanden ist, so bedeutet das, daß sich hier selbstverständlich etwas neues ereignet, auch wenn es einen alten Namen, d. i. Katechismus trägt. Dem zeitgenössischen Menschen liegt es viel näher und erscheint es viel einfacher, wenn er selbst entscheiden kann, was er aus dem Bereich der Dogmen übernehmen will, ohne dennoch aufzuhören, an das wesentliche der Auslegung zu glauben, als sich streng an eine absolute Unterwürfigkeit zu binden. Gerade in dieser Freiheit, die die Autoren den Glauben gewähren sieht man das neue psychologische Verhältnis zum Phänomen der Religion überhaupt.

Nun auch neben den Bemerkungen seitens der Theologen gibt es im Katechismus Auslegungen, die eher einige Schwächen aus der kirchlichen Vergangenheit bemängeln, anstelle sie zu kritisieren. Zum Beispiel im Kapitel »Wozu Missionen?« wird über die Ausbreitung des Christentums unter die Völker, die einen anderen Glauben hatten, gesprochen. »Früher lag ein starkes Motiv zur Missions-Arbeit darin, daß die Heiden ohne die Wahrheit Christi für immer verloren sein werden. Heute aber sind wir eher davon überzeugt, daß wir einfach nicht wissen können, welchen Weg Gott mit jenen geht, die den Weg Jesu nicht kennengelernt haben. Über die ewige Errettung der Nichtchristen können wir sehr wenig sagen, und die Kirche ist in dieser Frage nicht ohne die Führung des Geistes Gottes heute ruhiger als früher.« Daß um jene, die nicht Christen waren, nur Angst bestand, daß ihre Seelen verloren wären, klingt nicht gerade überzeugend. Hier aber ist es nicht notwendig, das zu kommentieren.

Der holländische Katechismus hat seine Leser auch über den Menschen Individualität verneint. Hier wird zunächst gesagt, daß lichen Praxis vor der marxistischen Praxis hervorheben, die dem Menschen Individualität verneint. Hier wird zunächst gesagt, daß der Marxismus bis heute in seinem *Credo* ausdrücklich feststellt, daß es einen Gott nicht gibt, und daß es schädlich ist für die Menschen, an Gott zu glauben. Wer sein Herz auf ein Absolutum richtet, »projiziert« einen Teil seiner selbst nach außen. Er verliert einen Teil seiner selbst und entfremdet sich. Danach wird folgender Text von Marx zitiert: »Die Religion ist das Seufzen der gequälten Schöpfung, die Seele einer herzlosen Welt und der Geist, der geistlosen Zuständen entspringt. Sie ist Opium des Volkes.«

Dem Katechismus folgend ist diese Lehre zu einer Zeit entstanden, da der Glauben (nur teilweise begriffen) tatsächlich viele Menschen dazu anhielt, sich für eine gerechtere Verteilung der Nahrung, der

In its essence, the Dutch catechism has a philosophical-existential structure in its approach to all questions. This increases interest in everything that will be said in connection with it, and it is also a novelty that you can read the book starting with each chapter without losing the whole.

If a tie has arisen between theologians and the official church and authors of the catechism, it means that something new is obviously happening here, even if it has an old name, i. e. catechism wear t. It is much closer and appears to be much easier for contemporary man if he can decide for himself what he wants to adopt from the field of dogma, without nevertheless ceasing to believe in the essence of the interpretation, than to bind oneself strictly to an absolute submission. Precisely in this freedom that the authors grant to belief, one sees the new psychological relationship to the phenomenon of religion in general.

Now, in addition to the comments made by theologians, there are interpretations in the catechism that tend to denounce some weaknesses from the Church's past instead of criticizing them. For example, in the chapter "Why Missions?" the spread of Christianity among the peoples who had another faith is discussed. "In the past, a strong motive for missionary work was that without the truth of Christ, the Gentiles would be lost forever. Today, however, we are more convinced that we simply cannot know which way God goes with those who have not got to know the way of Jesus. About the eternal salvation of the non-Christians we can say very little, and the church is not quieter today than it was formerly on this question, not without the guidance of the Spirit of God. That there was only fear for those who were not Christians, that their souls were lost, does not sound very convincing.

But here it is not necessary to comment on that.

The Dutch Catechism has also denied its readers about man as an individualist. Here it is said first of all that emphasizing the practice before the Marxist practice, which denies that man is an individualist. First of all, it is said here that Marxism to this day expressly states in its credo that there is no God and that it is harmful for people to believe in God. Who fixes his heart on an absolute, he "projects" a part of himself outwards. He loses a part of himself and alienates himself. Then the following text by Marx is quoted: "Religion is the groaning of tormented creation, the soul of a heartless world, and the spirit that springs from spiritless states. She is the opium of the people.«

According to the catechism, this teaching arose at a time when the faith (only partially understood) was actually leading many people to advocate for a more just distribution of food, the 362nd

Kleidung und der Wohnungen einzusetzen. »Deshalb ist dies eine dauernde Gewissensfrage für die Christen, was sie aus der Botschaft Jesu machen«.

»In der jüdisch-christlichen Welt entstanden, hat der Marxismus, obwohl er darauf absolut feindlich reagierte, Elemente dieser Welt übernommen. Zum Beispiel das Erwarten einer besseren Zukunft und die Anschauung, daß auch »der kleine Mensch« Träger der Erlösung sein könnte. Diese Elemente im Marxismus können für viele der Weg in ein neu belebtes Christentum sein.«

In diesem Sinn (so behaupten die Autoren des Katechismus) dürfen wir den Marxismus nicht vielleicht nur als nachchristlich bezeichnen, sondern auch als vorchristlich. Auf dem Boden des Glaubens, in dem dieses Buch geschrieben ist, ist Jesus die Erfüllung von Gottes Wunsch an uns Menschen. Deshalb haben wir ein Weltbild, das nach ihm entstanden sind, Islam, Humanismus, Marxismus, ein unbewußtes Verlangen, ein herumirrendes Suchen nach seinem klaren und reinen Bild, das wir Christen so häufig verdunkeln«.

Von Marxismus ist noch im Kapitel »Über die Erlösung« die Rede. Hier wird gesagt, daß der Marxismus eine ganz bestimmte Art des abendländischen Humanismus ist, und das er eine ausgesprochene Lehre von der Erlösung sei, sowie daß es hier nicht ohne Bedeutung ist, daß Marx' Eltern Juden waren, also Angehörige eines Volkes, das noch immer auf den Messias wartet. Wie Buddha wurde auch Marx vom menschlichen Elend erschüttert. Zum Nachdenken reizte ihn das für Menschen unwürdige Elend des neu entstandenen Industrieproletariats in der ersten Hälfte des vergangenen Jahrhunderts. Im Katechismus steht weiters geschrieben, daß Marx die Lösung nicht in der individuellen Beruhigung und in der Gefühlsfreiheit wie Buddha gesucht hat, auch nicht als Humanist im Verlangen, auch weiterhin Mensch zu sein. Im Gegenteil, Marx hat die Erlösung in einem ganzen bestimmten Geschichtsverlauf gesehen, besonders in der Rückkehr zum ursprünglichen Standpunkt dem Werk unserer Hände gegenüber. Früher, im Naturzustand, war der Mensch im Besitz seines Werkes. Der Mensch hat sein »sich selbst« in dieses Werk gelegt und sich in ihm verloren. Aber er behielt den Genuss und die Benutzung des Werkes, und damit auch sich selbst. Was das anlangt, hat er sich selbst nicht entfremdet. In der Kultur aber herrscht durch die Arbeitsteilung und Mechanisierung ein anderer Zustand. Hier gibt es Menschen, die mächtige Produktionsmittel besitzen, mithilfe derer andere arbeiten, und der Besitzer der Produktionsmittel wird immer reicher. Dinge, die er überhaupt nicht produziert hat, gehören ihm. Seine Eigenheit geht in die Dinge über, das sind die Verlängerungen seiner Persönlichkeit. Seine Persönlichkeit wird damit in einem gewissen Sinn zu einer fremden Sache. So wird er für die menschliche Eigenheit zum Fremden, er »entfremdet« sich. Und weiter: »Der ausgenützte Arbeiter entfremdet sich ebenso, und zwar auf viel schmerzhaftere Weise. Er legt sich selbst in das Werk seiner Hände. Behielte er dieses Werk, so behielte er auch sich selbst. Er muß aber sein Werk verkaufen und erhält dafür ein geringeres Gehalt als es wert ist. So wird er entfremdet«. Anschließend wird darüber gesprochen, daß das Proletariat diesen Zustand nicht immer hinnehmen wird, es wird

to use clothing and homes. "Therefore this is a constant question of conscience for Christians, what to make of the message of Jesus".

“Having emerged in the Jewish-Christian world, Marxism, although

reacting absolutely hostile to it, has taken over elements of that world. For example, the expectation of a better future and the belief that "little people" could also be bearers of salvation. For many, these elements in Marxism may be the way to a revitalized Christianity."

In this sense (according to the authors of the catechism) we may perhaps not only describe Marxism as post-Christian, but also as pre-Christian. On the basis of faith on which this book is written, Jesus is the fulfillment of God's wish for us humans. That is why we have a worldview that came after him, Islam, humanism, Marxism, an unconscious desire, a wandering search for his clear and pure image, which we Christians so often obscure.

Marxism is discussed in the chapter "On Redemption."

Here it is said that Marxism is a very specific type of Western humanism and that it is an outspoken doctrine of salvation, and that it is not irrelevant here that Marx's parents were Jews, i.e. members of a people still waiting for the Messiah. Like Buddha, Marx was shaken by human misery. The disgraceful misery of the newly created industrial proletariat in the first half of the last century stimulated him to think. In the catechism it is also written that Marx did not seek the solution in individual calm and in freedom of feeling like Buddha, nor as a humanist with the desire to continue to be human. On the contrary, Marx saw salvation in a whole specific course of history, especially in the return to the original standpoint regarding the work of our hands.

Formerly, in the state of nature, man was in possession of his work.

Man has placed his "himself" in this work and lost himself in it. But he retained the genui and the use of the work, and with it himself. As far as that goes, he has not alienated himself. In culture, however, a different situation prevails due to the division of labor and mechanization. Here are people who own powerful means of production, with the help of which others work, and the owner of the means of production gets richer and richer.

Things he didn't produce at all belong to him. His uniqueness goes into things, these are the extensions of his personality. In a certain sense, his personality becomes alien. In this way he becomes alien to human uniqueness, he "alienates" himself. And further: »The exploited worker alienates himself in the same way, and in a much more painful way. He lays himself in the work of his hands. If he kept this work, he would also keep himself. But he has to sell his work and receives a lower salary than it is worth. This is how he becomes alienated". Then it is said that the proletariat will not always accept this state of affairs, it will 363

eine Revolution beginnen, und es wird zur Diktatur des Proletariats kommen. Dann wird erneut der Naturzustand hergestellt sein, und es wird gearbeitet werden, wann Bedarf danach besteht. Danach wird ein Text aus den »Frühschriften« zitiert, in dem es heißt, daß in der kommunistischen Gesellschaft die Gesellschaft selbst die allgemeine Produktion regeln wird, und das wird mir ermöglichen, »heute dies, morgen jenes zu tun, am Morgen zu jagen, am Mittag zu fischen und am Abend Viezucht zu betreiben, nach dem Essen zu kritisieren, und ohne jemals Jäger, Fischer, Hirte oder Kritiker zu werden gerade wie ich Lust habe«. Weiter sagen die Autoren des Katechismus, daß dieser Mensch sich nicht mit unwichtigen Dingen befassen wird (nach Leben und Tod und Gott zu fragen), sondern harmonisch und glücklich leben wird. *Also die Revolution ist eine neue Verkündigung.*

Dies verlangen das Gesetz und der Gang der Geschichte. »Der Kapitalist ist nicht schlecht aber er muß weg. Der Proletarier ist kein guter Mensch, kein Heiliger, aber er steht da wo Heil aufsprießt.« Die Autoren des Katechismus sehen in dieser Lehre einen völligen Geschichtsdeterminismus, und der einzelne ist wie eine Schachfigur die sich im Ganzen verliert.« Das »Ich« ist im Marxismus eigentlich nur eine Million Menschen durch eine Million geteilt.« Praktisch bedeutet das: Der Einzelne kann für das Ganze geopfert werden (was etwas anderes ist als die christliche Selbstaufopferung für das Ganze). Das ist erschreckend. Eine menschliche Gemeinschaft, die das Einzelwesen so wenig schätzt, es sogar zu opfern, zerstört sich selbst: niemand ist mehr sicher. Der Geschichtsverlauf kann fordern, daß jemand liquidiert werde. Der Geschichtsverlauf ist das Schicksal, dem im Marxismus niemand entgehen kann. Auch hier gilt: der Mensch ist nur Mensch. Wer soll ihn befreien? Der »Heilzustand?« Weiter wird davon gesprochen, daß nach 100 Jahren seither genau das Gegen teil von dem geschehen ist, was Marx über die Zukunft gesagt hat. Heute verringert sich der Unterschied zwischen Reichen und Armen. Und was ist mit dem Marxisten nach seinem Tod? Nacht. »Kann sich der Mensch so weit verändern, daß er diese Frage nie stellt?«

Dennoch liegt im Marxismus eine Art religiöser Impuls. Viele Themen sind der jüdisch-christlichen Offenbarung entnommen: »die heilige« Zukunft als Rückkehr zum Ursprünglichen; weiter die »Botschaft«, an die »geglaubt wird«; eine Partei als »das heilige Volk«, die »Idee« vom jetzt als der »Zeitfülle«; »ein leidender Erlöser«, (das Proletariat). Doch sind alle diese Themen durch einen soziologischen Inhalt ausgefüllt; sie geben keine Antwort auf »die letzten Fragen«; und es scheint, sagen die Autoren des Katechismus, als lösten der Marxismus und Kommunismus in keiner Weise die Alltagsprobleme. Hier ein Auszug: »Was aber sagt das Evangelium jenen, die noch nicht am Lebensstandard teilhaben, der im Wachsen ist, und keinen Anteil an der Vermenschlichung der Arbeit; für die der Fortschritt zu spät kommt; deren Arbeit ungesund ist und den Geist tötet; deren Lebenswerk nicht gelingt? Können sie diese Unglücklichen mit einer Zukunft trösten, die sie nicht mehr erleben werden? Im Marxismus ist dies die einzige Aussicht, die ihnen geboten wird.

general one production, and that will enable me, »today this, tomorrow to do that of hunting in the morning, fishing in the noon and raising cattle in the evening, criticizing after the meal, and without ever becoming a hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic just as I please have". Further, the authors of the Catechism say that this man will not concern himself with unimportant things (questioning about life and death and God), but will live harmoniously and happily. So the Revolution is a new proclamation.

The law and the course of history demand this. »The capitalist isn't bad, but he has to go. The proletarian is not a good person, not a saint, but he stands where salvation springs up.«

The authors of the Catechism see in this doctrine a complete historical determinism, and the individual is like a chess piece that loses itself in the whole.' The 'I' in Marxism is really just a million people by a million divided". In practical terms, this means that the individual can be sacrificed for the whole (which is different from Christian self-sacrifice for the whole). That is shocking. A human community that values the individual so little, even sacrificing it, is self-destructive: no one is safe any more. The course of history can require that someone be liquidated. The course of history is the fate that no one can escape in Marxism. The same applies here: man is only man. Who should free him? The »healing condition?« It is also said that after 100 years, exactly the opposite of what Marx said about the future has happened. Today, the gap between the rich and the poor is narrowing. And what about the Marxist after his death? Night.

"Can man change himself so far that he never asks this question?"

Yet there is a kind of religious impulse in Marxism. Many themes are taken from Judeo-Christian revelation: "the holy" future as a return to the original; further the "message" in which "is believed"; a party as "the holy people," the "idea" of now as the "fullness of time"; "a suffering Redeemer" (the proletariat). But all these themes have a sociological content; they don't answer "the ultimate questions"; and it seems, say the authors of the catechism, that Marxism and communism are by no means the 16th of everyday problems. Here is an excerpt: »But what does the gospel say to those who do not yet share in the standard of living that is growing, and have no share in the humanization of work; for whom progress comes too late; whose work is unwholesome and kills the spirit; whose life's work is unsuccessful? Can you console these unfortunates with a future they will never see again?

In Marxism, this is the only prospect they are offered.

Und das ist tatsächlich eine Aussicht voll Hoffnung, vor allem für gute Menschen. Dies aber ist zu wenig, denn es setzt voraus, daß der Mensch – der Einzelne ist nicht so wichtig, eventuell ein unnützliches Leben lebt, weil es um die Gesamtheit der Menschheit geht. Dem entgegen weiß der christliche Glauben, daß es tatsächlich um die ganze Menschheit geht, daß aber der Einzelne dabei nicht beiseite gelassen werden darf. Er besagt, daß auch ein Leben, das in den Augen der Menschen mißlungen ist, für den Einzelnen voll von Werten, voll von Zufriedenheit und die Ruhe sein kann. Denn auch der Herr ist zum Leben eingegangen, indem er scheiterte. Daher weißt auch der Christ, daß auch sein Scheitern nicht ohne Hoffnung ist«.

Um nicht weiter auf alle bestehenden Dilemmas einzugehen, geben wir eine kurze Zusammenfassung, die zugleich auch eine absolute Lösung ist. Dieser Auszug lautet folgendermaßen: »Jesus hat etwas getan, was weder Buddha, noch Mohammed, noch Marx noch irgend einer getan haben: er ist von den Toten auferstanden. Und das ist auch die Botschaft in diesem Buch: Jesus lebt. Tod und Sünde sind überwunden. Das tote Kind wird leben: es wird nicht eins mit dem All, sondern es wird im eigenen Leben, in der eigenen Liebe eins mit Gott und den Menschen.« Diese Unterschiede werden so verkündet: »Wir werden selbst nicht im Tod verschwinden, wie das der Humanismus und Marxismus lehren; wir werden uns nicht wegströmen ins All, wie das der Hinduismus und Buddhismus annehmen. Wir werden auch nicht fern von Gott eine Art irdischen Lebens führen, wie das der Islam meint, sondern wir werden in persönlicher Liebe ineinander und in Gott aufgehen. Weiter wird hervorgehoben, daß es im Humanismus und Marxismus christliche Werte gibt, wie auch in anderen Religionen.« Im Marxismus zeigt sich immer von Neuem die Neigung, eigentlich gegen seine eigene Lehre, den einzelnen Menschen, besonders den Unterdrückten, in seinem vollen Wert zu begreifen, in sich selbst und nicht als Teil einer wertvollen Menschheit. Dürfen wir darin nicht etwas von dem Geist sehen, der das Schaf auf die Schultern nahm und 99 Schafe in der Wüste ließ?«

Der Sinn davon ist klar. Diese Werte sind dem Marxismus fremd und völlig der Lehre Christi entnommen, und deshalb können auf die Christen auch andere christlich wirken: »Häufig zeigen sich hier teilweise erleuchtende Wahrheiten des allgemeinen katholischen Glaubens. Diese Wahrheiten haben bisher einseitig, aber intensiver als bei uns gelebt, was beschämend ist: völlige Anteilnahme bei den Hinduisten, Sanftmut bei den Buddhisten, Aufopferung bei den Muslim, Sorge um die Erde bei den Humanisten, Leidenschaft zur Gerechtigkeit bei den Marxisten«. Und so geschieht es, daß Nichtchristen den Christen die Evangelien verkünden.

Nun, das Finale sieht doch anders aus. Kein Mensch ist von der Gnade Gottes ausgenommen; der Verfolger kann zum Apostel werden und der schwere Sünder zum Heiligen. »Der Gegner darf nicht vernichtet werden, er muß vielmehr gerufen werden, zu kommen, dies mit größerer Freude im Himmel als über 99 Gerechte. Kurz: Jeder Mensch ist für das Glück bestimmt, keiner ist abgeschrieben. Das ist nicht so selbsterklärend wie man vielleicht denken könnte. Zum Beispiel kennt der Kommunismus, der doch auch eine Heilaussicht für

And that is indeed a hopeful prospect, especially for good people. But this is not enough, because it presupposes that man - the individual is not so important - possibly lives a useless life because it is about humanity as a whole. On the other hand, the Christian faith knows that it is actually

about the whole of mankind, but that the individual must not be left aside. It says that even a life that is miserable in the eyes of people can be full of values, full of contentment and tranquility for the individual. For the Lord also entered into life by failing. Therefore the Christian also knows that his failure is not without hope.

In order not to go further into all existing dilemmas, we give a short summary, which is also an absolute solution. This excerpt reads as follows: "Jesus did what neither Buddha, nor Mohammed, nor Marx, nor anyone else did: he rose from the dead. And that is also the message in this book: Jesus lives. Death and sin are overcome. The dead child will live: it will not become one with the universe, but in its own life, in its own love, it will become one with God and with man." These differences are proclaimed as follows:

»We will not disappear in death ourselves, as humanism and Marxism teach; we will not emanate into space as Hinduism and Buddhism assume. Nor will we lead a kind of earthly life far from God, as Islam believes, but we will merge in personal love in one another and in God. Furthermore, it is emphasized that there are Christian values in humanism and Marxism, just as in other religions.« In Marxism, the tendency, actually against its own teaching, to the individual human being, especially the oppressed, shows itself again and again in its fullest value to understand. in itself and not as part of a valuable humanity. May we not see in it something of the spirit that took the sheep on his shoulders and released 99 sheep in the desert?“

The meaning of this is clear. These values are alien to Marxism and taken entirely from the teachings of Christ, and that is why others can also have a Christian effect on Christians: Partially illuminating truths of the general Catholic faith often appear here. These truths have hitherto been lived one-sidedly, but more intensely than with us, which is shameful: total sympathy among the Hindus, gentleness among the Buddhists, self-sacrifice among the Muslims, concern for the earth among the humanists, passion for justice among the Marxists. And so it happens that non-Christians proclaim the gospels to Christians.

Well, the final looks different. No man is exempt from the grace of God; the persecutor can become an apostle and the grave sinner a saint. »The adversary must not be destroyed, he must rather be called to come, with greater joy in heaven than over 99 righteous people. In short: everyone is destined for happiness, no one is written off. This is not as self-evident as one might think. For example, communism, which also has a prospect of salvation for 365

die ganze Menschheit ist, jene, die ewig ausgeschlossen sind. Der Kapitalist kann kein Proletarier werden. Er muß verschwinden, sich aber nicht bekehren, denn so nimmt man an, er kann sich nicht verändern. Nun, in Christentum geschieht dies. Jeder Kommunist kann Christ werden und oft ein sehr guter Christ. Vielmehr darf nicht einmal der Gewalttätigste, der um Aufnahme in die Kirche bittet, abgewiesen werden.

»Viele Humanisten haben viel Vertrauen in die Menschheit. Ihnen aber fehlt das Vertrauen auf die Auferstehung, und deshalb sind sie in einem gewissen Sinn Menschen, die »keine Hoffnung haben.«

Um abzuschließen: Ihnen allen fehlt also der Anker, der sie halten könnte, und dieser Anker ist: die Güte Jesu. Wer das nicht hat, befindet sich in einer absurdnen Lage.

So also wird auch der Marxismus auf das Niveau einer soteriologischen Lehre gestellt, die dem Christentum nicht konkurrieren kann, weil Marx nicht auferstanden ist, im Gegensatz zu Jesus Christus. Schon der Apostel Paulus hat geschrieben, daß der Glauben ohne Auferstehung als Faktum völlig gegenstandslos wäre. Und so hält sich durch 20 Jahrhunderte die Tradition des Glaubens, daß es so war, und deshalb muß man hoffen, daß es sich an allen vollzieher wird.

Wozu war es überhaupt notwendig im Katechismus über Marxismus zu sprechen? Ist das das Thema der Diskussion oder ein methodologischer Standpunkt, eine Antwort auf geistige Bewegungen unserer Zeit zu finden? Man könnte früher sagen, daß das ein Standpunkt ist, der den Glauben für sich braucht, um sich zu bestimmen, um damit sich selbst nicht in irgendeiner Antithese, sondern in seiner Bestimmung, den Sinn der Welt und des Lebens zu erfassen, auszudrücken. Damit stellt sich das Problem des Beweisens überhaupt. Wie soll ein Standpunkt sich selbst beweisen, um damit den anderen vorraus zu sein, die dazu angeblich nicht imstande sind? Dem Gläubigen wird tatsächlich eine wichtige Behauptung kundgetan: Jesus ist auferstanden, Marx aber nicht, und in diesem Verhältnis kann der Marxismus nicht in Frage kommen, eine Lösung für Lebensproblem zu sein. Wenn alles aufgrund des Glaubens an die Auferstehung geschlossen wird, welchen Wert hat dann alles, was außerhalb »dieses einzigen Ausweges« liegt? Im Verhältnis zum Dogma ist das wirklich nur Kraftvergeudung an nebensächliche Lebensumstände, die den Menschen aus der Diesseitigkeit keinesfalls herausführen. Der auferstandene Jesus aber ist die Verwirklichung aller jener Wünsche, die sich erst in Zukunft ereignen werden.

Ein solches Argumentieren gegen Marx und andere ist etwas ungewöhnlich. Es wird behauptet, daß Gott das getan hätte, was Marx und andere nicht können, und so sollte es auch kein Dilemma geben. Das hieße: Gott ist Gott, der Mensch ist Mensch, und demzufolge ist das Verhältnis klar.

Das Dogma ist die eschatologische Hoffnung, während die geschichtliche Wirklichkeit Boden des Lebens und der Arbeit ist. Wenn Dogma Geschichtlichkeit (Jesus ist auferstanden) zuerkannt wird, so wird die Geschichte mit Absicht eschatologisiert, und ein solches Ziel hat angemessene Mittel nötig. Die Geschichte als Plan der Eschatologie negiert

dern». Well, in Christianity this is happening. Any communist can become a Christian and often a very good Christian. In fact, not even the most violent who asks to be admitted to the church may be turned away.

“Many humanists have a great deal of faith in humanity. But they lack confidence in the resurrection, and so in a sense they are people who "have no hope."

To conclude, you are all lacking the anchor that could hold you, and that anchor is: the goodness of Jesus. If you don't have that, you're in an absurd situation.

In this way, Marxism is also placed on the level of a soteriological teaching that cannot compete with Christianity, because Marx was not resurrected, in contrast to Jesus Christ.

Even the Apostle Paul wrote that faith without the resurrection as a fact would be completely irrelevant. And so the tradition of believing that it was so endured for 20 years, and therefore one must hope that it will be passed on to all executors.

Why was it even necessary to talk about Marxism in the Catechism? Is this the theme of the discussion or a methodological point of view to find an answer to intellectual movements of our time? It used to be possible to say that this is a point of view that needs faith for itself in order to determine itself, so that it does not find itself in some antithesis, but in its determination, the meaning of the world to grasp and express it and of life. So the problem of proof arises in general. How should a point of view prove itself in order to be ahead of the others? who are said not to be able to do this? In fact, an important assertion is made to the believer: Jesus is risen, but Marx is not, and in this respect Marxism cannot qualify as a solution to life's problems. If everything is concluded on the basis of belief in the resurrection, what is the value of everything that lies outside of "this only way out"? In relation to dogma, this is really just a waste of energy for irrelevant circumstances that in no way lead people out of this world. But the risen Jesus is the realization of all those wishes that will only come about in the future.

Such an argument against Marx and others is somewhat unusual. It is claimed that God did what Marx and others could not, and so there should be no dilemma.

That means: God is God, man is man, and according to this the relationship is clear.

The dogma is the eschatological hope, while actual reality is the ground of

life and work. If historicity (Jesus is risen) is accorded to dogma, history is intentionally eschatologized, and such an end needs adequate means.

History as plan of eschatology negated 366

sich selbst als Geschichte und wird zur Folge von einem Erlösungsplan, der einzelne Stufungen hat. Der Mensch wird für die Ewigkeit erlöst, und so wird das Diessetige notwendig nur als ein Durchgangsstadium aufgefaßt. Um dieser Vergänglichkeit Sinn zu geben als Weg in diese Ewigkeit, ereignete sich das, was das Dogma lehrt, d. h. die Auferstehung Jesu. Diese Sinngebung erhielt ein absolutes Verhältnis, und so ist das Ganze ein Prozeß auf ein solches Ende gerichtet. Also, das Ende ist der Schluß, der seine Wandlung in der Auferstehung erhält. Dies bedeutet eine geschichtliche Umkehr wie die eschatologische Parusie unter den Menschen selbst. Die Umkehr hat Gott durch sein Leben, seinen Tod und zuletzt durch seine Auferstehung bestätigt. Das ist das Wesen der religiösen Sinngebung.

Was aber für eine Antithese ist das: der auferstandene Jesus und der nichtauferstandene Marx? Warum braucht das die Kritik und die Argumentation, wie soll das überzeugen und auf welche Weise? Gegebenständlich geht das nicht zusammen, weil man den konkreten Menschen nicht den Glauben an etwas als Faktum gegenüberstellen kann. Dieses Verhältnis kann man nur so lösen, daß man die Idee, den Prozeß, die Wirklichkeit und das Wesen der Geschichte im Christentum und im Marxismus erläutert. Wenn eine und dieselbe Situation von zwei Aspekten aus untersucht wird, können Einzelheiten des einen, sowie des anderen Standpunktes dargelegt werden, und daraus werden Schlüsse folgen. Der Inhalt stellt sich selbst durch seine Immanenztheit und Logik vor, durch seine Eigenheit, und ein solcher Zustand kann mit anderen Ansichten verglichen werden. Also, für ein gedankliches Verhältnis ist folgendes keine Begründung: Jesus ist auferstanden und Marx nicht, vielmehr, was bietet dem heutigen Menschen eine und was die andere Seite. Haben beide Teile ihre Anhänger, so kann das so aussehen: entweder haben beide Seiten gute Argumente und gewinnen so Anhänger, oder keine der Seiten hat irgendwelche Argumente, oder aber es hat sie nur eine, die andere aber nicht. Man darf nie bis zur Ausschließlichkeit gehen, um etwas zu beweisen. Sowohl das Christentum als auch der Marxismus können einander verneinen, und doch bestehen beide, ohne daß auch nur eines von ihnen als gefährdet betrachtet würde. Hier ist es also in dieser Möglichkeit und in diesem Zustand wesentlich, daß es sich in diesen beiden Verhältnissen um das Suchen nach der Bestimmung des Menschen als Menschen handelt. Es gibt viele Antworten, keine aber ist absolut. Wenn hier Christentum und Marxismus verglichen werden, so sind das zwei Möglichkeiten von Antworten, in denen der zeitgenössische Mensch sich auf diese Weise entschließt, daß er sich erklärt, weshalb er das tut, was er tut. Ist dies erreicht, kann es auch anderen übertragen werden. Der Marxist erklärt sich selbst, warum er nicht glaubt, und er sagt damit gleichzeitig dem religiösen Menschen, weshalb der glaubt. Also der Marxismus ist nicht der absolute Beweis, durch den die Religiöse verschwindet. Es ist klar, daß sich der Gläubige selbst aus anderen Voraussetzungen erklären wird, er wird sagen, er ginge von der offensichtlichen Wahrheit aus und Ähnliches. Es besteht kein gegenseitiges Überzeugen, und es ist auch nicht notwendig. Aber es ist notwendig zu sagen, vom Niveau des Denkens, was dem Denken gemäß und immanent ist, was dagegen nicht, damit

itself as history and results from a plan of salvation that has individual degrees. Man is redeemed for eternity, and so what is here on earth is necessarily only understood as a transitional stage. In order to give meaning to this impermanence as a way into this eternity, what the dogma teaches, i. H. the resurrection of Jesus. This giving of meaning was given an absolute relationship, and so the whole thing is a process aimed at such an end.

So, the end is the *Schlüfti*, which receives its transformation in the resurrection. This means a historical reversal like the eschatological parousia among men themselves. God confirmed the reversal through his life, his death and finally through his resurrection. This is the essence of religious meaning.

But what kind of antithesis is this: the resurrected Jesus and the non-resurrected Marx? Why does this need criticism and argumentation, how should it be persuasive and in what way? Objectively, this does not go together, because one cannot confront concrete people with belief in something as a fact. This relationship can only be resolved by explaining the idea, the process, the reality and the essence of history in Christianity and Marxism. If one and the same situation is examined from two points of view, details of one point of view as well as the other can be presented, and conclusions will follow. The content presents itself by its im-manence and logic, by its own character, and such a state can be compared to other views. So, for an intellectual relationship, the following is no justification: Jesus is risen and Marx is not, rather what offers today's man one side and what the other. If both parts have their supporters, it can look like this: either both sides have good arguments and thus gain supporters, or neither side has any arguments, or only one has them and the other does not. One must never go too far to prove anything. Both Christianity and Marxism can negate each other, and yet both exist without either being considered endangered. Here, in this possibility and in this state, it is essential that in these two relationships it is a matter of searching for the determination of man as man. There are many answers, but none are absolute. If Christianity and Marxism are compared here, these are two possible answers in which contemporary man decides in this way that he explains why he is doing what he is doing. Once this has been achieved, it can also be transferred to others. The Marxist explains to himself why he does not believe, and at the same time he tells the religious person. why he believes. So Marxism is not the absolute proof through which religiosity disappears. It is clear that the believer will explain himself from other assumptions, he will say that he proceeds from the revealed truth and the like. There is no mutual witness, nor is it necessary. But it is necessary to say, from the level of thinking, what is appropriate and immanent to thinking, and what is not, so that 367

man dies gegenständlich und methodologisch unterscheiden kann. Damit gelangt man an die »Grenze der reinen Vernunft«, aber auf die Weise der Vernunft selbst. Deshalb kann als Argument nicht gelten: auferstanden oder nicht auferstanden, sondern die gedankliche Begründbarkeit als Weg in die Forschung. Bleiben wir bei der Unantastbarkeit des Dogmas, so ist wirklich jede weitere geistige Anstrengung gegenstandlos und völlig unnütz. Indem man sagt, daß der Mensch Gott geschaffen habe, und nicht Gott den Menschen, zeigt sich doch ein Verdacht allen religiösem Mythen gegenüber, und solange sie für sich selbst keine besseren Beweise haben, als das Verlangen nach Glauben, kann das Denken ruhigen Gewissens bei der These vom Menschen als selbständiger Schöpfer seiner Geschichte und seiner selbst bleiben.

Deshalb begreift Marx' Humanismus den Menschen als Individuum, nicht als »eine Million Menschen geteilt durch eine Million« (wie das die Autoren des Katechismus sagen), sondern als aktiven Befreier, sowohl seiner selbst als auch der Gesellschaft von allem, was Gegensatz zum Wesen des Menschen steht, das in verschiedenen Formen der Entfremdung deformiert ist, als Zustand, der überwunden werden muß. Der undogmatische Marxismus unterscheidet sich von der dogmatisierten Theorie und Praxis ausnahmslos darin, wie er heißt, und so ist es methodologisch unmöglich, den Marxismus mit verschiedenen politischen Pragmatismen zu identifizieren. Wenn man das aber dennoch tut dann ist die Kritik am Marxismus tatsächlich eine leichte Arbeit, und das ist dann Pseudo-Problem, das keine Gleichwertigkeit im ursprünglichen Inhalt hat.

one can distinguish this objectively and methodologically. In this way one reaches the "limit of pure reason", but in the way of reason itself. Therefore, the argument cannot be valid: risen or not risen, change the intellectual justifiability as a way into the Research. If we stick to the

inviability of the dogma, then every further intellectual effort is really pointless and completely useless. In saying that man created God and not God man, one nevertheless shows a suspicion of all religious myths, and as long as they have no better evidence for themselves than the inquiry according to G believe, thinking can stick to the thesis of man as an independent creator of his history and himself with a clear conscience.

Therefore, Marx's humanism conceives of man as an individual, not as "a million men divided by a million" (as the authors of the Catechism say) but as an active liberator, both of himself and himself the society of everything contrary to human essence, deformed in various forms of alienation, as a condition to be overcome. Undogmatic Marxism invariably differs from dogmatized theory and practice in what it is called, and so it is methodologically impossible to identify Marxism with various political pragmatisms. But if you do that anyway, then the critique of Marxism is actually an easy job, and that is then a pseudo-problem that has no equivalence in the original content.

LUCIFER AND THE LORD

Rade Bojanović

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Just as no philosophy of life based on deep and sufficiently universal motives, no matter how naive it might be, has ever totally disappeared from man's conception of reality, instead undergoing transformations adapting it to new modes of behaviour and thought, by the same token, there are still traces today of the primitive belief that angels and devils are the main performers in human behaviour and that the momentary balance of power between these two forces is the main determinant of man's fate. The belief in angels and devils can easily be correlated with man's recognition or intuition that his nature contains not only permissible and socially desirable motives, but also dark impulses prohibited by ethical principles. But the knowledge that the two sides of man's nature are symbolized by devils and angels does not in itself shed much light on this problem. We must understand the complete dynamical process in which these symbols operate. To avoid conflict between acceptable and unacceptable impulses and the anxiety that this conflict produces, the undesirable motives must somehow be eliminated from the immediate psychological realm of consciousness. Their existence in the human personality can be negated in a number of ways. One of the most frequent ways, which essentially boils down to the well-known mechanism projection, is to ascribe these impulses to the operation of forces outside the personality, i. e. to project them into the outside world. The devil is then the projected incarnation of unacceptable and forbidden motivations. Such a projection and conception based on symbols as devils and angels still appear innocent enough. However, not only the post-religious variants of this projection, but also the application in real life of the thesis of the existence of angels and devils immediately showed that the externalization of one's own unacceptable motives had an aggressive content and that projection played the role of the settling of scores among people. In reality, when bestial actions were explained and when people were denounced the agency of external incarnations was never of decisive importance; the devil reenters

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man's body, but of course someone else's body. However, even when human society became too sophisticated to believe any longer in real angels and devils, people still throughout history kept on ascribing their own, and others', bad intentions and motives to other people, the ones, of course, whom they believed not to share the same views or to be enemies. It is hard for man to accept the thought that any evil exists in himself; he denies this evil as part of his nature but in others sees the demons of hell.

The practice of portraying groups of people and individuals with the likenesses of Satan has primarily been typical for situations of political conflict. Very often innocent people have been proclaimed heretics without any evidence or argumentation. History shows clearly enough that suspicious and unworthy motives have been imputed to progressive and human figures, because their thought troubled uneasy consciences and threatened the dogma of their contemporaries.

I

This text will consider the psychological significance of accusations that have been levelled at outstanding intellectuals in recent years in the socialist countries.

Condemnations of intellectuals in the socialist countries of course arise from various psychological mechanisms, but a look at pattern of accusation shows right away that intellectuals are very often condemned for the very deviations that they themselves are fighting against in their discussions and scientific investigations. It seems that criticism of intellectuals is very simple task: the bureaucracy of socialist countries most often burden scientists and public figures with the guilt for those deformations that it is responsible for itself. An example of this is the condemnation of Polish scientists (in 1968) as opponents of socialism, even though they were working for the advancement of socialism by criticizing the deformations within their country. But the sentencing of the Polish scientists is not the only example. In countries that call themselves socialist, trials of writers, scientists, artists, etc. are frequent; there are frequent charges of anti-socialist ideas levelled against those very people who have the courage to speak out against everything that should not be tolerated in socialism. Eminent scientists who strove to promote the development of new social relationships in their critical and creative writings have been branded as opponents of these new social relationships; those attacking centralist tendencies – bureaucracy and technocracy, with the most fiery conviction have been called bureaucrats and centralists: men whose writings on statism have given a theoretical contribution to understanding this phenomenon and have indicated its practical implications have been smeared as proponents of statism. In a similar fashion people are labeled opponents of economic measures which the governments of the socialist countries are trying to implement, even though these same people have unfailingly supported progressive trends in the economy but have also pointed out the consequence ensuing from their inconsistent enforcement. Finally, iro-

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nically enough, it even happens that polemically inclined humanists are censured because their criticisms are not concrete, are not backed by evidence, because they amount to vilification without any serious argumentation to support it. However, this last example is far from being funny. The true, ugly face of this grotesque accusation beautifully confirms what has been said about the nature of condemnations of intellectuals.

Even upon a cursory examination of these examples, all the conditions seem to have been filled for the accusations levelled by the bureaucracy against intellectuals to be interpreted as the mechanism of projection, because in reality the bureaucracy must bear the responsibility for many deformations that it attributes to intellectuals, and, if even in a indirect manner, it must have had a share in producing them. The mechanism of projection is defined as the means by which people reduce anxiety and dissatisfaction because of the existence within themselves of socially unacceptable motives, thoughts, intentions and guilt by attributing them to other people. General empirical findings in regard to the mechanism of projection indicate that persons who are poorly integrated, anxious, and prone to guilt feelings are likely to project into other people the qualities *that they most hate and fear in themselves*. Persons whose thinking is conservative and those who are unfriendly, suspicious, rigid and compulsive are quick to condemn others for their own weaknesses and for their own psychological imperfection. They are often intolerant and readily disillusioned in other people. In addition, they show inflexibility and inadequacy in their perceptions and judgement. They are very critical of others and blind to their own failings.

Psychologists often use the mechanism of projection in interpreting political behaviour. In many accusations that are not backed up by adequate evidence and that show no positive attempt to solve some problem, they often perceive the projection of the uneasy conscience of the person passing sentence. And really, it would almost be impossible to say that a bureaucracy which calls the critics of bureaucracy bureaucrats was not a case of projection. It is impossible not to see the tendency to project in a professional, who is characterized by an ambition for power, when he says of humanist scientists that they primarily want power, or in a bureaucrat, whose interests are completely set apart from those of the working class, whose social status, material prosperity and way of looking at all essential things differ from the worker's, when he sees critics of the existing state of affairs as people whose interests are contrary to the interests of the working class. It is easy to think that many accusations against intellectuals are more or less, but mainly less, subtle variants of the mechanism of projection, intended to maintain the psychological balance of the person doing the projecting.

Projection is a great invention, or should we say, a great observation of classical psychoanalysis. Not only in orthodox psychoanalysis, but in all of dynamic psychology many problems have been solved by being interpreted in terms of projection. However, as has already been observed with other »defence mechanisms«, the very definition of projection indicates that it does not determine the mecha-

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nism of behaviour, but merely the final process of its dynamics. The empirically proven tendency for one's own qualities to be projected into other persons gives rise to many questions: what is the real cause of this tendency; what makes it possible; how is it implemented. I think that the essential question which has remained unexplained is why a person projects those very qualities of his own that he fears the most or that suffuse his subconscious. If it is already clear that projection has a competitive character, it should be asked why some other undesirable traits are not attributed to others. If there is a tendency to see the devil in other people, surely it could have a variety of aspects. The problem is why many accusations have a projective nature at all. According to Cameron's interpretation, projection develops from childish mechanisms of avoiding punishment or the loss of prestige and love, from that familiar »he did it, not me«.¹ But to say that the mechanism of projection develops from another mechanism is not to define its essence. Why is the use of an infantile mechanism (if it really is such) an adequate means for coping with personal problems? The problem remains, what lies at the root of the fact that personal problems can be solved by projecting them into others. The problem then is in the current situation. This is where we find unacceptable motives without projecting these motives into others. The problem then is in the current situation. This is where we should seek the conditions for the application of the mechanism of projection.

No doubt the psychological process that we call projection has different meanings in the context of different mechanisms of behaviour. However, since projection is not the main topic of this article, let the hypothesis suffice that the process of eliminating feelings of guilt and inadequacy by projecting them into others often results from a feeling of being threatened by the one who is the object of the projection, and from a feeling of rivalry in respect to various positions and various value system. This is the feeling of rivalry that goes with the dilemma »it's him or me«, with the feeling that only one is right. Of course both the feeling of being threatened and the feeling of rivalry may be based on completely unrealistic personal calculations and personal insecurity, as is most often the case.

In denunciations of intellectuals, I think that projection has a place in the complex dynamic process whose paradigm will be defined here.

II

Intellectuals are denounced as a rule after they have taken polemical and argumentative stands. Instead of giving a serious answer to intellectuals' increased interest in social problems, the entire official reaction consists of very strong accusations with no serious arguments to back them. Denunciations of intellectuals, then, are an inadequate response to criticism, a symptom of not being able to take criticism.

¹ Norman Cameron: *The Psychology of Behavior Disorders*, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, pp. 166-170.

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An analogy with the reaction of an immature personality to criticism can help the understanding of the syndrome of the inability to take criticism. The neurotic is suffused with conflicting desires, thoughts and opinions, some of which are acceptable and others of which he must be ashamed. In a situation of extreme conflict, life is hard to bear, and the neurotic naturally represses the »bad« part of his personality. In order to preserve his psychological equilibrium, he does not want to know anything about his impermissible impulses, about those elements in his personality that reactivate the terrible conflicts. The neurotic forms *an ideal picture of himself* which denies the existence of everything unacceptable and which functions as a defence mechanism against the reawakening of what has been suppressed. The immature personality rejects everything unacceptable as not being true and sees criticism as an expression of deep animosity. The immature personality does not tolerate any criticism of himself and rejects even the most innocuous suggestions. His majesty the neurotic is completely invulnerable.

Even in normal behaviour there are of course correlations to this idealized picture and its defensive function. In every ruling set of politicians there are people who unquestioningly identify with the principles declared to be progressive and the most functional from the standpoint of the development of society. Uncritical identification with everything progressive most often amounts to verbal protestations and precludes every critical reexamination and forming of an opinion. The basic principles of society are taboo for critical thought, and discussions on them are often viewed by these people as sacrilege and as the denial of all generally accepted values. Unquestioning identification with everything progressive serves as a defence mechanism that preserves this personality from the doubts and conflicts of contradictory views and motives. Conflicts are the result of the discrepancy between the principles that these people avow and their actual behaviour, between what is promised and the real situation. Large social differences, i. e. the extremely low standard of living and the poverty of a large segment of the population, the insufficient or non-existent participation of the broad masses in political life despite the fact that the countries calling themselves socialist declare that everything is done in the name of and for the benefit of the broad masses, difficulties in developing democratic institutions, e. g. difficulties in creating a free and impartial press, and many other problems are the reasons why the bureaucracies of these countries begin to doubt the correctness of their position. In the socialist countries these problems have created an awareness of the discrepancy between their actions and the principles they proclaim, and conflicts have arisen because these countries avow principles that staunchly deny the existence of such problems. Since the proponents of bureaucratic tendencies in reality must bear the responsibility for these problems, and since many of these problems arise as the result of a given manner of administration, it would be unrealistic not to expect all of this to lead at least to a temporary awareness of the discrepancy between their own actions and the principles they advocate, and to a feeling of guilt. Their consciences cannot be completely

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numbed during the entire time that they talk about how the working man should have the final decision on everything even though they have not given him the possibility of marking any decision whatsoever. They cannot, without a suspicion of perfidy, constantly take the working man as the criterion for everything and still let him live in worse material conditions without real decision-making powers in many essential matters. But, on the other hand, one would have to be completely unfamiliar with dynamic psychology not to expect all this to provoke a defence mechanism, whose function is to appease the conscience and at least temporarily suppress awareness of the gap between what is said and what is done.

When criticism appears that is directly or indirectly aimed at these persons, i. e. protests that the needs of the broad masses of the population are not being catered to, there is an immediate tendency to reject the criticism because of this defensive identification with everything progressive. There is a reinforcement of tendencies to identify, which in political behaviour is manifested in the flood of compliments that these persons pay to themselves as answer to the criticism. Since these tendencies to identify are exceedingly strong and have a defensive nature, one can discern in the behaviour of these persons the attitude, also conditioned by the traditional style of governing, that only they can be both the factors of progress and the criterion of what is progressive. And for psychological reasons, out of the desire to dominate and idealize their personalities, bureaucrats try to represent all the prevailing principles of society, all its institutions and, finally, even society itself. Their defensive reaction to criticism is a specific one: since such persons are identified with everything progressive and in their auto-perception are incarnations of what is progressive, whoever criticizes them is considered to be attacking the principles with which they have identified, and is not viewed as a critic of certain manifestations and persons responsible for their appearance. This substitution is a psychological one, but its effect is evident and often demonstrated in practice: in the socialist countries people who have criticized certain phenomena and certain persons are regularly pronounced opponents of those principles which at a given moment are considered to be progressive and the most functional. Defending themselves from criticism, the persons in power also defend the entire system of administration with which they are completely merged, since it maintains their motives of egocentricity and domination.

Since criticism carries the danger of reawakening guilt feelings and doubt in whether one's behaviour conforms to the principles with which identification has been made, the critic objectively threatens the psychological equilibrium of these personalities. In the deep recesses of their consciousness, the critic is perceived as a rival, among other things because he challenges the previously inviolable right of a definitive ruling over everything important, and because he applies criteria which are not used by those prone to identify. The irrational feeling of rivalry can be clearly discerned in political behaviour, but it is most evident in statements to the effect that humanist scientists primarily want power. The feeling of rivalry prepares the ground

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for the activization of the mechanism of projection. According to the logic that operates mainly in dichotomies, which is an expression of the conflict pattern, the critic and the ones being criticized cannot have the same views and hold the same positions, and since everything unacceptable must be denied as part of one's own personality, everything that is rejected as unacceptable is projected into the critics.

This is an adequate context for projection. It is easy to recognize actions and attitudes that are the result of less indirect projection. Many political accusations contain the idea that all evil comes from a group of intellectuals, who, as has been discussed already, because of their social position do not have any possibility of causing large problems to society. Such views invariably neglect the real problems and as the expression of the personal conflicts of those identifying, their entire political activity is directed against the group of »deviators«.²

It is easy to recognize this view as only a variant of the conception of devils and angels, since it contains the concept of the struggle between the goodies and the baddies, the latter being portrayed in a manner worthy of the most successful portraits of Satan. The painting of this portrait is achieved not only by the method of political smears, but also by the personal insecurity, guilt feelings, hatred and aggression toward those perceived as personal enemies. A compilation is made of the sins of the scientists who write about the problems of socialist societies, which, considering that these are »attacks« against all the accepted values of these societies, represents the very real equivalent of the sins of heretics accused of quintessential religious deviations. It goes without saying that these catalogues of sins are not supported by evidence or arguments. If they were, then there would be no problem.

Only persons beset with conflicts of contradictory desires can see political life as a black and white struggle between the good and the bad, the latter of course being »they«. Only an uneasy conscience can externalize its anxieties in a compulsive search for evil. Only he who is tortured by doubt in the correctness of his own actions is prone to doubt the correctness of anyone appearing as a critic.

Of course this analysis cannot overlook the fact that in every political issue there are opponents and dissidents, but the language of censure cannot be used against political opponents, rather the language of well-reasoned analysis. It is not difficult to distinguish between conscious accusations and projected imputations. The latter are invariably accompanied by a syndrome comprising a compulsive division into the good and the bad, dichotomous judgements and gray shades. This syndrome is so self-sufficient that it does not require any special logical context.

² The skirting of the real issues and stressing of those that can distract the attention of the public and give it »psychological nourishment«, as a calculated political move can interfere with the psychologically conditioned neglected of real problems. It would be best, however, to say that persons beset with conflict and forced to suppress awareness of their real position are disposed to using such political methods.

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From the standpoint of mental health as well, all accusations not based on properly logical thinking should be eliminated from political life. Logical arguments should be considered as a crucial criterion for political judgements for the other reason that an irrational manner of making evaluations may lose contact with psychological motivations and become a standard procedure.

III

Let us sum up the paradigm of the mechanism of accusations as inadequate defensive reactions in respect to criticism. The first element is identification with prevailing principles, which has the nature of a defence against doubts and conflicts arising as the result of the awareness of a discrepancy between one's own actions and declared principles. This is a defence against the stings of conscience and a variant of the idealized vision of oneself. The next element is the appearance of criticism, which points a finger at the fact that the professed principles are not being followed; criticism, then, carries the danger of reawakening the conflict pattern. Defensive reactions take place as a consequence. One of these is the stronger tendency to identify. Another is that because of the defensive nature of this identification with the prevailing principles, because of the perception of the critic as a rival, and because of the defensive, dichotomous reasoning to which both the critic and those being criticized cannot be in the same positions – because of these reasons the critics are charged with being opposed to the accepted principles or with not upholding them properly. Projections are made according to which the critic opposed to those principles which should be realized in practice, when actually the bureaucracy must bear the responsibility for the failure to achieve this or for the insufficiently energetic application of them, because of which this defensive identification is made and the consciousness of the discrepancy between actions and the avowed principles is temporarily suppressed.

However, in spite of the fact that the operation of all the elements of the dynamic processes described here can be easily traced in political behaviour, nevertheless there is still a problem in adequately explaining denunciations of intellectuals by means of this paradigm. I think that the problem of suitable explaining the complicated mechanisms of behaviour in dynamic psychology – and that goes for this explanations as well – cannot be solved by finding a correlation in empirical observations for each of the elements in this complicated reaction, saying, as is usually the case, that some of these elements may also be »unpsychogenically« conditioned. A paradigm of behaviour can be »put together« out of elements for which there are empirical correlations, but it is a problem whether they function in a natural way in its context or in the context of some other »mechanism« or independently. In line with this logic, it is necessary to prove that *in principle there is a connection among the elements of*

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the paradigm defined in this text, and it is necessary to show that they are mutually contingent on one another and that in the end they lead to denunciations that have the nature of projections.

Empirical evidence shows that one of the defences against guilt feelings and the feeling of inadequacy is projection in the form of blaming others for those tendencies which the person tries to deny in himself.³ This is not the only observation indicating that there is a connection between guilt feeling or the pricking of conscience as a causal element of the described mechanism and projected accusations. The evidence has already been mentioned that persons susceptible to feelings of guilt and inadequacy are prone to project into others those traits that they hate the most and fear within themselves. In this context it was stated that these persons are inflexible and inadequate in their judgements, and we of course can do no other than consider projective accusations as being inadequate judgements.⁴

Some evidence backs up the hypothesis that consciousness of a discrepancy between one's behaviour and declared principles and the feeling of inadequacy and guilt arising from it can be temporarily suppressed or coped with through idealization of one's personality – by identifying with everything progressive and seeing one's own personality as an incarnation of progress. The findings mentioned above show that persons filled with feelings of guilt and inadequacy are prone not only to see evil in other people, but also to reject everything bad in themselves. In narcissistic patterns there is an evident propensity to projection.⁵ Since the ideal picture in principle is an escape from the conflict patterns, it can be asserted with certainty that *defence against the reawakening of unpleasant patterns is carried out simultaneously through blaming others and through forming an idealized auto-perception.*

The other elements in the pattern, as can be seen from the text, can be considered the logical consequence of three basic elements or the circumstances in which a connection between them can be made. And, finally, it is assumed here that all these elements represent a mechanism of inadequate response to criticism. Of course, accusations of intellectuals can be made even when there is no criticism as a direct cause – and then it amounts to finding a scapegoat. Experience has shown that such opinions have invariably attended increased social interest on the part of intellectuals. On the other hand, it is theoretically sound »mechanism«, because it strikes to the heart of the conflict pattern and requires a restructuring or strengthening of earlier defence reactions.

The question arises whether interpretation of the behaviour of the main actors in denunciations of intellectuals on the basis of primarily psychological principles is euphemistic. Should these accusations be viewed mainly as the calculated discrediting of people who are trou-

³ Otto Fenichel, *The Psychoanalytical Theory of Neuroses*, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., London, 1945, p. 165.

⁴ Krech, Crutchfield and Ballachey, *The Individual in Society*, pp. 209 and 210. According to research carried out by McClosky, the existence of these relations can be deduced from the complex set of variables.

⁵ Otto Fenichel, op. cit., pp. 146, 147.

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However, the basic premises of the supposition that accusations are a deliberate attempt to discredit without psychological implications run counter to the fundamental principles of dynamic psychology. A man cannot live with the thought that his actions are dishonourable; he cannot bear such a psychological imbalance. It is a known fact that even a disagreeable physical appearance is made acceptable in the lover's mind. Consciousness of one's incorrect actions must be at least temporarily suppressed, or else some rationalization must be found for them so as to appear before others and before oneself as correct. The aim of this article has been to analyse some of the ways that people cope with the realization that there is a discrepancy between their own actions and declared principles. The story looks different from what might be supposed on the basis of the hypothesis that accusations are exclusively deliberate attempts at discrediting. Belief in the correctness of one's own position must exist. The cognitive functions when in the service of this need undergo destruction themselves, and valid reasons are often not recognized because they lead to unpleasant consequences. This does not mean that the intellect is completely withdrawn – some facts cannot be overlooked, but for this psychology the feeling is important that one's basic stand is correct (because this maintains psychological balance), and in the name of this conviction facts can be ignored, inhuman actions can be condoned, and ridiculous experiments with logic can be made. The described pattern of reactions should not be understood to mean that an unconscious mechanism has taken over control of the behaviour of the persons who are the main expounders of these accusations. There is no question that there is an awareness of the discrepancy between one's own actions and declared principles, but rather a solution has been found which will maintain self-respect and temporarily suppress this consciousness and which will uphold the motives of egocentrism and domination. This is a case where the perception of one's own and others' actions are distorted for the sake of maintaining psychological equilibrium. From the ethical standpoint, these actions are just as wrong as incorrect accusations with a constant awareness of them.

Therefore, it is not necessary to ask whether the denunciations of intellectuals are exclusively deliberate discrediting or predominantly a psychological response mechanism which suppresses a correct

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evaluation of reality. Perception is not completely distorted, activities are mainly on a conscious level, but this entire chain of actions must necessarily have psychological implications, must submit to the »laws« of reactions.

Because we cannot overlook the fact that such mechanisms as described above are regularly used to convince the public that intellectual critics are a danger to society does not exclude the psychological implications. Indeed it is these structures of the personalities under discussion that find it convenient to use political manipulations to eliminate the source of the threat to their psychological balance. It is reasonable to expect that anyone able to suppress awareness of his own actions will be prepared to use every means possible to stop others from really understanding what his critics are saying. It is here that we have the link between interpreting the behaviour of these personalities on the basis of psychological principles and on the basis of traditional political methods, whose ultimate goal is to maintain ruling positions.

The pattern of reactions to the criticism of intellectuals, as discussed in this article, has been formulated as a model manner of reacting, on the basis of studying political behaviour. Of course this does not apply to all politicians. It is most applicable in societies in which the direction by central organs is predominant and for those persons who see politics primarily as a chance to achieve personal success, to satisfy their desire for power. The behaviour of such personalities will depend on the extent to which they are aware of the discrepancy between their actions and the needs of society. If they succumb to narcissistic tendencies, then they no longer have any chance for real perception and for adequate responses.

Of course this explanation of the denunciation of intellectuals as a defence mechanism relates only to the main actors, to those representing the main source of the accusations. The acceptance, approval and even making of accusations by other people may be based on a large number of motives. First of all, other politicians may accept and make denunciations of intellectuals from the need for unity within political organs and in order to further their career – then they quickly learn when and where to point their guns.

There are many categories of people for whom a change in social positions would not be advantageous, and they are inclined to pounce upon the critics of the existing order and to overlook or pass over the real arguments, and to select their arguments in such a way as to gradually convince themselves, more or less, of the incorrectness of the views of the critics. These are persons who like their social status very much. But there are also those with a conservative make-up who do not like what could in any way be considered an attack on the actual, and therefore their personal, organization. A similar reaction can be seen in those persons who find security in accepting everything that is official. They are willing to pay for their feeling of security with total conformism.

We should also mention the not inconsiderable number of persons who feel the need to turn their discontent and aggression against some group that has been legally condemned. In this way they subcon-

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However, sufficiently integrated personalities, people for whom rationality retains its decisive role in social perception, easily see that every denunciatory attitude towards people that is not founded on sufficient or convincing arguments is based on dubious motives.

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The devil and the angel spring from the same source – from doubt in one's own views, from conflicts that lacerate the personality and lead to inadequate judgements. To see god in oneself and the devil in others is the same thing. It is escape from the same thoughts, from the same views. But, the more the person idealizes his own personality, the greater the discrepancy with reality. Everything unacceptable within oneself becomes even more terrifying and it becomes more difficult to combat it. At the same time, one's attitude towards others becomes less adequate and less humane.

Just as witch-hunts are a drug having a very deceptive and short-lived effect, the idealizing of oneself is a drug which does the most harm to the one taking it.

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LE MONOPOLISME DE PARTI ET LA PUISSANCE POLITIQUE DES GROUPES SOCIAUX

Stevan Uračar

Belgrade

Dans chaque société donc, capitaliste et socialiste, il existe des partis politiques, c'est-à-dire le parti politique, car c'est là la forme la plus adéquate de connexion politico-idéologique des particuliers et des groupes en vue d'orienter leur action vis-à-vis du pouvoir d'Etat, soit de le consolider, soit de l'appuyer, soit de lui opposer résistance, de le repousser ou de l'empêcher dans ses activités. En dernière analyse, le parti politique est une structure organisationnelle par laquelle on aboutit à l'activation maximum des forces politiques, c'est-à-dire de la société, tout en établissant, en même temps, leur puissance politique et leur influence. Ceci veut dire pratiquement que les groupements socio-politiques de base (les classes et les couches) usent des partis politiques comme forme d'organisation libre et volontaire de leur adhérents en vue de canaliser leurs activités politiques. Le parti est une forme de connexion entre l'action politique de l'Etat et l'activité politique des groupes et des particuliers, une forme de transmission et de circulation de ces actions dans des sens inverses – de la société à l'Etat et de l'Etat à la société. On doit faire rappeler ceci quand on a en vue le parti politique et même certaines autres formes d'organisation politique dans les pays qui sont en processus de construction du socialisme.

A la suite des circonstances historiques, dans tous les pays socialistes on n'a formé jusqu'à présent que le système monoparti, avec une avant-garde et un parti au pouvoir qui n'a pas vis-à-vis de soi un parti rival ou un parti d'opposition. Ainsi, on a inconditionnellement créé à cet égard un monopole politique unique en son genre, ce qui imprime un cachet puissant sur l'ensemble du système politique, c'est-à-dire au processus politique des pays en question. Bien que des différences sensibles existent à la fois dans la structure organisationnelle, la position et le rôle des partis communistes, il ne fait pas de doute qu'il s'agit précisément ce monopolisme politique qui contribue à la création de quelque chose qui leur est commun, et ce qui, malgré les tentatives accentuées d'observer des distances, fournit des preuves

B elgrade

In each society, therefore, capitalist and socialist, there exist political parties, that is to say the political party, because this is the most adequate form of politico-ideological connection of individuals and groups with a view to orient their action vis-à-vis the state power, either to consolidate it, or to support it, or to oppose it resistance, to repel it or to prevent it in its activities. In the last analysis, the political party is an organizational structure by which one achieves the maximum activation of the political forces, that is to say of the society, while establishing, at the same time, their political power and their influence. This practically means that the basic socio-political groups (classes and strata) use political parties as a form of free and voluntary organization of their adherents in order to channel their political activities. The party is a form of connection between the political action of the state and the political activity of groups and individuals, a form of transmission and circulation of these actions in opposite directions - from society to the state and from state to society. We must remember this when we have in view the political party and even certain other forms of political organization in the countries which are in the process of building socialism.

As a result of historical circumstances, in all socialist countries up to now only the one-party system has been formed, with a vanguard and a party in power which does not have vis-à-vis itself. a rival party or an opposition party. Thus, a unique political monopoly has been unconditionally created in this respect, which imparts a powerful stamp on the whole political system, that is to say on the political process of the countries in question. Although significant differences exist both in the organizational structure, the position and the role of the communist parties, there is no doubt that it is precisely this political monopolism which contributes to the creation of something which is common to them, and which, in spite of the accentuated attempts to observe distances, furnishes proofs 381

convaincantes d'une grande similitude, de l'identité typologique des systèmes politiques respectifs, en tenant compte évidemment des autres caractéristiques des ordres sociaux existants. Cette circonstance a des conséquences de grande portée pour le processus politique dans son ensemble.

Le monopole politique d'un parti assure ce qu'aucun parti politique ne peut atteindre dans le système pluriparti, en effet, qu'une organisation politique s'intronise, de façon illimitée temporellement et fonctionnellement, et par ses méthodes d'activité et ses entreprises, aux position sociales dominantes. Intronisée, elle concentre, c'est-à-dire que se concentre en elle une immense puissance politique, ou, pour être plus précis, toute la puissance de celles des forces qui optent pour le socialisme et qui sont de loin supérieures à celles qui se prononcent réellement ou potentiellement pour le capitalisme. Ainsi, le processus politique se tourne autour d'un seul parti politique, comme s'il tournait autour de son propre axe. Alors qu'il assume en même temps le rôle de force motrice de l'ensemble du processus politique. Ce faisant, une grande importance revient, de toute évidence, à la forme de liens entre le parti et l'Etat: là où on a établi une symbiose organisationnelle et fonctionnelle particulière de ces deux formations politiques, le système politique et nettement différent de la situation dans laquelle cette symbiose est plus atténueée. Cependant, dans une analyse plus profonde et avec une dose nécessaire d'objectivisme il n'est pas difficile de prouver qu'ainsi l'essence des choses ne change pas, c'est-à-dire que le monopolisme politique demeure partout le même, c'est-à-dire que sa nature ne peut être changée substantiellement, que sa nature ne peut être modifiée essentiellement et se transformer en quelque chose de différent.

La position de monopole du parti politique au pouvoir aboutit toujours à ce que sa puissance politique immense est toujours usée pour les tâches clés dans la politique. Elle est avant tout, un cadre organisationnel au sein duquel s'édifie la ligne politique au pouvoir, déterminée par des documents de programme et ensuite concrétisée dans les documents partiels, les décisions des forums supérieurs et inférieurs du parti. En outre, le parti devient le facteur le plus important dans la réalisation de la ligne tracée par le programme et des tâches particulières plus restreintes. Ce qui est important, c'est l'affirmation ainsi, et uniquement, de cette formation politique en tant qu'incarnation de l'avant-gardisme, de la nécessité réelle de placer à la tête des forces politiques, de tous les facteurs, groupes et particuliers qui participent au processus politique, une formation unique, celle qui est la plus organisée et la plus capable. Car, il ne peut y avoir de politique sans force organisée, capable de diriger, de poser les objectifs, d'arrêter des décisions politiques, de coordonner les actions en vue de leur mise en œuvre. D'où aussi la nécessité d'organiser au niveau du parti celles des forces qui mènent la politique et y participent.

Dès lors, le parti au pouvoir s'approprie également le monopole idéologique, c'est-à-dire qu'il érige son idéologie au piédestal de l'idéologie officielle qui jouit de tous les avantages sociaux, politiques, psychologiques, etc. sur tous les autres aspects de manifestation de la vie idéologique, et surtout si celle-ci se trouve à une distance

The political monopoly of a party ensures what no political party can achieve in the multi-party system, in fact, that a political organization is enthroned, in an unlimited way in time and function. tionally, and by its methods of activity and its enterprises, with dominant social positions. Enthroned, she concentrates, that is to say, she concentrates in her an immense political power, or, to be more precise, all the power of those forces which opt for socialism and which are far superior to those which actually or potentially speak out for capitalism. Thus, the political process revolves around a single political party, as if it revolved around its own axis. At the same time it assumes the role of driving force of the whole political process. In doing so, great importance obviously goes to the form of links between the party and the state: where a particular organizational and functional symbiosis has been established between these two political formations, the system political and distinctly different from the situation in which this symbiosis is more attenuated. However, in a deeper analysis and with a necessary dose of objectivism, it is not difficult to prove that the essence of things does not change in this way, that is to say that political monopolism remains everywhere. the same, that is to say that its nature cannot be changed substantially, that its nature cannot be essentially modified and transformed into something different.

The monopoly position of the ruling political party always results in its immense political power always being used for key tasks in politics. It is above all an organizational framework within which the political line in power is built, determined by program documents and then concretized in the partial documents, the decisions of the higher and lower forums of the party. In addition, the party becomes the most important factor in achieving the line drawn by the program and the more restricted particular tasks. What is important is the affirmation thus, and only, of this political formation as an incarnation of avant-gardism, of the real need to place at the head of political forces, of all the factors, groups and individuals who participate in the political process, a unique formation, that which is the most organized and the most capable. Because there can be no politics without an organized force, capable of directing, setting objectives, making political decisions, coordinating actions with a view to their implementation. Hence also the need to organize at the party level those forces that conduct and participate in politics.

Consequently, the party in power also appropriates the ideological monopoly, that is to say that it erects its ideology on the pedestal of the official ideology which enjoys all the social, political advantages , psychological, etc. on all the other aspects of the manifestation of ideological life, and especially if this is at a distance 382

quelconque de l'idéologie au pouvoir, officielle. Le monopole idéologique signifie qu'une idéologie approvisionne les membres du parti, et le plus souvent de la manière la plus rigoureuse, en veillant au maximum que son respect soit aussi conséquent que possible et presque absolu, qu'il n'y ait pas de possibilité de déviation du fonds d'idées générales et de positions déterminées sur les questions clés de la vie politique. Car toute déviation sur le plan idéologique devient signe de suspicion politique et est taxée, de ce fait, de déviationnisme à l'intérieur du parti. En outre, on met ainsi à profit tous les moyens d'influence idéologiques, et notamment les mass media qui, au degré actuel de développement, sont devenus une force gigantesque qui subordonnent et traitent la conscience des particuliers, souvent de façon brutale et agressive, et souvent subtile et pour ainsi dire inapercevable. Grâce à cette indoctrination intensive puissante et dirigée, il n'est pas étonnant que l'idéologie monopoliste devienne souvent extrêmement simplifiée, schématisée, dogmatique, unilatérale, intolérante, pétrifiée, stérile et presque caricaturale. Et encore: elle devient alors le refuge de divers mythes et préjugés politiques fascinants qui imprègnent la structure spirituelle de la communauté et des particuliers et déterminent non seulement les visions théoriques-abstraites du socialisme en général ou de certaines de ses composantes, mais deviennent aussi le point de départ exclusif, unique de l'activité pratique, ainsi que le critère de tout engagement théorique-pratique. Tout ceci, évidemment, a d'énormes conséquences sur l'ensemble de la politique.

La position monopoliste d'un parti est surtout caractéristique sur le plan de sa connexion avec l'organisation d'Etat, c'est-à-dire sur le plan de l'influence qu'elle a sur le pouvoir de l'Etat, de même que vice versa – de l'influence de l'Etat sur le parti politique respectif. Il existe là, en effet, une symbiose constitutive, symbiose qui n'est pas seulement durable, qui dépasse les brèves périodes mandataires entre les élections (tel que le cas avec la symbiose accidentelle Etat-parti au pouvoir dans le capitalisme, par exemple), mais qui est organique, car les mécanismes de parti et d'Etat s'entremêlent ou se séparent organisationnellement, tout en préservant l'unité personnelle dans la mesure où les mêmes personnes occupent des postes d'importance dans les forums du parti et les organes d'Etat. Même dans le cas de leur tendance à la séparation aussi complète que possible – comme c'est le cas chez nous ces quelques dernières années – son entremêlement de fait reste accentué par le fait même que par la-dite rotation la composition de dirigeants se transpose de la voie d'Etat sur la voie du parti, et vice versa, mais au même niveau et avec approximativement la même possibilité de possession du pouvoir et de l'influence politiques. Aussi a-t-on créé des garnitures de dirigeants à tous les niveaux, qui sont prédestinées à exercer les fonctions les plus importantes. Dans de telles circonstances, il est évident, les positions politiques ne peuvent pas être conquises en dehors de la ligne de la carrière établie, soit à travers le parti, à travers l'Etat ou, éventuellement, à travers une organisation socio-politique. Toutes les autres lignes sont soit des lignes d'outsiders ou décoratives et sans possibilité de conquête vérité-

anyone from the ideology in power, official. The ideological monopoly means that an ideology supplies the members of the party, and most often in the most rigorous way, taking care as much as possible that its respect is as consistent as possible and almost absolute, that there is no possibility of

deviation from the stock of general ideas and determined positions on the key questions of political life. Because any deviation on the ideological level becomes a sign of political suspicion and is therefore accused of deviationism within the party. Moreover, all the means of ideological influence are thus taken advantage of, and in particular the mass media which, at the present stage of development, have become a gigantic force which subordinates and treats the consciousness of individuals, often in a brutal and aggressive, and often subtle and almost invisible. Through this powerful and directed intensive indoctrination, it is no wonder that the monopoly ideology often becomes extremely simplified, schematized, dogmatic, unilateral, intolerant, petrified, sterile and almost caricatural. And again: it then becomes the refuge of various fascinating political myths and prejudices which permeate the spiritual structure of the community and individuals and determine not only the theoretical-abstract visions of socialism in general or of some of its components, but also become the exclusive, unique starting point of practical activity, as well as the criterion of any theoretical-practical commitment. All of this, of course, has enormous implications for politics as a whole.

The monopoly position of a party is above all characteristic in terms of its connection with the state organization, that is to say in terms of the influence it has on the power of the state, same as vice versa - from the influence of the state on the respective political party.

There exists, in fact, a constitutive symbiosis, a symbiosis which is not only durable, which goes beyond the brief periods of office between elections (as is the case with the accidental symbiosis between the state and the party in power in capitalism, for example), but which is organic, because the mechanisms of party and state intertwine or separate organizationally, while preserving personal unity insofar as the same people occupy important positions in party forums and state bodies. Even in the case of their tendency to separate as completely as possible - as is the case with us in the last few years - their de facto intertwining remains accentuated by the very fact that by the said rotation the composition of rulers is transposed from the state road to the party road, and vice versa, but at the same level and with approximately the same possibility of possessing political power and influence.

Also, we have created sets of leaders at all levels, who are predestined to exercise the most important functions. In such circumstances, it is obvious, political positions cannot be won outside the established career line, either within the party, across the state, or possibly within a socio-political organization. All other lines are either underdog or decorative lines and have no veri383 conquest possibility.

table des puissantes positions politiques. C'est ainsi que l'on a créé des murs qui ne peuvent pas être percés du dehors, car il n'existe pas de force politique qui pourrait l'entreprendre.

La position monopoliste du parti dans certains pays s'est transformée non seulement de fait mais formellement aussi en suprématie de cette formation sur l'Etat, si bien que les principales décisions politiques se transforment directement en actes juridiques des plus hauts organes de l'Etat. Ou alors, on arrête des actes avec l'acceptation commune des forums du parti et des organes d'Etat du même rang. Là où cette connexion entre le parti et l'Etat n'est pas si prononcée, souvent les situations de fait aboutissent au même ou semblable résultat, à savoir que l'exercice de la partie la plus importante du pouvoir politique s'appuie sur le mécanisme du parti et de l'Etat, ce en quoi le premier à l'avantage de la force en raisons des positions plus puissantes des forums du parti. Or, étant donné que l'on a construit le plus souvent un parallélisme entre les forums du parti et les organes de l'Etat – qui dans certains pays va tout droit à la symétrie réelle, et dans certains avec certaines déviations – du sommet à la base de ces formations organisationnelles, il est naturel que le pouvoir politique se lie organisationnellement et se manifeste à travers l'Etat, dans le même temps et dans la même direction. Il ne se sépare en rien, mais se comprime davantage encore en mécanisme puissant que constituent deux forces complémentaires, très édifiées et puissantes à tout égard. Centré ainsi et dans de tels mécanismes, le pouvoir politique reçoit inévitablement toutes les caractéristiques que possèdent le parti et l'Etat en tant que tels, et notamment les liens qui s'établissent entre eux. Il devient puissant, apte à des entreprises de taille, mais en même temps susceptible à diverses déformations.

C'est là que se trouve le centre et le foyer du pouvoir politique, et cela veut dire que c'est là que se constituent les tenants déterminés de la puissance politique qui dirigent les mouvements des cours principaux dans le processus volumineux qu'est toujours le processus politique, soit dans sa totalité, soit dans ses manifestations partielles. C'est aussi la raison pour laquelle tous les autres moments et facteurs du processus politique se voient repousser vers la périphérie, car c'est d'eux ou à l'aide d'eux que sont créés seulement les aspects complémentaires, et de ce fait auxiliaires, du pouvoir politique. Que cela se passe ainsi, c'est ce que prouve, entre autre, le fait que ce centre se maintient partout, même là où l'on modifie formellement cette structure et où l'on n'aspire pas à mettre en prominance le pouvoir politique en dehors des cadres que représentent le parti et l'Etat dans leur connexion organisationnelle ou seulement fonctionnelle. Cette connexion aboutit à la création d'un axe auquel s'accroche l'ensemble de la politique et l'entité du système politique.

L'existence du monopolisme de parti, n'est pas, évidemment, un hasard. Il ne fait pas de doute que des conditions particulières et extrêmement difficiles et une suite de circonstances dans le monde et dans certains pays ont rendu inévitable cette forme d'organisation du parti et la position et le rôle correspondant du parti au pouvoir. Or, cela ne veut pas dire aussi que tous les événements liés à ceci sont – une nécessité historique. Au contraire, à cet égard il y a eu toujours –

The monopoly position of the party in some countries has been transformed not only de facto but also formally into the supremacy of this formation over the state, so that the main political decisions are transformed directly into legal acts of the highest state bodies. Otherwise, actions are taken with the common acceptance of party forums and state organs of the same rank.

Where this connection between the party and the state is not so pronounced, often the factual situations lead to the same or similar result, namely that the exercise of the most important part of political power is relies on the mechanism of the party and the state, in which the former has the advantage of strength due to the more powerful positions of the party forums. However, given that we have most often constructed a parallelism between party forums and state organs - which in some countries goes straight to real symmetry, and in some with certain deviations - from the summit to the base of these organizational formations, it is natural that political power is organizationally linked and manifests itself through the State, at the same time and in the same direction. It is not separated in anything, but is compressed even further into a powerful mechanism that constitutes two complementary forces, very edified and powerful in every respect.

Centered in this way and in such mechanisms, political power inevitably receives all the characteristics possessed by the party and the state as such, and in particular the links that are established between them. It becomes powerful, suitable for large undertakings, but at the same time susceptible to various deformations.

This is where the center and focus of political power is, and that is where the determined tenants of political power are constituted who direct the movements of the main courts in the voluminous process that is always the political process, either in its totality or in its partial manifestations. This is also the reason why all the other moments and factors of the political process are pushed to the periphery, because it is from them or with their help that only the complementary aspects are created, and from this made auxiliaries, political power. That this happens is what proves, among other things, the fact that this center is maintained everywhere, even where this structure is formally modified and where one does not aspire to put the political power outside the frameworks represented by the party and the state in their organizational or merely functional connection. This connection results in the creation of an axis to which the whole of politics and the entity of the political system clings.

The existence of party monopolism is, of course, no coincidence. There is no doubt that particular and extremely difficult conditions and a series of circumstances in the world and in certain countries have made this form of

party organization and the corresponding position and role of the party in power inevitable. Now, this also does not mean that all events related to this are -

a historical necessity. On the contrary, in this respect there has always been

et on a partout confirmé d'une façon ou d'une autre qu'elles devaient se produire – différentes déformations, plus ou moins graves, durables et temporaires, plus générales et plus spécifiques. Grâce à tout ceci, on a vu se créer de riches expériences qui ont encouragé tant des options et acceptations apologétiques de ce système que la critique puissante de toute part, et avant tout de la part de ceux qui prenaient l'expérience du parlementarisme bourgeois et du système pluriparti comme l'unique expérience compétante pour l'évaluation du rôle du parti politique en tant que formation spécifique.

Si le système monoparti a pu jouer partout, et surtout dans certaines phases du développement, un rôle progressif, il est certain que, parallèlement et notamment dans certaines autres phases du développement il contenait de soi-même d'énormes dangers potentiels qui se sont manifestés, plus ou moins, dans la pratique sociale. C'est précisément ce qui avait éveillé la plus grande attention des analystes.

Le danger fondamental a été toujours le rétrécissement possible de la démocratie socialiste du fait même que le monopolisme politique du parti au pouvoir se consolidait. Seulement dans les périodes de la prise directe du pouvoir d'Etat et de sa consolidation, quand ce parti a déjà un rôle politique, étant à la tête de la classe ouvrière et des autres forces qui luttent contre l'ordre ancien, le parti joue inconditionnellement un grand rôle positif dans la fondation du système de la démocratie socialiste. Elle jouit de la confiance sans réserve des forces révolutionnaires et des masses, et apparaît ainsi et dans la même mesure comme protagoniste du démocratisme socialiste. Alors précisément, le système monoparti, c'est-à-dire le monopolisme du parti, offre non seulement la plus grande, mais aussi la chance unique pour jeter les bases de la démocratie socialiste dans les conditions respectives des pays. Seulement sous condition que le parti joue ce rôle, il ne pourra devenir un danger pour le développement de la démocratie socialiste. Cependant, sortant de cette phase de développement de chaque pays, le monopolisme de parti se transforme, pour ainsi dire automatiquement et inévitablement, en source des plus grands dangers, surtout pour la démocratie socialiste. Il devient le barrage politique de la propagation de la participation réelle des masses aux processus politiques décisifs, et avant tout parce qu'il permet, comme nous l'avons déjà dit, qu'un groupe s'intronise aux positions dominantes. Ce faisant, il ne change en rien cette situation de fait, et se borne à dissimuler l'existence d'un mécanisme plus ou moins développé d'institutions et de formes organisationnelles du nouveau type historique de la démocratie.

Ce système assure des priviléges de facto d'un cercle relativement restreint dans la sphère de la politique, car on rétrécit à l'extrême la possibilité d'épanouissement naturel de cadres politiques capables. La base et limitée à ceux qui se sont, disons, affirmés dans le période de la conquête du pouvoir, et plus tard le rafraîchissement et le rajeunissement normal de la composition gouvernante deviennent de plus en plus difficile. Et ceci d'autant plus, car dans de telles conditions ce n'est que par une structure de parti considérablement bureaucratisée, qui assure un succès graduel et certain seulement à des personnes médiocres et conformistes jusqu'au bout, que l'on paralyse pour

and it has everywhere been confirmed in one way or another that they must occur - different deformations, more or less serious, lasting and temporary, more general and more specific. Thanks to all this, we have seen the creation of rich experiences that have encouraged both apologetic

options and acceptances of this system and powerful criticism from all sides, and above all from those who took the experience of bourgeois parliamentarianism and of the multi-party system as the only competent experience for the evaluation of the role of the political party as a specific formation.

If the one-party system was able to play everywhere, and especially in certain phases of development, a progressive role, it is certain that, at the same time and especially in certain other phases of development, it contained enormous potential dangers which manifested themselves., more or less. in social practice. This is precisely what had aroused the greatest attention of analysts.

The fundamental danger has always been the possible shrinkage of socialist democracy due to the very fact that the political monopolism of the party in power was consolidated. Only in the periods of the direct seizure of state power and its consolidation, when this party already has a political role, being at the head of the working class and other forces fighting against the old order, does the party play unconditionally a great positive role in the foundation of the system of socialist democracy. It enjoys the unreserved confidence of the revolutionary forces and the masses, and thus appears and to the same extent as the protagonist of socialist democratism. So precisely, the one-party system, that is to say the monopolism of the party, offers not only the greatest, but also the unique chance to lay the foundations of socialist democracy in the respective conditions of the countries. Only if the party plays this role can it become a danger to the development of socialist democracy. However, emerging from this phase of the development of each country, party monopolism is transformed, so to speak automatically and inevitably, into a source of the greatest dangers, especially for socialist democracy. It becomes the political barrier to the spread of the real participation of the masses in decisive political processes, and above all because it allows, as we have already said, that a group enthrones itself in dominant positions. In doing so, he does not change this de facto situation in any way, and limits himself to concealing the existence of a more or less developed mechanism of institutions and organizational forms of the new historical type of democracy.

This system secures de facto privileges to a relatively small circle in the political sphere, because it narrows to the extreme the possibility of natural development of capable political cadres. The base and limited to those who are, say. asserted in the period of the conquest of power, and later the normal refreshing and rejuvenation of the governing composition becomes increasingly difficult. And this all the more so, for under such conditions it is only by a considerably bureaucratized party structure, which assures gradual and certain success only to mediocre and conformist people to the

ainsi dire, totalement, la circulation normale des hommes et des équipes qui, dans les conditions nouvelles, peuvent accomplir des tâches nouvelles. Quand on sait que la politique – et notamment dans les mouvements tumultueux qui caractérisent le socialisme – est extrêmement dynamique, la nécessité de l'affirmation des politiciens capables, courageux et d'initiative devient encore plus grande que dans le capitalisme. Contrairement à ce besoin, ce système est tout à fait conforme au conservatisme, à l'inertie, au dogmatisme, à l'idéologie de la »direction sage«, et d'autres phénomènes négatifs qui accompagnent le système monoparti, et surtout quand celui-ci est rigide posé.

Un danger particulièrement grand réside dans la réduction naturelle de la compacité intérieure, de l'enthousiasme politique, de l'esprit de principe, des grandes possibilités de réaliser de façon engagée et avec esprit de suite les grandes tâches, etc. Le parti est également exposé aux pressions des phénomènes négatifs dans ses propres rangs, à la création de peureux et de conformistes, de petits-bourgeois, de carriérastes, mêmes parmi les individus, dont le moral est en dissonance avec le moral d'un communiste moyen. Souvent, dans ses propres rangs, prennent de la vigueur de mauvais politiciens et des créatures (comme l'a prouvé la pratique de Staline) qui portent plus de mal au socialisme que les adversaires réels ou supposés en dehors du parti. Celui-ci et d'autres phénomènes ne sont que le signe de la bureaucratisation du parti, ce qui aboutit à la paralysie de ses possibilités et de son activisme.

La pratique historique a prouvé la valeur limitée du système monoparti. D'où aussi les tentatives de palier aux lacunes que se déclarent dans l'application d'un modèle rigide de ce système. Par exemple, chez nous on a inauguré depuis longtemps le cours de la création d'un système sans partis, d'un système de séparation du parti et du pouvoir, de la transformation du parti en force politico-idéelle principale. En supposant que des conditions réelles assurent la disparition gradauelle et enfin définitive du parti politique, il serait vraiment le plus souhaitable que l'on crée un système au sein duquel il n'y aurait aucun parti. On peut espérer que cela se produise dans l'avenir.

Cependant, il y a certains indices qui témoignent que le système biparti serait possible dans le socialisme aussi. Nombre de pays socialistes ont connu des crises et des règlements de compte brutaux dans les sommets du parti. Il est difficile de croire qu'il s'agissait toujours de quelque conversions subites de certains hauts fonctionnaires du parti en »adversaires du socialisme«, mais plutôt d'un phénomène de divergence possible et même naturelle autour des questions politiques majeures, ce qui était suivi non seulement d'excommunications mais aussi de liquidations (non seulement politiques mais physiques aussi) des oppositionnels. De tels cas ont provoqué partout une image angoissante et mauvaise du système monoparti, cependant que le système lui-même perdait nombre de ces traits démocratiques, notamment celui du démocratisme à l'intérieur du parti. Aussi ne serait-il pas plus naturel que deux partis existent, dont chacun lutterait également pour le socialisme, en se différenciant, évidemment, dans sa structure, ses partisans et ses approches idéologiques à certaines questions concernant l'édification du socialisme? Dans ce cas, un parti

politics - and especially in the tumultuous movements that characterize socialism - is extremely dynamic, the need for the affirmation of capable, courageous and initiative politicians becomes even more greater than in capitalism. Contrary to this need, this system is very much in keeping with the conservatism, inertia, dogmatism, "wise leadership" ideology, and other negative phenomena that accompany the one-party system, and especially when it is rigidly posed.

A particularly great danger resides in the natural reduction of inner compactness, of political enthusiasm, of the spirit of principle, of the great possibilities of realizing in a committed way and with a spirit of consistency the great stains etc. The party is also exposed to the pressures of negative phenomena within its own ranks, to the creation of cowards and conformists, petty bourgeois, careerists, even among individuals, whose moral is in dissonance with the world. speech of an average communist. Often in its own ranks bad politicians and creatures (as proved by the practice of Stalin) sprung up who do more harm to socialism than the real or supposed adversaries outside the party. This and other phenomena are only the sign of the bureaucratization of the party, which leads to the paralysis of its possibilities and its activism.

Historical practice has proven the limited value of the one-party system. Hence also the attempts to compensate for the shortcomings that appear in the application of a rigid model of this system. For example, in our country the course of the creation of a system without parties, of a system of separation of party and power, of the transformation of the party into the main politico-ideal force was inaugurated a long time ago. Assuming that real conditions ensure the gradual and finally definitive disappearance of the political party, it would really be most desirable to create a system in which there would be no party. We can hope that this will happen in the future.

However, there are certain indications that the two-party system would be possible in socialism as well. Many socialist countries have experienced crises and brutal settling of scores at the party summits. It is hard to believe that it was always a question of some sudden conversions of certain high functionaries of the party into "adversaries of socialism", but rather of a phenomenon of possible and even natural divergence around major political questions, which was followed not only by excommunications but also by liquidations (not only political but also physical) of the oppositionists. Such cases have everywhere created an agonizing and bad image of the one-party system, while the system itself has lost many of these democratic traits, in particular -

ment that of dem ocratism within the party. So it would not be more

natural for two parties to exist, each of which would equally fight for socialism, differing, of course, in its structure, its supporters and its ideological approaches to certain questions. concerning the construction of socialism? In this case, a party 386

qui rassemblerait la majorité en tant que parti au pouvoir, aurait face à soi une opposition organisée, et chacun d'eux devraient tenir compte qu'il ne pourrait s'éterniser, ni les structures qui sont son oeuvre. Ou, par exemple, que l'on assure dans les cadres d'un parti l'action légale de l'opposition organisée qui constituerait la minorité et qui pourrait, dans un dialogue politique normal avec la majorité, s'employer pour une politique proclamée et déterminée, agissant ainsi en tant que correctif de la politique de la majorité de parti. Ainsi seraient enrayés les côtes les plus graves du système monoparti – sans atteinte aucune au socialisme en tant que tel. Les expériences du système biparti dans le capitalisme prouvent éloquemment que le système social et politique se stabilise réellement, c'est-à-dire que de cette manière ne s'exprime que la stabilité du système social. Or, d'autre part, la peur d'une opposition socialiste témoigne d'un sentiment d'instabilité, de manque d'homogénéité et de solidité organique de l'ordre. Et, l'on n'est pas encore certain quelle est la situation véritable, c'est-à-dire de savoir si un degré de stabilité nécessaire est présent ou non. Qui plus est, il n'est pas exclu, non plus, que jusqu'ici il n'y avait pas eu de possibilités pour le système biparti dans le socialisme, de même que l'on pourrait énoncer l'hypothèse de son instauration dans l'avenir. Ceci d'autant plus que les pays hautement développés, par leur passage sur la voie du socialisme, briseront avec leur pratique les mythes antérieurs, et contribueront à l'affirmation du socialisme dans ce sens également. En effet, on profiterait ainsi dans des conditions nouvelles, socialistes, des acquis positifs des traditions du système pluriparti et de la démocratie correspondante dans les pays capitalistes hautement développés.

Bien que le pouvoir politique se voit concentré entre les mains des gens englobés par l'organisation, et notamment dans le contexte de l'Etat et du parti politique au pouvoir, la puissance politique réellement la plus grande et la plus importante se trouve dans les groupes sociaux, dans les classes, les couches et autres. Bien qu'il ne s'agisse pas de formations organisationnelles, ces groupes possèdent effectivement la plus grande puissances sociales, c'est-à-dire qu'ils ont le plus grand rôle historique et sont les acteurs principaux dans les mouvements historiques. Par conséquent, le pouvoir politique qu'ils possèdent apparaît être la précondition réelle du pouvoir politique, organisationnellement formé et lié aux tenants de l'organisation. Donc, les tenants organisationnels-institutionnels du pouvoir politiques ne sont que les représentants de la puissance politiques, et sociale, des groupes sociaux correspondants. En effet, diverses déviations sont possibles à cet égard, déviations qui se manifestent en raison des particularités de la position et du rôle soit des groupes sociaux respectifs soit des formations organisationnelles.

Il est caractéristique que dans le socialisme chaque groupe social s'efforce de s'assurer la plus grande influence possible dans le pouvoir politique. La raison principale en serait, vraisemblablement, – l'importance extraordinairement grande de la politique et des possibilités qu'elle offre. L'impossibilité d'assurer dans l'économie des priviléges durables et ineffaçables (comme dans le système où la propriété privée est dominante), détermine l'orientation de chaque groupe social selon

which would bring together the majority as a party in power, would face an organized opposition, and each of them should take into account that it could not last forever, nor the structures which are its work. Or, for example, that one ensures within the framework of a party the legal action

of the organized opposition which would constitute the minority and which could, in a normal political dialogue with the majority, work for a declared and determined policy. , thus acting as a corrective to the policy of the party majority. In this way, the most serious aspects of the one-party system would be checked - without any attack on socialism as such. The experiences of the two-party system in capitalism eloquently prove that the social and political system is really stabilized, that is to say that in this way only the stability of the social system is expressed. However, on the other hand, the fear of a socialist opposition testifies to a feeling of instability, lack of homogeneity and organic solidity of the order. And, it is not yet certain what the real situation is, i.e. whether a necessary degree of stability is present or not. What is more, it cannot be ruled out either that so far there have been no possibilities for the two-party system in socialism, just as one could state the hypothesis of its establishment in coming. This all the more so since the highly developed countries, by their passage on the road to socialism, will break with their practice the previous myths, and will contribute to the affirmation of socialism in this sense as well. Indeed, in new, socialist conditions, we would thus benefit from the positive achievements of the traditions of the multi-party system and the corresponding democracy in the highly developed capitalist countries.

Although political power is concentrated in the hands of the people encompassed by the organization, and particularly in the context of the state and the political party in power, the real greatest and most important political power is found in the social groups, in classes, strata and others. Although they are not organizational formations, these groups do indeed possess the greatest social power, i.e. they have the greatest historical role and are the main actors in historical movements. . Consequently, the political power they possess appears to be the real precondition of political power, organizationally formed and linked to the supporters of the organization. Therefore, the organisational-institutional supporters of political power are only the representatives of the political and social power of the corresponding social groups. Indeed, various deviations are possible in this respect, deviations which manifest themselves because of the peculiarities of the position and role either of the respective social groups or of the organizational formations.

It is characteristic that in socialism each social group strives to secure for itself the greatest possible influence in political power. The main reason for this would, presumably, be - the extraordinarily great importance of politics and the possibilities it offers. The impossibility of ensuring lasting and indelible privileges in the economy (as in the system where private property is dominant) determines the orientation of each social group according to

le domaine de la politique. D'autre part, la politique, de son côté, devient plus importante que jamais auparavant: elle reçoit non seulement un champ d'action plus vaste, mais aussi des instruments plus puissants; elle est devenue source, directe ou indirecte, et le confluent de toutes les autres activités sociales. Dans un certain sens, comme l'a souligné Lénine, la politique a reçu le primat sur l'économie.

Etant donné que l'essence du pouvoir politique est d'habitude analysée de sorte à pouvoir découvrir les liens qui l'unissent à la société dans son ensemble, voire avec les groupes fondamentaux qui s'y trouvent, il s'avère nécessaire de souligner, cette fois encore, du moins les moments les plus importants. Ces moments se réduisent le plus souvent à la question suivante: si et dans quelle mesure le pouvoir politique est placé sous l'influence de la puissance politique des groupes et du milieu dans lequel elle se déploie, et, dans ce même ordre d'idées, si et dans quelle mesure on parvient à réaliser leurs intérêts?

A la différence de toutes les sociétés de classes antérieures, la société socialiste ne revêt pas cette structure de classe typique, et on pourrait même parler des classes conditionnellement, comme des groupes sociaux spécifiques. Sans considération des conditions particulières et de la façon de laquelle la révolution socialiste est accomplie, sa tâche principale et ses conséquences fondamentales c'est la destruction de la structure de classe antérieure, et cela veut dire en premier lieu, du système de propriété privée des moyens de production de base, qui fut la cause de la différenciation en classe des capitalistes et en classe ouvrière. Ces deux classes perdent leur fonds et la société socialiste les maintient dans une période relativement courte, non pas comme des classes typiques, mais comme des vestiges spécifiques des classes, qui, en perspectives et relativement vite, perdent ces traits. Ces vestiges des classes intérieures ont une position et un rôle tout à fait différents.

Cependant, aussi longtemps qu'il y aura des vestiges de classes et dans la mesure dans laquelle leur existence se manifestera, il s'avère indispensable d'instaurer la domination de la classe ouvrière, que l'on appelle d'habitude la dictature du prolétariat. Sans considération de l'imprécision terminologique et du caractère inadéquat (pour la bonne et simple raison que le prolétariat s'abolit en tant que prolétariat, par sa révolution), on souligne de cette façon que la classe ouvrière, qui a été la force principale dans l'exécution de la révolution, demeure, selon la nature des choses, aux positions dominantes, dans la période de l'édification des bases de la société socialiste. Sa domination signifie, en effet, une tentative de réaliser ses intérêts de classe particuliers, et cela veut dire de refouler, d'opprimer de façon correspondante, et si nécessaire, les vestiges de la classe capitaliste. Toutes les formes et moyens de l'organisation politique, et notamment l'ordre étatique-juridique, le parti politique au pouvoir, diverses organisations sociopolitiques, etc., se mettent au service de la classe ouvrière et sont engagés, par conséquent, dans les formes de lutte de classe existantes. C'est dans cette mesure là qu'il s'agit de moyens à l'aide desquels se réalise la-dite dictature du prolétariat. Evidemment, elle diffère non seulement d'un pays à l'autre, mais aussi selon le degré de l'édification socialiste de la société. En principe, on pourrait dire qu'elle est

pointed out, politics took precedence over economics.

Since the essence of political power is usually analyzed in such a way as to be able to discover the links which unite it to society as a whole, and even to the fundamental groups within it, it is proves necessary to underline, this time again, at least the most important moments. These moments are most often reduced to the following question: if and to what extent political power is placed under the influence of the political power of the groups and of the environment in which it is deployed, and, in this same order of ideas , if and to what extent we succeed in realizing their interests?

Unlike all previous class societies, socialist society does not have this typical class structure, and one could even speak of classes conditionally as specific social groupings. Regardless of the particular conditions and the way in which the socialist revolution is carried out, its main task and its fundamental consequences is the destruction of the previous class structure, and that means in the first place, of the property system. deprived of the basic means of production, which was the cause of the differentiation between the capitalist class and the working class. These two classes lose their fund and the socialist society maintains them in a relatively short period, not as typical classes, but as specific vestiges of the classes, which, in perspective and relatively quickly, lose in t these traits. These vestiges of the inner classes have an entirely different position and role.

However, as long as there are vestiges of classes and to the extent to which their existence manifests itself, it is essential to establish the dominance of the working class, which is called accustomed to the dictatorship of the proletariat. Without considering the terminological imprecision and the inadequacy (for the good and simple reason that the pro le tariat is abolished as a pro le tariat, by its revolution), it is underlined in this way that the class working class, which was the main force in the execution of the revolution, remains, according to the nature of things, in the dominating positions, in the period of the construction of the bases of the socialist society. Its domination means, in effect, an attempt to realize its particular class interests, and that means to repress, correspondingly oppress, and if necessary, the vestiges of the capitalist class. All the forms and means of political organization, and in particular the state-legal order, the political party in power, various socio-political organizations, etc., place themselves at the service of the working class and are engaged, therefore, in existing forms of class struggle.

It is to this extent that it is a question of means by means of which the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat is realized. Obviously, it differs not only from one country to another, but also according to the degree of socialist construction of the society. In principle, we could say that it is 388

sur la voie de disparaître graduellement, de déperir proportionnellement et parallèlement avec la disparition des vestiges de classe, de la lutte de classe et des formes de classe qui en sont l'expression directe.

Bien que ces vestiges disparaissent, toutefois, ne disparaît pas, mais s'élargit au contraire la vaste couche de travailleurs industriels et autres. L'industrialisation et la croissance économique aboutissent à l'augmentation numérique de la nouvelle physionomie des travailleurs. Etant donné que les travailleurs sont de toute évidence les producteurs directs et les tenants fondamentaux de la production matérielle, l'on continue à compter sur les travailleurs comme sur la principale puissance politique. Ceci est souligné sans cesse, justement ou injustement, surtout dans l'activité politique, et c'est ainsi que l'on maintient la continuité caractéristique à la fois des structures politiques et de l'idéologie politique. Toutefois, des faits se dégagent de plus en plus souvent, sur la base desquels il nous est possible de placer sous un point d'interrogation des affirmations sans réserve selon lesquelles les travailleurs possèderaient la plus grande puissance politique. Il semble en effet, que c'est justement à travers la stabilisation sociale, c'est-à-dire la disparition de la-dite dictature du prolétariat, que se perd, de facto et proportionnellement à ceci la puissance politique des travailleurs en tant que groupement particulier. Qui plus est, il semble que les travailleurs peuvent se voir placés, et le sont, dans une position subordonnée par rapport à un nouveau groupe puissant – la bureaucratie. Comme on le sait, on a beaucoup discuté chez nous précisément des diverses questions relatives à ce fait.

Sous bureaucratie on sous-entend, entre autre, une couche qui émerge et se maintient dans la société socialiste grâce à la spécialisation, à la division du travail et l'engagement professionnel des gens dans la gestion des affaires publiques. Cette couche se forme de tous ceux qui se préoccupent essentiellement de l'administration dans le cadre de certaines formations organisationnelles dans l'économie, la politique et la culture. Evidemment, sont les plus importantes les parties de cette couche, qui sont recrutées de la gestion de l'économie et dans le contexte de l'organisation d'Etat, ainsi que du parti au pouvoir et des organisations socio-politiques. Or, il convient de souligner que la notion de bureaucratie ne doit en aucun cas être identifiée à la notion d'Etat. Car, d'après le volume, la structure et leur rôle, ce sont là des phénomènes très différents. Et ceci d'autant plus que la notion de bureaucratie est prise dans sa signification odieuse, c'est-à-dire comme une caractéristique du grand groupe de gestionnaires qui sont les protagonistes des caractéristiques négatives de tout système de gestion, c'est-à-dire de ce qui est convenu d'appeler le bureaucratisme.

Les bureaucrates sont à la fois le produit et les tenants de la gestion et l'organisation irrationnelle à tout point de vue. Or, vu qu'ils émergent et se développent dans les domaines les plus divers, ils ne représentent pas un groupe social homogène. Il y a, en effet, des différences considérables dans les positions des bureaucrates haut placés et des petits bureaucrates. Ils ne sont pas liés mutuellement, pas plus qu'ils le sont par les formes organisationnelles dans lesquelles ils vivent. Toutefois, ils s'intéressent également au maintien des conditions

Although these vestiges disappear, however, does not disappear, but on the contrary widens the vast layer of industrial and other workers.

Industrialization and economic growth lead to the numerical increase of the new physiognomy of workers. Since the workers are obviously the direct producers and fundamental supporters of material production, the workers continue to be relied upon as the main political power. This is constantly emphasized, rightly or wrongly, especially in political activity, and it is in this way that the continuity characteristic of both political structures and political ideology is maintained. However, facts are emerging more and more often on the basis of which it is possible for us to place under a question mark unqualified assertions as to which workers possess the greatest political power. It seems, in fact, that it is precisely through social stabilisation, that is to say the disappearance of the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat, that the political power of the workers as a whole is lost, de facto and in proportion to this. that particular group. Moreover, it seems that workers can see themselves and are placed in a subordinate position in relation to a powerful new group - the bureaucracy. As we know, there has been a lot of discussion among us precisely on the various questions relating to this fact.

Under bureaucracy we mean, among other things, a layer that emerges and maintains itself in socialist society thanks to specialization, the division of labor and the professional commitment of people in the management of public affairs. This layer consists of all those who are primarily concerned with administration within the framework of certain organizational formations in the economy, politics and culture. Obviously, the most important are the parts of this layer, which are recruited from the management of the economy and in the context of the state organization, as well as from the ruling party and socio-political organizations. However, it should be emphasized that the notion of bureaucracy should in no way be identified with the notion of the state. For, according to the volume, the structure and their role, these are very different phenomena. And this all the more so since the notion of bureaucracy is taken in its odious meaning, that is to say as a characteristic of the large group of managers who are the protagonists of the negative characteristics of any management system, that is to say what is agreed to apply bureaucratism.

Bureaucrats are both the product and proponents of irrational management and organization in every way. However, since they emerge and develop in the most diverse fields, they do not represent a homogeneous social group. There are, indeed, considerable differences in the positions of high bureaucrats and low bureaucrats. They are not mutually linked, any more than they are by the organizational forms in which they live. However, they are also interested in maintaining the conditions 389

dans lesquelles ils apparaissent et opèrent. Grâce à ceci, il représente une couche particulière qui, par sa grandeur, son importance numérique et son rôle, surgit comme une des plus importantes couches. Dans cette couche s'alignent tous ceux qui, pour une raison ou une autre, ne se trouvent pas dans la production immédiate, alors qu'ils n'ont pas des qualités nécessaires pour exercer d'autres activités de gestion. Aussi deviennent-ils un fardeau pesant, d'autant plus qu'ils tentent de s'assurer quelques priviléges – matériels, professionnels, fonctionnels, etc. Les bureaucrates apparaissent dans tout système de gestion, et aucun d'entre eux n'est certain qu'il ne devienne le refuge de leur épanouissement. Ce n'est même pas le cas avec le système de l'autogestion sociale, comme la pratique l'a prouvé éloquemment.

La bureaucratie a une grande puissance politique par le fait même qu'elle ne se trouve pas en marge, mais au sein de la forme de l'organisation et de la gestion. Elle aspire, de toute évidence, à subordonner ces formes en question à ses besoins et ses intérêts. Il semble qu'elle y parvient, notamment quand les conditions sociales de la communauté sociale et de toutes les couches sont mauvaises. Tout de même, il semble que des obstacles objectifs et des limites objectives à ces aspirations existent. Même si la bureaucratie voudrait instaurer sa domination, elle se heurterait aux structures existantes et aux forces anti-bureaucratiques. Sa faiblesse fondamentale consiste en ce qu'elle n'est pas en mesure de détruire le mode existant, le mode socialiste de la production, et encore moins est-elle capable de mettre en place »son« mode de production, sur le terrain duquel elle pourrait se consolider durablement et assurer sa reproduction en générations. Par conséquent, sont exagérés, pour le moins, les assertions selon lesquelles la bureaucratie serait une nouvelle classe qui marquerait l'existence d'un nouveau système d'exploitation, etc.

Les autres couches sociales (*paysannerie, intelligentzia, avant tout*), couches qui ont été formées pour des raisons de propriété ou n'importe quelle autre raison, les différentes professions, et même les-dits groupes d'intérêt, etc. peuvent avoir une grande influence dans certaines périodes de la construction du socialisme. Dans cet ordre d'idées, ces groupes aspirent à s'assurer une place correspondante dans le pouvoir politique, c'est-à-dire dans les formes organisationnelles et institutionnelles qu'il possède. Par leur présence même, ces groupes divers marquent de leur propre cachet la structure et le fonctionnement des formes du pouvoir politique. Elles se composent des membres et des représentants de ces groupes et aspirent par là même d'en profiter pour leurs intérêts particuliers, évidemment dans la mesure dans laquelle cela est possible dans les conditions de l'existence et de rivalité de nombreux groupes différents.

Chaque couche sociale devient objectivement, en effet, dans le processus même de la structuration de la société, la force ou le facteur avec lequel il faut compter. Si, par exemple, dans un pays retardataire nous avons une immense portion de paysannerie (c'était le cas en Union soviétique, et actuellement en Chine), l'ensemble du système politique et le rôle des instruments politiques fondamentaux doivent être ajustés non seulement conformément à l'orientation proclamée et effectuée dans l'édition du socialisme, mais aussi, et avant tout,

In this layer are aligned all those who, for one reason or another, are not in the immediate production, although they do not have the qualities necessary to exercise other management activities. They also become a heavy burden, all the more so as they attempt to secure certain privileges - material, professional, functional, etc. Bureaucrats appear in any management system, and none of them is certain that it will become the refuge of their development. This is not even the case with the system of social self-management, as practice has eloquently proved.

The bureaucracy has great political power by the very fact that it is not on the margins, but within the form of organization and management. It obviously aspires to subordinate these forms to its needs and interests. It seems that it succeeds, especially when the social conditions of the social community and of all strata are bad. All the same, it seems that objective obstacles and objective limits to these aspirations exist. Even if the bureaucracy wanted to establish its dominance, it would come up against existing structures and anti-bureaucratic forces. Its basic weakness is that it is not able to destroy the existing, socialist mode of production, much less is it able to set up "its"

mode of production, on the ground of which it could consolidate durably and ensure its reproduction in generations. Consequently, the assertions that the bureaucracy is a new class that marks the existence of a new system of exploitation, etc., are exaggerated, to say the least.

The other social strata (peasantry, intelligentsia, above all), strata that were formed for reasons of property or any other reason, the different professions, and even the so-called interest groups, etc. can have a great influence in certain periods of the construction of socialism. In this order of ideas, these groups aspire to secure a corresponding place in political power, that is, in the organizational and institutional forms that it possesses. By their very presence, these diverse groups mark the structure and functioning of the forms of political power with their own stamp. They are made up of the members and representatives of these groups and thereby aspire to benefit from them for their particular interests, obviously to the extent that this is possible under the conditions of existence and rivalry. many different groups.

Each social stratum objectively becomes, in fact, in the very process of the structuring of society, the force or factor to be reckoned with. If, for example, in a backward country we have a huge portion of the peasantry (this was the case in the Soviet Union, and currently in China), the whole of the political system and the role of the fundamental political instruments

à cette structure sociale. Il ne fait pas de doute que la forme de collectivisation, par exemple, de la campagne en URSS représentait, peut-être, la tentation la plus cruelle et la source de maintes déviations stalinienennes. Les thèses notoires sur l'alliance des travailleurs et des paysans, mais aussi de la lutte de classe contre les »éléments exploitateurs« véritables ou présumés, ont exercé une influence sur le façonnement et l'action du pouvoir politique et de ses instruments. Si le pouvoir politique dans la phase de collectivisation était globalement engagé, et l'appareil de contrainte était, avec ou sans raison, orienté contre la résistance des parties de la paysannerie – cela veut dire que cette couche contenait une grande puissance, qu'elle figurait comme une très grande force politique. De même, il est certain que la »mer de paysans« en Chine détermine essentiellement les courants des entreprises initiales dans l'édification du socialisme, et même la physionomie des formes organisationnelles et des protagonistes du pouvoir politique dans ce pays.

Les changements dans les couches d'une société socialiste, la disparition ou la transformation des couches antérieures et la création des couches nouvelles se reflètent inévitablement dans la structure politique. Par conséquent, le pouvoir politique s'adapte, dans son ensemble ou en partie, tôt ou tard, aux changements survenus. Leur puissance sociale et politique deviennent soit l'appui soit un barrage caractéristique à la manifestation du pouvoir politique, et notamment de celui de l'Etat.

A côté des couches mentionnées et d'autres couches qui se prolifèrent dans les cadres de toute la communauté sociale, on ne peut pas négliger les microgroupes qui se forment dans les cadres les plus restreints, et c'est justement le cas des groupes non-formels qui sont d'habitude appelés des cliques. Les cliques sont une forme particulière de rassemblement d'un cercle plus étroit de membres de certaines communautés ou formations organisationnelles plus vastes. Elles emergent dans le processus direct de l'organisation et de la gestion qui s'opèrent dans des cadres relativement étroits. Elles peuvent se former aussi dans le cadre de l'Etat, mais uniquement dans les cadres des unités organisationnelles déterminées, inférieures et supérieures, qui sont compétentes pour l'exercice des activités déterminées. Aussi peuvent-elles agir dans les unités organisationnelles du parti politique et des organisations socio-politiques. Evidemment, toutes les organisations de travail, dans les entreprises et les institutions, qui constituent le système d'autogestion, assurent un milieu propice à l'apparition et l'action des cliques. Peut-être qu'aucune autre forme de regroupement humain dans la société socialiste ne signale avec tant de relief l'illusion d'une harmonie absolue, d'absence de conflits entre les parties de la communauté sociale, comme le démontre l'action des cliques. Car la prolifération des cliques et leur action dans le cadre des milieux étroits offre à tout un chacun la possibilité de ressentir dans son propre milieu la présence et l'action de ces groupes étroits.

Les cliques aspirent à usurper le pouvoir politique, le faissant ouvertement ou de façon dissimulée. Selon la règle, elles préconisent des intérêts égoïstes, raison pour laquelle elles dissimulent le plus souvent leur activité soit par les formes organisationnelles-institutionnelles

to this social structure. There is no doubt that the form of collectivization, for example, of the countryside in the USSR represented, perhaps, the most cruel temptation and the source of many Stalinist deviations. The notorious theses on the alliance of workers and peasants, but also on the class

struggle against the real or presumed "exploiting elements", have exerted an influence on the shaping and action of political power and its instruments.

If the political power in the phase of collectivization was globally engaged, and the apparatus of coercion was, with or without reason, oriented against the resistance of the parts of the peasantry - it means that this layer contained a great power, that it appeared as a very great political force. Likewise, it is certain that the "sea of peasants" in China essentially determines the currents of the enterprises initiated in the construction of socialism, and even the physiognomy of the organizational forms and the protagonists of political power in this country.

The changes in the strata of a socialist society, the disappearance or transformation of previous strata and the creation of new strata are inevitably reflected in the political structure. Consequently, political power adapts itself, in whole or in part, sooner or later, to the changes that have occurred. Their social and political power becomes either the support or a characteristic barrier to the manifestation of political power, and in particular that of the State.

Alongside the layers mentioned and other layers which proliferate in the frameworks of the whole social community, one cannot neglect the microgroups which form in the most restricted frameworks, and this is precisely the case of the non-groups. which are usually called cliques. Cliques are a particular form of coming together of a narrower circle of members of certain larger communities or organizational formations. Elias emerge in the direct process of organization and management that operate within relatively narrow frameworks. They can also be formed within the framework of the State, but only within the frameworks of the determined organizational units, lower and higher, which are competent for the exercise of the determined activities. They can also act in the organizational units of the political party and socio-political organizations. Obviously, all the work organizations, in companies and institutions, which constitute the system of self-management, provide an environment conducive to the appearance and action of cliques. Perhaps no other form of human grouping in socialist society signals with such relief the illusion of absolute harmony, of the absence of conflict between the parts of the social community, as demonstrated by the action of the clicks.

Because the proliferation of slaps and their action within the framework of narrow circles offers everyone the possibility of feeling the presence and action of these narrow groups in their own environment.

Cliques aspire to usurp political power, doing so overtly or covertly. According to the rule, they advocate selfish interests, which is why they

existentes, soit par leur prétendue action en vue d'un intérêt plus général. Les cliques agissent de façon analogue dans tous les milieux et à tous les niveaux. Elles sont les protagonistes des divisions tranchantes et des tensions et contradictions intérieures. Les conflits des cliques emportent le plus souvent une bonne partie de l'énergie et paralySENT la productivité véritable de l'action politique. Les cliques ne peuvent pas se réconcilier avec l'existence des formes véritablement démocratiques et vastes de l'activité, raison pour laquelle elles les ignorent ou s'efforcent de les adapter de sorte qu'elles puissent servir pour masquer la manipulation par les cliques du pouvoir politique. Aussi peut-on dire que les cliques brisent de facto les structures démocratiques dans lesquelles elles se trouvent, c'est-à-dire qu'elles réduisent leur valeur dans la mesure dans laquelle elles réussissent à s'imposer.

Sur cette base et dans ce milieu, qui caractérise la communauté globale dans toutes les étapes du développement du socialisme dans tous le pays, sa structure et fonctionne le pouvoir politique. Ses formes organisationnelles fondamentales et ses tenants se conforment totalement aux cadres dans lesquels ils apparaissent et agissent. Ce faisant, la place particulière et la plus importante incombe à l'ordre étagico-juridique, d'où découle aussi la plus haute importance de la connexion de cette formation et de l'entité sociale, c'est-à-dire l'importance de faire connaître et de réaliser les intérêts de cette entité par l'intermédiaire d'une telle formation.

L'ordre étagico-juridique socialiste est la forme la plus adéquate, et même la forme organisationnelle et politique la seule possible, dans laquelle s'exprime la gestion des affaires publiques de toute la communauté. Toutes les autres formes sont, dans un certain sens, étroites et inadéquates pour servir véritablement à la réalisation réelle des besoins généraux. Celle-ci est une formation globale, toutes les autres étant partielles. Par sa composition et les principes de son fonctionnement, cette formation présente des avantages considérables par rapport aux autres. Evidemment, elle reflète les besoins généraux seulement dans la mesure où ils sont réels, c'est-à-dire dans la mesure où la société n'est pas divisée en classes, mais possède une suite de préconditions réelles pour se former graduellement en société sans classes, stratifiée, mais tout de même assez solidaires. La possibilité en découle du fait qu'une telle formation se sépare le plus du partiel et du groupe. Par son existence, elle dépasse le groupe et impose, pour ainsi dire automatiquement, ce qui en moyenne se rapproche au général et du commun. Se trouvant dans le milieu divisé en couches et groupes, et se composant elle-même de parties (dans lesquelles on relève, entre autres, des groupes étroits sous forme de cliques), cette formation apparaît comme le résultat de la neutralisation réciproque de nombreuses parties qui sont injustes et même réciproquement opposées. Cette formation s'affirme d'autant plus que la neutralisation réciproque devient plus réelle dans les rapports des parties différentes. Bien que dans les détails le partiel peut aussi être mis à profit pour la réalisation des objectifs de groupe concrets, cette formation peut, par son résultat final et en moyenne, davantage que n'importe quoi s'employer pour les intérêts sociaux. Evidemment, pour pouvoir

existing, or by way of an alleged action with a view to a more general interest. The cliques act in a similar way in all circles and at all levels. They are the protagonists of the trans divisions -

songs and inner tensions and contradictions. Clique conflicts most often take away much of the energy and paralyze the true productivity of political action. The cliques cannot come to terms with the existence of genuinely democratic and broad forms of activity, which is why they either ignore them or try to adapt them so that they can be used to mask the manipulation by political power cliques.

So we can say that the cliques de facto break the democratic structures in which they find themselves, that is to say, they reduce their value to the extent to which they succeed in imposing themselves.

On this basis and in this environment, which characterizes the global community in all stages of the development of socialism in the whole country, political power is structured and functions. Its fundamental organizational forms and its proponents fully conform to the frameworks in which they appear and act. In so doing, the particular and most important place falls to the state-legal order, from which also derives the highest importance of the connection of this formation and the social entity, that is to say, the importance of making known and realizing the interests of this entity through such training.

The socialist statico-juridical order is the most adequate form, and even the only possible organizational and political form, in which the management of public affairs of the whole community is expressed. All other forms are, in a certain sense, narrow and inadequate to truly serve the real fulfillment of general needs. This is a global formation, all the others being partial. By its composition and the principles of its operation, this training has considerable advantages compared to the others. Of course, it reflects general needs only to the extent that they are real, that is, to the extent that society is not divided into classes, but has a series of real preconditions for its formation. gradually into a society without classes, stratified, but all the same quite united. The possibility arises from the fact that such a formation is most separated from the partial and from the group. By its existence, it goes beyond the group and imposes, so to speak automatically, what on average comes close to the general and the common. Finding itself in the middle, divided into layers and groups, and itself composed of parts (in which, among other things, we find narrow groups in the form of cliques), this formation appears as the result of the reciprocal neutralization of many parts which are unadjusted and even reciprocally opposed. This formation is all the more affirmed as the reciprocal neutralization becomes more real in the relations between the different

parties. Although in the details the partial can also be used for the achievement of concrete group objectives, this training can, by its final result and on average, more than anything else social interests. Of course, to be able to 392

le faire dans la plus grande mesure possible, il s'avère nécessaire soit de prendre en considération les besoins de tout le peuple, soit la possibilité pour le peuple entier de contrôler véritablement l'Etat en l'entourant de corps démocratiques représentatifs et en l'édifiant sur des principes démocratiques. Il va de soi, le meilleur c'est quand l'Etat agit dans le cadre du système d'autogestion développé. Or, tout ceci n'est possible que sous condition qu'on ait atteint la mesure nécessaire de rationalisation de cette formation politique, c'est-à-dire qu'elle n'a pas été exposé à des déformations dangereuses.

Voilà, ce serait, grosso modo, une variante de traitement de l'essence du pouvoir politique dans diverses étapes du développement de la société socialiste, en prenant en considération avant tout l'ordre étatique-juridique qui contient le pouvoir d'Etat comme un de ses éléments essentiels.

without saying that the best is when the State acts within the framework of the system of self-management developed. However, all this is only possible on the condition that the necessary measure of rationalization of this political formation has been achieved, that is to say that it has not been exposed to dangerous deformations.

That would be, roughly speaking, a variant of treatment of the essence of political power in various stages of the development of socialist society, taking into consideration above all the statico-juridical order which contains state power as a of its essential elements.

THE JUNE STUDENT MOVEMENT AND SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN YUGOSLAVIA

Svetozar Stojanović

Belgrade

1

Every revolution, relatively quickly after the assumption of power, is followed by signs of its own entropy.¹ A revolution awakens the masses from their lethargy – the question is how to stop them from becoming passive again? The daily train of events surreptitiously attempts to reduce revolution to a short-term event – what is to be done to stop *political* revolution from swallowing the *social* revolution?

The great revolutionary Utopian, Ernst Bloch, asks the dramatic question: why has the bourgeois revolution succeeded so quickly whereas the socialist revolution is a succession of crises.² The answer, in my opinion, should be sought in the fact that the socialist revolution was conceived quite differently from all previous revolutions. It is the infant of the great Hope for the end class prehistory and the beginning of real history.

The light of an extinguishing revolution long shines on the participants and witnesses, whilst concealing entropy within it. Those who have been the most *enchanted* by revolution³ feel the most anguish at signs of its entropy. Not everyone, like Trotsky (*The Betrayed Revolution*), seeks a way out of disillusion through opposition to the entropy of revolution. Many retreat into an ironical passivity. Resignation is, of course, not only a consequence, but at the same time a

¹ As far as I know, only Kenneth Boulding (in *The Meaning of the 20th Century*, Harper & Row, 1964) used, and only incidentally, the concept of entropy to explain social phenomena. However, he only refers to the entropy of social institutions and social systems, and not to the entropy of revolutions.

² See *Praxis*, 1-2/1969, p. 4.

³ Leon Trotsky dreamed of communism this way: »Man will become immeasurably stronger, wiser and subtler; his body will become more harmonized, his movements more rhythmic, his voice more musical. The forms of life will become dynamically dramatic.« See his *Literature and Revolution*, Ann Arbor, 1960, p. 256.

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2 See Pra x is, 1 -2/1969, p. 4.

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cause of the entropy of revolution. The worst are those whom power makes incapable of seeing the symptoms of the waning of the revolution in those revolutionaries who try to open their eyes to the entropy. The original enthusiasm, the feeling of strength, youth and dynamism soon subsides in them. Tired out along the long and painful road to the revolutionary Rainbow, they gradually turn from revolutionaries into evolutionaries, and rationalize this as being the realism of the matured mind. The trivial observation that no revolution ever realized everything it proclaimed, and that each one of them had its twilight as well as its dawn, also serves to save them from a schizoid split.

2

The assessment whether or not there is entropy in a revolution is not only a matter of knowledge. It inevitably has the nature of a value judgement because it is dependent on how *concretely* the basic aims and ideals of the revolution are imagined. Hence some forces in the mainstream of revolution may see entropy in precisely those manifestations which other forces in the same mainstream see as the quickening of the revolution. Just as there are opposing views in the assessment of the fate of a revolution, there are also various methods of struggle against its entropy. Here we shall deal with two of those ways. The first is the Maoist »cultural revolution«.

Maoists seek a remedy against entropy of the revolution in a romantic attitude towards primitive communism as the substance of their revolutionary tradition. They believe that this tradition will best be preserved if an all-out effort is made *not to change it*. This is a kind of a permanent fixation for the initial phase of the revolution.

The »cultural revolution« is not the first attempt by the Maoists to consolidate, perpetuate and extend primitive communism. For the same reason Maoists once conducted the policy of the »Great Leap Forward«. However, its difficulties only strengthened the Liu Shao Chi faction, which was in favour of certain modernization. Let us mention in passing that the difference between these two conceptions and orientations is very relative and hence hardly visible from the height of those countries that are far more developed than China. In order to suppress the opposing faction, Mao sought support outside the party apparatus, projecting, initiating and organizing the »cultural revolution«. It was not difficult to win the youth masses (»Red Guards«) for the policy of continuity with the period of the »Great Leap Forward«, and, more generally, for the policy of the romantic return to »the good old days« of the revolution.

The fundamental principle of primitive communism are: asceticism, collectivism and levelling egalitarianism. In other words, this type of communism is characterized by a kind of a collectivistic and egalitarian asceticism. I have already written about this type of communism at some length,⁴ and have no intention of repeating it here.

⁴ In the book »Kritik und Zukunft des Sozialismus«, Carl Hauser Verlag, München, 1970.

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⁴ In the book "Critique of Socialism", Carl Hauser Verlag, Munich, 1970.

It is quite certain that no hedonism, even a very moderate one, could be a realistic solution for China. A very backward country would have no prospects at all unless its population resigned themselves to the need of selfless sacrifices in favour of the future generations. However, it is questionable whether the true solution for such a country lies in the *absolutization* of ascetic communism: exhausting labour, exaggerated saving, a complete suppression of material incentives for the sake of moral-political stimulation.

In recent years Maoist ideology underwent an important internal change which is characterized by the absolutization of ascetism. At first Maoists justified the sacrifice of the present generations by the happiness of the future generations: »Ten years of suffering – ten thousand years of happiness!« This conception of sacrifice is sensible (*sacrifice for the sake of happiness* of future generations) but it conflicts with the principle of justice. The present generations, namely, are to live a life of sacrifice in order to secure happiness for the future generations, but could the burden of it not be distributed more justly among the generations? Furthermore, asceticism which has an exclusively instrumental value is not highly suitable for the ideological struggle against the USSR. The present generations in the Soviet Union want affluence, which has been made possible by the self-denials of the earlier generations. This is in accordance with the principle which was preached by Maoists themselves. Could they object to the USSR only that its population is unwilling to continue sacrificing themselves, this time for the sake of the happiness of the future Chinese generations and to relieve the burden now carried by the present Chinese generations?

In the »cultural revolution« Maoists absolutize asceticism: a rich life is *in principle* unacceptable, because it supposedly inevitably leads back to capitalism.⁵ Thus when pauperism is taken as a lasting model of living, then the mentioned difficulty with justice and the mentioned weakness in the ideological dispute with the USSR are done away with. However, another big problem arises: the crisis of the sense of sacrifices. An exemplary life implies a ceaseless sacrifice: the present generations sacrifice themselves »for the sake of« future generations which must also sacrifice themselves and so on *ad infinitum*. Since all generations, both the present and the future ones, are expected to live according to the principle of sacrifice, then this sacrifice must turn around in circles trying to find its purpose within itself, because it is not supposed to seek it outside.

However, independently of all these, the question arises whether the »cultural revolution« may constitute a sufficiently efficient way of fighting the entropy of the revolution. Sensing that aspirations for modernization will inevitably be renewed, Mao Tse-tung believes that some kind of a cultural revolution will be necessary in China once about twenty years. In fact, in order to preserve collectivistic and egalitarian asceticism as a permanent social atmosphere, it will not be

⁵ It is interesting that for Maoists it is the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, which initiated a certain de-Stalinization, that represents the beginning of an alleged restoration of capitalism in the USSR.

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sufficient just to renew the campaigns; the trend for modernization, which will acquire its impetus, will demand ever stronger and more violent campaigns.

However, if the praetorians of the revolutions are to be ascribed this role, then they will gradually turn themselves into its grave-diggers. A lasting curbing of human nature's desire for comforts can only be effected by more ruthlessness. But, being men themselves, the ruthless praetorians have the same desire for comforts. After a certain time, they are bound to start satisfying this impulse within themselves, while at the same time curbing it through violence in others. In this manner, in the name of preserving the revolution, there will be an ever growing gulf in society between the oppressed masses and the oppressing apparatus. The latter will force the masses to live according the principle of collectivist and ascetic egalitarianism, they themselves will be living a vulgar-hedonist and selfish life of privilege. The participation of masses in renewed political campaigns will continue creating the illusion of democracy, because their »spontaneity« will conceal the great string-pullers.

3.

Now let us consider the Yugoslav June student movement. There has still been no serious analysis of it.⁶ This is a good indicator of the state of social sciences in Yugoslavia. Not even the basic documents on student movement have been published, which just goes to show the level of democracy in our society. In the more advanced countries not only documents are published immediately, but also entire libraries of books and discussions on the student movements.

The most popular view is that our student movement is a reaction against the difficulties of the socio-economic reform, the serious socio-political »deformations«, the monopoly over social and political positions held by older generations, etc. It cannot be denied that these and similar factors are relevant in explaining the student movement. However, the real significance of this phenomenon cannot be understood unless it is considered against the entire background of the social revolution in Yugoslavia. In my opinion the fundamental significance of the Yugoslav student movement should be seen in the resistance to the entropy of the social revolution.

Long before students appeared on a large scale on the political scene, our society had had experience with the entropy of the revolution. The first symptoms appeared very soon after the revolutionaries had taken power in 1945. The main cause of the entropy at that time was the copying of the Stalinist model of social organization. I purposely said the *Stalinist* and not the *Soviet* model, since a certain continuity with the latter was established only with the introduction of workers' councils. The turning point was the Communist Party's conflict with

* Two months after the demonstrative strike of university students and teachers in June 1968, several articles about it were published in the journal *Delo*, but this issue was suppressed. Recently the journal *Gledišta* (5-6/1969) printed the transcript of a rather interesting discussion about the student movement in the world and in Yugoslavia.

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the Cominform in 1948. The most important consequence of this break was the introduction of the forms of self-management in the basic social groups. This was a kind of *revolution within the revolution*. As is always the case, the entropy of a revolution can only be combat-ed by further revolutionaryzation.

However, the golden age of this revolution within the revolution was a short one and had its ideological culmination in the adoption of the Programme of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in 1958. It soon began to reveal its limitations. No matter how enthusiastically it was embraced by the working masses, the revolution within revolution was nevertheless initiated, directed and strictly controlled from above. Thus slowly but surely stagnation has set in. Social changes are still in evidence, but now they are more quantitative and do not extend to essential matters. The forms of self-government, established long ago, have still not been able to get out of the ghetto of small social groups and to develop into an *integral system* of self-management. This accounts for the hybrid system: self-management (such as it is) at the base and strong statism at all higher levels of social organization.

This statist structure is well accommodated by the obsolete system of political organization. Occasionally it is rightfully observed that the socio-political organizations are in a crisis and that they should be thoroughly reformed. No better illustration of this is needed than the fact that to this very day workers have not succeeded in democratically electing someone from their midst to the leadership of the trade unions. In the very best of cases they are still represented by people who were workers three decades ago, but even more so by the trade union apparatus that reproduces itself. Nevertheless, all the proclaimed *reforms* of the system of political organization end up as *reorganizations*.

To build up an integral system of self-government it is necessary to have a developed and democratic system of political organization and activities. But our socio-political organizations, despite declarations to the contrary, still are the transmisions of the League of Communists. And in the League of Communists itself, democracy is still in its infancy.

The common language of self-government and self-management, which even the statist use, creates an ideological screen around the real socio-economic system. Herein lies the special nature of statism in Yugoslavia. Everyday life, however, shows that the statist are fighting tooth and nail to retain control over the centres of decision-making power at all higher levels of social organization, since they have to tolerate the forms of self-management at the lowest level. When one group of statist carries off a political victory over another group, this is usually celebrated as the »definitive victory over statist forces«. That is why we have so far had so many such successive »definitive« victories. When the conflicts within the statist structure unexpecledly come to the surface, they create an illusion of revolutionary dynamism and cause serious political crises and shocks.

A radically conceived and implemented socio-economic reform could make an end to the present stagnation and entropy of the social revolution. However, of late less is being said about the *socio-economic*

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reform, and more just about the economic reform. During the implementation of the economic reform there was a significant differentiation and even polarization of forces advocating it. At first it looked as though there was only a conflict between the statist, who were obstructing the economic reform, and those who supported it. Further developments, however, revealed that there were two basically different conceptions of the reform: one was petty-bourgeois and the other was democratic-socialist. There was a very sharp conflict between these two lines, especially immediately before the student demonstrations.

In the petty-bourgeois conception, the economic reform justly threw out the centralist-distributive, statist economic model, but unjustifiably made a fetish of uncontrolled market forces. On the eve of the student demonstrations the adherents of this view had sent up trial balloons in the press and in other ways on the introduction of stocks. A certain number of shares would, they said, be distributed to the producers, so that they would have closer involvement with their self-managing collectives. After this, of course, stock markets for the buying and selling of shares would have to be opened. Only we were not told what would happen to that little socialism in practice when the short idyll of a universal owning of stocks was over, and society had been divided into those producers without shares and the »producers« in whose hands shares would be concentrated. There had even been an ideological adjustment to the trend towards uncontrolled social differentiation as the essential feature of petty-bourgeois socialism. The idea of social equality and solidarity had increasingly disappeared from theory and press. The illusion had spread that the revolution could survive even without a struggle to realize ideals.

The economic reform as conceived by the democratic-socialist forces should create a modern market economy controlled and planned by the self-governing society. This line advocates material incentives for professional work and distribution according to the results of work, but at the same time it resolutely opposes exaggerated social differentiation, since this would rapidly lead to a disintegration of the socialist society. According to this view, the finance from public funds, among them the finances of the Yugoslav community for the rapid development of undeveloped regions, should in the future be spent much more rationally, but should not be cut back. The burden of the economic reform should rightfully be distributed so that it would not be disproportionately borne by the working class, as has been the case so far.

The student action was directed against both lines – the statist and the petty-bourgeois – which jeopardize the social revolution in Yugoslavia. For this reason both forces united to combat the students. The students extended support to democratic-socialist forces working to create an integral system of social self-government and self-management based on an economy that would be simultaneously planned and market-oriented. When the documentation on the student movement is published, this will be quite clear.

People behave differently when they see the symptoms of entropy of the revolution. Some are surprised, disillusioned, and resigned.

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obstructing the economic reform, and those who supported it. Further developments, however, revealed that there were two basically different conceptions of the reform: one was petty-bourgeois and the other was democratic-socialist. There was a very sharp conflict between these two lines, especially immediately before the student demonstrations.

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The economic reform as conceived by the democratic-socialist forces should create a modern market economy controlled and planned by the self-governing society. This line advocates material incentives for professional work and distribution according to the results of work, but at the same time it resolutely opposes exaggerated social differentiation, since this would rapidly lead to a disintegration of the socialist society. According to this view, the finance from public funds, among them the finances of the Yugoslav community for the rapid development of undeveloped regions, should in the future be spent much more rationally, but should not be cut back. The burden of the economic reform should rightfully be distributed so that it would not be disproportionately borne by the working class, as has been the case so far.

The student action was directed against both lines - the statist and the petty-bourgeois - which jeopardize the social revolution in Yugoslavia. For this reason both forces united to combat the students.

The students extended support to democratic-socialist forces working to create an integral system of social self-government and self-management based on an economy that would be simultaneously planned and market-oriented. When the documentation on the student movement is published,

this will be quite clear.

People behave differently when they see the symptoms of entropy of the revolution. Some are surprised, disillusioned, and resigned.

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There are many who recognize all »deformations« (which we refer to here as entropy), but because of their metaphysical conception of the social revolution still consider that there is still essentially a continuity of the revolution. The students joined those forces that are actively fighting to stop entropy and to revitalize the social revolution.

What was the *basic* reaction of the state and party leadership to the student demonstrations? Our politicians had previously met with numerous, albeit isolated, strikes. Now they were unexpectedly faced with mass demonstration and for this reason were nervous and frightened. They were particularly worried because they were aware that owing to the lack of democracy they did not have a proper idea of the forces at work beneath the social surface. They were particularly fearful of the possibility that the student movement would set off an eventual workers' movement. Therefore the first concern of the politicians was to isolate the students from the rest of the population, particularly from the workers, and gradually to reduce the student action to a political and cultural happening within the walls of the university. In this respect the misinformation that the students were only asking for an improvement in their material position (whereas »the working class was consciously bearing the burden of the economic reform«) came in handy. In other republics, the rumour was noised that the student movement in Belgrade had a nationalistic Serbian character.

It is well known that for an organization man a spontaneous social movement is a book with seven seals. Thus from the first moment the politicians feverishly tried to find the initiators and organizers of the student movement. One of the top politicians publicly stated immediately after the student demonstrations that it was backed by a »reactionary political conspiracy«. Rumours about the *Stalinist-statist* background of the student movement were spread on all sides. Of the politicians that came forward during and after the student action, there were some honourable but very rare exceptions to this rule.

The allusions, and afterwards increasingly open assertions that the student movement essentially had a primitive-communist and even Maoist character stood much better chances of success. As we have seen, primitive communism, including the Chinese type, is characterized by collectivism, asceticism and levelling egalitarianism. In our student movement, however, there was not one slogan or idea tinted with collectivism or asceticism. And if there were any ingredients of primitive egalitarianism at all, they were completely secondary. But still this was made the main charge against the student movement. The struggle of the students against uncontrolled and exaggerated social differentiation was cleverly portrayed as a primitive communist crusade against small entrepreneurs (artisans, truck owners etc.) in the tertiary activities.

However, even if primitive communism were a salient feature of the movement, its origin certainly could not be found in the influence of Maoism. Primitive communism was the dominant conception of Yugoslav communist movement during the armed revolution, war communism and reconstruction of the country. It should not be forgotten that between primitive communism and the modern communism that

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we advocate today there is not only a conflict, but also in a certain degree a continuity. Thus the critics of the student movement should have more respect for our common revolutionary, primitive-communist tradition.

It should emphatically be made clear that the programme and manner of entering the political scene of our student movement basically differ from the youth movement in the Chinese »cultural revolution«. Our student movement is spontaneous and *democratic-communist* in character.

One of the common accusations has been deduced from the student slogan about a »movement within a movement«. This slogan was meant to convey that the student movement was a movement within the communist and socialist movement, and not a movement *outside* it. This slogan is deliberately interpreted as a desire to set up a new political organization or even party. The organization man simply cannot understand that someone can carry on a political struggle and at the same time not wish to found a separate political organization.

The student movement is often criticized for not being able to cope with a modern economy. This is meant to reinforce the accusation of primitive communism. There is no doubt that a modern socialist society cannot be built without the development of an efficient and rational economy. But in respect to this excuse, it should be pointed out that the economy is the weak side not only of the student movement, but also of the state-party leadership in Yugoslavia. Some of them accuse the student movement of utopianism, forgetting that before the war as young communist they were such great »realists« that they promised the people they would not have to pay taxes when they came into power!

What have been the results of the student movement? My answer to this question might sound paradoxical: the results have been small, but important.

The student movement was in many ways responsible for shaking – and this for the first time so publicly and on such a large scale – the prevailing ideological (distorted) vision of »our self-governing society«. The reaction to the student action indirectly revealed that in this country there is a degree of self-management exclusively in the social institutions at the base, but that above it, in spite of the theory of the »withering away of the state«, a state force is operating which has a *dominant* social position. The students have lost their political innocence; at first they were sincerely surprised to receive knocks on the head in answer to their revolutionary demands. The young revolutionaries also discovered the »justness« of the state: in addition to being beaten, they were charged with using violence. Finding themselves up against the wall of solidarity of the state apparatus, the student movement could not bring about the replacement or even resignation of a single, no matter how insignificant, official. One of its greatest successes nevertheless was that it forced some politicians to remove their democratic-socialist mask and to use brute force. Since such politicians always feel better behind a mask, it is no wonder that the student action has infuriated them so.

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The student movement also forced some intellectuals to take off their leftist-democratic make-up. Some of them (e. g. D. Pejović in the journal *Kritika* 7/1969) revealed their true ideological-political face when they began to write about the world and the Yugoslav student movement in more pejorative terms than typically conservative intellectuals.

The student demonstrations levelled a significant ideological and political (although a less practical) blow against the petty-bourgeois conception of the economic reform. Among other things, under the influence of the students the »Guidelines of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia« were adopted.

It should be said that in the given conditions the student movement could not produce any very visible results in the struggle for the development of integral self-government in Yugoslav society. The radical change of the system which is necessary is not possible unless revolution from above, which we have already discussed, grows into a revolution from below. This requires that the working class and the working masses in general come onto the political scene. The barriers to social revolution should be removed under pressure from below, since integral social self-government and socialist democracy cannot be dependent on someone's good will, least of all of those »above«. It must be the result of the relationships of social forces. Entropy of the revolution can be effectively stopped only by conscious and large-scale revolutionary engagement. Indeed this was the basic significance of the student action.

However, in Yugoslavia, particularly at the higher levels of social organization, forces are still dominant which find it in their interest to maintain the present hybrid system: a degree of self-management in everyday life, and statism in all the higher and more important centres of decision-making. The democratic socialist forces in these centres have still not become strong enough to be able to take a more energetic action and to rely more openly on pressure from below, including student pressure. Since this shifting of power in the basic centres have still not taken place, the student movement could not give any large results. For this reason there has been a »gentlemen's« agreement in the state-party hierarchy to avoid discussions of the student movement as much as possible. The entire 9th Congress of the League of Communists was held without a word being spoken about the student movement. The fateful show-down has been postponed for later. Only then will the anticipatory significance of such a social movement as was Yugoslav student movement be quite clear.

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STREIKS IN DER GEGENWÄRTIGEN JUGOSLAWISCHEN GESELLSCHAFT

Nebojša Popov

Belgrad

»Der Sozialismus hat als Negation der kapitalistischen Negation einen metasindikalistischen Hokus-Pokus erdacht: Streikend streikt der Sozialismus gegen sich selbst und wirkt somit als Negation der anti-kapitalistischen Negation logischerweise antisozialistisch.« (M. Krleža)

Seit den ersten Streikerscheinungen in der heutigen jugoslawischen Gesellschaft sind bereits volle 12 Jahre verstrichen. Fast die Hälfte dieser Zeit hat die Öffentlichkeit darüber nicht einmal die elementarsten Informationen erhalten.¹ Erst im Jahre 1964 beginnen sie durch das Monopol der politischen Polizei zu sickern (auch die Gewerkschaftsfora beginnen sich mit ihnen zu befassen). Erst von da ab gelangen die ersten empirischen Erörterungen, die sich mit diesen Streiks befassen, in die wissenschaftliche und in die breitere Öffentlichkeit.

Die Streiks wurden zunächst als feindliche Aktivität angesehen, sei es nun, daß der »Feind« indirekt auf ihr Erscheinen einwirkt, sei es, daß er daraus Nutzen zieht (propagandistischen und dergl.). Dies ist jedoch in keinem einzigen Fall bewiesen worden (sonst wären zweifellos bestimmte Maßnahmen, auch strafrechtlicher Natur, unternommen worden).² Solche Interpretationen sind auch heute nicht völlig

¹ Es sind auch bereits früher einige Aufzeichnungen erschienen, die Streiks, jedoch außerhalb jeder Erfahrung, erwähnten – im allgemeinen als eine Erscheinung, die der Selbstverwaltung nicht entspricht.

² Lediglich eine Forschungsarbeit bestätigt, daß in zwei Fällen Arbeiter, die aus der wirtschaftlichen Emigration (aus der Bundesrepublik Deutschland) zurückgekehrt waren, bedeutenden Einfluß ausgeübt hätten, da sie durch ihre Erzählungen von dem dortigen Standard zum Schüren der Unzufriedenheit beitrugen, was sich schwer als feindliche Aktivität einordnen ließ. (Siehe R. Lampret, Nekatera protislovja in navskržja v gospodarskih organizacijah, protestne ustavitev dela, diplomska naloga VSPV, Ljubljana, 1965), Beilage, Tabelle 3.

Belgrade

»Socialism, as a negation of capitalist

schcn N eg a tio n a m e ta-indicative hocus-

Pocus devised: striking strikes socialism

itself and thus works as a negation of the anti-capitalist N eg a tio n logically antisocial

table.« (M . Krlcza)

A full 12 years have passed since the first strikes appeared in today's Yugoslav society. For almost half of that time, the public has not received even the most basic information about them.¹ It is not until 1964 that they begin to seep through the monopoly of the political police (the trade union forums also begin to deal with them). Only from then on did the first empirical discussions dealing with these strikes reach the academic and the wider public.

The strikes were initially viewed as hostile activity, either because the "enemy" indirectly influenced their appearance or because he took advantage of it (propagandistic and the like). However, this has not been proven in a single case (otherwise certain measures, including those of a criminal nature, would undoubtedly have been taken).² Such interpretations are not complete even today but outside of any experience mentioned - generally as a phenomenon inconsistent with self-government.

* Merely one research work confirms that in two cases workers who had returned from economic emigration (from the Federal Republic of Germany) had exerted significant influence, since sic contributed to the dissatisfaction with their stories about the standard there, which was difficult to categorize as hostile activity. (See R. Lamper, Nekatera pro tislo v ja in na v skrižja v gospodarskih org an izacijah, pro testne ustavitev dela, diplomski naloga VSPV, Ljubljana, 1965), Supplement, Table 3.

verschwunden (sie sind im allgemeinen gegenwärtig in der Furcht, daß, gingen die Streikenden auf die Straße, sich unter sie sogenannte feindliche Elemente mischen könnten).

Eine weitere Tendenz in den Interpretationen dieser Erscheinung geht davon aus, daß in einer a priori Selbstverwaltungsgesellschaft Streiks absurd sind (indem man von der unbewiesenen Behauptung ausgeht, daß die Arbeiter tatsächlich Eigentümer der Produktionsmittel und damit faktisch Träger der politischen Gewalt sind) und damit, angeblich die Arbeiter gegen sich selbst streiken. Ein gewisser Neutralismus dieser Standpunkte hat dazu beigetragen, daß sich die Auffassungen, die am meisten gegenwärtig, und nach denen diese Erscheinungen das Ergebnis einer Diskrepanz zwischen den Möglichkeiten und der Realisierung der Selbsverwaltung sind, ein Konflikt zwischen dem Streben nach Selbstverwaltung und dem Hintertreiben ihrer praktischen Realisierung,³ weiter entwickeln. Diese Widersprüchlichkeit hatte in der überwiegenden Mehrheit der Interpretationen keine Sozialträger, noch wurden die realen Ausgangspunkte der Konflikte bestimmt. Mit der Entwicklung der Forschungserfahrungen zerfiel diese Orientierung in mehrere Varianten, die wir jedoch leider nicht zur Gänze interpretieren können. Wir werden sie daher an den entsprechenden Stellen dieser Arbeit berücksichtigen.⁴

Zu Beginn dieser Arbeit werde ich versuchen, mich hinsichtlich der Bezeichnung dieser Erscheinungen, festzulegen. In Umlauf sind drei: Arbeitseinstellung, Protesteinstellung der Arbeit und Streik.

Autoren, die den Gebrauch des Terminus Streik vermeiden, betonen, daß es sich auch um keine Streiks handele, weil diese für die kapitalistische Gesellschaft, in der ein antagonistischer Klassenkonflikt vorhanden ist, charakteristisch seien, wohingegen es einen solchen Konflikt in der sozialistischen Gesellschaft nicht gäbe. Ihnen zufolge stellen die Arbeiter im Sozialismus nicht ihre Arbeit ein, um neue Rechte zu erlangen, sondern nur zwecks Realisierung jener Rechte, die ihnen normativ zustehen, die jedoch aus verschiedenen Gründen nicht realisiert wurden.⁵

Zwei Forschungsarbeiten, die sich mit dieser Erscheinung ausführlicher befassen, versuchen diese genauer zu definieren. So bietet B. Kavčić z. B. eine der ersten Definitionen an: »Von einer Protestarbeitseinstellung können wir nur dann sprechen, wenn die Arbeit von einer (relativ) größeren Gruppe von Arbeitern eingestellt wird, die damit eines ihrer Rechte realisieren wollen, das ihnen von Gesetz wegen zusteht, im konkreten Falle jedoch nicht realisiert wurde – und zwar nach dem erfolglosen Versuch, im regulären Verfahren eine zufriedenstellende Antwort zu erhalten.⁶ N. Jovanov akzeptiert im

³ M. Švab, Konflikt med možnostjo in uresničitvijo, Aufsatz zum Thema »Arbeitseinstellung«, *Theorija in Praksa*, 1964, Nr. 2.

⁴ Ausführlichere und relativ systematisierte Information zu den verschiedenen Stellungnahmen und Behandlungen von Streiks findet der Leser in: *Obustave rada*, Herausgeber: Zentrum für politische Studien und Bildung, Beograd, Mai 1967.

⁵ Siehe: M. Švab, Zitiertes Werk, S. 258. und R. Lampret, Ang. Werk, S. 9. Ähnliche Standpunkte vertritt auch O. Kozomara, nur daß sie die Streiks auch im Kapitalismus mit politischer Bewegung gleichsetzt (O. Kozomara, Arbeitseinstellung gestern und heute, *Kulturni radnik*, Zagreb, 1968, Nr. 3).

⁶ B. Kavčić, O protestnih ustavivah dela, *Theorija in praksa*, Ljubljana 1965, Nr. 9, S. 1445.

disappeared (they are generally one present in fear that if the strikers went out into the street, so-called hostile elements could mix with them).

Another tendency in the interpretation of this phenomenon assumes that

strikes are absurd in an a priori self-governing society (by starting from the unproven assertion that the workers actually own the means of production and are therefore in fact bearers of the political power) and thus, allegedly, the workers are striking against themselves. A certain neutralism of these points of view has contributed to the change in the conceptions that are the most current and that these phenomena are the result of a discrepancy between the possibilities and the realization of self-government. a conflict between striving for self-government and thwarting its practical realization,³ further develops. In the vast majority of interpretations, this contradiction had no social support, nor were the real starting points of the conflicts determined. With the development of research experience, this orientation falls apart into several variants, which we unfortunately cannot interpret in their entirety. We will therefore take them into account at the appropriate points in this work.⁴

At the beginning of this work I will try to define myself with regard to the designation of these phenomena. There are three in circulation: cessation of work, protest cessation of work and strike.

Authors who avoid using the term strike emphasize that they are not strikes either, because they are characteristic of capitalist society, in which there is an antagonistic class conflict, whereas such a conflict does exist in not a gift to socialist society. According to them, the workers in socialism do not stop their work in order to obtain new rights, but only in order to realize those rights to which they are normatively entitled, but which, for various reasons, have not been realized.⁵

Two research papers that deal with this phenomenon in more detail attempt to define it more precisely. So B offers

Kavčić z. Take, for example, one of the first definitions: »We can only speak of a pro-work stoppage if the work is stopped by a (relatively) large group of workers who thereby realize one of their rights want, which they are entitled to by law, but was not realized in the specific case - namely after the unsuccessful attempt to obtain a satisfactory answer in the regular procedure.⁰ N. Jovanov accepts in the 3 M. Švab, K on flik t m ed m o ž n o stjo in u r e s n ič itv ijo , Essay on the topic » Work s hiring « , T e o r ija in P raksa, i9 6 4 , N o . 2.

4 A u sfih rlic h e r e u n d r e l a t i v e s y s t e m a t i s i e r t e Information to be compared with Stellungnahmen und Behandlungen von Streiks findet der Leserin: O Busta Verada, Herausgeber: Zentrum für Political Studies and Buildings, Belgrade, May 1967.

** Siehe: M Švab, Z itiertes Work, S. 258. and R. Lampret, Ang. Werk, S.*

A h n lic h e S ta n d p u n k te v e r tr itt au ch O . K o zo m ara, n u r d
afi sie d ie S tre ik s au c h im K ap ita lism u s m it p o litisc h e r B ew eg
u n g g leic h se tz t (O . K o zo m ara , A rb e its e in s te llu n g g e s te m
u n d he u te, K u ltu r n i ra d n ik , Z a g re b , 1968, Nr. 3).

* B. Kavčič, *The Protest of Hustavity, Practice Theory*, Ljubljana 1965, Nr. 9, S.

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Grunde die gleiche Definition, versucht jedoch umfassendere historische Erläuterungen für diese Erscheinung zu finden (er untersucht die Streik-Geschichte nach der Oktoberrevolution und besonders die Meinung Lenins zu den Streiks sowie sein Verhältnis zu ihnen).

Seine Bemühungen zielen auf eine präzisere Bestimmung der heutigen Streikerscheinungen. Er legt auf der Grundlage des Interessenkriteriums (eines dauernden und eines gegenwärtigen) das Bestehen zweier Varianten einer im Grunde gleichen Erscheinung fest.

Die erwähnten Erscheinungen resultieren wahrscheinlich aus der Orientierung des Autors auf empirische Forschungen, die vorhergehend im Rahmen der Arbeitsorganisationen stattgefunden haben. Hiermit lässt sich jedoch natürlich nicht der Grundgehalt der gesellschaftlichen Erscheinung identifizieren, da sie notwendigerweise in breiteren gesellschaftlichen Relationen zu sehen ist.

Ich bin der Auffassung, daß der Terminus »Streik« (in dieser Arbeit abstrahieren wir andere Formen der aktiven und passiven Resistenz) der Erscheinung entspricht, die wir untersuchen. Es ist die spezifische Form des Kampfes des Arbeiters für die Verbesserung der Lebens- und Arbeitsbedingungen im Rahmen der gegebenen Gesellschaftsorganisation. Streik ist mithin der Ausdruck der Lohnverhältnisse, bzw. des Konfliktes des Trägers dieses Verhältnisses um die Höhe des Lohnes. In diesem Konflikt tritt die Arbeiterschaft nach der Logik ihrer gegenwärtigen Interessen auf und nicht als Klasse gegen eine andere Klasse – und erst damit nähme die politische Bewegung ihren Anfang, die auf eine Abschaffung der Voraussetzungen der Lohnverhältnisse ausgerichtet ist.⁷

In dieser Arbeit werde ich zunächst den Streik als gesellschaftliche Erscheinung beschreiben und möchte dann versuchen, die Ursachen, und möglicherweise auch die Reichweite dieser Erscheinung in der heutigen jugoslawischen Gesellschaft festzustellen.

I. BESCHREIBUNG DER ERSCHEINUNG

Die Erfahrungen, über die wir verfügen, sind nicht völlig systematisch zusammengetragen, die Quellenangaben sind vielfältig (häufig sind sie der breiteren Öffentlichkeit auch nicht hinreichend zugänglich) und sie sind das Ergebnis verschiedener Notwendigkeiten, gewöhnlich im Auftrage von Geldgebern, die theoretischen Ausgangspositionen der Autoren sind jedoch natürlicherweise nicht einheitlich. Auf Grund der verfügbaren Angaben lassen sich jedoch die Grundkennzeichen der Erscheinung relativ wahrheitsgetreu rekonstruieren.

Zunächst werde ich in kürzesten Zügen zwei Streiks beschreiben, nicht weil sie für die gesamte Streikpraxis typisch wären, sondern aus

⁷ Siehe N. Jovanov, O protestnim obustavama rada, im Buche *Obustava rada*, Beograd, 1967.

⁸ N. Jovanov, Neka opšta pitanja protestnih obustava rada, *Gledišta*, Beograd, Nr. 2.

⁹ Siehe hierzu näher: K. Marx, Die Armut der Philosophie, Kultura, Beograd, 1946, S. 154–155; und V. I. Lenin, Was ist jetzt zu tun, Ausgewählte Werke, Kultura, Beograd 1960, Band III.

Basically the same definition, but tries to find a more comprehensive historical explanation for this phenomenon (he examines the history of strikes after the October revolution and in particular Lenin's opinion on the strikes and his relationship to them).

His efforts are aimed at a more precise determination of today's strike phenomena. On the basis of the criterion of interest (one permanent and one current) he establishes the existence of two variants of an essentially identical phenomenon.

The mentioned phenomena probably result from the author's orientation to empirical researches that previously took place within the framework of labor organizations.

Of course, this does not identify the basic content of the social phenomenon, since it must necessarily be seen in broader social relations.

I believe that the term "strike" (in this work we abstract other forms of active and passive resistance) corresponds to the phenomenon we are studying. It is the specific form of workers' struggle for improvement of living and working conditions within the given social organization. A strike is therefore an expression of the wage situation or the conflict between the bearer of this situation and the amount of the wage. In this conflict, the working class acts according to the logic of its current interests and not as a class against another class - and only then does the political movement begin, which is aimed at the abolition of wage conditions

In this work I will first describe the strike as a social phenomenon and then I would like to try to determine the causes and possibly also the extent of this phenomenon in contemporary Yugoslav society.

I. DESCRIPTION OF THE APPEARANCE

The experiences we have are not fully systematic, the sources are varied (and often not sufficiently accessible to the wider public) and they are the result of various needs, usually on behalf of funders, the theoretical starting points However, the positions of the authors are of course not uniform.

On the basis of the information available, however, the basic characteristics of the phenomenon can be reconstructed relatively truthfully.

First, I will describe two strikes in the shortest possible terms, not because they were typical of all strike practice, but because they were 7 See N . Jo v an o v , O p rotestnim obustavam a rad a, in the book c O bustava rada, Beograd, 1967.

8 N. Jo v an o v , Some general questions of the protest buildings, Gled ilt a, Belgrade, Nr. 2.

- For more on this see: K. M arx, Die P armut der Philosophie, K ultura, Beograd, 1946, pp. 154-155; and V. I. L enin, W hat is to be done now,

dem Grunde, weil sich daraus die Angaben, die später ausgeführt werden, leichter verstehen lassen. Und dies kann auf einige Tendenzen verweisen, von denen in diesem Teil der Arbeit besonders die Rede sein wird.

1. ZWEI BEISPIELE

Der Streik in den Gruben von Zasavljé wurde als erste Erscheinung dieser Art registriert, dagegen ist der Streik im Hafen von Rijeka einer der letzten Streiks (bei der Auswahl haben wir uns auch von der Quantität der verfügbaren Angaben bestimmen lassen).

a) *Bergwerke von Zasavljé (Januar 1958)*¹⁰

Angesichts des Tags der Republik im Jahre 1957 zahlten die Gruben in Trbovlje den sogenannten Überschuss aus, außer an die Bergarbeiter der Braunkohle Trbovlje-Hrastnik. Die Grube war wegen der Stromverteuerung und der sehr hohen Amortisierung, die die Produktionskosten belastete – die Kohleverkaufspreise jedoch durch positive Bundesgesetzvorschriften plafoniert waren, in einer sehr schwierigen Finanzlage. Die Bergarbeiter Funktionärsschaft, Gewerkschaftsverband und das Fabrikkommittee des Bundes der Kommunisten wandten sich unter dem Druck der Unzufriedenheit der Arbeiter um Hilfe an die Regierungsorgane, an die Funktionäre des Gewerkschaftsbundes und des Bundes der Kommunisten der Gemeinde, des Kreises, der Republik, sowie an den entsprechenden Zentralausschuß des Gewerkschaftsbundes Jugoslawiens. Da die zahlreichen Verhandlungen und Delegationen die kritische Lage nicht änderten, brach nach 40 Tagen der Streik aus.

Sämtliche im Bergwerk Trbovlje Beschäftigten, (rund 3.800 Arbeiter der Produktion und über 300 Angestellte, unter ihnen auch über 300 Angestellte des Bundes der Kommunisten) außer denjenigen, deren Arbeitsplätze vom Sitz des Unternehmens entfernt lagen, stellten ihre Arbeit für die Dauer von 52 Stunden ein (vom 13. Januar abends bis zum 15. Januar 1958 vormittags). Am 14. Januar schlossen sich ihnen auch die Bergarbeiter von Hrastnik aus Solidarität an. Der Streik wickelte sich im Rahmen des Unternehmens ab, es fanden keine Demonstrationen statt – weder in diesem Rahmen noch außerhalb der Arbeitsorganisation, noch wurde seitens der Streikenden Gewalt angewandt (weder gegenüber Personen noch gegenüber Sachen).

Während der Dauer des Streiks gab es keinen Streikausschuß, vielmehr verkündete im Augenblick der Arbeitseinstellung der Arbeiterrat gemeinsam mit dem Gewerkschaftsverband die Ergebnisse der geführten Gespräche, woraufhin die Grundforderungen festgelegt und den Trägern der politischen Gewalt außerhalb der Arbeitsorganisation, vor allem den Bundesorganen zugestellt wurden. Es wurde eine Erhöhung der persönlichen Einkommen, die Auszahlung einer einmaligen Zulage, die über den in den Tarifstatuten des Unternehmens festgelegten Grundlöhnen liegt, ferner Sicherheitsschutz am Arbeits-

¹⁰ Quellenangabe R. Lampret, S. 22-36 und REFLEKTOR der Borba, Beograd, 27. IX. 1969.

The reason is that it makes it easier to understand the information that will be given later. And this can refer to some tendencies, which will be discussed in particular in this part of the work.

1. ZWEIBEISPELLE

The strike in the mines of Zasavlje was registered as the first occurrence of this kind, while the strike in the port of Rijeka is one of the last strikes (when selecting, we were also informed by the Quibe determined from the available information).

a)

Zasavlje mines (January 1958) 10

In view of the Republic Day in 1957, the mines in Trbovlje paid out the so-called Oberschufi, except to the Trbovlje-Hrastnik lignite miners. The pit was in a very difficult financial situation due to the increase in the price of electricity and the very high amortization, which weighed on the production costs - the coal sales prices, however, were capped by positive federal legislation. The miners' officials, trade unions and the factory committee of the Communist League, under pressure from the dissatisfaction of the workers, turned to the organs of government, the officials of the trade unions and the Communist League for help of the municipality, the district, the republic, as well as to the relevant central committee of the Yugoslav Trade Union Federation. Since the numerous negotiations and delegations did not alter the critical situation, the strike broke out after 40 days.

All employees in the Trbovlje mine (about 3,800 production workers and over 300 employees, including over 300 employees of the Union of Communists) except those whose jobs are from the company's headquarters remote workers suspended their work for a period of 52 hours (from the evening of January 13 to the morning of January 15, 1958). On January 14, they were also joined by the Hrastnik miners from Sodljarit. The strike took place within the framework of the company, no demonstrations took place - neither within this framework nor outside of the work organization, nor was violence used by the strikers (neither against persons nor towards things).

For the duration of the strike there was no strike committee, rather, at the moment of the cessation of work, the workers' council together with the trade union association announced the results of the talks, after which the basic demands were laid down and were sent to bearers of political power outside the work organization, especially to the federal organs. An

increase in personal income, the payment of a one-off bonus in excess of the base wages set out in the company's collective bargaining charter, and security protection at work were provided a m p re t, p. 22 -36 and R E F L E K T O R d e r B orba, B eo g ra d , 27. IX . 1969

platz (Hygienisch-technischer Arbeitsschutz) und letztenendes wurde auf der Erörterung und Veränderung der Wirtschaftsbedingungen der Grube bestanden. Eine Delegation der Bergarbeiter reiste zweimal hintereinander nach Belgrad und erhielt nach der zweiten Reise das Versprechen, daß die Forderungen der Streikenden erfüllt würden, woraufhin der Streik eingestellt wurde.

Durch den Ausbruch des Streikes entstand eine confuse politische Situation und beschleunigte Mobilisierung der oben bereits erwähnten und anderer Regierungsbehörden, sowie der Fora der gesellschaftlich-politischen Organisationen. Im Kurzverfahren wurde den Forderungen der Streikenden stattgegeben: Sämtlichen Kollektivmitgliedern wurde die Hälfte des Monateinkommens als Zulage ausgezahlt. Es wurden Zusatzlöhne ausgezahlt, (teils aus Gemeindemitteln, was durch Bundesmittel ersetzt wurde). Es wurden auch die Tage im Ausstand bezahlt, die Arbeiter erhielten Schutzzüge und der Kohlepreis wurde mit Beginn des laufenden Jahres erhöht. Die Nachricht über das, was sich in Trbovlje begab, verbreitete sich schnell über inoffizielle Kanäle in der unmittelbaren Umgebung von Trbovlje. Aus Solidarität mit ihren Kollegen in Trbovlje traten (am 16. und 17. Januar) rund 1.200 (von 1.861 Beschäftigten) Bergarbeiter in Zagorje ob Savi in den Streik. Die Lage in diesem Bergwerk war nicht so schwierig wie in Trbovlje. Initiatoren des Streiks waren einige Bergarbeiter, die auch auf die Streikorganisation bedeutenden Einfluß ausübten. In den Streik traten weiterhin auch die Arbeiter zweier Unternehmen in Trbovlje und eines Unternehmens in Zagorje.

An all diesen Streiks waren rund 5.500 Arbeiter beteiligt. Vermutlich aus Furcht, daß sich der Streik weiter ausdehnen könnte, wurden energische Maßnahmen gegen die Streikenden eingeleitet, um einer Erneuerung vorzubeugen und, eventuell, auch eine Ausbreitung der vergangenen Geschehnisse. So hat z. B. die Republiksfunktionärschaft Sloweniens das Kreis- Gemeinde- und Bergbaukommittee des Bundes der Kommunisten aufgelöst und auch die Grundorganisation der Bergarbeiter entlassen.

Die jugoslawische Presse, Rundfunk und Fernsehen, brachten weder Informationen noch Nachrichten über den Streik, was auch in den kommenden Jahren die Praxis sein wird.

b) *Hafen von Rijeka (Juni 1969)*

In den dem Monat Juni vorausgegangenen Monaten des Jahres 1969 befand sich der Hafen von Rijeka in einer schweren Finanzlage, weshalb es bereits im Jahre 1968 zu vier kleineren Streiks gekommen war, die nur der Auftakt für den bald darauf ausbrechenden fünften Streik sein sollten.¹¹ Nach Einsicht in den Wirtschaftsplan des Unternehmens für das Jahr 1969 wurde festgestellt, daß eine Verringerung des Umfangs der Hafenarbeiten um 8,6%, eine Verringerung des Gesamteinkommens um 2,4%, eine Erhöhung der Wirtschaftskosten um 6,6%, eine Verringerung des Gesamteinkommens um 6,6%, und eine Verringerung des persönlichen Einkommens in der Masse um

¹¹ Information über Arbeitseinstellungen in Kroatien (vom 1. I. 68 bis 31. VII. 1969 RVSSJ für Kroatien, 9. X. 1969).

platz (hygienic-technical occupational safety) and finally it was insisted on discussing and changing the economic conditions of the mine. A delegation of miners went to Belgrade twice in a row and after the second trip received a promise that the strikers' demands would be met, after which the

strike was called off.

The outbreak of the strike created a confused political situation and accelerated mobilization of the above-mentioned and other government agencies, as well as forums of socio-political organizations. The demands of the strikers were granted in a short procedure: all collective members were paid half of their monthly income as an allowance. Additional wages were paid (partly from municipal funds, which was replaced by federal funds). The days off were paid, the workers got protective suits and the price of coal was increased at the beginning of the current year. The news of what was happening in Trbovlje quickly spread through unofficial channels in the immediate vicinity of Trbovlje. Around 1,200 (out of 1,861 employees) miners in Zagorje ob Savi went on strike (on January 16 and 17) in solidarity with their colleagues in Trbovlje. The situation in this mine was not as difficult as in Trbovlje.

The initiators of the strike were some miners, who also exerted a significant influence on the organization of the strike. Workers from two companies in Trbovlje and one company in Zagorje also went on strike.

Around 5,500 workers were involved in all these strikes. Presumably fearing that the strike would spread further, vigorous action was taken against the strikers to prevent a renewal and, possibly, a spread of what had happened. So z. For example, the Slovenian Republic officials dissolved the County, Communal and Mining Committees of the Union of Communists and also dismissed the basic organization of miners.

The Yugoslav press, radio and television did not carry any information or news about the strike, which will continue to be the case for years to come.

b)

Port of Rijeka (June 1969)

In the months preceding June 1969, the port of Rijeka was in a difficult financial situation, which is why four smaller strikes had already occurred in 1968, which were only to be the prelude to the fifth strike which broke out soon afterwards.¹¹ After examining the company's economic plan for 1969, it was established that a reduction in the volume of port works by 8.6%, a reduction in total income by 2.4%, an increase in economic costs by 6.6% %, a decrease in total income by 6.6%, and a decrease in personal income in bulk by 11 In formatio n about vacancies in Croatia (from 1. I. 68 to 31. V II .

21,6% geplant waren. Darüberhinaus wurde das Urlaubsgeld aufgehoben, (das für jeden Tag des Urlaubs 30 n.D betrug), der Frühstückspreis wurde erhöht, die Entschädigung für einige Krankheitsfälle, und die Herabsetzung der Fahrgeldrückerkstattung. Das traf am meisten diejenigen Arbeiter, die auch ansonsten ein niedrigeres Einkommen als die anderen Gruppen Beschäftigter hatten, womit ihr realer Standard um mindestens 30% abfiel. Damit hatten sich die auch sonst schweren Lebensbedingungen noch weiterhin erschwert, denn, wie es in dem Bericht der Gewerkschaftskommission heißt »wohnen viele Arbeiter mit ihren Familien in Bunkern, Ställen, leerstehenden Autobussen und anderen Unterkünften, die für die Zeit, in der wir leben, unbegreiflich sind und mit unserer sozialistischen Gesellschaft unvereinbar.« Die erwähnten Maßnahmen traten mit der Verabschiedung der entsprechenden Beschlüsse des Arbeiterrates, ohne vorhergehende Konsultierung des Kollektivs, in Kraft. Über einen solchen Vorgang wurde unter den Arbeitern längere Zeit gesprochen. Der Unmut wuchs und der latente Konflikt wuchs sich unmittelbar bevor die gefassten Beschlüsse ausgeführt werden sollten, zum Streik aus.

Der Streik begann am 1. Juni als 300 Arbeiter des Hafenwerkes ihre Arbeit niedergließen. Am darauffolgenden Tage ging die erste Schicht, (1.500 von insgesamt 4.600 im Hafen Beschäftigten) anstatt zu den Hafendocks, zum Verwaltungsgebäude des Betriebes. Sie drangen in das Gebäude ein, eroberten Stockwerk für Stockwerk und warfen die Angestellten, und andere Funktionäre auf die Straße. Sie begannen den Generaldirektor und den Finanzdirektor tätlich anzugreifen, sowie den Vorsitzenden der Gewerkschafts- und Parteiorganisation, den Hauptanalytiker, sowie einige andere Führungspersönlichkeiten und Angestellten des Betriebes. Einige von ihnen jagten sie die Straße entlang und schlügen sie.

Am gleichen Tag fand eine Sitzung der Arbeitervertreter der im Streik stehenden (es gab einen Streikausschuß) mit den Gewerkschaftsvertretern der Stadt statt. Es wurde besprochen, daß am folgenden Tage eine Sitzung der Vertreter aller Werkseinheiten des Hafens mit den Regierungsbehörden, mit Regierungsvertretern und Fora der gesellschafts-politischen Organisationen Rijekas stattfinden sollte, wozu auch Republiksveteranen hinzugezogen werden sollten. Am nächsten Tag fand auf den Hafendocks eine Kundgebung statt, an der über 3.000 Arbeiter teilnahmen. Einzelne, die sich dazu hatten hinreissen lassen, Funktionäre tätlich anzugreifen, wurden kritisiert und diese Tatsache wurde bedauert, der Streik wurde eingestellt und die Forderungen der Arbeiter erfüllt, das gerade erst angenommene Statut über die Verteilung der persönlichen Einkommen wurde für ungültig erklärt und die Gültigkeit des alten verlängert. Ferner fand eine Auszahlung der Einkommensdifferenzen in einer Höhe von 10% für die ersten vier Monate des laufenden Jahres statt, die persönlichen Einkommen für Monat Mai wurden zur Gänze ausgezahlt, was auch für Monat Juni garantiert wurde, es wurde die volle Fahrgeldbeihilfe erstattet und eine Verbesserung der Arbeitsorganisation und der Arbeitsteilung zugesagt, sowie eine Überprüfung der Möglichkeit, die Differenzzahlungen der persönlichen Einkünfte zu erhöhen. Bei der Bank wurde ein kurzfristiger Kredit für die Erfüllung der erwähnten

21.6% were planned. In addition, the holiday pay was abolished (which amounted to 30 n.D for each day of the holiday), the breakfast price was increased, the compensation for some sickness cases, and the reduction of the fare refund. This hit hardest those workers who otherwise had lower incomes than the other groups of workers, dropping their real standard by at least 30%. As a result, the otherwise difficult living conditions had become even more difficult, because, as the report of the trade union commission says, »many workers live with their families in bunkers, stables, empty autobuses and others Housing that is incomprehensible for the time we live in and incompatible with our socialist society.« The mentioned measures occurred with the adoption of the relevant decisions of the Workers' Council, without previous ones Consultation of the collective, in force. Such a process was discussed among the workers for a long time. The resentment grew and the latent conflict grew into a strike immediately before the decisions taken were to be implemented.

The strike began on June 1st when 300 workers at the port work went out of work. On the following days, the first shift (1,500 of a total of 4,600 employees in the port) went to the administration building of the company instead of to the port docks. They entered the building, took floor by floor and threw the employees and other officials onto the street. They actually began to attack the general director and the finance director, as well as the chairman of the trade union and party organizations, the chief analyst, and some other managers and employees of the company. Some of them chased them down the street and beat them.

On the same day, a meeting was held between the workers' representatives of those on strike (there was a strike committee) and the city's trade union representatives. It was discussed that on the following day a meeting of representatives of all port business units with the government authorities, government representatives and forums of socio-political organizations of Rijeka should take place, to which representatives of the Republic should also be involved. The next day, a rally was held on the docks, attended by over 3,000 workers. Individuals who had allowed themselves to be carried away to actually attack officials were criticized and this fact was deplored, the strike was called off and the demands of the workers fulfilled, the just adopted statute on the distribution of labor personal income was declared invalid and the validity of the old one was extended Personal income for the month of May was paid out in full, which was also guaranteed for the month of June, the full fare subsidy was reimbursed and an improvement in work organization and work Pledged to share work, as well as to review the possibility of collecting the differential payments for personal income. A short-term loan was taken out from the bank for the fulfillment of the aforementioned 408

Verpflichtungen aufgenommen. Es wurde eine Notverwaltung eingeführt und vorgeschlagen, die Organisation des Bundes der Kommunisten aufzulösen. Sieben Streikende wurden wegen Gewaltanwendung gegenüber der Funktionärschaft des Betriebes verhaftet.

Presse, Rundfunk und Fernsehen brachten mehrere Informationen und Kommentare zu dem Streik.

2. VON TRBOVLJE (1958) BIS RIJEKA (1969)

a) Räumliche und zeitliche Verbreitung der Erscheinung.

Im Laufe von mehr als 11 Jahren (auf diese Zeitspanne beziehen sich die Angaben), wurden auf dem Gebiet Jugoslawiens 1.732 Streiks registriert (alle Untersuchungen besagten jedoch, daß es erheblich mehr waren).¹³ Sie tauchten zunächst in Slowenien, der wirtschaftlich am meisten entwickelten Republik auf, um sich schnell nach Kroatien, Serbien und auf die anderen Republiken auszubreiten. Es ist mithin von einer allgemein jugoslawischen Erscheinung die Rede. (Streiks wurden in mehr als 2/5 der Gemeinden jugoslawischen Territoriums registriert).¹⁴ Sie haben allerdings nicht das gesamte Territorium Jugoslawiens erfaßt, sondern zeigen sich gewöhnlich in Gebieten mit entwickelter Industrie, besonders in größeren Städten, bzw. Industriestädten.

Unvollständigen Angaben zufolge waren es im Jahre 1958 – 28, im Jahre 1959 – 35, im Jahre 1960 – 61. Im darauffolgenden Jahr 1961 hatte sich die Zahl der Streiks bereits verdoppelt, es wurden 130 gezählt und im Jahre 1962 sogar 225.¹⁵ In den darauffolgenden zwei Jahren waren die Veränderungen weniger stark: 1963 – 213 und 1964 – 273 Streiks. Von 1965 bis 1967 ist die Zahl der Streiks abfallend: (1965 – 231, 1966 – 153, 1967 – 113), um erneut anzusteigen, im Jahre 1968 waren es 135 und in den ersten acht Monaten des laufenden Jahres 136. Zu einem Anwachsen der Streiks kam es, wie ersichtlich, immer dann, wenn größere Wandlungen im Wirtschaftssystem mit tiefgreifenden gesellschaftlichen Implikationen im Gange waren.¹⁶

¹² Angaben entnommen aus dem Bericht der Studiengruppe des Zentralkomitees der Gewerkschaft für Verkehr, Bd. 27. VI. 1969, ferner *Borba* vom 3. VI., 17. VI. und 27. IX., *UUS* 11. VI. sowie *Veterjne novosti* 8. VI. 1969.

¹³ Quelle: Konfliktsituationen in den Werkseinheiten und die Rolle der Kommunisten bei ihrer Lösung, Kommission des Präsidiums des BdKJ für innere politische Fragen und Entwicklung der gesellschaftlichen Beziehungen, für Wirtschaftspolitik und für die Entwicklung des Bundes der Kommunisten und der Rat des Bundes der Gewerkschaften Jugoslawiens für gesellschaftlich-wirtschaftliche Beziehungen, Beograd, 6. Oktober 1969, Beilage 1.

¹⁴ Angaben nach einer Umfrage des Bundesarbeitsrates und des Rates des Bundes der Werktätigen, die in der ersten Hälfte des Jahres 1969 durchgeführt wurde. Die Fragebogen wurden an 478 Gemeinden gesandt, wovon 403 Antworten schickten. 202 führten Angaben über Streiks an. (Konfliktsituationen... Anlage 1) 9/10 fanden von Beginn des Jahres 1966 bis August 1969 statt, als es in Jugoslawien zwischen 516 und 500 Gemeinden gab. (Siehe: Statistisches Jahrbuch Jugoslawiens, 1969, S. 62).

¹⁵ Konfliktsituationen... Beilage 1.

¹⁶ Das war in den Jahren 1961 und 1962 zur Zeit der sogenannten neuen Wirtschaftsmaßnahmen und im anderen Falle handelt es sich um die Jahre der Wirt-

commitments made. An emergency administration was introduced and it was proposed to dissolve the organization of the Communist League. Seven strikers were arrested for using violence against factory officials.

Press, radio and television brought a variety of information and comments to the strike.

2. V O N T R B O V L J E (1958) BIS R IJE K A (1969)

a) Spatial and temporal distribution of the phenomenon.

In the course of more than 11 years (the data refer to this period), 1,732 strikes were registered in the territory of Yugoslavia (however, all studies indicate that there were considerably more).¹³ They first appeared in Slovenia, the economically most developed one republic to quickly spread to Croatia, Serbia and the other republics. We are therefore talking about a general Yugoslav phenomenon. (Strikes were registered in more than 2/5 of the communes of Yugoslav territory).¹⁴ However, they did not cover the entire territory of Yugoslavia, but usually appear in areas with developed industry, especially in large cities or industrial towns.

According to incomplete information, there were 28 in 1958, 35 in 1959, and 61 in 1960. In the following year, 1961, the number of strikes had already doubled to 130

and even 225 in 1962.¹⁵ In the following two years the changes were less pronounced: 1963-213 and 1964

- 273 strikes. From 1965 to 1967 the number of strikes fell: (1965 - 231, 1966 - 153, 1967 - 113), only to rise again to 135 in 1968 and 136 in the first eight months of the current year An increase in strikes, as can be seen, occurred whenever major changes were underway in the economic system with profound social implications.¹⁰

12 Information taken from the report of the study group of the central committee of the trade union for transport, Bgd. 27. VI. 1969, fc rn cr Borba from 3. VI., 17. VI. and 27. IX , V U S 11. VI, as well as V e čern je novosti 8. VI. 1969.

,s source: C on flic tsitu a tio n s in the w ork units and the role of the com m unists in their solution, C om m ission of the P ra sid ium s of the B dK J for internal affairs political issues and development of social relations, for economic policy and for the development of the Union of C om m unists and the Council of the Union of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia for social - economic relations, Beog rad, October 6, 1969, supplement 1.

11 Data based on a survey by the Federal Labor Council and the Council of the Federal Government of W ak ta ti n , conducted in the first half of 1969.

The questionnaire was sent to 478 communities, of which 403 responded. 202 lead to strikes. (Conflict situations in a town ... A village 1) 9/10

took place from the beginning of 1966 to August 1969, when there were between 516 and 500 congregations in Yugoslavia. (See: Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia, 1969, p. 62).

18 Conflict in Village

18 That was in the years 1961 and 1962 at the time of the so-called new economic measures and in other cases it is about the years of the winter-409

Vom Januar 1964 bis zum Dezember 1966 ist (von insgesamt 654 Streiks) die Reihenfolge der Republiken beim Auftreten der Streiks wie folgt: Serbien (30,3% von der Gesamtstreikzahl für Jugoslawien), Slowenien (28,7%), Kroatien (16,4%), Bosnien-Herzegowina (13,5%). Mazedonien (8%), Montenegro (2,4%). Vom Januar 1967 bis zum August 1969 änderte sich bei insgesamt 384 Streiks die Reihenfolge: Serbien steht mit 42,7 immer noch an erster Stelle, Kroatien kommt an die zweite Stelle mit 25,0%, an dritter Stelle stehen Slowenien und Bosnien-Herzegowina mit je 13,5% und am Schluß rangieren auch weiterhin Mazedonien 4,7% und Montenegro mit 0,6%.¹⁷ In der Gesamtbilanz steht an erster Stelle Serbien, dann Kroatien, ferner Slowenien und Bosnien/Herzegowina, und am Schluß Mazedonien und Montenegro.

Nach den einzelnen Wirtschaftszweigen kam es von insgesamt 513 Streiks, über die genauere Angaben vorhanden sind, im Bergbau am häufigsten zu Streiks. Am zahlreichsten sind die in der Metallindustrie (22,7%), in der Textilindustrie (9,3%), der Holzindustrie (9,5%), ferner im Bauwesen (7,4%), der Industrie von Baumaterial (4,9%), der Elektroindustrie (5,7%), in den Bergwerken (5,8%), im Verkehrswesen (5,1%); am seltensten treten sie in der Chemieindustrie mit lediglich 1% auf.¹⁸ Gleichfalls wurden Streiks von Ärzten in Kraljevo, des medizinischen Personals des Krankenhauses in Ljubljana, der Richter und Justizangestellten in Lazarevac, der kulturell Schaffenden in Ptuj und Osijek, usw. registriert.¹⁹

b) Zahl der Beteiligten, Dauer und Ort

In den ersten sechs Jahren, (von Anfang 1958 bis 1963) ist es fast unmöglich, die Zahl der an den Streiks Beteiligten festzustellen. Von der Gesamtzahl (1732) bewegte sich die Zahl der Streikenden, unvollkommenen Angaben zufolge, (in den Jahren, in denen die Angaben zusammengetragen wurden) zwischen 9 (1965) und 20.000 Beteiligten (in den ersten neuen Monaten des Jahres 1969).²⁰ Etwas zuverlässiger sind die Angaben, die an Hand einer Umfrage in 403 Gemeinden gesammelt wurden:²¹

DAUER DES STREIKS	ZAHL DER STREIKS	ZAHL DER BETEILIGTEN
bis zu 3 Stunden	175	34,2%
von 3 bis 7 Stunden	109	21,2%
1 Arbeitstag	111	21,6%
2 Arbeitstage	50	9,7%
3 Arbeitstage	14	2,7%
4 Arbeitstage	7	1,4%
mehr als 4 Arbeitstage	23	4,5%
Ohne Angaben	24	4,7%
Insgesamt	513	100
		72779
		100

schaftsreform. In beiden Fällen läßt sich denken, daß zu einem Ansteigen der Streiks die Unsicherheit und Ungewißheit hinsichtlich des Ausgangs der Maßnahmen beigetragen haben.

¹⁷ Konfliktsituationen ..., Beilage 1.

¹⁸ Ebenda

¹⁹ Politika, 5. VII. 1968, 3. IV. 1968 und 2. VI. 1968; Borba 25. V. 1968.

²⁰ Konfliktsituationen ..., Beilage 1.

²¹ Ebenda

From January 1964 to December 1966 (out of a total of 654

strikes), the order of the republics in the occurrence of strikes is as follows: Serbia (30.3% of the total number of strikes for Yugoslavia), Slovenia

(28.7%), Croatia (16.4%), Bosnia-Herzegovina (13.5%).

Macedonia (8%), Montenegro (2.4%). From January 1967 to August 1969, with a total of 384 strikes, the order changed: Serbia is still in first place with 42.7%, Croatia comes second with 25.0%, ranks are Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, each with 13.5%, and at the end there are also Macedonia with 4.7% and Montenegro with 0.6%.¹⁷ In the overall balance, Serbia comes first, then Croatia, further Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and finally Macedonia and Montenegro.

According to the individual economic sectors, it came from a total of 513

strikes, for which more detailed information is available, most frequently lead to strikes in mining. The most numerous are those in the metal industry (22.7%), in the textile industry (9.3%), in the wood industry (9.5%), and in construction (7.4%), the industry of building material (4.9%), the electrical industry (5.7%), in the mines (5.8%), in the transport sector (5.1%); They occur least frequently in the chemical industry, with only 1%.¹⁸ Likewise, strikes by doctors in Kraljevo, medical staff at the hospital in Ljubljana, judges and judicial employees in Lazarevac, registered as cultural creators in Ptuj and Osijek, etc.¹⁹

b) Number of participants, duration and place

In the first six years (from the beginning of 1958 to 1963) it is almost impossible to ascertain the number of those who took part in the strikes. Of the total number (1732), the number of strikers, according to imperfect data, (in the years in which the data were collected) ranged between 9 (1965) and 20,000 participants (in the first new months of 1969).²⁰ Slightly more reliable is the data that was collected by means of a survey in 403 municipalities:²¹

D A U E R D E S S T R E I K S

Z A H L D E R S T R E I K S

Z A H L D E R B E T E I L I G T E N

up to 3 hours can

175

34,2%

19522

26,8 %

vo n 3 bis 7 S tu n d e n

109

21,2 %

15284

21,0 %

1 A r b e i t s t a g

111

21,6 %

12852

17,6%

2 A r b e i t s t a g e

50

9,7 %

10541

14,5%

3 A r b e i t s t a g e

14

2,7 %

7169

9,9 %

4 A r b e i t s t a g e

7

1,4 %

1082

1,5%

mehr als 4 Arbeitstage

23

4,5 %

2396

3,3 %

Ohne Angaben

24

4,7 %

3933

5,4 %

Insgesamt

513

100

72779

100

scheiterten In beiden Fällen nicht zu denken, dafür zu einem Anstieg endeter Streiks die tatsächlich eher hielten und weniger wie früher hinreichend des Ausgangs der Maßnahmen have nothing to do with it.

17 Konfliktsituationsen..., Beileg 1.

18 Enda

18 Politics, 5. VII. 1968, 3. IV. 1968 and 2. VI. 1968; Borba 25. V 1968.

80 Konfliktsituationsen..., Beileg 1.

Am meisten Teilnehmer hatten die Streiks, an denen die Arbeiter der Metallindustrie (21,2%) von der Gesamtzahl der Streikenden und der Textilindustrie (16,4%) teilgenommen haben. Es folgen die Bergarbeiter (12,5%), die Arbeiter der Holzindustrie (9,5%) des Bauwesens (4%) usw.

3. ANLASS, FORDERUNGEN UND ERGEBNISSE

Über die Ursachen, die unserer Meinung nach zu Streiks führen, werden wir später sprechen. An dieser Stelle wird nur die Rede von den jeweiligen Anlässen (den unmittelbaren Ursachen) der Streiks sein.

Die bisherigen Untersuchungsergebnisse haben gezeigt, daß die Anlässe für Streiks zumeist in zwei Grundbeziehungen in der Arbeitsorganisation zu finden sind: bei der Verteilung der persönlichen Einkommen (niedrige persönliche Einkünfte, nicht ausgezahlte persönliche Einkommen, nicht ausgezahlte Differenzzahlungen, große Unterschiede in den persönlichen Einkommen, zu hohe Normen, Nichtanerkennung des realisierten persönlichen Einkommens, usw.; dies sind in $\frac{3}{4}$ der Fälle die Anlässe sämtlicher untersuchter Erscheinungen), sowie auch ein Nichtfunktionieren der Selbstverwaltung (unzureichende Informiertheit, Konflikte mit der Führerschaft des Unternehmens, Konflikte zwischen einzelnen Gruppen, usw.) Die übrigen unmittelbaren Anlässe sind vielfältig (Überschuß an Arbeitskräften und Entlassungen, schlechte Wohnbedingungen, Aufhebung von Vergütungen und ähnliches).²²

Zur ersten Gruppe der Streikanlässe ist zu sagen, daß es sich nicht allein um die Summe der Geldleistungen handelt und auch nicht allein um die Forderung, das persönliche Einkommen zu erhöhen oder den realen Lebenshaltungskosten anzugeleichen. Grund ist auch die Mißbilligung bestehender wesentlicher Unterschiede in den Grundvoraussetzungen für den Anteil der verschiedenen Beschäftigungsgruppen an der Verteilung der persönlichen Einkommen. Gewöhnlich haben nur die unmittelbaren Erzeuger Normen zu erfüllen oder andere konkret ausgearbeitete Vorschriften, auf Grund derer ihr Verdienst bestimmt wird, wohingegen diejenigen, die außerhalb der unmittelbaren Produktion stehen, einen festen Grundlohn haben, was unter solchen Verhältnissen einem garantierten Gehalt gleichkommt. Die unmittelbaren Erzeuger sind von solcher Sicherheit ausgeschlossen (es kommt vor, daß alle, außer den Arbeitern, ihre vollen persönlichen Einkommen ausgezahlt erhalten, nur sie allein bekommen es mit Abzügen). Dies ist vermutlich einer der Hauptgründe, weshalb es bei Streiks auch zu Konflikten innerhalb der Arbeitsorganisation kommt. Außerdem haben auch die Qualifikationen auf die Höhe des Verdienstes einen großen Einfluß (dieser Einfluß ist um so größer um so weniger Richtlinien über den tatsächlichen Arbeitsbeitrag und Arbeitsergebnis vorhanden sind), so daß Arbeiter mit geringer Qualifi-

²² Siehe hierzu ausführlich: R. Lampret, Über Protestarbeitseinstellungen, auch N. Jovanov, Kennzeichen und Tendenzen der Streikentwicklung in Jugoslawien.

The strikes, in which the workers of the metal industry (21.2%) of the total number of strikers and the textile industry (16.4%) took part, had the largest number of participants. They are followed by miners (12.5%), workers in the timber industry (9.5%), construction (4%), etc.

S. A N L A S S , FOR THE RUNNING UNDER THE ROCK

We will talk later about the causes which, in our opinion, lead to strikes. At this point we will only talk about the respective causes (the immediate causes) of the strikes.

The results of the investigation to date have shown that the reasons for strikes are mostly to be found in two basic relationships in the organization of work: in the distribution of personal income (low personal income, unpaid personal income, unpaid differential payments, large differences in personal income, high standards, disregard for realized personal income, etc.; these are in

% of cases are the causes of all the phenomena examined), as well as non-functioning self-government (inadequate information, conflicts with the management of the company, conflicts between individual groups, etc.). The other immediate causes are diverse (surplus of labor and layoffs, poor housing conditions, cancellation of remuneration and the like).²²

Regarding the first group of reasons for the strike, it must be said that it is not just about the sum of the cash benefits and not just about the demand to increase personal income or to adjust it to the real cost of living. The reason is also the disapproval of existing significant differences in the basic requirements for the share of the various employment groups in the distribution of personal income. Usually only the direct producers have standards to meet or other specifically worked out regulations by which their earnings are determined, while those outside direct production have a fixed basic wage, which in such circumstances amounts to a guaranteed salary.

The immediate producers are excluded from such security (it happens that all but the laborers are paid their full personal earnings, they alone are paid with deductions). This is probably one of the main reasons why strikes also lead to conflicts within the work organization.

In addition, qualifications also have a large influence on the level of earnings (this influence is all the greater the fewer guidelines on actual labor contribution and work output exist), so that low-skilled workers

*** See here in detail: R. Lamper, Uber protest work cessations, also N. Jovanov, Characteristics and tendencies of the development of strikes in*

kation, und somit auch geringeren Einkünften, am häufigsten zum Streik Zuflucht nehmen. Daher läßt sich sagen, daß die Aufteilung der Werkseinheiten nach Qualifikationen ebenfalls zu Konflikten zwischen den Gruppen innerhalb der Arbeitsorganisation beiträgt. Die Arbeiter und die außerhalb der Produktion beschäftigten genießen nicht nur bei der Verteilung der persönlichen Einkommen einen unterschiedlichen Status, sie nehmen auch ungleich an der Verteilung des politischen Einflusses innerhalb der Werkseinheit teil (später werden wir noch sehen, daß die Arbeiter auch global bei der Verteilung der einflußreichsten Determinanten des Lebens und der Arbeit benachteiligt sind: bei den materiellen Gütern und der politischen Gewalt). Die Polarisierung innerhalb der Werkseinheit beschränkt sich nicht allein auf den Konflikt zwischen Arbeitern und Angestellten, sondern die Konflikte sind häufig verschiedener Herkunft. Es besteht eigentlich eine Tendenz der Konstituierung und Intensivierung des Konfliktes in Form eines Dreiecks, das von folgenden Gruppen gebildet wird: der Gruppe der Produktionsarbeiter, die streikt und die nur schwachen Einfluß auf die Beschußfassung, die schlechten Arbeitsbedingungen und die Realisierung der Einkommen hat; die Faktoren in der Werkseinheit, die entscheidenden Einfluß auf die Fassung der Beschlüsse hat und schließlich eine weitere Gruppe von Produktionsarbeitern, die nicht streikt, weil sie stärkeren Einfluß auf die Beschußfassung sowohl hinsichtlich besserer Arbeitsbedingungen, als auch auf die Realisierung der Einkommen hat.

Die Forderungen der Streikenden entsprechen der Häufigkeit ihres Entstehens. Am häufigsten geht es um die Höhe und die Auszahlung der Löhne, darauf folgen die Forderungen nach einigen Personalveränderungen in der Werkseinheit, bessere Werkseinheit und Verwaltung, es geht auch um allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen der Werkseinheit und einige Tendenzen in den gesellschaftlichen Beziehungen.

Die bisherigen Forschungen geben nicht vollkommen Aufschluß darüber, in welchem Maße den Forderungen der Streikenden stattgegeben wird. Trotzdem läßt sich ziemlich zuverlässig behaupten, daß ihre Forderungen zumeist erfüllt werden, nahezu ausschließlich werden Forderungen erfüllt, die mit den persönlichen Einkommen in Verbindung stehen, weitaus seltener solche, die sich auf andere Veränderungen in der Werkseinheit beziehen. Ausnahmsweise werden auch Veränderungen außerhalb der Werkseinheit zugesagt. Zu Veränderungen in den Gesellschaftsbeziehungen in größeren gesellschaftlichen Gemeinschaften kommt es im Grunde auch nicht. Wie wir später noch sehen werden, reproduzieren sich die Ursachen auf dem gleichen Niveau und so ist es auch nicht verwunderlich, daß sich die Streiks in den gleichen Rahmen wiederholen, obwohl die Anlässe, in der Regel, bestätigt werden.

4. ALLGEMEINE TENDENZEN IN DER STREIKPRAXIS

Die verfügbaren Angaben und detaillierten Beschreibungen zweier Streiks eröffnen einen Einblick in einige allgemeine Tendenzen der Erscheinung, die wir untersuchen.

cation, and thus also lower income, most often resort to strikes. Therefore, it can be said that the division of work units by skills also contributes to conflicts between groups within the work organization.

The blue-collar workers and those employed outside of production not only enjoyed different status in the distribution of personal income, they also participate unequally in the distribution of political influence within the plant unit (we will come back later see that workers are also globally disadvantaged in the distribution of the most influential determinants of life and work: material goods and political violence). The polarization within the factory unit is not limited to the conflict between workers and employees, but the conflicts are often of different origins. In fact, there is a tendency for the conflict to be constituted and intensified in the form of a triangle formed by the following groups: the group of production workers who are on strike and those who have only weak influence on decision-making, the bad ones working conditions and the realization of income has; the factors in the plant unit that have a decisive influence on the making of the decisions and finally another group of production workers who do not go on strike because they have a greater influence on the making of decisions both in terms of better working conditions and on the realization of the income has.

The demands of the strikers correspond to the frequency of their occurrence. Most often it is about the amount and payment of wages, followed by demands for some personnel changes in the plant unit, better plant unit and administration, it is also about general business conditions and the work unity and some tendencies in social relations.

The research to date does not fully reveal the extent to which strikers' demands are met. Nonetheless, it can be said fairly reliably that their demands are met mostly, almost exclusively, those related to personal income, far less frequently those related to other causes.

changes in the factory unit. As an exception, changes outside the factory unit are also promised. There are basically no changes in social relations in large social communities either. As we shall see later, the causes reproduce at the same level and so it is not surprising that the strikes are repeated in the same framework, although the causes are, as a rule, eliminated.

4. A L L G E M E I N T E N D E N Z E N I N D E R S T R E I K P R A X I S

The available data and detailed descriptions of two strikes provide a glimpse of some general trends in the phenomenon we are investigating.

(1) Es ist Tatsache, daß sich die Streiks zunächst in der entwickeltesten Republik gezeigt haben, von wo aus sie sich ausbreiteten, was auf eine Korrelation zwischen Industrialisierung und der Entwicklung der Arbeiterklasse verweist, die ihrer Stellung immer bewußter wird, sowie der Interessen und Möglichkeiten ihrer Realisierung. Eine relative Isolation der Wirtschaftssphäre von anderen Sphären des gesellschaftlichen Lebens behindert das Übergreifen des Gesellschaftlichkeitspotentials der Arbeiterklasse, so daß die Streiks durch die Macht der Verhältnisse in der Wirtschaftssphäre lokalisiert bleiben. Erst unlängst begannen sie sich auch außerhalb der Wirtschaft auszudehnen (Bildungsschaffende, Richter, Studenten, medizinisches Personal, private Fuhrunternehmer usw.)

(2) Die Streikanlässe sind auf dem Gebiet der Arbeitsbeziehungen zu suchen und betreffen vor allem die Höhe der persönlichen Einkommen, sowie die Art ihrer Festlegung und Auszahlung. Die Streiks sind unmittelbar auf die Lösung von Augenblicksproblemen ausgerichtet und hören mit deren Lösung auf. Die Ursachen der Unzufriedenheit werden in der Regel von der Wirkung des Streiks nicht erfaßt. (Die Geschäftsführungbedingungen der Unternehmen und Wirtschaftszweige, die Beziehungen der Werkseinheit sowie der Organe der größeren Gesellschaftsgemeinschaften bei der Verwaltung der Produktionsmittel und der Verteilung der Arbeitsüberschüsse, Interessenkonflikte in der globalen Gesellschaft und ähnliches), und somit bleiben sie zumeist auch ungelöst. Unter ihrer Wirkung wiederholen sich Konfliktsituationen in der Werkseinheit und in kurzen Intervallen kommt es zu wiederholten Streiks.²⁴ Streiks sind das letzte Mittel im Kampf um die Realisierung der unmittelbaren Interessen der Arbeiter, durch außerinstitutionellen Druck auf die offizielle Machtstruktur, nachdem zuvor versucht wurde, durch diese legal hindurchzudringen und die wesentlichen Probleme auf diese Weise zu lösen.

(3) Nur ausnahmsweise kommt es zur Solidarität der Arbeiter einer Werkseinheit und noch seltener zur Solidarität einer größeren Zahl von Arbeitern (ein gewisser inoffizieller Einfluß und eine latente Solidarität sind vorhanden); gewöhnlich sind verschärzte Konflikte innerhalb der Werkseinheit zwischen den in ihr vertretenen verschiedenen Interessengruppen gegeben. Solche Konflikte sind immer häufiger, auch Gewaltanwendung. Der enge Rahmen der Werkseinheit, ferner der Druck der offiziellen öffentlichen Meinung (unter der Parole: jeder löse die Probleme in seinem eigenen Hause) heizen den Konflikt in diesen Relationen noch mehr an und so wird auch tatsächlich nicht über den eigenen Zaun (wirtschaftlicher, politischer und ideologischer Indoktrination) der lokalisierter Konflikte geschaut.

²² N. Jovanov, Über Arbeitseinstellungen . . ., S. 14.

²⁴ Außer dem bereits erwähnten Fall des Hafens von Rijeka, wo in weniger als einem Jahr fünf Streiks verzeichnet wurden, ist auch der Fall der Motorenfabrik in Rakovica von Bedeutung, wo es in weniger als einem halben Jahr zu vier kleineren Streiken kam, an denen einige Teile des Kollektivs teilnahmen, bis der fünfte Streik ausbrach, an dem dann nahezu alle beschäftigten Arbeiter teilnahmen. (*Politika*, 11. V. 1969)

possibilities of their realization. A relative isolation of the economic sphere from other spheres of social life hinders the spillover of the social potential of the working class, so that the strikes remain localized in the economic sphere by the force of circumstances. Only recently have they also begun to spread outside the economy (educators, judges, students, medical staff, private trucking companies, etc.) (2) The reasons for the strikes are to be found in the field of industrial relations and primarily affect the level of personal income, as well as the way in which they are determined and paid out. The strikes are aimed directly at solving immediate problems and stop solving them. The causes of the dissatisfaction are usually not covered by the effects of the strike. (The business management conditions of companies and branches of industry, the relationships of the work unit and the organs of the larger social communities in the administration of the means of production and the distribution of labor surpluses, conflicts of interest in global society and the like), and thus they mostly remain unresolved. Under their action, conflict situations in the factory unit are repeated and strikes are repeated at short intervals.²⁴ Strikes are the last resort in the struggle for the realization of the workers' immediate interests, through non-institutional pressure on the official power structure, having previously tried to get through them legally and solve the essential problems in this way.

(3) Only exceptionally does the solidarity of the workers of a factory unit and even more rarely the solidarity of a larger number of workers occur (a certain unofficial influence and latent solidarity is present); usually there are aggravated conflicts within the work unit between the various interest groups represented in it. Such conflicts are becoming more common, including the use of violence. The narrow framework of the factory unit, furthermore the pressure of the official public opinion (under the slogan: everyone solves the problems in his own house) heat up the conflict in these relations even more and so in fact one does not cross one's own fence (economic, political and ideological indoctrination) of localized conflicts.

a N Jo v an o v , Ober Arbeitse'sstellun g en S.

14 Aside from the already mentioned case of the port of Rijeka, where five strikes were recorded in less than a year, the case of the engine factory in Rakovica is also significant, where in less than half a year there were four smaller strikes, in which some parts of the collective took part, until the five ftc strike broke out, in which almost everyone was then employed th w o rk e rs took part. (P o h tik a , 11. V. 1969)

(4) Die Streiks beschränken sich nicht in sämtlichen Fällen auf die Werkseinheiten, die Arbeiter gehen immer öfter auf die Straßen und demonstrieren.²⁵ Immer häufiger sind sie besonders organisiert (unter Umgehung der offiziellen Funktionärsstruktur), bilden ihre Streikausschüsse, die die Arbeiter im Streik bei den Verhandlungen um die Erfüllung ihrer Forderungen vertreten. Hiermit entwickelt sich eine besondere Eigenschaft des Streikkampfes, die diese Erscheinung, den Generalstreik mit inbegriffen, zu einer politischen Arbeiterbewegung umformen kann. Hierzu kommt noch die Tatsache, daß es Massenstreiks sind, an denen eine immer größere Zahl von Arbeitern teilnimmt.²⁶

(5) Über die Streiks wird mehr und mehr öffentlich gesprochen, es kommt jedoch nicht zu echten Dialogen. Charakteristisch für sämtliche Arbeiten ist auch die Tatsache, daß sie sich auf die Werkseinheiten beschränken und nur ganz ausnahmsweise schwache Anzeichen dafür vorhanden sind, daß sie umfassendere gesellschaftliche Relationen annehmen.

(6) In einigen Fällen werden einzelne Streikteilnehmer auch vor Gericht gestellt (in Niš, Jesenice, Rijeka, Slavonski Brod), was wahrscheinlich ein Symptom dafür ist, daß der frühere inoffizielle Druck auf die Arbeiter (Verhöre, etc.) in neuerer Zeit auch in die institutionelle Struktur einbezogen wird (Justiz).

II. URSACHEN UND MÖGLICHE REICHWEITE DER STREIKS

Bisher haben wir uns auf die Beschreibung der Erscheinung als solche beschränkt. Wir wollen jedoch versuchen, weiter zu gehen und auf Grund der Tatsachen und Möglichkeiten auf eine grundlegende Frage zu antworten: Warum kommt es in der heutigen jugoslawischen Gesellschaft überhaupt zu Streiks? Wenn wir hierauf nicht gerade eine Antwort geben können, die sämtliche Leser zufriedenstellt, so lassen sich immerhin einige Ideen für weitere Untersuchungen und Überlegungen zu dieser sehr komplizierten gesellschaftlichen Erscheinung suggerieren. Dieser Teil der Arbeit beruht überwiegend auf den Untersuchungsergebnissen anderer Soziologen und nur teilweise auf Material, das von mir im Verlauf meiner bisherigen Untersuchungen zusammengetragen wurde. Die Betrachtung der Tendenzen und ihre Auslegung als Folge unzureichender Erhellung der Problematik, von der hier die Rede ist, trägt daher vorwiegend Arbeitscharakter und

²⁵ Streiks wurden in mehreren Fällen zu Straßendemonstrationen; zu den ersten gehört der Streik des Krankenhauspersonals in Ljubljana, ferner der Streik der Bildungsschaffenden in Ptuj – und von den bereits angeführten, der Streik in Rijeka, zuvor noch in Koper, als die Arbeiter des Tomos-Werkes am 17. und 18. Mai 1968 auf den Straßen demonstrierten. In diesem Fall kam es auch zu Schlägereien mit den Funktionären, jedoch nicht so heftig wie in Rijeka (*UUS* 29. V. 1968)

²⁶ Die Untersuchungen N. Jovanovs zeigen, daß »Tendenzen einer Verringerung der Streiks mit kleiner Teilnehmerzahl zu verzeichnen sind, jedoch eine Zunahme der Streiks, an denen eine größere Anzahl von Arbeitern teilnimmt«. (N. Jovanov, Kennzeichen und Tendenzen..., S. 11 und 12).

*workers on strike in the negotiations for the fulfillment of their demands. A special feature of the strike struggle develops here, which can transform this phenomenon, including the general strike, into a political workers' movement. To this must be added the fact that these are mass strikes in which an increasing number of workers are taking part.*²⁶

(5) *The strikes are being talked about more and more openly, but there is no real dialogue. Also characteristic of all works is the fact that they are limited to the work units and only in exceptional cases are there weak signs that they are assuming more comprehensive social relations.*

(6) *In some cases individual strikers are also taken to court (in Niš, Jesenice, Rijeka, Slavonski Brod), which is probably a symptom of the earlier unofficial pressure on workers (interrogations, etc.) has recently also been included in the institutional structure (judiciary).*

II. U R S A C H E N U N D MO GLICH HERE ICFIWEITEDER STRIKES

So far we have limited ourselves to the description of the phenomenon as such. However, let us try to go further and, based on facts and possibilities, to answer a fundamental question: Why do strikes occur in today's Yugoslav society at all? If we cannot exactly give an answer to this that satisfies all readers, we can still suggest some ideas for further investigation and reflection on this very complicated social phenomenon. This part of the work is mainly based on the research results of other sociologists and only partly on material collected by me in the course of my previous research. The consideration of the tendencies and their interpretation as a result of insufficient elucidation of the problem at issue here is therefore mainly of a work nature and 25 strikes were seen as cases to punitive done in strikes; one of the first is the strike of the hospital workers in Ljubljana, as well as the strike of the education workers in Ptuj - and by the already mentioned, the Strike in Rijeka, and before that in Koper, when the workers of the 'famous plant' struck on May 17th and 18th, 1968. In this case, there were also strikes with the fewest, albeit not as fierce as in Rijeka (VUS 29. V. 1968) The INVESTIGATIONS Notebooks show that »tend to a degree of the strike with small parts, it does not enter into the strike, and a great number of workers share in it.« (N. Jovanović, Kenedičhen and Tendencija... , p. 11 and 12).

kann nur Beitrag zur Untersuchung der Struktur der globalen Gesellschaft sein, vor allem jedoch der Integrations- und Desintegrationsprozesse (in erster Linie der Widersprüche und Konflikte) in ihr.

Bereits der Einblick in die Erscheinungsformen und ihre Beschreibung zeigt, daß es sich hier um eine Erscheinung von globaler Bedeutung handelt, die, obwohl zumeist auf partielle Strukturen begrenzt, trotzdem die Struktur der globalen Gesellschaft durchdringt. Es ist ein besonderer Konflikttyp der Interessengruppen. Die Streiks sind nur eine der Konfliktformen durch die sich die tiefgreifenden Konflikte spontan artikulieren.

Wenn wir nun eine Antwort auf die gestellte Frage suchen wollen so müßten wir die Differenzierungen (Stand und Tendenz) der Globalstruktur der Gesellschaft feststellen. Versuchen wir demnach eine Untersuchung der wesentlichen Unterschiede der einzelnen Gesellschaftsschichten und zwar vor allem in drei Grundrichtungen: Verteilung des materiellen Reichtums, Distribution der politischen Gewalt (als bestimmter historischer Form der gesellschaftlichen Macht) und die Unterschiede hinsichtlich ihrer Wertorientierungen. Nachdem wir bereits festgestellt haben, daß in der Regel Arbeiter streiken, werden wir überwiegend nach Determinanten ihrer gesellschaftlichen Lage suchen, aus der die Streiks im Grunde auch hervorgehen. Eine gründliche Untersuchung des anderen Konfliktpols, sowie auch Breite und Intensität der Konflikte gehen über den Rahmen dieser Arbeit hinaus.

1. MATERIELLE STANDARDUNTERSCHIEDE

Wenn moderne gesellschaftliche Unterschiede angesprochen werden, so werden zumeist in erster Linie die Unterschiede im materiellen Standard betont und zwar in der Regel die Spanne der persönlichen Einkommen in den einzelnen Werkseinheiten. So kommt man gewöhnlich zu einer Manipulation mit Angaben, mit denen man einen angeblichen Gleichstand »beweist«.

Die realen Verhältnisse schließen jedoch, wie wir sehen werden, die Begründung einer solchen Behauptung aus. Sie gilt nicht für umfassendere Gesellschaftsgruppierungen, am allerwenigsten, wenn es sich um Verhältnisse der globalen Gesellschaft handelt. Die Angaben, über die wir verfügen, wurden nicht systematisch für diese Arbeit zusammengetragen, sie sind jedoch, wie ich hoffe, ausreichend indikativ, um einen Einblick in die realen Unterschiede der materiellen Lage der verschiedenen Gesellschaftsschichten zu bieten, besonders deutlich machen sie jedoch die materielle Lage des Arbeiters.

Die Unterschiede im Lebensstandard der Bürger beruhen auf der ungleichen wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung der einzelnen Gebiete Jugoslawiens, woher die Widersprüche in der Struktur der globalen Gesellschaft röhren. Eine Angabe, die die erwähnten Widersprüche impliziert, bezieht sich auf das Volkseinkommen. Es betrug im Jahre 1967 auf jugoslawischem Raum 1(636 nD): 55(35064 nD), am niedrigsten war es in der Gemeinde Dragas auf Kosovo, am höchsten in Lju-

Already the insight into the forms of appearance and their description shows that we are dealing here with a phenomenon of global importance, which, although mostly limited to partial structures, nonetheless penetrates the structure of global society. It is a special type of conflict of interest groups. The strikes are just one of the forms of conflict through which the profound conflicts are spontaneously articulated.

If we now want to look for an answer to the question posed, we must determine the differentiations (status and trend) of the global structure of society. Let us therefore attempt an investigation of the essential differences between the individual social strata, namely in three basic directions: the distribution of material wealth, the distribution of political violence (as a specific historical form of social power) and the differences in their value orientations. Having already established that it is usually workers who go on strike, we will primarily look for determinants of their social situation, from which the strikes basically also arise. A thorough investigation of the other pole of conflict, as well as the breadth and intensity of the conflicts, is beyond the scope of this work.

1. M A T E R I E L L E S T A N D A R D U N T E R S C H I E D E

When modern societal differences are addressed, it is usually primarily the differences in material standards that are emphasized, usually the range of personal incomes in the individual factory units. This is how one usually arrives at a manipulation with data with which one "proves" an alleged tie.

However, as we shall see, the real circumstances preclude the justification of such a claim. It does not apply to broader social groups, least of all when it comes to global society. The data that we have have not been systematically collected for this work, but are, I hope, sufficiently indicative to offer an insight into the real differences in the material situation of the different classes of society, but they make the material one particularly clear position of the worker.

Differences in the standard of living of the citizens are due to the unequal economic development of the individual regions of Yugoslavia, from which the contradictions in the structure of the global society stem. One data implying the contradictions mentioned relates to national income. In 1967 in Yugoslavia it was 1(636 nD): 55(35064 nD), it was lowest in the municipality of Dragas in Kosovo, highest in Lju 415

bljana-Zentrum (die Einwohnerzahl stammt aus dem Jahre 1961).²⁷ Gleichen Angaben zufolge betrug diese Spanne in Serbien zwischen der erwähnten Gemeinde und der Gemeinde Beograd-Altstadt 1:43. Eine Betrachtung der Spannen der persönlichen Einkommen allein im Rahmen der einzeln genommenen Werkseinheiten führt zu dem Schluß, daß diese Spannen 1:2 bis 1:5, und seltener darüber betragen. Wenn man jedoch aus diesem Rahmen herausgeht in breitere Räume so sind die Spannen um ein mehrfaches größer. So bewegten sich die Spannen in der Wirtschaft der jugoslawischen Teilrepublik Serbien im 1967 in einer Relation von 1:20, wenn die maximalen Durchschnittseinkommen mit den geringsten persönlichen Einkommen der Werkseinheit verglichen werden.²⁸ Wenn es innerhalb der Werkseinheit solche Spannen gibt, so kann man annehmen, daß die erwähnten Unterschiede bedeutend größer sind, denn »man kann damit rechnen, daß das größte Einkommen in der Werkseinheit fast dreimal so hoch ist wie ein Durchschnittseinkommen in der Werkseinheit und daß das kleinste persönliche Einkommen ungefähr bei der Hälfte des Durchschnittseinkommens liegt«.²⁹

Da bekanntermaßen die persönlichen Durchschnittseinkommen außerhalb der Wirtschaft, wo gewöhnlich nicht gestreikt wird, höher sind als innerhalb der Wirtschaft, so sollte man in erster Linie die Entwicklung der persönlichen Durchschnittseinkommen im Auge behalten, die für die jugoslawische Wirtschaft unter dem Durchschnitt liegen.

Das jugoslawische Durchschnittseinkommen betrug im Jahre 1968 862 nD. In der gleichen Zeit erhielten 335.200 Arbeiter in der Textilindustrie (9% der Gesamtbeschäftigungszahl auf dem gesellschaftlichen Sektor der Wirtschaft) ein Einkommen, das bedeutend unter dem Durchschnitt lag – 659 Din. und etwas darüber. Jedoch noch immer bedeutend unter dem allgemeinen Durchschnitt von 715–794 nD lagen die persönlichen Einkommen von 939.300 Arbeitern in anderen Wirtschaftszweigen (was 27,8% der Gesamtzahl der auf dem gesellschaftlichen Sektor der Wirtschaft Beschäftigten ausmacht.)³⁰ Dem-

²⁷ Quelle: Veränderungen bei der Entwicklung einiger Elemente des Lebensstandards von 1964 bis 1969, Rat des Sozial. Gewerkschaftsbundes Jugoslawiens (VSSJ), Beograd, Juni 1969, S. 9.

²⁸ Siehe: Statistik der persönlichen Einkommen, Sonderveröffentlichung Nr. 5 für September 1967. Institut für Statistik der jugoslaw. Teilrepublik Serbien, Beograd, November 1967, S. 3. Da es sich um Durchschnitte handelt, ist die Bevölkerungsschichtung indikativ: »Für die Distribution der Arbeitsorganisationen und des beschäftigten Personals nach der Höhe des persönlichen Durchschnittseinkommens der Arbeitsorganisationen ist im Grunde charakteristisch, daß der größte Teil der Arbeitsorganisationen (37%), in denen auch die Grundmasse der Beschäftigten arbeitet (43%), ein persönliches Durchschnittseinkommen zwischen 500 und 700 nD hat ... 22% AO mit 19% der Beschäftigten hatten ein persönliches DEI unter 500 nD ... auf 3% der insgesamt in den Arbeitsorganisationen Beschäftigten mit einem persönlichen Durchschnittseinkommen von über 1.200 nD entfällt etwas über 6% der Gesamtmasse der ausgezählten persönlichen Einkommen in Industrie und Bergbau bzw. das persönliche Einkommen der in Werkseinheiten Beschäftigten mit einem Durchschnitt über 1.400 nD (nur 1% der Gesamtbeschäftigungszahl) macht fast 3% der Gesamtmasse der persönlichen Einkommen aus. S. 3 u. 4.

²⁹ Ebenda, S. 3.

³⁰ Veränderungen und Entwicklung einiger Elemente des Lebensstandards... S. 46.

A consideration of the ranges of personal incomes alone within the framework of the individually taken work units leads to the conclusion that these ranges are 1:2 to 1:5, and more rarely more.

However, if you go out of this frame into broader space, the spans are several times larger. Thus, in 1967, the spreads in the economy of the Yugoslav republic of Serbia were in a ratio of 1:20, when the maximum average incomes are compared with the lowest personal incomes of the work unit.²³ If there are such ranges within the work unit, one can assume that the differences mentioned are significantly larger, because "one can calculate that the largest income in the work unit is almost three times as much as is as high as an average income in the work unit and that the smallest personal income is about half of the average income".²⁹

As it is well known that the average personal income outside of the economy, where there are usually no strikes, is higher than inside the economy, one should primarily focus on the development of the average personal income in the economy. Keep an eye on below average for the Yugoslav economy.

The Yugoslav average income in 1968 was

862 AD. At the same time, 335,200 workers in the textile industry (9% of the total number of employees in the public sector of the economy) received an income significantly below the average - 659 Din. and something about it. However, still well below the general average of 715-794 ND were the personal incomes of 939,300 workers in other economic sectors (representing 27.8% of the total number of workers in the social sector of the W i ndustry employees.)³⁰ Dem-27 Source: C h a n g e s in th e t h o e d e v e l e m e n t o m e n t s o f the sta n o f life

dards von 1964 to 1969, Social Research. Gewerkschaftsbundes Jugoslaws (VSSJ), Belgrade, June 1969, p.9.

28 S iehe: Statistics of personal lichen E income. Sonderveroffentlichung Nr. 5

für S e p te m b e r 1967. I n s titu t für S ta tis tik d e r ju g o s la w . T e ilre p u b lik S e rb ien , B eo g r a d , N o v e m b e r 1967, S. 3. D a es sich u m D u rc h s c h n itte h a n d e lt, ist d ie B evolker u n g ssc h ic h tu n g in d ik a tiv : »F iir d ie D is trib u tio n d e r A rb e its o rg a n is a tio n e n u n d des b e sc h a ftig te n P e rso n a ls n a c h d e r H o h e des p e rs o n lic h e n D u rc h s c h n itsse in k o m m e n s de r A rb e its o rg a n is a tio n e n ist im G ru n d e c h a ra k te ris tis c h , dafü d e r g ro fite T e il d e r A rb e its o r g a n is a tio n e n (3 7 %), in d e n e n au c

h d ie G ru n d m a s s e d e r B e sc h a ftig te n a r -

b e itet (4 3 %), a person licks Durch schnitse in commens e between 500 and 700 n D

h a t . . . 2 2 % . A O m it 19% d e r B e sc h a ftig te n h a tte n e in p e rso n lic h e s D E I u n t e r 500

n D . . . a u f 3 % d e r in sg e sa m t in d e n A rb e its o rg a n is a tio n e n B e sc h a ftig te n m it ein e m p e rso n lic h e n D u rc h sc h n ittse in k o m m e n v o n iib er 1.200 n D e n tf a llt e tw a s iib er 6 %

d e r G e sa m tm a sse d e r a u sg e z a h lte n p e rso n lic h e n E in k o m m e n in In d u s trie u n d B erg -

b a u b z w . d a s p e r s o n l i c h E in com m e n d e r i n W e rk s e i n h e i t n B e s h a ftig te n m it e inem Durchschnittüber 1.400 n D (only 1 % of the Gesam the s ch a ftig te n z a h l) m a c h t fast 3 % of the Gesam tmasse of the person lichen E income. S. 3 u. 4.

22 E b e n d a , S. 3.

30 V e r a n d e r u n g e n u n d Entwic k lung e in i g e r Elements of Lebens standards.

S. 46.

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nach erhielt bedeutend mehr als ein Drittel der Gesamtbeschäftigteanzahl auf dem gesellschaftlichen Sektor der Wirtschaft, persönliche Einkommen, deren Durchschnitt unter dem allgemeinen Durchschnitt liegt. Wenn man hierzu noch das Verhältnis von 1:2, 3, 4, 5, hinzurechnet, so erhält man erst dann ein etwas realeres Bild der tatsächlichen Unterschiede.

Manipulationen mit Spannen und Durchschnitten vernebeln jedoch die realen Verhältnisse zwischen Reichen und Armen, die entgegengesetzte Pole im materiellen Standard der Bürger darstellen. Die Gruppe der armen Arbeiter ist jedoch nicht klein und keinesfalls zu vernachlässigen.

Und zwar nicht allein vom moralischen Standpunkt her, sondern vor allem vom wirtschaftlichen: es handelt sich ganz einfach um eine Gefährdung der erweiterten Reproduktion der Arbeitskräfte, was bedeutende Folgen für die Wirksamkeit des Produktionsprozesses hat. Die Zahl der armen Arbeiter ist im Ansteigen begriffen, wie die nachfolgenden Angaben beweisen. 89.567 Arbeiter in 500 Werkseinheiten erhielten 1968 minimale persönliche Einkommen. Allein im ersten Drittel des Jahres 1969 waren es – 65.475 Arbeiter in 336 Werkseinheiten.³¹ Über die realen Spannen im materiellen Standard geben bereit die Angaben einer Umfrage über den persönlichen Verbrauch der Einwohnerschaft im Jahre 1968 Auskunft: 16,5% von vierköpfigen Landhaushalten realisierten Einkommen von 499 Din oder 120 pro Familienmitglied, 38,8% der Landhaushalte realisierte 799 Din und 11,9% der Haushalte über 2.000 nD.³²

In der gleichen Zeit steigen unerwartet schnell die Lebenshaltungskosten (hier soll nicht die Gesamtproblematisches Standards behandelt werden, nur das unerwartete Tempo), so daß man annehmen kann, daß, besonders bei einigen Arbeitergruppen, die Situation noch schwieriger ist. Mit der Reform wurde nämlich ein Anstieg der Lebenshaltungskosten von 28% vorgesehen, ohne eine Frist für diesen Anstieg festzulegen. Dieser Anstieg war jedoch bis Ende des Jahres 1965 bereits erreicht (21,5%). Im Jahre 1968 sind die Lebenshaltungskosten auf 51% angestiegen, was fast das Doppelte des mit der Reform geplanten Anstiegs ausmacht.

Im Jahre 1969 stiegen die Lebenshaltungskosten weiter. In sechs Monaten des Jahres 1969 sind sie im Vergleich zu 1968 um 9% angestiegen.³³ Nach Analysen der Gewerkschaften sind die realen persönlichen Einkommen im Jahre 1968 gegenüber 1964 um 28% angestiegen.³⁴ Nach Analysen der Gewerkschaften sind die realen (per 1968) jedoch um 2%.³⁵ Auch Perzeptionen der Arbeiter über die Entwicklung der Unterschiede zwischen Reichen und Armen sprechen zugunsten der Behauptung, daß diese Erscheinung sehr auf ihre Stimmung einwirkt. Bei einer von mir Ende des Jahres 1967 durchgeführten Untersuchung sind die Befragten (845 Arbeiter aus allen

³¹ Ebenda, S. 48.

³² Ebenda, S. 52.

³³ Ebenda, S. 51.

³⁴a Unterschiede bei der Realisierung der persönlichen Einkommen und ihre Implikationen auf Unterschiede der Pensionsgrundlagen, VSSJ, Beograd, Oktober 1969, S. 7.

actual differences.

However, manipulations of ranges and averages obscure the real relationships between rich and poor, who represent opposite poles in citizens' material standards. However, the group of poor workers is not small and by no means negligible.

And not only from the moral point of view, but above all from the economic point of view: it is simply a question of endangering the expanded reproduction of labor power, which has important consequences for the efficiency of the production process.

The number of poor workers is increasing, as the following data show. 89,567 workers in 500 factory units received minimum personal income in 1968. In the first third of 1969 alone there were - 65,475 workers in 336 work units.³¹ The data from a survey on the personal consumption of the population in 1968 give eloquent information about the real margins in the material standard: 16.5% of four-person workers Rural houses have realized incomes of 499 Din or 120

per family member, 38.8% of rural households realized 799 Din and 11.9% of households over 2,000 nD.³²

At the same time, the cost of living is rising at an unexpectedly rapid rate (we do not intend to address the whole issue of the standard here, only the unexpected pace), so it can be assumed that the situation, particularly for some groups of workers, is even more difficult. In fact, the reform provided for a 28% increase in the cost of living, without setting a deadline for this increase. However, this increase had already been achieved by the end of 1965 (21.5%). In 1968, the cost of living rose by 51%, almost double the increase projected with the reform.

In 1969, the cost of living continued to rise. In six months of 1969 they increased by 9% compared to 1968.³³ According to analyzes by the trade unions, real personal incomes in 1968 increased by 28% compared to 1964.³³ According to analyzes by the trade unions, real per-to 1968) however, by 2%.^{33a} Workers' perceptions of the development of the differences between rich and poor also speak in favor of the claim that this phenomenon has a strong influence on their mood. In a study I conducted at the end of 1967, the interviewees (845 workers from all 31 Ibenda, p. 48.

³³ E things, S. 52.

³³ E things, S. 51.

T

331 Differences in the realization of personal income and their temporal likelihood among different pension foundations, VSSJ, Belgrade, October 1969, p.7.

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Wirtschaftszweigen Serbiens) der Meinung, daß diese Unterschiede nicht durch Arbeit gerechtfertigt seien, noch für die Entwicklung der gesellschaftlichen Beziehungen fördernd.³⁴

Bei der Zuteilung von Wohnungen bestehen zwischen den Arbeitern und anderen Gesellschaftsgruppen wesentliche Unterschiede. Arbeiter kommen verhältnismäßig seltener zu Wohnungen, was häufig bei verschiedenen Anlässen festgestellt wurde, worüber jedoch leider keine systematisierten Angaben vorliegen. Daher werden wir uns auf zwei Angaben beschränken; die erste bezieht sich auf die Mittel für den Wohnungsbau, die zweite auf die sozialen Implikationen der Städteplanungs- und Wohnungspolitik.

Der Anteil der einzelnen Träger und Quellen der gesellschaftlichen Mittel für den Wohnungsbau war, in Prozenten ausgedrückt, im Jahre 1965 für die Sozialistische Föderative Republik Jugoslawien wie folgt:³⁵

Wirtschaftsorganisationen	18,6
Sonstige Werkseinheiten	6,2
Banken	2,1
Gesellschaftspolitische Gemeinschaften	72,8
Bürger	0,3

Ein weiteres Beispiel impliziert die legalisierte gesellschaftliche Ungleichheit in der urbanistischen Politik. So zeigt z. B. die Entwicklung der Städte am Muster von Sarajevo im Jahre 1967, daß hinsichtlich der Wohnfläche wesentliche Unterschiede bestehen – die einen haben 2,5 qm, andere 35 qm pro Person zur Verfügung (der Durchschnitt beträgt 8 qm). Die Untersuchung kommt auch weiterhin zu folgender Feststellung: Der Prozeß der gesellschaftlichen Differenzierung spiegelt sich legal auf dem Gebiet des Städtebaus wider und führt zu Segregationerscheinungen. Von fünf neuen Wohnsiedlungen (in Sarajevo) sind drei segregationistischen Typs, eine ist vollkommen eine Siedlung der »Elite« und eine ist ein Armenghetto.³⁶

Wir haben hier nur einen Teil der verfügbaren Angaben für eine kurze Zeitspanne angeführt. Eine Evolution der materiellen Unterschiede kann wesentlicher Gegenstand umfassenderer Untersuchungen sein. Hiermit in Verbindung möchten wir nur die Aufmerksamkeit auf die Notwendigkeit von Untersuchungen dieser Art über eine längere Zeitspanne hinweg lenken, denn die vorhandenen materiellen Unterschiede sind weder heute noch gestern entstanden, noch fallen sie mit den ersten Versuchen oder auch der heutigen Phase der Selbstverwaltung zusammen. Sie sind früheren Datums, nicht allein, weil sie ihre Wurzeln in der vorrevolutionären Gesellschaft haben, sondern weil sie in unmittelbarer Korrelation mit einem entsprechenden Typus

³⁴ Siehe N. Popov, Arbeiter und Prinzip der sozialen Ungleichheit, *Polet*, Zagreb, 1969, Dreierausgabe 25, 26, 27.

³⁵ Material für Vorkongressdiskussion, SSJ (jug. Gewerkschaft), Beograd, Februar 1968, Heft 4, S. 21.

³⁶ M. Živković, Ein Beispiel der Segregation bei der Entwicklung unserer Städte. *Sociologija*, Beograd, 1968, Nr. 3, S. 54.

Substantial differences exist between workers and other groups in society in the allocation of housing. Workers come to flats comparatively less frequently, which was often found on various occasions, but unfortunately no systematic data are available on this. Therefore, we will limit ourselves to two statements; the first relates to the funds for housing, the second to the social implications of city planning and housing policies.

*The share of individual sponsors and sources of social funds for housing construction, expressed in percentage, was as follows in 1965 for the Socialist F orative R epublic of Yugoslavia:*35

economic organizations

18,6

Other factory units

6,2

Banks

2,1

Socio-political communities

72,8

Burger

0,3

*Another example implies legalized social inequality in urban politics. So e.g. B. the development of cities based on the example of Sarajevo in 1967, that there are significant differences in terms of living space - some have 2.5 square meters, others 35 square meters per person (the D average amount 8 qm). The study also comes to the following conclusion: The process of social differentiation is reflected legally in the area of urban development and leads to segregation phenomena. Of five new housing estates (in Sarajevo), three are of a segregationist type, one is entirely an "elite" estate and one is a poor ghetto.*36

We have presented here only part of the available information for a short period of time. An evolution of the material differences can be a major subject of more comprehensive investigations. In connection with this, we wish only to draw attention to the need for investigations of this kind over a longer period of time, because the existing material differences have not

arisen neither today nor yesterday, nor Do they coincide with the first attempts or also with the current phase of self-government. They are of earlier date, not only because they have their roots in pre-revolutionary society, but because they are in direct correlation with a corresponding type. P o p o v , W o rk e r a n d prin c ip o f s o c ial inequality, P o let, Z a greb , 1969, three editions 25, 26, 27.

33 M a te ria l fiir V o rk o n g re ssd isk u ssio n , S S J (ju g . G e w e rk sc h a ft), B e o g r a d , F e b ru a r 1968, H e ft 4, S. 21.

*c, ***

2 iv k o v ić , E in B eisp iel d e r S e g r e g a tio n b ei d e r E n tw ic k lu ng u n s e re r S ta d te .

S o c io lo gija , B e o g r a d , 1968, N r . 3, S. 54.

einer politischen Organisation stehen (Berufsrevolutionäre), nach dem Beispiel die gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse während und nach dem Volksbefreiungskrieg geformt wurden.³⁷

Prokopfeinkommen, persönliches Einkommen und Wohnraum sind jedoch nur ein Teil der Indikatoren für die realen Unterschiede im materiellen Standard. Hier können weitere hinzugefügt werden, die lediglich Erwähnung finden sollen: Anstieg der Arbeitslosigkeit (vor allem der Arbeiter), Unterschiede bei anderen Geldzuwendungen (Urlaubsgeld, u. ä.), ferner die Abschaffung der Fahrgeldermäßigung, Zahlung von Gesundheitsleistungen u. ä., wodurch das Bild der tatsächlichen sozialen Unterschiede abgerundet wird.

All dies verweist auf die Feststellung, daß in der Gesellschaft hinsichtlich der materiellen Lage, die sich vor allem in der Reproduktion (und Erweiterung) der Gruppierung widerspiegelt, die im Armut oder am Rand der Armut lebt, während am anderen Pol der Gesellschaftsstruktur eine Gruppierung besteht (und wächst), die im allgemeinen oder überhaupt nicht in ihrer materiellen Existenz bedroht ist – bedeutende Differenzierungen vorhanden sind. In der ersten Gruppierung befinden sich überwiegend Arbeiter (nicht allein geringer Qualifikation) und nicht nur Arbeitslose und Arbeitsscheue. Daher behauptet M. Vojnović sehr zu Recht, daß »ein breiterer Begriff der Armut akzeptiert werden muß, der die Armut mit den Produzenten in Verbindung bringt, der die Grundlage der Pauperisierung gerade im Produktionsprozeß und weiter im politischen Prozeß findet.³⁸ Eine solche Lage des Arbeiters muß, wenn er keine klare Perspektive für Veränderungen der Augenblickssituation sieht, natürlich in einen bestimmten gesellschaftlichen Verhalten resultieren. Zum anderen haben die gesellschaftlichen Unterschiede und die auf ihnen beruhenden Konflikte wesentlichen Einfluß auf die Möglichkeit ihrer legalen (mittels der offiziellen Behördenstruktur) positiven Lösung.

2. DIE ARBEITER AM RANDE DER OFFIZIELLEN BEHÖRDENSTRUKTUR

Wie wir bereits im ersten Teil der Arbeit gesehen haben, zeigen sich die Streiks außerhalb der institutionellen Ordnung, wo sich auch ihre unmittelbare Wirkung erschöpft. Es gelingt ihnen nicht, durch

³⁷ Siehe hierzu ausführliche Ausführungen M. Caldarović in einer Diskussion über die Theorie der Partei, *Pregled*, Sarajevo, 1964, Nr. 6, S. 626. Dieser Autor weist in einer anderen Arbeit auf das gleiche Phänomen hin: »Im Gegensatz zu dem Einfluß der revolutionären Veränderungen wirkte das fest gefügte und detailliert ausgearbeitete System den wirtschaftlichen und politischen Privilegien, sowie auch das ideologische Monopol der Führungsschicht, der revolutionären Elite, negativ. Die Verschlossenheit, Illegalität und die Bemächtigung von Sonderzuteilungen in einer Zeit des allgemeinen Mangels, häufiger Mißbrauch und viele gesetzwidrige Vorgehen bei der Sicherung von Privilegien, führten zur Festigung einer oligarchischen Hierarchie und zur Mystifizierung der Autorität...« (Gesellschaftliche Prozesse und gesellschaftliche Werte, Institut für gesellschaftliche Forschungen, Universität Zagreb, 1968, S. 18).

³⁸ M. Vojnović, Diskussion bei den Kongressgesprächen, III Psychologenkongreß Jugoslawiens, Beograd, 1969, S. 62. Auf dem Kongreß wurde eine umfassende Diskussion über die Armut geführt, siehe: gleiche Publikation, S. 46-83. Zum gleichen Thema wurde auch häufiger in der Zeitschrift *Susret* geschrieben. Siehe Nr. 78 und 79, vom 20. III. und 3. IV. 1968.

Per capita income, personal income and housing are

however, only part of the indicators of real differences in material standards. Here others can be added, which should only be mentioned: rise in unemployment (especially among workers), differences in other cash benefits (holiday pay, etc.), also the abolition of reduced fares, payment of health benefits, etc., which paints the picture of the actual social differences is rounded off.

All this points to the observation that in society, in terms of the material situation, which is reflected above all in the reproduction (and expansion) of the group living in poverty or on the brink of poverty, while at the other pole of the social structure a grouping exists (and grows) which is generally or not at all threatened in its material existence - significant differentiations are present. In the first group there are predominantly workers (not only those with low qualifications) and not only unemployed and work-shy. Therefore, M. Vojnović rightly asserts that »a broader concept of poverty must be accepted, which connects poverty with the producers, which finds the basis of pauperization precisely in the production process and further in the political process.³⁸ Such a situation of the Arbeiters, if he does not see a clear perspective for changes in the momentary situation, must of course result in a certain social behavior. On the other hand, the social differences and the conflicts based on them have a significant influence on the possibility of their legal (by means of the official administrative structure) positive solution.

2. THE ARBITRATION OF PHYSICAL RANDS BEHIND THE STRUCTURE

As we have already seen in the first part of the work, the strikes appear outside the institutional order, where their immediate effect is exhausted. See M. Čaldarović' detailed remarks on this in a discussion about the theory of the party, Pravogled, Sarajevo, 1964, no. 6, p. 626. In another work, this author points out the same phenomenon: »In contrast to the influence of the revolutionaries in the ruling class, the revolutionary elite, had a negative effect. The seclusion, illegality, and merging of special grants in an epoch of general scarcity, frequent abuse, and many illegal activities in the safeguarding of Privilegia, led to the consolidation of an oligarchy and to the mystification of authority... « (Social Processes and Societal Values, Institute for Societal Research, Um-

viersitaža, 1968, S. 18).

38 M. Vojnović, Discussion at the Congresal Languages, I II Psychologists' Congress

Yu goslav iens, Beograd, 1969, p. 62. A comprehensive discussion on poverty was held at the congress, see: same publication, p. 46-83. The same topic was also written more frequently in the journal Susret. See no. 78 and 79, dated 20. II. and 3. IV. 1968.

die politische Hülle hindurchzudringen, innerhalb derer sich die Konfliktsituationen reproduzieren.³⁹ Wenn diese Hülle so festgefügt ist, so fragt man sich natürlich, wie hoch der Anteil der Bevölkerung, der sich für den Streik entscheidet, bei der Distribution der politischen Macht ist. Vor allem ist es die Frage, inwieweit die Arbeiter in den Institutionen vertreten sind, die Grundträger der tatsächlichen politischen Gewalt sind – in den Vertretungsorganen und gesellschaftlich-politischen Organisationen – und wie stark ihr politischer Einfluß in den Werkseinheiten selbst ist.

Unter den arbeitenden aktiven Bevölkerung, nach Angaben des Jahres 1953 (7,390.000) und im Jahre 1961 (7,960.000) ist der Anteil der Bauern von 67,8 auf 55,4% zurückgegangen. Die Zahl der ansonsten in der Wirtschaft Beschäftigten (unter ihnen Bergarbeiter, Industriearbeiter und Handwerker) ist von 26,2% auf 36,3% angestiegen. Die Zahl der außerhalb der Wirtschaft Beschäftigten ist von 3,1 auf 5,1% angestiegen, die Zahl der Angehörigen von Staatsorganen von 3,0% auf 3,1%.⁴⁰ Da uns Bergarbeiter, Industriearbeiter und Handwerker als Hauptteilnehmer der Erscheinung, die wir untersuchen, am meisten interessieren, so soll man im Auge behalten, daß auf diese Gruppe im Jahre 1969 42,6% der beschäftigten Bevölkerung Jugoslawiens entfällt.⁴¹

a) *Vertretungskörperschaften*

Die Statistik gibt erst seit kurzem solidere Angaben über das soziale Gefüge der Vertretungskörperschaften, der Versammlungen. Daher werden wir nur Angaben über die letzten sechs Jahre machen.

ANTEIL DER BERGARBEITER, INDUSTRIEARBEITER
UND HANDWERKER IM SOZIALGEFÜGE DER VERSAMMLUNGEN
(IN %)*⁴²

Versammlung (Parlament)	Mittlerer Wert	Wahljahr			
		1963	1965	1967	1969
Bundesversammlung	3,0	5,5 (670)	3,9 (670)	1,9 (670)	0,8 (610)
Republiks- und Provinzversammlungen	4,8	7,0 (2887)	4,6 (2621)	2,8 (2880)	keine Angaben
Kreisversammlungen	13,1	13,8 (4486)	13,0 (2734)		abgeschafft
Gemeindeversammlungen	14,9	14,6 (42994)	15,4 (41445)	14,6 (40279)	keine Angaben

³⁹ Siehe hierüber auch: S. Švar, Weit von der Macht, *UUS*, 25. XII. 1968, Weit von der Polemik, *UUS*, 5. II. 1969, Elite, Masse und Macht, *Omladinski Tjednik* (Wochenzeitung der Jugend) Zagreb, 29. XI. 1969, Nr. 70-71.

⁴⁰ Siehe: B. Horvat, Der Versuch über die jugoslawische Gesellschaft, *Mladost*, Zagreb, 1969, S. 225.

⁴¹ *Jugoslovenski pregled*, Beograd, 1969, Nr. 7-8.

⁴² Quellen: Statistisches Bulletin, Beograd, Januar 1964, Nr. 206; SB. November 1965, Nr. 372, Oktober 1968, Nr. 491; *Jugoslovenski pregled*, Juli-August, Nr. 78. Diese Tendenzen wickelten sich nach den gleichen Angaben so ab. Bei der Wahl

represented in the institutions that are the main bearers of actual political power - in the representative bodies and socio-political organizations - and to what extent their political power Influence is in the factory units themselves.

Among the working active population, according to the data of 1953 (7,390,000) and in 1961 (7,960,000) the share of peasants decreased from 67.8 to 55.4%. The number of people otherwise employed in the economy (including miners, industrial workers and craftsmen) rose from 26.2% to 36.3%.

The number of people employed outside the economy has risen from 3.1 to 5.1%, the number of members of state bodies from 3.0% to 3.1%.⁴⁰ Da us Miners, industrial workers and craftsmen as the main participants in the phenomenon we are investigating are of most interest, so we must keep in mind that this group in 1969 42, 6% of the employed population of Yugoslavia is eliminated.⁴¹

a) Representative bodies

It is only recently that statistics have provided more reliable information about the social fabric of representative bodies and assemblies. We will therefore only provide information on the last six years.

A N T E I L D E R B E R G A R B E I T E R , I N D U S T R I E A R B E I T E R

**U N D H A N D W E R K E R I M S O Z I A L G E F O G E D E R V E R S
A M M L U N G E N**

(IN • /•) «

V e r s a m m l u n g

M i t t l e r e r

W a h l j a h r

(P a r l a m e n t)

W e r t

1963

1965

1967

1969

B u n d e s v e r s a m m l u n g

3,0

5,5

3,9

1.9

0,8

(670)

(670)

(670)

(610)

R e p u b l i c - u n d

4,8

7,0

4,6

2,8

k e i n e

P r o v i n z v e r s a m m l u n g e n

(2887)

(2621)

(2880)

A n g a b e n

C r e a s s m l u n g e n

13,1

13,3

13,0

a b g e s c h a f f t

(4486)

(2734)

G e m e i n d e v e r s a m m l u n g e n

14,9

14,6

15,4

14,6

k e i n e

(42994)

(41445)

(40279)

A n g a b e n

39 S ieh e h ie ru b e r a u ch : S. S u v a r , W e it v o n d e r M a c h t , V U S , 25. X I I . 1968 , W e it v o n d e r P o lem ik , V U S . 5. I I . 1969 , E lite , M asse u n d M a c h t , O m la d in s k i Tje d n i k (W o c h e n z e itu n g d e r Ju g e n d) Z a g re b , 29. X I . 1969 , N r. 7 0-71.

40 S iehe: B. H o rv a t , D e r V e rsu c h u b e r d ie ju g o s la w is c h e G e s e llsc h a ft , M la d o st , Z a g re b , 1969 , S. 225.

41 Jugoslovensky Pregled , Belgrade , 1969 , Nr. 7 -8

43 Quellen: Statistics Bulletin , Belgrade , January 1964 , Nr. 206; SB. November 1965 , Nr. 372, October 1968 , Nr. 491; Jugo Slovenski Pregled , July-August , Nr. 78.

D ie se T e n d e n z e n w ic k e lte n sich n a c h d e n g leic h e n A n g a b e n so ab . B ei d e r W a h l 420

Der Anteil der Arbeiter im sozialen Gefüge der Versammlungen zeigt nach den ausgeführten Angaben zwei Grundtendenzen: zunächst ist die Zahl der Arbeiter von der Gemeinde zum Bund rückläufig. Unter Berücksichtigung der bedeutenden Unterschiede in der materiellen Basis der verschiedenen Machtstufen (wesentlich unterschiedlicher Anteil bei der Verteilung des Arbeitsüberschusses) und demnach auch der Unterschiede in der tatsächlichen politischen Gewalt, bedeutet dies, daß mit dem Wachsen der politischen Macht der Vertretungsgremien, der Anteil der vertretenen Arbeiter in ihnen rückläufig ist.⁴³ Zum zweiten, bei den Wahlen, für die wir Angaben vorliegen haben, sinkt die ansonsten schon geringe Zahl der Arbeiter in den Versammlungen über den Gemeindeversammlungen (in denen sie im Grunde auf dem gleichen Niveau stagniert) kontinuierlich.

b) *Werkseinheiten*

Zur Festlegung der Distribution der politischen Macht im Rahmen der Werkseinheiten ist auch die Natur ihrer Beziehungen mit breitem Sozialkontext, vor allem jedoch mit den höheren Machtorganen, von Bedeutung. Ich möchte im Zusammenhang hiermit an die allgemein bekannte Tatsache erinnern, daß der überwiegende Teil des Arbeitsüberschusses außerhalb der Werkseinheiten konzentriert und auch außerhalb in andere Fonds abgezweigt wird. Das zeigt wie wenig die Wirtschaft von der Machtssphäre emanzipiert ist, daß sie sich noch immer nicht aus der staatlichen Schutzzsphäre befreit hat (die industrielle Struktur erwuchs aus der politisch-administrativen und ist tief mit ihr verbunden).⁴⁴

Außerdem besteht auch ein sehr tiefer personeller Zusammenhang. Der reguläre Kanal nämlich, durch den man zu den Führungsfunktionen gelangt (insbesonders Direktorposten) verbindet die Wirtschaft mit dem Staat. Das ist einer der Gründe für ihren verstärkten Einfluß in den Werkseinheiten selbst »weil sie im größten Maße über politisch-administrative Informationen verfügen, sowie über Kenntnisse, die für die Kommunikation der Werkseinheit mit ihrer Umgebung von größter Bedeutung sind.«⁴⁵

Um diese Achse, die eine vertikale Linie der Formierung informell strukturierter Machtträger ist, entstehen verschiedene Varianten personeller Zusammensetzung der Gruppen und sie legen die informel-

im Jahre 1963, 1965, 1967 und 1969 betrug die Zahl der Arbeiter im Bundesrat 2,1; 1,1; 0,5. Im Jahre 1969, als der Nationalitätenrat gegründet wurde, sind in ihm 0,2 Arbeiter vertreten und in dem gleichfalls neu formierten gesellschaftlich-politischen Rat findet sich kein einziger Arbeiter. Ferner im Wirtschaftsrat 18,3; 14,2; 5,8; 0,6, im Bildungsrat waren weder vorher Arbeiter vertreten, noch sind sie es jetzt. Im Sozial- und Gesundheitsrat waren es im ersten Jahr 0,8, späterhin verschwanden sie. Im Organisations-politischen Rat – solange er bestand – waren es 8,3; 5,8; 4,2. Nach Republiken und Wahljahren sah der Prozentsatz der Teilnahme der Arbeiter folgendermaßen aus: Bosnien/Herzegowina (5,7; 4,5; 2,3), Montenegro (3,6; 1,2; 0,8), Kroatien (4,1; 4,1; 3,2), Mazedonien (10,3; 4,4; 3,3), Slowenien (12,8; 6,8; 1,7), Serbien (7,7; 5,2; 4,0), Kosovo (4,4 für das Jahr 1965, Angaben fehlen und 3,7).

⁴³ Über die Wirtschaftsentwicklung und die Distribution des Arbeitsüberschusses siehe: »Summarische Analyse der Wirtschaftsentwicklungen und Vorschläge für die Wirtschaftspolitik« Ausgabe Jug. Institut für Wirtschaftsforschungen, Beograd, 1968.

Taking into account the significant differences in the material basis of the various levels of power (significantly different share in the distribution of the labor surplus) and consequently also the differences in the actual political power, this means that with the growing political power of the representative bodies, the proportion of workers represented in them is declining. 43 Second, in the elections for which we have data, the otherwise small number of workers in assemblies above municipal assemblies (where it basically stagnates at the same level) continually.

b) work units

Also of importance in determining the distribution of political power within the framework of the work units is the nature of their relationships with the broader social context, but above all with the higher organs of power. In connection with this I would like to remind you of the well-known fact that the greater part of the labor surplus is concentrated outside the factory units and also diverted outside into other funds. This shows how little the economy is emancipated from the sphere of power, that it has still not freed itself from the state's protective sphere (the industrial structure grew out of the political-administrative structure and is deeply connected with it). 44

There is also a very deep personal connection.

Namely, the regular channel through which one reaches managerial positions (particularly director posts) connects the economy with the state. This is one of the reasons for their increased influence in the work units themselves "because they have a large amount of political-administrative information, as well as knowledge that is of great importance for the communication of the work unit with its environment." 45

Around this axis, which is a vertical line of the formation of informally structured power-bearers, different variants of the personal composition of the groups arise and they place the informal-in the years 1963, 1965, 1967 and 1969 the number of jobs iter in the Federal Council 2.1; 1.1; 0.5 In 1969, when the National Assembly Council was founded, 0.2 workers are represented in it and there is a new social and political council not a single worker. Also in the Economic Council 18:3; 14.2; 5.8; 0.6, never represent workers in the economic council, nor are they now. In the social and health council it was 0.8 in the first year, later they disappeared. In the Organization of political Council - as long as it existed - it was 8.3; 5.8; 4.2. After republics and election years, the percentage of participation of workers was as follows: Bosnia/Herzegovina (5.7; 4.5; 2.3), Montenegro (3.6; 1.2; 0.8), Croatia (4.1; 4.1; 3.2), Macedonia (10.3; 4.4; 3.3), Slovenia (12.8; 6.8; 1.7), Serbia (7.7; 5.2; 4.0), Kosovo (4.4 for the year 1965, no data and 3,7).

43 On the economic development and the distribution of the labor surplus, see: »Summary analysis of current economic developments and propositions for the economic detention politics« Issue Jug. Institute for Economic Research, Belograd, 1968.

len Transmissionsmechanismen politischen Einflusses fest. Derartige Transmissionen stärken den Einfluß der formellen Führungsguppen noch mehr, was darüber hinaus die Möglichkeiten demokratischer Initiative im Rahmen der formellen Selbstverwaltungsstruktur einengt, so daß man ohne weiteres sagen kann, daß eine Kluft »zwischen Sozialprozessen und Organisationsstruktur besteht«.⁴⁵ Wenn man weiterhin einzelne Werkseinheiten als isoliertes Ganzes betrachtet, dann stellt man, trotz bedeutender Präsenz der Arbeiter in den Organen der Arbeiterselbstverwaltung und in den gesellschaftlich-politischen Organisationen, bei allen Untersuchungen fest, daß ihr politischer Einfluß nicht realisiert ist. Einer der Indikatoren für den realen Stand in dieser Hinsicht ist in der Perzeption von Befragten über die faktische Verteilung des politischen Einflusses enthalten. Die Untersuchungen zeigen hier gewöhnlich, daß die Befragten der Meinung sind, daß den größten Einfluß bei der Fassung von Beschlüssen die Funktionäre haben (und zwar, wie in einer Untersuchung ersichtlich, nicht allein in der »Führungs-« sondern auch in der Vertretungshierarchie) und die Arbeiter den geringsten Einfluß.⁴⁷

Für unser Thema ist besonders die Angabe von Bedeutung, da bei den von den Umfragen der letzten zwei Jahre erfaßten Arbeitern, der Wunsch nach tatsächlicher Teilnahme an der Beschußfassung laut wurde. Früher war nämlich die Stimmung vorhanden, die bestehende autokratische Einflußstruktur mit einer entgegengesetzten demokratischen zu ersetzen, wohingegen sie sich später mit der bestehenden Einflußdistribution abfanden und erklärten sich mit gewissen Korrekturen einverstanden.⁴⁸ Eine solche Stimmung – wenn sie eine stärkere und umfassendere Tendenz darstellt – verweist auf eine mögliche Resignation durch die gemachte Erfahrung von der Undurchdringlichkeit der offiziellen politischen Struktur, was unter bestimmten Bedingungen nicht nur zu einer Ausweitung der Streiks führen könnte, sondern auch zu stärkeren gesellschaftlichen Erschütterungen, die die Ruheperiode und das Einverständnis zur Unterwerfung unterbrechen könnten.

c) *Der Bund der Kommunisten*

Auch die Angaben über das Sozialgefüge des Bundes der Kommunisten sind nicht solider verfolgt worden.

⁴⁴ J. Županov, *Selbstverwaltung und gesellschaftliche Macht*, Ausgabe *Nase teme*, Zagreb, 1969, S. 107.

⁴⁵ Ebenda, S. 107.

⁴⁶ V. Rus, *Sozialprozesse und Machtstruktur in der Werkseinheit*, *Sociologija*, Beograd, 1966, Nr. 4, S. 111.

⁴⁷ Die Untersuchungen J. Županovs zeigen, daß die Funktionäre die einflußreichste Gruppe in beiden Hierarchien sind: in der ersten (der Vertretungshierarchie) folgen hinter ihnen die Funktionäre der Wirtschaftseinheiten, danach die direkten Funktionäre und Arbeiter. In der zweiten Hierarchie (der Führungs-
hierarchie) rangiert hinter dieser Gruppe der Arbeiterrat und der Verwaltungsausschuß. Angef. Werk, S. 173.

⁴⁸ Siehe umfassender: J. Jerovšek, *Mißverständnisse über die Modelle der Selbstverwaltung in den Werkseinheiten*, *Teorija in Praksa*, Ljubljana, 1969, Nr. 3, S. 432 u. ff.

is a gap »between social processes and organizational structure«.⁴⁵ If one continues to look at individual work units as an isolated whole, then one places, despite the significant presence of workers in the organs of worker self-government and in the social -political organizations, determined in all investigations that their political influence has not been realised. One of the indicators of the real state of affairs in this regard is contained in respondents' perceptions of the actual distribution of political influence. The studies here usually show that the respondents are of the opinion that the greatest influence in the making of decisions has the functionaries (and, as shown in one study, not only in the "Management" but also in the representation hierarchy) and the workers have the least influence.⁴⁷

The information is particularly important for our topic, since the workers surveyed in the last two years expressed a wish for actual participation in the decision-making process. In the past, there was a mood to replace the existing autocratic influence structure with one opposite to the ocratic, whereas later they came to terms with the existing influence distribution and agreed to certain corrections.⁴⁸ Such a mood - if it represents a stronger and more comprehensive tendency - points to a possible resignation through the experience of the und through d rin g -

official political structure, which under certain conditions could lead not only to a widening of the strikes, but also to greater social shocks that could interrupt the period of calm and the consent to submission.

c)

The B and the com m unist

The data on the social fabric of the League of Communists have not been followed up more solidly either.

44 J. Županov, Selskiye rukovodstva i funktsii v Macht, Auseinander, Zareb, 1969, S. 107.

45 Ebenda, S. 107.

46 V. Rus, Sozialpolizei und Machtsstrukturen in der Werkssiedlung, Socio logija, Beograd, 1966, Nr. 4, S. 111.

"According to J. Zupanov's research, the Function is ready in flu fi-reichste Group within a Hierarchy : in the center (of the Vertretungshearchie) follows the intermediate functions of the Wirtschafts in height, and then the di-recten F In the second Hierarchy (the Fuhrungshie rarchie) ranks between these Arbitrator Groups and the Verwaltung sau ssch u fi"

A n g e f. W e r k , S. 173.

49 Sieheum fassender: J Jerov šek , Understanding Self-Service Models in Works in Height , Theory in Practice , Ljubljana , 1969, N r. 3, S.

432 u. ff.

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Über die Beziehungen innerhalb des Bundes der Kommunisten wurde erst angesichts der letzten Kongresse etwas mehr geschrieben. Bereits bei der Einführung der Selbstverwaltung, bzw. beim VI. Kongreß, kommen widersprüchliche Tendenzen in ihm stärker zum Ausdruck. Zwei sind davon am bedeutendsten: Eine ist auf eine Realisierung einer Konzeption einer parteilosen Selbstverwaltungsdemokratie ausgerichtet, die andere strebt zu einer Fortführung der klassischen politischen Beziehungen (Monopolisierung der Gesamtmacht in den Spitzen der Parteihierarchie). Danach zu urteilen, daß sich die allgemein akzeptierten Voraussetzungen der Finalisierung der demokratischen Ausrichtung der politischen Avantgarde der Arbeiterklasse nur schwer realisieren lassen, scheint die zweite Tendenz noch immer sehr stark zu sein.

Eine der Schlüsselvoraussetzungen für die Realisierung der ersten Tendenz, ist, wie man das längst erkannt hat und worauf man auch hartnäckig bereits jahrelang besteht, nicht allein im Bund der Kommunisten, sondern auch außerhalb – die steigende Mitwirkung der Arbeiter im Bund der Kommunisten, damit sich die realen Aussichten erhöhen, daß ihr Einfluß nicht nur auf die Aktivität des Bundes der Kommunisten übergreift, sondern auch auf die Politik umfassender gesellschaftlicher Gemeinschaften.

Diese Tendenz realisiert sich jedoch nicht in Richtung einer demokratischen Orientierung, was nachfolgende Angaben beweisen: Von 1946 bis 1966 ist der Prozentsatz der Arbeiter im Bund der Kommunisten unmerklich angestiegen, wohingegen sich in der gleichen Zeit die Zahl der Angestellten bedeutend erhöht hat (ihre Zahl hat sich vervierfacht). Die Bauern sind siebenmal seltener unter den Mitgliedern des Bundes der Kommunisten anzutreffen.⁴⁹ Von der aktiven Bevölkerung finden sich im Jahre 1964 in der Mitgliedschaft des Bundes der Kommunisten 2% Bauern, 19,5% sind Angehörige der sonstigen Wirtschaftszweige (auch Arbeiter mit inbegriffen) und 60,4% sind aus dem Gefüge des Staatsapparates.⁵⁰ Wenn man diese Gruppen weiterhin erklärt, dann ist, der gleichen Quelle nach, der Stand im gleichen Jahr folgender: Im Bund der Kommunisten waren 60% des gesamten Führungskaders vertreten, 50% Intellektuelle, 40% Routine-Angestellte, 25% hochqualifizierte und ungelernte Arbeiter, 2% Bauern. Neueren Angaben zufolge, waren Ende des Jahres 1968 im Bund der Kommunisten 31,1% Arbeiter vertreten, was 13,4% von der Gesamtzahl der beschäftigten Arbeiter ausmacht.⁵¹

d) Gewerkschaftsbund

An Stelle von Durchschnittswerten und Prozenten wollen wir ein Ereignis beschreiben, daß gleichermaßen von der ausgeprägten Notwendigkeit und Bereitschaft der Arbeiter spricht, auf der vertikalen

⁴⁹ Die Zahl der Arbeiter bewegte sich von 27,6% (im Jahre 1946), über 32,2% (1952) bis zu 33,9% (1966), in der gleichen Zeit verringerte sich die Anzahl der Bauern um das Siebenfache (von 50,4% im Jahre 1946 über 42,8% 1952 bis 7,4% im Jahre 1966). Die Zahl der Angestellten vervierfachte sich dagegen von 10,3% über 18,9 zu 39,1%. Siehe B. Horvat, angeführtes Werk, S. 248.

⁵⁰ Ebenda, S. 255.

⁵¹ M. Tripalo, Über die Probleme der weiteren Entwicklung und Aktivität des BdKJ, *Komunist*, Beograd, Nr. 664, 11. XII. 1969.

A little more was written about relations within the League of Communists only in view of the last congresses. Already at the introduction of self-government, or at the VI. Congress, contradictory tendencies are more strongly expressed in it. Two of them are the most important: one is aimed

at realizing a concept of a non-partisan self-governing democracy, the other strives for a continuation of classical political relations (monopoly of overall power at the top of the party hierarchy). Judging from the fact that the generally accepted assumptions of finalizing the democratic orientation of the political vanguard of the working class are difficult to realize, the second tendency still seems to be very strong.

One of the key prerequisites for the realization of the first trend, as has long been recognized and has been insisted on stubbornly for years, not only within the League of Communists but also outside it - is the increasing participation of the workers in the League of Communists, with it the real prospects are increasing that their influence will spread not only to the activity of the League of Communists, but also to the politics of wider social communities.

However, this tendency does not translate into a democratic orientation, as the following data proves: from 1946 to 1966 the percentage of workers in the Union of Communists increased imperceptibly, while at the same time the number of employees increased significantly (their number increased quadrupled). Peasants are seven times less common among the members of the Communist League.⁴⁹ Of the active population in the Communist League in 1964, 2% were peasants. 19.5% are members of the other branches of the economy (including workers) and 60.4%

are from the structure of the state apparatus.⁵⁰ If one further explains these groups, then, according to the same source, the status in the same year is as follows: In the League of Communists 60% of the entire leadership cadre were represented, 50% intellectuals, 40% Routine employees, 25% highly skilled and unskilled workers, 2%

Farmers. According to more recent data, at the end of 1968 the Union of Communists represented 31.1% workers, which is 13.4% of the total number of employed workers.⁵¹

d) union dog

Instead of average values and percentages, we want to describe an event that speaks equally of the pronounced need and willingness of the workers, on the vertical 49 The number of workers moves from 27.6% (in a h re 1946), over ^2 2%

(1952) to 33.9% (1966), in the same period the number of peasants decreased sevenfold (from 50.4% in 1946 to 42.8% in 1952 to 7.4% in 1966. The number of employees, on the other hand, quadrupled from 10.3% to 18.9% to 39.1% See B. H o rv a t, cited W erk, p. 248.

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« M. Tripalo, Oberdie Problems of Other Internships and Activities of the B
dK J, Communist, Belgrade, Nr. 664, 11. XII. 1969.

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Linie der politischen Organisation der Gesellschaft einen Einfluß zu erlangen, sowie von den realen Grenzen bei der Realisierung dieser Bestrebungen.

Die Reden einiger Delegierter auf dem VI Kongreß des Gewerkschaftsbundes Jugoslawiens (im Juni 1968, unmittelbar nach den Studentendemonstrationen) haben die Temperatur ansteigen lassen. Der Beitrag eines Arbeiters der Motorenindustrie in Rakovica, M. Kićović (der nach Beratungen mit den Delegierten der Metallindustrie Skopje, Zagreb, Ljubljana und Beograd auftrat), erhielt die Zustimmung einer großen Zahl der Delegierten, besonders, als er von der Bürokratisierung der Gewerkschaft sprach (»wir brauchen in der Gewerkschaft keine Profis, sie behindern die Aktionen der Arbeiter nur und stumphen die Schärfe unserer Forderungen ab. Der Funktionär denkt häufig nur an seine Stellung und hält sie sich verständlicherweise warm«).⁵² Er sprach ferner davon, daß die Gewerkschaft »als Surrogat der Selbstverwaltung für die Arbeiter nicht notwendig ist«, weil das nur zu einer Amortisierung der Konflikte und zu einer Hinauszögerung ihrer Lösungen führe. Über das Gleiche sprach auch I. Gregurinčić, Drucker aus Zagreb. Indem er die Bürokratie im Rahmen der umfassenden gesellschaftlichen Gemeinschaften behandelte und nicht nur über die Bürokratie in der Fabrik, mit der man, wie er meinte, noch irgendwie fertig werden kann, verwies er auf die Macht der Bürokratie außerhalb der Arbeitsorganisationen (»... Kopfschmerzen machen mir jedoch die Bundes- und Republikserwaltung, die uns den ganzen Arbeitsüberschuß aus der Tasche ziehen«).⁵³ Beide Redner suggerierten auch einige konkrete Maßnahmen, unter andern auch solche, die zur Lösung der grundlegenden Gesellschaftsprobleme führen können. M. Kićović: »Sind nicht einzelne auf unsere Kosten reich geworden? Wenn sie das sind – und sie sind es, dann gehört ihnen dieses Vermögen fortgenommen«. I. Gregurinčić suggeriert die gleiche Haltung: »Es ist mit aller Kraft zu versuchen, ein Gesetz über die Konfiszierung des auf unehrliche Weise oder durch Korruption erworbenen Vermögens zu erbringen und zwar ohne Rücksicht darauf, um wen es sich handelt«.⁵⁴

In einer solchen Atmosphäre sollten die neuen Mitglieder des Zentralkomitees des jugoslawischen sozialistischen Gewerkschaftsbundes gewählt werden. Die beauftragte Kommission schlug eine geschlossene Kandidatenliste vor, was auf den Widerstand einer großen Zahl von Delegierten stieß, die eine Erweiterung der Liste forderten, womit sie jedoch nicht durchdrangen. Der Streit dehnte sich auch auf die Art der Wahl aus: öffentlich oder geheim (das Statut sieht geheime Wahl vor). Die Funktionärschaft schlug öffentliche Wahl vor. Da kam es zu einer Konfusion. Bei der Auszählung der Stimmen zu diesem Vorschlag wurden die Stimmen angeblich nicht genau ausgezählt, schließlich wurde trotzdem geheim gewählt; jedoch für die geschlossene Liste. Ein solcher Ausgang stellte eine Zahl der Delegierten nicht zufrieden, so daß rund 300 Delegierte den Kongreß verließen und

⁵² UUS, Zagreb, 10. VII. 1968.

⁵³ Gregurinčić, Aufgaben der Gewerkschaft nach dem VI Kongreß des jugoslawischen Gewerkschaftsbundes, *Kulturni radnik*, Zagreb, 1968, Nr. 5, S. 44–45.

⁵⁴ UUS, gleiche Nummer und *Kulturni radnik*, gleiche Nummer, S. 50.

line of the political organization of society to gain influence, as well as the real limits in the realization of these aspirations.

The speeches of some delegates at the VI Congress of the Yugoslav Trade

Union Federation (in June 1968, immediately after the student demonstrations) raised the temperature. The contribution of a worker from the motor industry in Rakovica, M. Kićović (who appeared after consultation with the metal industry delegates of Skopje, Zagreb, Lju b ljan a and Beograd) received the approval of a large number of delegates, especially when he spoke of the bureaucratization of the union ("we don't need professionals in the union, they just hamper the actions of the workers and dull the sharpness of our demands The functionary often only thinks about his position and understandably keeps it warm.")⁵² He also spoke of the fact that the trade union 'as a surrogate of self-government for the workers further is not necessary» because that only leads to an amortization of the conflicts and to a delay in their solutions. I. G regurinčić, printer from Z agreb, also spoke about the same thing. Dealing with bureaucracy in the context of broader societal communities, and not just through factory bureaucracy, which he felt can somehow be dealt with, he referred to the Power of bureaucracy outside of the labor organizations ("... but the federal and republican administrations, which pull the whole excess labor out of our pockets, give me a headache").⁵³ Both speakers also suggested some concrete measures s, including those that can lead to the solution of the fundamental problems of society. M. Kićović: »Aren't some people getting rich at our expense? If they are - and they are, then this property belongs to them." I. G regurinčić suggests the same attitude: »It is necessary to try with all your might to bring about a law on the confiscation of property acquired dishonestly or through corruption, without regard to the on who it is about.⁵⁴

In such an atmosphere the new members of the Central Council of the Yugoslav Socialist Trade Union Federation should be elected. The mandated commission proposed a closed list of candidates, which met with opposition from a large number of delegates, who called for the list to be expanded, but did not succeed. The dispute also extended to the type of election: public or secret (the statute provides for secret election). T he functionaries proposed public elections. A confusion ensued. When the votes for this proposal were paid out, the votes were allegedly not paid out exactly, but in the end secret ballots were held anyway; but for the closed list. Such an outcome did not satisfy a number of delegates, so that around 300 delegates left the congress and 63 V US . Z a g re b , 10. VII. 1968

53 G re g u rin č ić , Aufgabender Gewerkschaft after the VI Congress of Jugoslawischen Gewerkschaftsbundes, Kulturniradnik , Zagreb , 1968 , N r. 5, S. 44 -4

34 V U S , g le ic h e N u m m e r u n d K u ltu r n i r a d n i k , g le ic h e N u m m e r , S. 50.

nicht für die Liste der 107 von der Kommission vorgeschlagenen Kandidaten stimmte«.⁵⁵ Einen solchen Verlauf des Streits über die Wahlweise resümiert I. Gregurić: »Einzelne haben ihre bezahlten Stellungen als Funktionäre »ausbetont« und fürchteten sich, daß mit einer Erweiterung der Kandidatenliste ihr Posten verlorengäbe könnte, was sicher auch geschehen wäre.«⁵⁶ Zum Schluß sagt er: »Ich frage mich nur, wessen Kongreß das gewesen ist?«⁵⁷

Den angeführten Angaben zufolge haben die Arbeiter keine realen Möglichkeiten an Ort und Stelle, innerhalb der institutionellen Machtstruktur, auf den Inhalt der politischen Beschlüsse einzuwirken. Der Einfluß anderer sozialer Gruppen ist in dieser Sphäre dominant. Diesbezüglich ist zu bemerken, daß sich parallel zur Ausweitung der normativ-pluralistischen Institutionen, die einen Einfluß der Interessen in Richtung ihrer Kompromißlösung bewirken könnten, trotzdem die oligarchische Distribution reproduziert, bzw. eine Konzentration der politischen Macht, die ein starker Wall gegen die Realisierung der Interessen der Arbeiter darstellt.

Die inoffizielle Machthierarchie und die Transmission des Einflusses in die offizielle Struktur ist nicht nur in unseren Bedingungen vorhanden, sondern auch in hochentwickelten Industriegesellschaften. Das, was für dieses Phänomen unter unseren Bedingungen charakteristisch ist, ist die Tatsache, daß eine solche Hierarchie nicht allein aus der industriellen Organisation hervorgeht, sondern aus einem bestimmten Typ politischer Organisation, die eine lange Tradition hat. Für einen solchen Typ politischer Organisation ist das Vorhandensein engerer Gruppen charakteristisch, die in sich nahezu die ganze Organisationsmacht konzentrieren. »Diese Formel, sagt J. Županov, ist ein wesentlicher Teil der Struktur der revolutionären Gruppen vor dem Kriege und wurde von dort zunächst in die Zeit des Befreiungskrieges übertragen und danach auf die Nachkriegszeit.«⁵⁸ Der Einfluß dieser

⁵⁵ Gregurić, ebenda, S. 47.

⁵⁶ Ebenda, S. 49.

⁵⁷ Ebenda, S. 50. Anläßlich einer so gestellten Frage möchte ich die Aufmerksamkeit auf eine weitere Angabe lenken, die in gleicher Weise indikativ für das Verhältnis der Arbeiter und der Gewerkschaften ist. Der Gemeinde-Gewerkschaftsrat Požarevac forderte, daß das Präsidium des Rates des jugoslawischen Gewerkschaftsbundes, das auf dem erwählten Kongreß gewählt worden war, den Rücktritt einreicht, da es angeblich Beschlüsse des Kongresses umgewandelt habe und weil »Mitglieder höherer Gewerkschaftsfora ohne größeren Widerstand, wohlwollend die Verabschiedung vieler Beschlüsse der Bundes- und Republiksvorwaltung hingenommen hätten, obwohl diese die Lebensinteressen berührte und Auswirkungen für sämtliche Arbeiter gehabt hätten. Man ist der Meinung, daß eine so tolerante Haltung aus dem hohen persönlichen Lebensstandard der Mitglieder der höchsten Gewerkschaftsfora hervorgeht. . . . (Politika, 26. II. 1969)

⁵⁸ J. Županov, angeführtes Werk, S. 138. Die gleiche Erscheinung beschrieb auch M. Caldarović in der bereits zitierten Arbeit: »Subordination der Fora, Machtzentren, Initiative und Verantwortung in der Funktionärschaft, drastische Unterschiede bei der Information, – das sind die Grundcharakteristika der revolutionären Organisationen in der Bewegung zwischen zwei Kriegen« (S. 19). Nach dem Kriege kommt die im Verlauf des Krieges heraustraktillierte Hierarchie zum Ausdruck: »Die schon formierte bürokratisch-hierarchische Struktur in der avantgardistischen politischen Partei – gleichfalls verschmolzen mit Merkmalen militärischer Ordnung – gerät nach Beendigung des Krieges in Konflikt mit dem Revolutionserlebnis der breiten Masse, besonders in den befreiten Städten, die weniger dem „ideologischen Training“ während des Krieges ausgesetzt waren.« (S. 17)

method: "Individuals have "concreted" their paid positions as functionaries and feared that with an expansion of the candidate list, her post could have been lost, which certainly would have happened.«50 Finally he says: »I just wonder whose congress it was?«57

According to the data given, the workers have no real possibility of influencing the content of political decisions on the spot, within the institutional power structure. The influence of other social groups is dominant in this sphere.

In this regard, it should be noted that parallel to the expansion of normative-pluralistic institutions, which could cause an influence of interests towards their compromise solution, the oligarchic distribution is nevertheless reproduced, or a concentration of political power, which is a strong wall against the realization of workers' interests.

The unofficial hierarchy of power and the transmission of influence into the official structure is present not only in our conditions but also in highly developed industrial societies.

What is characteristic of this phenomenon under our conditions is the fact that such a hierarchy arises not only from industrial organization but from a certain type of political organization which has a long tradition.

Such a type of political organization is characterized by the presence of narrower groups, which concentrate almost all organizational power in themselves. "This formula, says J. Županov, is an essential part of the structure of the revolutionary groups before the war and was transferred from there first to the time of the liberation war and then to the post-war period."58 The influence of these 55 G regurinčić, ibid., p .47.

*• *Ibid. p. 49.*

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57 E benda. p. 50. In response to a question posed in this way, I would like to draw your attention to a further piece of information, which is in the same way indicative of the behavior of the work r an d th e unions. T he P ožarevac Municipal Trade Union Council demanded that the P ra sid ium of the Council of the Yugoslav Trade Union Confederation elected at the aforesaid congress elects orden w ar, submitting the resignation because it allegedly changed resolutions of the Congress and because

»Mem bers of the h igh h er c r trade f ora w ithout major resistance, benevolently accepting the adoption of many resolutions of the federal and R cp ublik sadminis tration -

men had , although these affected vital interests and had ramifications for all workers . Man is the opinion. that such a tolerant attitude derives from the high personal standard of living of the members of the highest trade union forum. . . . (Politics, 26.2.1969)

*8 J. Županov, work cited. p. 138. M. Ć aldarović also described the same phenomenon in the work already cited: »Subordination of the Fora, Machtkonzentration in them , In itiativ e und Vera n two Regen nt the functional body, drastic differences in the informal association , - these are the basic characteristics of the revolutionaries and organs in the B movement between two wars" (p. 13). After the war, the hierarchy that crystallized in the course of the war comes to expression: »The already formed bureaucratic-hierarchical structure in the ayant - guardian political party - also fused with characteristics of militarist order - after the end of the war came into conflict with the revolutionary experience of the broad masses, especially in the liberated cities. who were less exposed to the "ideological training" during the war.« (p. 17) 425

Monopolgruppen verbreitet sich strahlenförmig in alle Beschluszentren und engt damit die realen Möglichkeiten demokratischer Initiative ein. Diese Kanäle sind die Achse der vertikalen Strukturierung der Sozialgruppen, aus denen die Interessenkonflikte erwachsen.

3. WERTORIENTIERUNGEN

Die dritte Differenzierungsrichtung der globalen Gesellschaft betrifft die Wertorientierungen der verschiedenen Gesellschaftsschichten, aus denen Wertsysteme erwachsen, die unter gewissen Umständen auch miteinander in Konflikt geraten können, was nur einer der Sonderaspekte der Globalkonflikte ist.

Die Diffusionstendenzen der Wertorientierungen können wir über ihr Verhältnis zum normativen Grundwert der proletarischen Bewegung verfolgen: die integrale, freie Persönlichkeit und die kommunistische Gemeinschaft freier Menschen; und zum zweiten über ihr Verhältnis zu einem im Verhältnis zu dem ersten, instrumentalen, deshalb aber nicht weniger bedeutsamen Wert: die soziale Gleichheit. Die Komplexität dieses Gebietes des gesellschaftlichen Lebens stellt ein delikates und relativ sehr wenig erforschtes Gebiet dar, weshalb wir uns hier nur mit seinen Grundkonturen befassen wollen.

Die Absolutisierung der politischen Macht in den bisherigen Bauer-Arbeiterrevolutionen (von der Oktoberrevolution an) trägt die Tendenz einer Transzendierung der Bedingungen, die seinerzeit ihre gesellschaftliche Rolle überdimensioniert haben. In diesem Rahmen kommt es unausweichlich zur Degradierung der Persönlichkeit zu einem politischen Tier, jedoch nicht im ursprünglichen Sinn (als zoon politikon) sondern im Rahmen des Dominierungsverhältnisses und der Unterordnung innerhalb der verknöcherten hierarchischen politischen Organisation der Gesellschaft. Auf diese Weise wird die Persönlichkeit in nur eine ihrer möglichen Ausdruckssphären – in die politische Sphäre gedrängt, in der sie, ohne Rücksicht ob nun als Diener oder Herrscher, auf verkehrte Weise zum Ausdruck gelangt.

Auf weiterem sozialen Plan stellt der Besitz von Macht die Grundlage der vertikalen gesellschaftlichen Differenzierung dar, womit eine neue Reproduktionsgrundlage der klassischen Interessensunterschiede und der Konflikte innerhalb der Gesellschaft realisiert wird. Das autoritäre Potential politischer Macht, durch alte und neue Impulse inspiriert, führt in einigen Fällen auch zur physischen Vernichtung von Menschen. Nicht allein das materielle Interesse (die Früchte des politischen Monopols), sondern irrationale Wurzeln des Machtwillens (nicht nur durch die kulturelle Zurückgebliebenheit forciert, sondern auch durch die anxiosthetischen Eigenschaften der modernen Zivilisation) können häufig zu einer Ausartung erforderlicher Selbstverteidigung gegenüber denjenigen führen, die die erlangte Freiheit auf verschiedene Arten bedrohen. In diesem Falle, wo es sich um ideologische Unterschiede handelt, können diese die exklusiven Eigenschaften von absolut Gut und Böse annehmen.

Wenn es jedoch bis dahin gekommen ist, dann bleibt bis zu drastischen Abrechnungen nunmehr ein kleiner Schritt. Da – und im Ver-

3. RUNGE N V E R T O R Y

The third direction of differentiation in global society relates to the value orientations of the various social strata, from which value systems grow, which under certain circumstances can also come into conflict with one another, which is just one of the special aspects of global conflicts.

We can follow the diffusion tendencies of the value orientations through their relationship to the normative basic value of the proletarian movement: the integral, free personality and the communist community of free people; and secondly, about their relation to a value that is in relation to the first, instrumental, but therefore no less important: social equality. The complexity of this area of social life represents a delicate and relatively underexplored area, so we will only concern ourselves here with its basic contours.

The absolutization of political power in the previous peasant-worker revolutions (from the October revolution onwards) bears the tendency of a transcending of the conditions that at that time overdimensioned their social role. Within this framework, personality is inevitably degraded to become a political animal, but not in the original sense (as a zoon politikon) but within the framework of the dominating relationship and subordination within society ossified hierarchical political organization of society. In this way personality is pushed into only one of its possible spheres of expression - the political sphere, in which, whether as servant or ruler, it finds expression in the wrong way .

On a broader social plan, the possession of power is the basic location of the vertical social differentiation, with which a new basis for reproduction of the classic differences in interest and the conflicts within society is realized. The authoritarian potential of political power, inspired by old and new impulses, also leads in some cases to the physical annihilation of people. Not only the material interest (the fruits of the political monopoly), but irrational roots of the will to power (forced not only by cultural backwardness, but also by the axionistic characteristics of modern civilization). often lead to a proliferation of necessary self-defence against those who threaten the freedom gained in various ways. In this case, where ideological differences are involved, they can take on the exclusive qualities of absolute good and evil.

If it has come to that, however, then there is only a small step left before drastic billing is possible. D a - and in Ver-426

hältnis zu solcher Erfahrung kommt es zur Herauskristallisierung divergierender Wertorientierungen – vor allem jedoch von zwei grundlegenden: der demokratischen (Selbstverwaltungsorientierung) und der autoritären. Die Polarisierung zwischen diesen Tendenzen, die zu einer Reduktion der Persönlichkeit auf die politische Sphäre streben, sowie das Bestreben nach einer immer breiteren Entfaltung der potentiellen Möglichkeiten der Persönlichkeiten, kommt in Gegen-sätzen zum Ausdruck: Gleichstellung oder soziale Unterschiede? Das ist das Dilemma des überwiegenden Teils der offiziellen Modelatoren der öffentlichen Meinung (wir haben bereits gesehen, wie begründet es ist, von der Verbreitung der Gleichmacherei in der Gesellschaft zu sprechen, wo die tatsächlichen Unterschiede in der materiellen Lage der verschiedenen Gesellschaftsschichten, um ein vielfaches größer sind als man das vorstellt oder aufzuzeigen versucht.) Zahlreiches Erfahrungsmaterial zeigt, daß dieses Bestreben zu einer Verringerung der vorhandenen materiellen Unterschiede, besonders bei den Arbeitern weit verbreitet ist. So stellt z. B. J. Zupanov in seiner Untersuchung eine Diskrepanz zwischen der Lage und den Aspirationen der Befragten fest. Die faktische Spanne in den Nenn-Löhnen beträgt 1:5, die gewünschten Löhne würde diese auf 1:3 herabsetzen.⁵⁹ Die größte Erhöhung ihrer Löhne wünschten diejenigen Befragten, die die kleinsten Löhne hatten (bis zu 45.000 alten Dinar) – 94%, von 45.001 Din. auf 60.000 – 73%. Diejenigen, die die höchsten Löhne hatten, wünschten eine viermal geringere Aufbesserung, – 23%, womit sich, wie man sieht, die Unterschiede nicht beseitigen lassen. Bei der weiteren Untersuchung der Korrelation zwischen dem gewünschten Lohnanstieg und anderen Varianten (Höhe des nominellen Verdienstes, Qualifikation, Arbeitsplatz, familiäre Lage des Arbeiters, techn.-ökonomische Wirksamkeit der Unternehmen) haben die Forscher festgestellt, daß diese weniger bedeutsam ist, als daß sie von einem unvorgesehenen Faktor abhängt.⁶⁰ Diesen Faktor haben sie in der »Norm der Egalität« entdeckt, die zur impliziten Kultur der jugoslawischen Gesellschaft gehört und nicht nur als internalisierte sondern auch als äußere Norm wirksam ist.⁶¹

Die bereits erwähnte Untersuchung Ende 1967 suggerierte mir ein ähnliches Ergebnis, jedoch mit etwas konkreteren Haltungen.⁶² Diesen Ergebnissen zufolge sind die Arbeiter vor allem daran interessiert, durch eine Vermehrung des gesellschaftlichen Reichtums, progressiv die Armut in der Gesellschaft zu beseitigen – und solange es diese noch gibt, die Maximaleinkommen zu begrenzen. Die Begrenzung der Maximaleinkommen hat demzufolge eine Bremsung und Kontrolle der Bereicherungstendenz des einen Teils der Gesellschaft – auf Kosten der Pauperisierung des anderen Teils, zum Ziel. Das bezieht sich vor

⁵⁹ J. Zupanov, angef. Werk, S. 279. Siehe hierzu ausführlicher: D. Tadić-J. Zupanov, Wirtschaftliche Aspirationen und gesellschaftliche Norm der Egalität, *Sociologija*, Beograd, 1969, Nr. 2. Die Untersuchung ist zusammengestellt von 10 Unternehmen eines Industriezentrums in Kroatien (1.156 Befragte) und die Untersuchung wurde im Jahre 1966 durchgeführt.

⁶⁰ J. Zupanov, angef. Werk, S. 297.

⁶¹ Ebenda, S. 299.

⁶² N. Popov, angef. Werk.

In relation to such an experience, divergent value orientations crystallize - above all, however, two fundamental ones: the democratic (self-government orientation) and the authoritarian. The polarization between these tendencies, which strive to reduce personality to the political sphere, as well

as the striving for an ever broader development of the potential possibilities of personalities, is expressed in opposites: equality or social differences? This is the dilemma of the majority of the official modelers of public opinion (we have already seen how justified it is to speak of the spread of egalitarianism in society, where the actual differences in the material situation of the various strata of society are many times over are greater than is imagined or attempted to show.) A great deal of empirical material shows that this striving to reduce the existing material differences is widespread, especially among the workers. So e.g. B. J. Županov found a discrepancy between the situation and the aspirations of the interviewees in his study. The actual range in nominal wages is 1:5, the desired wages would reduce it to 1:3.59 The biggest increase in their wages would be desired by those respondents who had the smallest wages (up to 45,000 old dinars) - 94 %, from 45,001 Din.

to 60,000 - 73%. Those who had the highest wages wanted an increase four times lower, - 23%, which, as can be seen, does not eliminate the differences. By further examining the correlation between the desired wage increase and other variants (level of nominal earnings, qualification, job, family situation of the worker, techno-economic effectiveness of the firms), the researchers found that this is less significant, than that it depends on some unforeseen factor.⁶⁰ They discovered this factor in the "norm of egalitarianism," which belongs to the implicit culture of Yugoslav society and operates not only as an internalized but also as an external norm.⁶¹

The study I have already mentioned at the end of 1967 suggested a similar result, but with somewhat more concrete attitudes.⁶² According to these results, workers are primarily interested in progressively eliminating poverty in society through an increase in social wealth - and as long as there is poverty nor is there to limit the maximum income. The aim of limiting the maximum income is therefore to slow down and control the tendency towards enrichment in one part of society - at the expense of pauperizing the other part. That refers to

*• J. Županov, *angcf. Werk*, p. 279, See in detail: D. Tadić - J. Županov, *Economic aspirations and societal norms of equality*, *oo-ciologija*, Beograd. 1969, no. 2. The research is compiled by 10 companies of an industrial center in Croatia (1,156 respondents) and the research was conducted in 1966 by *gefu hrt*.

J. Županov, *Eng. Work P.* 297.

Ebenda, S. 299.

*• N. Popov, *angf. Werk*.

allem auf die Träger politischer Funktionen (die, wenn sie sich professionalisieren, danach streben, der Gesellschaftskontrolle zu entgleiten und für die Demokratie ein bedeutendes Hindernis sind). Der Egoismus dieser Schicht, der sich unter bestimmten Umständen auf Privilegien bzw. Einkommen, die direkt aus der Machtverfügung resultieren, gründet, findet einen Verbündeten im Egoismus jener Gesellschaftsgruppen in preferierter Wirtschaftslage, aus der sie ein Sonderinkommen (Profit) ziehen können.

Das Verhältnis dieser Gesellschaftsgruppen gegenüber der Idee der gesellschaftlichen Gleichheit ist negativ. Da sie jedoch auf die öffentliche Meinung einen dominierenden offiziellen Einfluß ausüben, so braucht man sich nicht zu wundern, wenn sie die Angst vor dem Gespenster der Gleichmacherei und allem, was damit verbunden ist, ausbreitet. Die tatsächlichen Werte jedoch, für die sich diese Gesellschaftsgruppen einsetzen, sind nur implizit gegeben: man kann sagen, daß sie die bestehenden materiellen Unterschiede akzeptieren oder sich für noch größere einsetzen, hierbei auch die daraus hervorgehenden gesellschaftlichen Folgen mit inbegriffen.

Es ist nicht überflüssig, hinsichtlich des bereits erwähnten auf frühere Fälle zu verweisen, wo man sich der Gleichmacherei energisch entgegenstellte. Nach den Leninschen Versuchen, einige bedeutende Intentionen und Lösungen der Pariser Kommune zu realisieren (Arbeiterlohn für die öffentlichen Funktionäre, begann Stalin, zu Beginn der Dreißiger Jahre, einen entschlossenen Kampf gegen die, wie er es selbst nannte, Gleichmacherei (*uravnivovka*), gegen die Linksnivellierung bei den Löhnen.

Die Kritik an der »Gleichmacherei« wurde, wie M. Životić bemerkte, »zum Paravent, hinter dem sich der Kampf der Bürokratie für immer größere materielle Privilegien verbarg.«⁶³ Ein solch jäher Abbruch erst begonnener Experimente (es handelt sich ja gerade um die ersten Versuche, eine Lösung zu finden, was nicht heißt, daß die ersten auch die günstigsten sind) hat es bis auf den heutigen Tag dauernd unmöglich gemacht, Lösungen zu suchen, die ein fundamentaler Beitrag zur Realisierung von Wertorientierungen der proletarischen Bewegung und zu gleicher Zeit der demokratischen politischen Organisation des Prozesses der sozialistischen Transformation der gesellschaftlichen Beziehungen sein können.⁶⁴

Gleichmacherei, wie man sie darstellen möchte, hat es nie gegeben und auch in einer unterschiedlichen materiellen Lage waren, viel-Bewegung oder in der Organisation der Gesellschaft, die nach der Revolution entstanden ist. Hierüber sprachen wir schon in den beiden vorangegangenen Abschnitten. Es kommt der Wahrheit näher, zu sagen, daß es innerhalb der gesellschaftlichen Gruppierungen, die wesentlich unterschiedlichen und nicht gleichen politischen Einfluß haben und auch in einer unterschiedlichen materiellen Lage waren, vielleicht kleine Unterschiede im materiellen Standard gegeben hat, was aber keinesfalls bedeutet, daß es eine Gleichmacherei in der Gesell-

⁶³ M. Životić, Mensch und Wert, *Prosveta*, Beograd, 1969, S. 159.

⁶⁴ Siehe hierzu ausführlicher: S. Stojanović, Zwischen Ideal und Wirklichkeit, *Prosveta*, Beograd 1969, S. 201–221.

obstacle to democracy). The egotism of this class, which under certain circumstances is based on privileges or income that results directly from the possession of power, finds an ally in the egotism of those social groups in the economic situation referred to , from which they can draw a special income (profit).

The attitude of these social groups towards the idea of social equality is negative. However, since they exercise a dominating official influence on public opinion, one need not be surprised if they fear the specter of equality and all that is associated with it However, the actual values for which these social groups advocate are only implicitly given: one can say that they accept the existing material differences or advocate even greater ones, including the including the resulting social consequences.

It is not superfluous, with regard to what has already been mentioned, to refer to earlier cases in which equalization was vigorously opposed. After Lenin's attempts to realize some important intentions and slogans of the Paris Commune (workers' wages for the public functionaries, Stalin, at the beginning of the 1930s, began a determined struggle against the, as he himself called it equalism (uravnivok), against the left-wing leveling of wages.

As M. Životić remarks, the criticism of »equalism« was

»to the paravent, behind which the struggle of the bureaucracy for ever greater material privileges hid.«⁶³ Such a year-old demolition of experiments that had only just begun (it's about just around the first attempts to find a solution, which does not mean that the first ones are also the most favorable) has up to the present day made it impossible to look for solutions that are fundamental to B Contribution to the realization of value orientations of the proletarian movement and at the same time theocratic political organization of the process of socialist transformation of social relations.⁶⁴

Equality, as one would like to portray it, never existed and we were also in a different material situation, much movement or in the organization of the society that arose after the revolution. We have already talked about this in the two previous sections. It is closer to the truth to say that within the social groups that have essentially different and not equal political influences and were also in different material situations, there might be small differences in material Standard, which in no way means that there is equalism in society M M . Životić, Mensch und Werk, Prosepta, Beograd , 1969, p. 159.

⁶⁴ Siehe hierzu auch früher: S. Stanojević, Zwischen den I

schaft gegeben hätte, die, in dieser Hinsicht, immer geteilter Ansicht war. Man darf hierbei auch nicht jene Unterschiede vergessen, die vorgefunden wurden und die die Revolution, mit Rücksicht auf das bereits Erwähnte, nicht beseitigen konnte. All dies müßte, verständlicherweise, weiter untersucht werden.

Die erwähnten Unterschiede in der Gesellschaft – die vorgefundene ausgeschlossen – liegen nicht in der Arbeit begründet, noch war das je der Fall, vielmehr ist die Stelle in der Machthierarchie der wesentliche Faktor, der die materielle Lage der Gruppen und des einzelnen in ihnen bestimmt, was eine Folge der Tatsache ist, daß »die politische Sphäre zu einem Gutteil in sich viele wirtschaftliche Funktionen des einstigen kapitalistischen Staates enthält, so daß sich die politische Ungleichheit als eine Totalität sämtlicher anderen Aspekte der Ungleichheit zeigt.«⁶⁵

Auf Grund des hier Gesagten kann mithin das Bestreben nach der Affirmation der Idee der sozialen Gleichheit keine Aufforderung sein, zum alten Stand der Dinge zurückzukehren, da es eine Gleichheit nie-mals gegeben hat. Es kann nur das Streben nach seiner fortschrittlichen Realisierung sein (jedoch dieses Prinzip – und dies sei hier nur nebenbei bemerkt – wurde auch in Ländern ohne sozialistische Orientierung deklarativ angenommen). Im übrigen läßt sich nach einer gesellschaftlichen Integration nicht streben, indem man auf Unterschieden insistiert. Einigen Interpretationen zufolge sieht es so aus, als könnten diese erst nachdem sie vergrößert wurden, verringert werden?

Ein Durchdringen der politischen Hülle der modernen Gesellschaft würde einen realen Ausweg auf eine umfassendere Ebene praktischer Affirmation der potentiellen Mehrbedeutung der Persönlichkeit eröffnen.

Eine solche gesellschaftliche Entwicklung bedroht jedoch natürlicherweise die Nutznießer der Macht dieser Hülle. Aus diesem Grunde stehen diese beiden Tendenzen in einem realen Konflikt. Da sie gegenseitig an vitale Interessen röhren stellt der Konflikt der Wertorientierungen nur ein relativ selbstständiger Ausdruck dar, sowie ein Beitrag zu umfassenderen Gesellschaftskonflikten. Die bisherigen Ausführungen bieten, wie wir hoffen, hinreichend Grundlagen dafür, daß wir zwei Grundursachen für Streiks in der modernen jugoslawischen Gesellschaft herausstellen:

(1) Die Arbeiter, die fast den ganzen Streik tragen, leben am Rande der wirtschaftlichen und politischen Prozesse in der Gesellschaft, weshalb sie nicht in der Lage sind, innerhalb dieser Prozesse ihren gesellschaftlichen Status zu ändern. Der relative Verarmungsprozeß (vom Standpunkt des erreichten Niveaus der Entwicklung der Gesellschaft und vom Standpunkt der aktuellen Möglichkeiten) verleiht ihrem Widerstand und Kampf für die Sicherung oder Erhöhung der augenblicklichen Löhne, die für die Reproduktion der Arbeitskraft bzw. für das tägliche Leben erforderlich sind, einen zusätzlichen Impuls.

⁶⁵ M. Janićević, Sozialismus und die Idee der gesellschaftlichen Gleichheit, *Sociologija*, 1967, Nr. 3-4, S. 52.

community, which, in this respect, was always divided. One must not forget here also those differences which were found and which the revolution, having regard to what has already been mentioned, could not eliminate. All of this, understandably, deserves further study.

The differences in society mentioned - excluding those found - are not due to work, nor have ever been, but place in the hierarchy of power is the essential factor determining the material position of the groups and the individual within them, which a corollary of the fact is that "the political sphere contains within itself to a good extent many of the economic functions of the former capitalist state, so that political inequality presents itself as a totality of all other aspects of inequality."65

On the basis of what has been said here, striving to affirm the idea of social equality cannot be an invitation to return to the old state of affairs, since equality never existed. It can only be the striving for its progressive realization (however, this principle - and this should only be mentioned here in passing - was also accepted declaratively in countries without a socialist orientation). Moreover, one cannot strive for social integration by insisting on differences. According to some interpretations, it looks like these could only be reduced after they were enlarged!?

Penetrating the political shell of modern society would open a real avenue to a fuller level of practical affirmation of the potential multiplicity of personality.

Such a social development, however, naturally threatens the beneficiaries of the power of this shell. For this reason, these two tendencies are in real conflict. Since they touch on each other's vital interests, the conflict of value orientations represents only a relatively independent expression, as well as a contribution to broader societal conflicts. The foregoing provides, we hope, sufficient basis for identifying two root causes of strikes in modern Yugoslav society:

(1)

The workers, who bear almost the entire strike, live on the fringes of the economic and political processes in society, which is why they are unable to change their social status within these processes. The relative impoverishment process (from the point of view of the achieved level of development of society and from the point of view of current opportunities) gives their resistance and struggle for securing or increasing the current wages necessary for the reproduction of labor power or for everyday life, an extra boost.

(2) Die Streiks bleiben im Vorfeld der offiziellen politischen Struktur, in der Sphäre der politischen Ökonomie da die Arbeiter in den bestehenden politischen Machtzentren als Sozialfaktor nicht adäquat vertreten sind. Im gleichen Rahmen bleiben auch die Streikergebnisse. Als Folge der tiefen gesellschaftlichen Differenzierung ist die offizielle politische Struktur paralysiert und für Einflüsse von außen verschlossen. Das behindert jedoch nicht eine Reproduktion der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse mit unveränderten Voraussetzungen.

Beide Haltungen führen uns, weiterhin, zur Frage des Charakters des Produktionsverhältnisses, in erster Linie jedoch der dominanten Form der Eigentumsverhältnisse in der modernen jugoslawischen Gesellschaft. Normativ und formalrechtlich betrachtet, ist das Monopol (die Ausschließlichkeit) des Besitzes von Produktionsmitteln ausgeschlossen. Von diesem Standpunkt her gesehen stehen diese im Gesellschaftseigentum. In Frage steht jedoch der Charakter der Eigentumsbeziehungen als der wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen.⁶⁶

Die Aufteilungsverhältnisse als Ausdruck der Eigentumsbeziehungen (Marx) suggerieren uns als Antwort, daß die noch nicht beseitigten Lohnverhältnisse ein bedeutendes (jedoch nicht auch einziges) Charakteristikum der Produktionsbeziehungen sind. So aufgefaßt, stellen die Eigentumsverhältnisse die Scheide der gesellschaftlichen Beziehungen und die Achse der Vertikalstrukturierung in der Gesellschaft dar. Etwas vereinfacht gesagt, stellen die gegensätzlichen Pole in der gesellschaftlichen Struktur auf der einen Seite die Arbeiter (mit bestimmten Untergruppen) und die Politokratie auf der anderen Seite (gleichfalls mit Untergruppen, von denen die bedeutendste die Bürokratie ist).⁶⁷

Das Gesellschaftseigentum als wirtschaftliche Beziehung (Verfügung, d. h. Nutzung, Einsatz des Arbeitsüberschusses), das durch die politische Machthülle gebremst wird, befindet sich noch immer erst im Keim, allerdings muß hier gesagt werden, mit einem starken Realisierungspotential. Es kann zu einer wesentlichen gesellschaftlichen Tendenz werden, wenn es die Globalgesellschaft durchdringt. Eine der Grundvoraussetzungen einer tatsächlichen Realisierung dieses Prozesses ist, daß die Arbeiter Schlüsselpositionen der politischen Macht erhalten. Hiermit würde der erste entscheidende Schritt zu einer Professionalisierung gemacht, bzw. zu einer Sozialisierung der Politik,

⁶⁶ Siehe hierzu ausführlicher: A. Bajt, *Gesellschaftseigentum, kollektives und individuelles, Gledita*, 1968, Nr. 4.

⁶⁷ Politokratie ist ein besserer Terminus als Bürokratie, weil unter Bürokratie gewöhnlich das Sozialgefüge des Staatsapparates verstanden wird – und hier ist die Rede von einer Gruppe, die sich gegenüber der Bürokratie als politische Gewalt verhält (weiterer Begriff) gegenüber der Verwaltung des Staatsapparates (engerer Begriff). Darüberhinaus kommt durch den Gebrauch des Begriffs Politokratie stärker das Prinzip zum Ausdruck, nach dem sich die Gesellschaftsbeziehungen bilden (Stellung in der Hierarchie der politischen Macht im Ganzen). Dies ist natürlich nur die Arbeitsdefinition. Solidere Bestimmungen müßten sich auf intensivere Untersuchungen stützen. Erst so könnte man auf die Frage antworten, ob es sich um einen ganz neuen historischen Gesellschaftstyp, der nicht in Klassen im traditionalistischen Sinn aufgeteilt ist, sondern ob es sich um eine neue Gruppierung handelt, die analog für die Kasten, Stände und Klassen Anwendung findet, jedoch nicht auf eine dieser Gruppierungsformen zurückgeführt werden kann.

(2)

The strikes remain in the forefield of the official political structure, in the sphere of political economy, since the workers are not adequately represented as a social factor in the existing centers of political power. The strike results remain within the same framework.

As a result of deep social differentiation, the official political structure is paralyzed and closed to outside influences. However, this does not prevent the reproduction of social conditions with changed conditions.

Both attitudes lead us, furthermore, to the question of the character of the production relation, but primarily to the dominant form of property relations in modern Yugoslav society. From a normative and formal point of view, the monopoly (exclusivity) of ownership of the means of production is excluded. Seen from this point of view, these are owned by the general public. What is in question, however, is the character of property relations as economic relations.⁶⁶

The distribution conditions as an expression of property relations (Marx) suggest to us as an answer that the wage conditions that have not yet been eliminated are an important (but not the only) characteristic of production relations. Understood in this way, property relations represent the divide of social relations and the axis of vertical structuring in society. Put simply, they represent the opposite poles in the social structure on the one hand the workers (with certain subgroups) and on the other hand the politocracy (also with subgroups, the most important of which is the bureaucracy).⁶⁷

Social property as an economic relationship (disposal, i.e. use, deployment of the labor surplus), which is slowed down by the political power envelope, is still in its infancy, but it must be said here, with one strong realization potential. It can become a major societal trend if it permeates global society. One of the basic prerequisites for an actual realization of this process is that the workers are given key positions of political power. This is the first decisive step towards de-professionalisation, or towards a socialization of politics, 86 See here for more detail: A . B a j t, S o c u t i l e p u e r t i m e , c o l l e c t i v e a n d i n -

dividuals, Gledista, 1968, Nr. 4.

87 Politocracy is in lesser terms as Bureaucracy, when Birocerations whenlich das Sozialgefüge des Staats apparatus verstanden wird - under the Redon einiger Gruppe, the self-evident head of the Bureau of Political Affairs Gewaltverhalt (weitere Beleg) genius of the State Apparatus (engineer

Be griff). D a r i i b e r h ina aus k o m t d u rc h d e n G e b r a u c h des B e griffs P o lito k r a tie s t r k e r d a s P r i n z i p zum Ausdruck , n a c h d e m sich die G e se llsc ha ft sbezie hung en bilden (Standing in the Hierarchy of Politics at Machtime Ganzen). This is the natural science of Arbeit's definition. S o l i d e r B e s t i m m u n g e n m üfitten sicha auf intensive Untersuchungen stützen. F irst so k o n te m a n a u f d ie Fr a g e a n t w o r t e n , o b e s i c h u m e i n a n e n g e n e n e n h i s t o r i s h e n g e s s h a ftsty p , then K lassen im tra d itio n a -

listisch e n Since it's getting to the bottom of the list, sometimes you'll find a new Group of Runghandels, the analog for the Caste, Standing and Klasse n Wending Find, je d o c h n ich t a u f eine d ie ser G r u p p i e r u n g s f o r m e n z u riic k g e führt w e r d e n k a n n

der weiterhin zu einer Änderung des Charakters der politischen Macht führen würde, was im wesentlichen Gegensatz zum sogenannten Eta-tismus stünde.

Solange in der Gesellschaft Lohnverhältnisse vorhanden sind, gibt es keinen Grund dafür, weshalb es nicht auch Streiks als deren natürliche Begleiterscheinung geben soll. Sie bestehen und bleiben im Rahmen der Lohnverhältnisse.⁶⁸ Das heißt jedoch nicht, daß sie nicht auch die Möglichkeit enthielten, zu einer politischen Bewegung als einer höheren Form des Einsatzes der Arbeiter, auszuwachsen. Besonders unter Verhältnissen, wo die Idee der Selbstverwaltung – die bisherigen Resultate ihrer Realisierung mit inbegriffen – einer der dominanten integrierenden gesellschaftlichen Werte ist.

Zum Schluß dürfen zwei weitere bedeutende Eigenschaften der Erscheinung, die wir untersuchen, nicht außer Acht gelassen werden, daher möchten wir versuchen, soweit das möglich ist, auch auf die Frage zu antworten: warum tauchen die Streiks erst seit 1958 auf und wie sieht ihre mögliche Zukunft aus?

(1) Die jugoslawische Gesellschaft ist – wie auch jede andere Gesellschaft – nicht homogen. Sie hat, obwohl man dies entschlossen angestrebt hat, die vorgefundenen sozialen Unterschiede nicht beseitigt, es sind sogar neue entstanden, die, wie wir gesehen haben, ihren Ausgangspunkt in dem spezifischen Typ der politischen Organisation haben, nach deren Vorbild die politische Organisation der Gesellschaft geschaffen wurde und in der auch heute noch die politische Macht dominiert. Jedoch auch trotz der dauernd gegenwärtigen gesellschaftlichen Differenzierung, kommt es erst seit kurzem zu Streiks.

Die Gründe hierfür sind sicher zahlreich und kompliziert. Einer, der am häufigsten angeführten ist, daß die Macht des Polizeiapparates so stark war, daß die realen Unterschiede nicht zum Ausdruck gebracht werden konnten.⁶⁹ Dies ist jedoch kein hinreichender Grund, denn es kam auch dann zu Streiks als die Macht dieses Apparates auch offiziell unverletzlich war. Ein weiterer Grund, der ihr Erscheinen hätte begünstigen können, ist die Erweiterung der normativen Rechte und der materiellen Grundlage der Selbstverwaltung, nach dem ersten (und bisher auch einzigen) Kongreß der Arbeiterräte (parallel hierzu erhielt die Idee der Arbeiterselbstverwaltung immer stärkeren sozialen Rückhalt) und die Rationalisierung des Verhältnisses zur Macht und zu den Gesellschaftsprozessen (Warenwirtschaft und Prinzip der wirtschaftlichen Wirksamkeit).⁷⁰

Hier sind noch zwei weitere Gründe hinzuzufügen: Zunächst einmal haben wir gesehen, daß die Streiks ihre größte Intensität erreicht ha-

⁶⁸ Siehe hierzu: Stärken Streiks die Rolle der Arbeiterklasse, Diskussion in der Zeitschrift *Susret*, Beograd, 1969, Nr. 98.

⁶⁹ Ein eklatantes Beispiel für den Umfang der Polizeimacht ist die *arbitrare* Anwendung des Übertretungsgesetzes aus dem Jahre 1947 (es wurde erst 1967 abgeschafft). Nach den Studentendemonstrationen hat es Versuche gegeben, diese Praxis wieder einzuführen (Vorschlag bekannt unter der Chiffre AS 1139 – siehe *Susret* 2. IV. 1969, Nr. 97 und *NIN* Nr. 944 und 945 für das Jahr 1969) was nicht zur Gänze realisiert wurde (nur teilweise in dem neuen Gesetz über die Übertretungen Teilrepublik Serbiens).

⁷⁰ Hierüber haben die bereits erwähnten Autoren geschrieben, besonders R. Lam-pret und B. Kavčić, in den zitierten Arbeiten.

which would continue to lead to a change in the character of political power, which would be fundamentally opposed to so-called statism.

As long as wage conditions exist in society, there is no reason why there

should not also be strikes as their natural accompaniment. They exist and remain within the framework of wage relations.⁶⁸ This does not mean, however, that they do not also contain the possibility of growing into a political movement as a higher form of worker involvement. Especially in circumstances where the idea of self-government - including the results of its realization so far - is one of the dominant integrating social values.

Finally, two other significant features of the phenomenon that we are examining cannot be ignored, so we would like to try, as far as possible, to answer also the question: why have the strikes only appeared since 1958 and how does theirs look like? possible future?

(1)

Like any other society, Yugoslav society is not homogeneous. It has not eliminated the existing social differences, in spite of the resolute efforts made to do so; new ones have even arisen which, as we have seen, have their starting point in the specific type of political organization on which the model of the political organization of the society was created and in which political power still dominates today. However, despite the ever-present social differentiation, strikes have only recently started.

The reasons for this are certainly numerous and complicated. One, most frequently cited, is that the power of the police apparatus was so great that real differences could not be expressed.⁶⁹ This is not a sufficient reason, however, for strikes occurred even when the power of this apparatus was also officially inviolable. Another reason that could have favored its appearance is the expansion of normative rights and the material basis of self-government after the first (and so far only) congress of workers' councils (at the same time the idea of workers' self-government received increasing social support) and the rationalization of the relationship to power and to social processes (commodity economy and the principle of economic effectiveness).⁷⁰

Here are two more reasons to add: First of all, we have seen that the strikes have reached their greatest intensity- M See: Strong strikes, the role of the working class, discussion in the journal Susret, Beograd, 1969, no. 98

• A blatant example of the scope of the police force is the arbitrage application of the Obertretungsgesetz from 1947 (it was only abolished in 1967). After the students' demonstrations, there were attempts to reintroduce this practice (proposal known under the cipher AS 1139 - see Susret 2. IV. 1969, No. 97 and N I N Nos. 944 and 945 for the year 1969) which has not been fully realized (only partially in the new law on the supreme transgression -

g a T e ilre public of Serbia).

70 The authors mentioned above wrote about this, especially R. Lam - prepared by B. Kavčić, in cited works.

ben, als versucht wurde, wesentliche Änderungen im Wirtschaftssystem durchzuführen, wobei eine bedeutende Anzahl der Arbeiter von einem Gefühl gesellschaftlicher Instabilität erfaßt worden war (Anstieg der Arbeitslosigkeit, usw.) Ferner barg das immer eifrigere Insistieren auf den »fatalen« Folgen der Gleichmacherei Bestrebungen zu einer Legalisierung der bestehenden sozialen Unterschiede in sich (sowie einer Legalisierung ihrer Grundlagen), was in einer Gesellschaft mit einem spezifischen Dualismus politischer und wirtschaftlicher Privilegien die Grundlagen für die Erlangung politischer und wirtschaftlicher Renten zu dauernden werden ließe. Das würde angeblich mit einer Emanzipierung der wirtschaftlichen Sphäre der Gesellschaft erreicht, aber unter der Bedingung, daß das Monopol der politischen Sphäre nicht aufgehoben wird (vielleicht sind hier in erster Linie die tatsächlichen Hindernisse für die Realisierung der Reform zu suchen). Eine solche Situation rief eine immer stärkere Welle von Arbeitsstreiks hervor.

(2) Noch schwerer ist es auf den anderen Teil der gestellten Frage zu antworten. Trotzdem wollen wir auf drei, vermutlich realste Möglichkeiten, hinsichtlich des weiteren Schicksals der Streiks in der jugoslawischen Gesellschaft antworten.

(a) Ein Aufleben der Arbeiterbewegung und die Entwicklung des progressiven Gesellschaftsbewußtseins können zu einer Affirmation einer modernen kommunistischen Bewegung führen, die auf der dialektischen Durchdringung traditioneller Wertorientierungen der proletarischen Bewegung und auf den Ergebnissen der wissenschaftlichen und technischen Revolution beruht. Eine solche Bewegung könnte ein wesentlich neuer Versuch sein, Beziehungen des Verstandes und der Vernunft, der Spontaneität und der Instrumentalisierung der historischen Möglichkeiten der Bewegung herzustellen (von diesem Standpunkt aus ist das Dilemma: Radikalisierung oder Funktionalisierung deplaciert). Eine spontane Arbeiterbewegung, deren Autonomie nicht von einer politischen Apparatur absorbiert würde, könnte ständige Durchbrüche zu einer Sozialisierung der Politik mit sämtlichen wesentlichen Konsequenzen dieses Prozesses möglich machen.

(b) eine zweite Möglichkeit ist eine Reproduktion des status quo und zwar auf diese Weise, daß die außerinstitutionellen Konflikte in einen positiven institutionellen Mechanismus eingebaut werden, womit eine Kontrolle der außerinstitutionellen Konflikte gewährleistet würde, was, wie man sich das bereits vor einigen Jahren vor Augen hielt, faktisch die Ohnmacht bedeutete, Politik und Wirtschaft zu sozialisieren.⁷¹ Hierüber sind die Polemiken vor kurzem wiederaufgelebt.⁷²

⁷¹ Hierzu schrieb bereits im Jahre 1964 V. Rus. Er ist der Auffassung, daß sofern eine Sozialisierung von Plan und Markt nicht möglich ist – was einzige und allein zur Realisierung der Selbstverwaltung in der Werkeinheit und in der Globalgesellschaft führen kann – dann eine optimale Demokratisierung nur als Institutionalisierung der Oppositionsdenzenzen möglich ist (V. Rus, *Simbioza dela in lastništva, Perspektive 1963–1964*, Nr. 36–37, S. 858).

⁷² Siehe J. Jerovšek, Konflikte in unserer Gesellschaft, *Sociologija*, 1968, Nr. 4, J. Perko-Separović, Konfliktinteressen in der sozialistischen Gesellschaft, *Gledišta*, 1969, Nr. 1 und Z. Vidaković, Zwei Untersuchungen der Protestarbeitsinstellungen (Streiks), *Gledišta*, 1968, Nr. 1, S. 32–33.

social differences in themselves (and legalize their foundations), which in a society with a specific dualism of political and economic privileges the basis for obtaining political and economic pensions to become permanent.
Supposedly, this is achieved with an emancipation of the economic sphere of society, but on condition that the monopoly of the political sphere is not abolished (perhaps here in the first place are the actual obstacles to search for the realization of the reform).

Such a situation provoked an ever-stronger wave of labor strikes.

(2)

It is even harder to answer the other part of the question asked. Nevertheless, we want to answer three, probably the most real, possibilities of the further fate of strikes in Yugoslav society.

(a) A revival of the labor movement and the development of progressive social consciousness can lead to an affirmation of a modern communist movement based on the dialectical penetration of traditional value theories of the proletarian movement and the results of the scientific and technical revolution. Such a movement could be an essentially new attempt to establish relations of mind and reason, of spontaneity and instrumentalization of the historical possibilities of the movement (from this point of view the dilemma: radicalization or functionalization out of place). A spontaneous workers' movement, whose autonomy would not be absorbed by a political apparatus, could make possible permanent breakthroughs towards a socialization of politics with all the essential consequences of this process.

(b) a second possibility is a reproduction of the status quo in such a way that the extra-institutional conflicts are built into a positive institutional mechanism, thus ensuring a control of the extra-institutional conflicts, which, as was already borne in mind a few years ago, actually meant the powerlessness to socialize politics and the economy.⁷¹ Polemics about this have recently revived.⁷²

71 His scholarship was written in the year 1964 V. Rus. Er ist der Auftragsteller, das ist offene Einzelisierung von Plan und Markt in einem Selbstverwaltungsgen in der Work in height within the Global self-schaft führen kann - dann eine optimale Demokratie erungen nur als Institutionalisierung der Mangelökonomie (V. Rus, Symbioza der inneren lastništva, Perspective 1963-1964, Nr. 36-37, S. 858).

71 Sieh and J. Jerovšek, Conflict in Unserer Gesellschaft, Sociology, 1968,

*Nr. 4, J Perko-Separović, Conflict of interest in society lists Gesellschaft,
Gledišta, 1969, Nr. 1 and Z V i d a k o v ić , Gender Research Protest
Between Its Institutions (Streiks), Gle d išta. 1968, No. 1, S. 32 -3*

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Einerseits wird auf den positiven Seiten der Institutionalisierung bestanden (die wirksame Lösung der Konflikte, die komplizierte Prozedur eines Schiedsgerichts, würde die Bedingungen für einen Streik komplizieren und ihre Zahl zurückgehen lassen, die Vollmacht und die Verantwortung der Führungskörperschaft und der gesellschaftlich-politischen Organisationen würde sich vergrößern und ein Gleichgewicht zwischen Funktionären und Arbeitern hergestellt). Einen entgegengesetzten Standpunkt vertreten diejenigen, die der Meinung sind, daß eine Institutionalisierung der Streiks die Anerkennung bedeute, daß der Selbstverwaltungsweg zur Lösung der Konflikte nicht wirksam ist.

Eine Institutionalisierung der Konflikte, besonders wenn ihr Herd und die Entwicklung in der Globalgesellschaft nicht erfaßt werden, garantierte eine Reproduktion der bestehenden Gesellschaftsstruktur, hierbei sogar die Möglichkeit einer dauernden Symbiose von Politik und Wirtschaft auf dem Prinzip des schon erwähnten vereinten Egoismus mit eingeschlossen.

(c) Eine weitere Möglichkeit, deren reale Aussichten mit der Verringerung der Wahrscheinlichkeit, daß die ersten beiden realisiert werden, wachsen, ist nicht auszuschließen. Es ist nämlich möglich, daß der verarmte Teil der Gesellschaft, im Augenblick der Hoffnungslosigkeit und wegen des ungewissen Morgen zu machtvilligen Zuflucht nimmt, die einen Ausweg aus den Schwierigkeiten versprechen könnten, unter der Bedingung, daß sie faktisch und rechtlich unbegrenzte Gewalt erhalten.

Obwohl wir überzeugt sind, daß die erstere Möglichkeit die progressivste ist, sollen die letzten beiden nicht ausgeschlossen werden. Klar ist ferner, daß nicht eine der erwähnten Möglichkeiten in Reinform überwiegen wird, es handelt sich mithin nur darum, welche dominant wird.

political organizations). would increase and establish a balance between officials and workers). Opposite views are held by those who believe that institutionalizing the strikes means recognizing that the self-governing way of resolving conflicts is ineffective.

An institutionalization of the conflicts, especially if their source and the development in the global society are not grasped, guarantees a reproduction of the existing social structure, even including the possibility of a permanent symbiosis of politics and economy on the principle of the already mentioned united egoism.

(c)

Another possibility cannot be ruled out, the real prospects of which increase as the probability of the first two being realized decreases. In fact, it is possible that the impoverished part of society, in the moment of hopelessness and because of the uncertain tomorrow, will resort to powerful people who could promise a way out of the difficulties, provided that they are factually and legally unfounded - receive limited violence.

Although we are convinced that the former possibility is the most progressive, the latter two should not be ruled out.

It is also clear that not one of the possibilities mentioned will predominate in its pure form, it is therefore only a question of which becomes dominant.

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DEUX CONTRIBUTIONS A L'ANALYSE DU STALINISME TCHECOSLOVAQUE

Jozef Čemernik

I

L'auteur de cet article tentera de décrire et d'analyser la technique des investigations de la Sécurité de l'Etat en Tchécoslovaquie, ces quelques dernières années. Il tentera aussi de résoudre le problème des-dits aveux des prisonniers politiques arrêtés, qui ne savaient ni en quoi consistait leur culpabilité ni pourquoi ils avaient été arrêtés. Les raisons de l'intérêt que l'auteur porte à ce sujet, nous pouvons les trouver dans des expériences personnelles déterminées: dans les années 50, l'auteur travaillait comme psychologue clinique. En cours d'exercice de ce métier, il a eu l'occasion de s'entretenir »tête-à-tête« avec des personnes, qui après avoir été arrêtées en vertu de l'article 231, avaient sollicité l'aide d'un établissement psychiatrique. Menant ces conversations, l'auteur a été en possibilité de vérifier sur le matériel vivant l'information professionnelle de deux psychiatres américains (publiée dans »Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry«, en avril 1956), évoquant le »brain washing« et »l'effacement de la personnalité« au cours des procès d'investigations politiques, c'est-à-dire le-dit menticide. Cependant, dans l'étude de ce sujet l'auteur a un autre avantage, peut être le plus important: ses propres connaissances traumatiques datant de 1949, et des années d'après . . . , de sorte qu'il pouvait dès lors se joindre à ceux qui savait que la *Nuit à Midi*, le célèbre roman de A. Koestler, traduit parfois de façon aussi antinomie que *Zéro et l'illimité*, roman qui entre autre parle de la procédure des interrogatoires des prisonniers politiques, que ce roman est davantage littérature des faits que fiction littéraire.

Les circonstances de l'arrestation, de l'investigation, du jugement et de l'exécution de Roubashov, héro principal du roman, sont une image intentionnelle et documentée de l'expérience absurde qu'ont subie les victimes des représailles stalinienennes.

Comment est-il possible que les prisonniers et les détenus politiques envisageaient si souvent avec tant de résignation leur défense? Qu'est-

Joseph Čemernik

I

The author of this article will attempt to describe and analyze the technique of state security investigations in Czechoslovakia in the last few years. It will also be necessary to resolve the problem of the confessions of arrested political prisoners, who did not know what their guilt consisted of or why they had been arrested.

The reasons for the author's interest in this subject can be found in specific personal experiences: in the 1950s the author worked as a clinical psychologist. During the exercise of this profession, he had the opportunity to talk "tete-a-tete"

with people who, after being arrested under article 231, had sought help from a psychiatric institution. Conducting these conversations, the author was able to verify on living material the professional information of two American psychiatrists (published in »Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry«, in April 1956), evoking the »brain washing" and "1 erasure of the personality" during the political investigation process, that is to say the so-called menticide. However, in the study of this subject the author has another advantage, perhaps the most important: his own traumatic knowledge dating back to 1949, and years after. . . , so that he could henceforth join those who knew that La Nuit à Mardi, the famous novel by A. Koestler, sometimes translated in a manner as contradictory as Zero and Villimit, novel which, among other things, speaks of the procedure for the interrogation of political prisoners, that this novel is more literature of facts than literary fiction.

The circumstances of the arrest, investigation, trial and execution of Roubashov, the novel's main hero, are an intentional and documented image of the absurd experience suffered by the victims of Stalinist reprisals.

How is it possible that political prisoners and detainees so often looked upon their defense with such resignation? What-434

ce qui décidaient de leurs »aveux«, aujourd’hui déjà légendaires? Enfin, quelles étaient ces méthodes qui ont contraint des personnalités intelligentes et civilisées à se soumettre à la volonté des hommes primitifs occupant les positions des chefs de la sécurité d’Etat secrète? On se pose donc la question de savoir comment peut-on tuer la dignité humaine à l’aide d’interrogatoires policiers?

Tout d’abord, il convient de prendre en considération l’action de circonstances particulières: la-dite *situation de prison*. Deuxièmement, dans le menticide (c’est-à-dire assassinat de la personnalité humaine) participent des pressions *physiques, psychiques et »physiologique»*. Et enfin, troisièmement: au succès des méthodes d’enquête de la police politique contribuaient divers *trucs criminalistiques* traditionnels et non traditionnels. C’est en effet la routine qui constitue la stratégie de l’interrogatoire et son style, routine qui est acquise par entraînement avec pour base l’expérience de certaines méthodes étrangères, déjà vérifiées, d’arrachement des »aveux«. Tout ceci, employé ensemble devait servir un seul but: obtenir l’aveu du soupçonné. Et cet objectif ne pouvrait être réalisé qu’en brisant l’homme, en tuant sa personnalité – comme à l’époque de la Sainte Inquisition. Seulement des »hérétiques« et des »sorcières«, on en comptait chez nous, en Tchécoslovaquie, à peu près dix à quinze fois de plus qu’au Moyen Age. Et la Commission de Kolder en définitive n’était pas soi-disant en mesure d’établir la responsabilité de nos Ignace de Loyola nationaux.

Chez les détenus politiques le menticide est réalisé graduellement: à l’aide de procédés projetés d’avance depuis l’arrestation jusqu’à la sentence. Ces procédés pourraient être interprétés techniquement, de sorte que leur planification rationnelle provoque une sorte de respect froid. Il est caractéristique que la *technique de l’interrogatoire* se fonde sur une variante d’emploi du réflexe conditionné de I. P. Pavlov. L’expression mentionnée »brain washing« a été forgée par un reporter qui a interviewé des réfugiés de Hongkong. Cette expression décrit assez bien ce qui se passait avec des personnes intelligentes et capables, des hommes de volonté tenace qui, comme par exemple, des éminents communistes des années trente ou cinquante, ont avoué des crimes qu’ils n’avaient pas commis et qui, par-dessus le marché, exprimaient leur gratitude à leurs persécuteurs.

Avant que la police politique n’ait abordé sa tâche d’annulation des réflexes antérieurs des questionnés et d’»effacement» de tout ce qui constituait leur personnalité, les victimes futures avaient été, selon toute apparence, classées en catégories déterminées d’après les moyens qui devront être utilisés aux fins d’obtenir les »aveux«.

Bien que cette *évaluation* routinière ne se basait du tout sur une connaissance psychologique scientifique quelconque des types psychologiques, elle a été, et c’est ce qui est le plus étrange, dans la plupart des cas exacte. L’évaluation scientifique des types est lente, cependant que l’on exigeait de l’enquête d’agir rapidement et avec succès. Dans la mesure où l’investigation se déployait rapidement dès le début jusqu’à l’»aveu» complet, c’est dans la même mesure qu’augmentait

what decided their »confessions«, already legendary today? Finally, what were these methods that compelled intelligent and civilized personalities to submit to the will of primitive men occupying the positions of heads of secret state security?

We therefore ask ourselves the question of how can we kill human dignity with the help of police interrogations?

First of all, it is necessary to take into consideration the action of particular circumstances: the so-called prison situation. Secondly, in menticide (i.e. the assassination of the human personality) physical, psychic and »physiological« pressures take part.

And finally, third: to the success of the investigative methods of the political police contributed various traditional and non-traditional forensic truths. It is indeed the routine which constitutes the strategy of the interrogation and its style, routine which is acquired by training based on the experience of certain foreign methods, already verified, of extracting »confessions«. All this, used together, was to serve one purpose: to obtain the confession of the suspect. And this goal could only be achieved by breaking man, by killing his personality - as in the days of the Holy Inquisition. Only »heretics« and »witches«, there were about ten to fifteen times more here in Czechoslovakia than in the Middle Ages. And the Commission of Kolder ultimately was not supposedly able to establish the responsibility of our national Ignatius of Loyola.

Among political detainees, menticide is carried out gradually: with the help of procedures planned in advance, from arrest to sentencing. These processes could be interpreted technically, so that their rational planning provokes a kind of cold respect. It is characteristic that the interrogation technique is based on a variant of the use of the conditioned reflex of I. P. Pavlov.

The phrase "brain washing" mentioned was coined by a reporter who interviewed refugees from Hong Kong. This expression describes quite well what happened with intelligent and capable people, men of tenacious will who, for example, the eminent communists of the thirties or fifties, confessed to crimes which they had not committed and who, in addition, expressed their gratitude to their persecutors.

Before the political police had embarked on their task of canceling the previous reflexes of the questioned and of "erasing" all that constituted their personality, the future victims had, to all appearance, been classified into determined categories of after the means which will have to be used in order to obtain the »confessions«.

Although this routine assessment was not based at all on any scientific psychological knowledge of psychological types, it was, strangely enough, in most cases accurate. Scientific evaluation of types is slow, while investigation was required to act quickly and successfully. Insofar as the

investigation unfolded rapidly from the beginning until the complete "confession", it was to the same extent that 435

la valeur de l'»agent« en charge. Et vice versa, la renommée et les capacités de l'»agent« se voyaient sensiblement menacées s'il ne parvenait pas à arracher l'»aveu« du questionné.

Bien que la violence physique ait été employée dans les cas qui étaient »urgents« et dans les cas qui devaient être le premier maillon de la chaîne de l'arrestation ultérieure, la méthode de loin plus efficace a été la pression psychologique et tout ce qui en étais lié. Des gens perspicaces et rapidement adaptables étaient plus battus que les gens simples, alors que pour les compromis, selon la règle, la menace suffisait. Il importe de signaler le fait que les personnes avec un puissant sentiment de culpabilité devenaient proie facile de l'enquêteur. Ce fut aussi le cas avec, par exemple, des personnes d'orientation religieuse. A ces gens on prouvait facilement que leur conduite n'était pas »chrétienne«, si bien que l'enquête atteignait assez facilement son but en approfondissant leur sentiment de péché. Ces gens avouaient facilement que leur actes »non chrétiens« avaient porté atteinte au »peuple«, cependant que l'aveu du »crime contre le peuple« était une preuve suffisante dans le procès préparatoire.

Toutefois, les techniques d'interrogation se combinaient. Pour toutes les catégories de victimes était, au fonds, en vigueur un procédé selon lequel l'aveu était arraché par l'hétérosuggestion. Parallèlement, les enquêteurs s'efforçaient à ce que l'hétérosuggestion se transforme graduellement en autosuggestion: que la victime elle-même commence à croire en sa culpabilité. Un mensonge répété mille fois, et un mensonge appris à la perfection, devenait partie de la conscience de l'accusé. Il commençait à croire dans ce mensonge – évidemment, dans des conditions qui intensifiaient cette autosuggestion jusqu'à la folie.

C'est le schéma principal de l'aboutissement à l'»aveu«. Or, ce n'est pas tout. Ce schéma a sa méthodologie particulière très élaborée, que nous tenterons d'éclaircir maintenant.

Que la foi en général, et surtout la foi magique, est de toutes les capacités spirituelles le facteur le plus important dans le sort de l'homme, c'est là vraisemblablement une des plus anciennes théories socio-psychologiques. Le fait du »fidéisme« était devenu décisif, avant tout, pour les communistes arrêtés ou les hommes qui faisaient confiance au régime. S'il s'est révélé que la foi déclarée dans l'humanisme n'était, en effet, qu'un simple mensonge hypocrite, alors à la place de la foi antérieure s'instaurait un état libéré d'illusions. Le changement subit du contenu de la conscience religieuse crée le sentiment de chaos et de déjouement. Je suis convaincu que ce n'est que dans ce sens que les communistes et les »fidéistes« étaient dans une situation plus difficile que les autres qui n'avaient aucunes illusions du stalinisme.

Lévy-Bruhl et Blondel ont prouvé que l'homme civilisé ne comprend pas le primitif, tout comme l'homme sain ne comprend pas un fou. Les arrêtés étaient placés dans une situation analogue de séparation. Ils ont cessé de comprendre les hommes autour d'eux. C'est une donnée de notre expérience personnelle. *Or, ainsi nous avons cessé de nous comprendre nous-mêmes, car – per analogiam – l'homme civilisé ne peut pas se comprendre soi-même* s'il se trouve dans le milieu des

capacities of the »agent« were significantly threatened if he did not succeed in extracting the »confession« of the questioned.

Although physical violence was used in cases that were "urgent" and in cases that were to be the first link in the chain of subsequent arrest, the far more effective method was psychological pressure. and everything related to it. Shrewd and quickly adaptable people were beaten more than simple people, while for compromises, as the rule, the threat was enough. It is important to point out that people with a strong sense of guilt fell easy prey to the investigator.

This was also the case with, for example, people of religious orientation. It was easy to prove to these people that their behavior was not "Christian", so that the inquiry quite easily achieved its goal by deepening their feeling of sin. These people easily admitted that their "un-Christian" acts had damaged the

»people«, while the admission of the »crime against the people« was sufficient proof in the preparatory trial.

However, the interrogation techniques were combined. For all categories of victims, there was basically a procedure whereby confession was extracted by heterosuggestion. At the same time, the investigators strove to ensure that the heterosuggestion gradually transformed into autosuggestion: that the victim himself began to believe in his guilt. A lie repeated a thousand times, and a lie learned to perfection, became part of the conscience of the accused. He began to believe in this lie - obviously, under conditions which intensified this autosuggestion until madness.

This is the main schema of the culmination of the "confession". But that's not all. This scheme has its particular very elaborate methodology, which we will now try to clarify.

That faith in general, and especially magical faith, is of all spiritual capacities the most important factor in the fate of man, is probably one of the oldest socio-psychological theories. The fact of "fideism" had become decisive, above all, for arrested communists or men who trusted the regime. If it turned out that the declared faith in humanism was, indeed, a mere hypocritical lie, then in place of the previous faith there would be established a state free from illusions. . The sudden change in the content of religious consciousness creates the feeling of chaos and distraction. I am convinced that it is only in this sense that the communists and the "fideists" were in a more difficult situation than the others who had no illusions about Stalinism.

Levy-Bruhl and Blondel have proved that the civilized man does not understand the primitive, just as the sane man does not understand a madman. The arrested were placed in an analogous situation of separation. They have ceased to understand the men around them. This is a fact of our personal experience. Now, in this way we have ceased to understand ourselves, because - per analogiam - civilized man cannot understand himself if he finds himself in the middle of the 436

primitifs, comme l'homme sain ne l'est plus tout à fait dans le milieu des fous. Les ruines de la personnalité de l'homme commençaient à naître sur cette *perte d'identité personnelle*.

La seule façon par laquelle un détenu politique peut prouver son appartenance à soi-même et aux autres c'est sa réaction à la violence et l'injustice. Cependant, dans notre situation il se produisait souvent que tout espoir en la possibilité de ce genre de réaction était perdu. Toutefois, il faudrait envisager la chose tout à fait théoriquement. Pour ce qui est du mode de réaction à l'injustice et la violence, les hommes peuvent être répartis en deux groupes. Puisque pour notre objectif il serait approprié de différencier les caractéristiques psychologiques (en faisant abstraction des critères moraux), nous répartirons les victimes des représailles en »romantiques« et »existentiels«. Nous employons, donc, des modèles plus ou moins littéraires. Dans la situation de prison, peu de gens sont »romantiques«, comme le fut l'historique Dimitrov. Les intellectuels sont plutôt »existentiels«, comme Mersault de la nouvelle »L'Etranger« de Camus. Le sentiment d'outsider, caractéristique pour les intellectuels, s'accentue dans la situation de prison, de concert avec la résignation.

Un moyen de pression spécial, c'est le cachot – *l'isolement*. L'Homme est un être social. Depuis sa naissance jusqu'à la mort il vit parmi les hommes. Quand il est totalement isolé, il est dépourvu de tous rapports inter-humains qui sont très importants pour sa personnalité. Il est ainsi dépourvu de son rôle social qui le maintient en équilibre. Quand en prison il est placé dans l'isolement total, il développe en soi un groupe de symptômes qui caractérisent dans certains cas ce qui est convenu d'appeler la psychose de prison. La consternation est la première réaction de l'arrêté. Il passe plusieurs heures dans sa cellule dans un état perdu et agité. Mais, après un certain temps, chez la plupart des détenus l'espoir revient. Ils se comportent comme si la vie leur a été redonnée: ils s'interessent à leur entourage. Au début ils refusent la nourriture. Ils dorment très peu, avec interruption. Toutefois, quelques jours après le prisonnier conclut que toute hyperactivité ne vaut rien. Au bout de trois semaines, le prisonnier, selon la règle, cesse de s'occuper de son apparence. Il mange toute la portion de nourriture. Ce faisant il mélange tout comme si les règles habituelles de comportement ne l'intéresse pas du tout. Il accomplit automatiquement les activités de la vie intérieure d'une prison, ou le fait sans sentiment aucun. A côté de tout ceci, il donne l'impression de désirer ardemment l'interrogatoire, sans considération de son courage ou de sa peur. Au cours des premiers interrogatoires, il dit tout ce qui, à son avis, ne pourrait aller à sa charge. Dans cette phase de disposition de parler du prisonnier il suffit à l'enquêteur d'appliquer des trucs relativement simples.

Cependant, nombre de prisonniers restent tenaces même après un isolement prolongé, alors qu'il y a de ceux (et ce sont avant tout ceux qui avant l'arrestation avaient des dispositions anormales) qui tombent vite dans la psychose de prison: ils ont des hallucinations ou ils pleurent, parlent à eux-mêmes ou prient à haute voix. Les gardiens de prison suivent l'évolution des symptômes mentionnés avec un

primitive, as the healthy man is no longer altogether in the midst of the mad. The ruins of man's personality began to arise from this loss of personal identity.

The only way in which a political detainee can prove his belonging to himself and to others is his reaction to violence and injustice. However, in our situation it often happened that all hope in the possibility of this kind of reaction was lost.

However, this should be considered entirely theoretically.

In terms of the mode of reaction to injustice and violence, men can be divided into two groups. Since for our purpose it would be appropriate to differentiate between psychological characteristics (leaving aside moral criteria), we will divide the victims of reprisals into »romantic« and »existential«.

We therefore use more or less literary modules. In the prison situation, few people are "romantic", as the historical Dimitrov was. The intellectuals are rather »existential«, like M ersault of the short story »The Stranger« by Camus. The feeling of outsider, characteristic for intellectuals, is accentuated in the situation of prison, together with resignation.

A special means of pressure is the dungeon - isolation. Man is a social being. From birth until death he lives among men. When he is totally isolated, he is devoid of all inter-human relationships which are very important for his personality.

He is thus stripped of his social role which keeps him in balance.

When in prison he is placed in total isolation, he develops in himself a group of symptoms which characterize in certain cases what is commonly called prison psychosis. Conternation is the arrestee's first reaction. He spends several hours in his cell in a lost and agitated state. But, after a while, hope returns to most inmates. They behave as if life has been restored to them: they are interested in their surroundings. At first they refuse food. They sleep very little, with interruptions. However, a few days later the prisoner concludes that any hyperactivity is worth nothing. After three weeks, the prisoner, according to the rule, ceases to concern himself with his appearance. He eats the entire portion of food. In doing so he mixes up everything as if the usual rules of behavior do not interest him at all. He performs the activities of the inner life of a prison automatically, or does so without feeling. Besides all this, he gives the impression of ardently desiring the interrogation, regardless of his courage or his fear. During the first interrogations, he said everything that, in his opinion, could not be supported by him. In this phase of disposition to talk about the prisoner, the interviewer just has to apply relatively simple truths.

However, many prisoners remain tenacious even after prolonged isolation,

while there are those (and these are above all those who before the arrest had abnormal dispositions) who quickly fall into prison psychosis: they have hallucinations where they cry, talk to themselves or pray aloud. Prison guards track Involution of the mentioned symptoms with a 437

intérêt presque professionnel. Cette longue expérience les rend aptes à évaluer le moment quand l'isolement doit être interrompu. Ce moment intervient, selon la règle, lorsque se manifeste le danger que le prisonnier auquel on veut arracher son »aveu« ne devienne fou.

La peur qui agit parfois comme réaction alarmante est chose permanente dans la prison. Cette peur peut être difficilement remplacée par le sentiment de camaraderie qui se crée entre les hommes partageant la même cellule. L'affaiblissement de la volonté du prisonnier est en proportion directe avec la durée de cette peur. Le manque de nourriture et la mauvaise nourriture sont la cause de l'affaiblissement physique, alors que selon certaines théories, qui cherchent l'origine organique des neuroses dans le diencéphale où sont logés aussi les centres de la faim, la faim aboutit aux multiples *neuroticismes* et avec eux à l'approfondissement de la peur.

Le matraquage était appliqué dans les prisons tchécoslovaques comme punition directe pour les péchés de classe ou hérétiques commis. Les membres du »groupe pour le matraquage« de Brno utilisaient un tuyau de caoutchouc qu'ils appelaient, par rapport aux associations les plus vulgaires, le »rêve des filles«. Le but pratique principal était d'implanter chez le prisonnier le sentiment de la peur et de l'impuissance. Ce fut là une *leçon générale*. Tout d'abord, on mettait une bande sur les yeux du prisonnier. La victime ne devait savoir d'où partaient les coups. Ainsi, on augmentait ce sentiment de la peur et de l'impuissance. Le plus souvent, on frappait les plantes nues des pieds. Ceci était, soi-disant, un vieille coutume de châtiment originale d'Asie.

Le rendement du mauvais traitement physique était augmentait par la ridiculisation ainsi que par le »jeu« auquel les enquêteurs se lavaient avec le détenu. Quand ils contraignaient le prisonnier, bande au yeux, de marcher en rond, ce »jeu« s'appelait »carrousel«. Les coups pleuvaient de toute part. Parmi les enquêteurs il y a eu beaucoup de »homo ludens« avec un gout pour l'exploration. Cependant, sur la base de nombre de témoignages semblables, il nous est possible de conclure que ces »jeux« faisaient partie des méthodes généralement appliquées.

L'action des drogues (vraisemblablement une certaine mixture de benzodrine) qui ont été utilisées dans certains cas, peut être imaginée seulement par celui qui les a employé et dans des quantités considérables. Les états cliniques des brèves psychoses, dites expérimentales, démontrent le changement de la structure de la personnalité: l'homme tout à coup perd son identité de caractère. Quelque chose de semblable se produisait chez les prisonniers politiques dans les moments d'autoaccusation. Après l'action de la drogue, l'homme demeure dans l'état de désorientation.

Un des anciens détenus m'a décrit cet état de désorientation: »C'est quand l'homme commence à sentir, comme d'une certaine distance, que quelque chose disparaît de son intérieur et que tout, en lui et dehors, reçoit une autre physionomie en raison de laquelle il n'est plus en mesure de se retrouver dans la réalité.« Depuis l'enfance nous construisons des systèmes de notions qui nous permettent de commu-

Fear, which sometimes acts as an alarming reaction, is a permanent thing in the prison. It is difficult to replace this fear with the feeling of camaraderie that is created between the men involved.

living in the same cell. The weakening of the prisoner's will is in direct proportion to the duration of this fear. The lack of food and the bad food are the cause of the physical weakening, whereas according to certain theories, which seek the organic origin of the neuroses in the diencephalon where are lodged also the centers of the hunger, the hunger leads to multiple neuroticisms and with them to the deepening of fear.

The bludgeoning was applied in Czechoslovak prisons as a direct punishment for class or heretical sins committed.

The members of the Brno »clubbing group« used a rubber hose which they called, in relation to the most vulgar associations, the »girls' dream«. The main practical aim was to instill in the prisoner the feeling of fear and helplessness. This was a general lesson. First, a blindfold was put on the prisoner's eyes. The victim must not have known where the blows were coming from. In this way, we increased this feeling of fear and helplessness. Most often, the bare soles of the feet are struck. This was, supposedly, an old custom of punishment originating in Asia.

The return to physical abuse was increased by ridicule as well as by the "game" that the investigators engaged in with the inmate. When they forced the prisoner, blindfolded, to walk in circles, this »game« was called »carrousel«. Blows rained down from all sides. Among the investigators there were many »homo ludens« with a taste for exploration. However, on the basis of a number of similar testimonies, it is possible for us to conclude that these »games« were part of the methods generally applied.

The action of the drugs (presumably some mixture of bezendrine) which have been used in some cases can only be imagined by the person who has used them and in considerable quantities. The clinical states of the brief psychoses, called experimental, demonstrate the change in the structure of the personality: the man suddenly loses his character identity. Something similar happened to political prisoners in moments of self-incrimination. After the action of the drug, the man remains in a state of disorientation.

One of the former prisoners described this state of disorientation to me: "It is when the man begins to feel, as if from a certain distance, that something is disappearing from his interior and that everything, inside and outside him, , receives another physiognomy due to which he is no longer able to find himself in reality.

niquer avec les autres hommes. Nous sommes contraints de modifier notre premier système de symboles privés pour que les autres puissent les comprendre. L'homme doit accepter ce rapport entre son langage et les phénomènes extérieurs qui serait conforme aux règles déjà existantes dans le reste du monde. Cependant, l'expérience personnelle est plus importante que ces règles, expériences qui, dans des conditions déterminées, peuvent nous blesser si des règles changées ne correspondent pas à ses données. Les neurophysiologues l'appellent »écroulement« (détachement).

Pour atteindre la désorientation de l'arrêté et du questionné, les enquêteurs recourraient, par exemple, à l'emploi systématique du mensonge: ils donnaient de fausses promesses, de fausses déclarations. Après l'interrogatoire qui comprenait la violence physique, on disait au prisonnier: »La prochaine fois tu seras battu encore plus!« Or, contrairement à ce que l'on s'attendait, l'interrogatoire suivant se déroulait sous le signe de la persuasion calme. En revanche, il se passait que l'on dise au prisonnier: »Eh bien, vous vous en êtes débarrassé, la prochaine fois il ne vous reste qu'à signer le protocole, et tout sera en ordre.« Dans ce cas, on procédait à l'interrogatoire pendant la nuit et au maltraitemen nocturne obligatoire. Or, avant de pouvoir saisir le paradoxe de la signalisation de l'enquêteur, le prisonnier était déjà, selon la règle, à bout de ses forces.

Etre à bout de forces – ce devait être, en effet, le sort logique de chaque »pécheur« interrogé de façon rationnelle. Au menticide on ne parvient que par l'effravante *exhaustion* (épuisement). C'était, dirons-nous, la deuxième méthode conceptuelle généralement acceptée, elle aussi. Ayant devant soi une victime totalement épuisée, l'»enquêteur« parvenait à construire des stéréotypes introduits suggestivement. En ce sens, la formule habituelle que la prison est en fait »rééducation« correspondait parfaitement. L'idée de cette dressure mentale conditionnée (rendue possible par l'»effacement« de la personnalité primaire) tire son origine, selon certaines sources, de la pratique de dressure des faucons de chasse. Ces faucons sont utilisés en effet par les chasseurs de Gruzie pour la chasse au petit gibier. Ces oiseaux sauvages, comme les chevaux au rodéo, sont dressés par épuisement systématique. Ainsi dressés, ils sont facilement dominés par leur maître. L'épuisement prête également concours aux méthodes pratiquées encore par l'inquisition de Venise, telles que par exemple, le réveil systématique au cours de la nuit, ou les interrogatoires nocturnes longs et très fréquents. Un autre moyen d'épuisement consistait à maintenir les gens debout: après 24 heures les pieds enflent en raison de l'extravasation des liquides et des vaisseaux sanguins. La peau se tend sur les pieds et devient très douloureuse. La circulation est perturbée, les attaques cardiaques se répètent suivies par le collapsus cardiaque. La fonction des reins est atteinte: l'urine ne se produit pas et le prisonnier a terriblement soif; il boit de l'eau qui n'est pas sécrétée mais augmente l'enflure des pieds. Les personnes qui ont été contraintes de rester debout pendant quelques jours tombaient dans des situations délirantes qui se caractérisaient par la perte d'orientation, la peur et les hallucinations visuelles.

fuck with other men. We are forced to modify our first system of private symbols so that others can understand them. Man must accept this relationship between his language and external phenomena which would conform to the rules already existing in the rest of the world. However,

personal experience is more important than these rules, experiences which, under certain conditions, can hurt us if changed rules do not correspond to its data. Neurophysiologists call it

»écroulement« (detachment).

To achieve the disorientation of Tarrete and the questioned, the investigators resorted, for example, to the systematic use of lies: they gave false promises, false declarations.

After the interrogation, which included physical violence, the prisoner was told: "Next time you will be beaten even more!" calm persuasion. On the other hand, it happened that the prisoner was told: "Well, you got rid of it, next time you just have to sign the protocol, and everything will be in order". In this case, the interrogation was carried out during the night and the obligatory nocturnal mistreatment. However, before being able to grasp the paradox of the signaling of the investigator, the prisoner was already, according to the rule, at the end of his strength.

To be exhausted - this must indeed be the logical fate of every rationally questioned »sinner«. Menticide can only be achieved by frightening exhaustion (exhaustion). This was, shall we say, the second generally accepted conceptual method, too. With a totally exhausted victim in front of him, the »investigator«

managed to construct suggestively introduced stereotypes. In this sense, the usual formula that prison is in fact "reeducation".

matched perfectly. The idea of this conditioned mental training (made possible by the "erasure" of the primal personality) has its origin, according to some sources, in the training practice of hunting falcons. These falcons are mainly used by the hunters of Gruzie for hunting small game. These wild birds, like horses at the rodeo, are trained by systematic exhaustion. Thus trained, they are easily dominated by their master.

Exhaustion also lends itself to the methods still practiced by the Venetian Inquisition, such as, for example, the systematic awakening during the night, or the long and very frequent nocturnal interrogations. Another means of exhaustion was to keep people upright: after 24 hours the feet swell due to extravasation of fluids and blood vessels. The skin stretches on the feet and becomes very painful. Circulation is disrupted, repeated heart attacks followed by cardiac collapse. The function of the kidneys is affected: urine does not come out and the prisoner is terribly thirsty; he drinks water which is not secreted but increases the swelling of the feet. People who were forced to stand for a few days fell into delirious situations

characterized by loss of orientation, fear and visual hallucinations.

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Tous les moyens et techniques décrites, depuis la désillusion par la peur jusqu'au matraquage et les réveils nocturnes systématiques, seraient le même but: l'épuisement. Une fois au bout de ses forces, et une fois que sa personnalité est en effet morte et sans volonté, l'homme ne perd pas seulement son identité mais souvent son *instinct de vie* fondamental.

Il existe cependant, une autre carte dans le jeu – la dernière carte, l'acte final: *l'attitude «amicale» de l'enquêteur*. Il découle de l'analyse même de l'isolement que le détenu désire éviter, à tout prix, que l'interaction psychologique entre l'enquêteur et le détenu devienne plus importante que les aspects physiques. Plusieurs fois au cours de l'interrogatoire, et de toute façon vers la fin de celui-ci, les enquêteurs affichent leur »visage humain«. Ceci se passait, selon la règle, au moment où l'interrogé était à bout de forces. L'»enquêteur« faisait alors partie de son désir – qui est semblable à celui du prisonnier – de terminer toute l'affaire. Il lui disait qu'il n'était pas absolument content de la situation de devoir prouver à l'arrêté ses »crimes«. Rarement le prisonnier fut si têtu pour refuser les cigarettes offertes, la bonne nourriture, ou l'amélioration du régime dans la cellule. Pour l'arrêté, cette »amitié« subite et la réduction de la tension et des mouvements de contraintes avait un effet paliatif. Comme s'il menait une conversation de tous les jours, l'arrêté s'entretenait avec son »agent« de sa famille, de ses enfants, de sa femme, de ses parents; il lui parlait de ses sentiments et de ses idéaux. Sans le savoir, l'arrêté offrait ainsi des informations lesquelles, dans le contexte des »lois« très largement conçues, pouvaient servir à des fins d'accusation ultérieure.

Cependant la *fausse projection* a été déjà durablement et en tant que segment introduite dans l'âme de l'interrogé. Ce n'est qu'ainsi qu'il pouvait lui devenir »ami«: l'enquêteur de la sécurité d'Etat devient un »copain«. Le coupable en est le système qui les a constraint, comme le prisonnier commence à penser, à jouer le rôle qu'ils ont joué. Le prisonnier ressent un terrible besoin pour la société des hommes et la camaraderie qu'il va jusqu'à oublier la violence que l'enquêteur pratiquait à son égard. C'est avec indulgence qu'il »comprend l'ami«, le premier à lui adresser une parole amicale, agissant en tant que force de l'extérieur, après plusieurs mois de détention. Cette absurdité kafkaienne assumait parfois de telles dimensions que l'interrogé politique insistait, pendant son jugement, sur son »aveu« en raison seulement de sa conviction intime qu'il aurait été impossible de trahir son »ami l'agent«.

Les condamnés à mort remerciaient les bourreaux quand ils leur mettaient la corde au cou, à l'image de Roubashov dans le roman de Koestler. On dit que cela n'est que le signe du désir de fuir de la réalité dans le néant, de mettre fin aux souffrances. Tout est possible dans de telles conditions. Il est possible aussi, que cette dernière amabilité du condamné vis-à-vis de son bourreau soit le résultat de la »rééducation«. D'autres explications peuvent exister également. De toute façon cet *acte final du menticide* dérobe à nos yeux la métaphysique de la récente histoire tchécoslovaque.

but often his basic life instinct.

There is, however, another card in the deck - the last card, the final act: the »friendly« attitude of the Hunter. It follows from the very analysis of the isolation that the prisoner wishes to avoid, at all costs, that

The psychological interaction between the investigator and the detainee becomes more important than the physical aspects. Several times during the interrogation, and in any case towards the end of it, the investigators display their »human face«. This happened, according to the rule, at the moment when the interrogated was exhausted. The "investigator" then expressed his desire - which is similar to that of the prisoner - to end the whole affair. He told him that he was not absolutely happy with the situation of having to prove his "crimes" on arrest. Rarely has the prisoner been so stubborn to refuse offered cigarettes, good food, or improved diet in the cell. For him, this sudden "friendship" and the reduction of tension and means of constraint had a palliative effect. As if carrying on an everyday conversation, the arrestee converses with his »agent«

his family, his children, his wife, his parents; he spoke to her of his feelings and his ideals. Unknowingly, the order thus offered information which, in the context of the very broadly conceived »laws«, could be used for the purposes of subsequent prosecution.

However, the false projection has already been durably and as a segment introduced into the soul of the interrogated. Only then could he become a »friend« to her: the state security investigator becomes a »buddy«. The culprit is the system that compelled them, as the prisoner begins to think, to play the part they did. The prisoner feels a terrible need for the society of men and the camaraderie that he goes so far as to forget the violence that the investigator practiced against him. It is with indulgence that he "understands the friend", the first to address him a friendly word, acting as a force from the outside, after several months of detention. This Kafkaesque absurdity sometimes assumed such dimensions that the political questioner insisted, during his judgment, on his "confession" solely because of his intimate conviction that it would have been impossible to hear his »friend the agent«.

Those sentenced to death thanked the executioners when they put the noose around their necks, like Roubashov in Koestler's novel. It is said that this is only the sign of the desire to flee from reality into nothingness, to put an end to suffering. Anything is possible under such conditions. It is also possible that this last friendliness of the condemned towards his executioner is the result of »re-education«. Other explanations may also exist. In any case, this final act of the menticide steals from our eyes the metaphysics of

II

Dans la vie d'une nation il y a nombre de détails que l'individu est susceptible d'oublier, mais que la société préserve. Il existe ce qu'on appelle la »mémoire sociale« (Maurice Halbwachs). Cependant, la société, c'est-à-dire ses institutions filtrent ces mémoires laissant survivre seulement celles qui sont en conformité avec ses points de vues d'actualité. En ce sens agissent, avant tout, les instruments idéologiques du pouvoir: on tire à la lumière du jour, ci et là, des traditions et des mythes qui, sous la condition de la-dite interprétation politique correcte, peuvent justifier le cours donné. Rappelons-nous dans quels buts le stalinisme en Tchécoslovaquie recourrait à l'idée traditionnelle du panslavisme, en mettant l'accent sur la position géographique de la plus grande nation slave. Quand chez nous on écrivait jusqu'à présent qu'un pays de l'Europe centrale était, en effet, un pays de l'Europe de l'Est, alors il ne s'agissait pas de connaissances insuffisantes de la géographie, mais d'une déficience de la mémoire sociale cultivée des années durant (pendant vingt ans au moins).

Etant donné que la politique n'est pas seulement l'art du possible, mais aussi l'art de faire des promesses qui ne seront jamais remplies, étant donné que la tactique politique s'efforce de réfaçonner la mémoire de la réalité politique quotidienne selon ses besoins, il faudrait toujours trouver des moyens appropriés pour que les souvenirs sociaux, de quelle époque que ce soit, soient vérifiés et soient remis à la lumière du jour. J'estime que l'actuel principe, généralement proclamé, de l'expertise sociale scientifique dans la politique devrait être appliqué de sorte à rappeler à nos organisations politiques et à certains de nos représentants leur mémoire assez courte.

L'histoire, comme on le sait, aime bien l'ironie. Compte tenu des deux dernières guerres mondiales, nous avons appris à traiter les Allemands en militaristes, en dépit du fait que cette caractéristique aurait été erronée, il y a un siècle, car à l'époque les Français étaient considérés de militaristes par excellence. Au cours des cent ans suivants les Suédois étaient connus comme une nation belligérante, bien qu'ils soient aujourd'hui des pacifistes exemplaires et possèdent même un complexe de neutralité.

Comment les choses se présentent-elles avec les Tchèques et les Slovaques? Depuis le printemps 1968, dans tout le monde civilisé on apprécie positivement les caractéristiques de nos deux nations respectives. On a en vue, en effet, les événements bien connu. Cependant, l'appréciation actuelle et en fin de compte les preuves historiques que nous étions toujours un peuple »bon« et »perspicace«, semblent négliger ce qui se passait avec nos nations au cours des 50 dernières années, ce qui se passait pendant ces années avec notre culture et notre caractère national.

Presque chacun d'entre nous a ressenti sur sa propre peau une certaine interruption, un déplacement du développement ou la censure dans la »bonne« tradition de nos nations. Il s'agit d'un côté pas tout à fait non essentiel de notre pratique politique des cinquante dernières années: de la-dite *pratique de cadres*. Grâce à celle-ci, nombre de fonctionnaires, aujourd'hui peut-être déjà anonymes, parvinrent

In the life of a nation there are many details which the individual is liable to forget, but which society preserves. There is what is called "social memory" (Maurice Halbwachs). However, society, that is to say its institutions, filters these memories, leaving only those that are in conformity with its current points of view to survive. In this sense act, above all, the ideological instruments of power: here and there, traditions and myths are brought to light which, under the condition of the so-called correct political interpretation, can justify the course given. Let us remember for what purposes Stalinism in Czechoslovakia resorted to the traditional idea of pan-Slavism, emphasizing the geographical position of the largest Slavic nation. When with us it was written until now that a country of Central Europe was, in fact, a country of Eastern Europe, then it was not a question of insufficient knowledge of geography, but of a deficiency of social memory cultivated for years (for at least twenty years).

Since politics is not only the art of the possible, but also the art of making promises that will never be fulfilled, since political tactics strive to reshape the memory of everyday political reality according to needs, appropriate ways should always be found to ensure that social memories, of whatever era, are verified and brought to light. I believe that the current, generally proclaimed principle of scientific social expertise in politics should be applied in such a way as to remind our political organizations and some of our representatives of their rather short memory.

History, as we know, loves irony. In view of the last two world wars, we have learned to treat the Germans as militarists, despite the fact that this characteristic would have been wrong a century ago, because at the time the French were considered militarists par excellence. . For the next hundred years the Swedes were known as a belligerent nation, although today they are exemplary pacifists and even possess a neutrality complex.

How are things with Czechs and Slovaks? Since the spring of 1968, the whole civilized world has positively appreciated the characteristics of our two respective nations. One has in view, indeed, the well-known events. However, the current appreciation and ultimately the historical evidence that we were always a 'good' and 'sharp' people, seems to overlook what was happening with our nations over the past 50 years, what was happening during those years with our culture and our national character.

Almost every one of us has felt on our own skin some interruption, displacement of development or censorship in the "good" tradition of our nations. This is a not entirely non-essential side of our political practice of the last fifty years: the so-called practice of cadres. Thanks to this, a

à diviser les citoyens de l'Etat en »mandarins« de cadres (Trotzky) et le plebs de cadres. C'est ainsi qu'on a cultivé en Tchécoslovaquie un genre particulier de »philistine rouge (Koestler). Dans cette pratique se passait vraiment des choses dignes de la sensibilité absurde contemporaine. A titre d'illustration, nous donnerons un exemple de mai 1968. C'est un exemple représentatif. Un certain ministre a envoyé des document de cadres à un homme qui a regagné son poste important après un intervalle de vingt ans. L'homme incriminé a commencé à feuilleter ce document dans lequel il a trouvé aussi un dossier qui le concernait. Toutefois, rapidement il a cessé de le lire. Il l'a retourné au ministre avec remarque qu'il ne désire pas détruire les dernières illusions sur ses amis et ses anciens copains qui, il y a vingt ans, avaient écrit ses caractéristiques.

La pratique de cadres n'est pas – comme d'ailleurs la majeure partie du mal antérieur – une invention tchécoslovaque. Cette pratique a été inventée et élaborée par le bureaucrate du parti soviétique Malenkov, le premier discipline de Staline. Cette invention semble avoir apportée, en dernière ligne, à son inventeur la victoire dans la lutte de vie ou de mort avec le deuxième héritier potentiel de Staline – Voznesensky.

La pratique de cadres était appliquée en Tchécoslovaquie selon le modèle habituel. Ainsi, il était possible de soumettre chaque citoyen au contrôle, le faisant dans le point le plus vulnérable: dans son existence matérielle. Dans de telles conditions, les entreprises deviennent des lieux dans lesquels se manifeste le pouvoir impersonnel et sans merci sur l'homme. Il n'y a pas de possibilités – a peu d'exceptions près – de se procurer un emploi en dehors de l'entreprise. Personne ne peut éviter d'être tenu en évidence. Chaque entreprise possédait un département de cadres, et celui-ci détenait en sa possession des documents secret décidant irrévocablement du sort de l'homme. La rue complétait ce que les départements de cadres ne pouvaient apprendre. Personne n'a pu, et ne le peut vraisemblablement encore, se débarrasser des commérages, des demi-vérités et des mensonges. Ceci rappelle certainement les thèmes de Kafka, les situations d'autant plus vaines et plus absurdes que la victime de la pratique des cadres ne recherchait pas d'explications. Il arrivait parfois que quelqu'un parvenait à pouver le non-fondée de l'accusation, à l'aide, par exemple, de document qui contestait l'accusation. Toutefois, le faux document de l'accusation demeurait dans le dossier de la victime. Ce matériel était conservé pour toute éventualité, pour être un baton à la portée de la main en cas d'exécution du chien d'affaires.

Cette pratique de cadres ne crée pas seulement un système d'obéissance et de peur. Aujourd'hui il est déjà possible de dire qu'elle a été inscrite dans l'histoire de nos nations comme la *mémoire sociale* du stalinisme. De ce fait, il convient de s'en rappeler aujourd'hui sans cesse comme, au moins, d'une relique tristement célèbre – en tenant compte de l'impératif du développement d'après-janvier: »que cela ne se répète jamais«.

Prenons en considération deux connaissances de la psychologie sociale plus récente. Si une nation n'est pas en mesure de donner à quelque chose son nom, alors ou cette chose ne mérite pas d'être mention-

was cultivated in Czechoslovakia. In this practice, things really happened worthy of contemporary absurd sensibility. By way of illustration, we will give an example from May 1968. This is a representative example. A certain minister sent executive documents to a man who has returned to his important post after an interval of twenty years. The accused man began to leaf through this document in which he also found a file which concerned him. However, soon he stopped reading it. He returned it to the minister with the remark that he does not wish to destroy the last illusions about his friends and old cronies who, twenty years ago, had written his characteristics.

The practice of frames is not - like moreover the majority of the previous evil - a Czechoslovak invention. This practice was invented and developed by the bureaucrat of the Soviet party Malenkov, Stalin's first discipline. This invention seems to have ultimately brought its inventor victory in the life-and-death struggle with Stalin's second potential heir -

Voznesensky.

The cadre practice was applied in Czechoslovakia according to the usual model. Thus, it was possible to subject each citizen to control, making him in the most vulnerable point: in his material existence. Under such conditions, companies become places in which impersonal and merciless power over man manifests itself. There are no possibilities - with few exceptions - of obtaining a job outside the company. No one can avoid being held in evidence. Each company had a department of managers, and this had in its possession secret documents that irrevocably decided the fate of the man. The street completed what the departments of managers could not learn. No one has been able, and probably still can, get rid of gossip, half-truths and lies.

This is certainly reminiscent of Kafka's themes, the situations all the more vain and absurd in that the victim of the practice of cadres did not seek explanations. It sometimes happened that someone was able to disprove the accusation, with the help, for example, of documents which disputed the accusation. However, the forged prosecution document remained in the victim's file. This material was kept for any eventuality, to be a handy stick in case of execution of the business dog.

This practice of frames does not only create a system of obedience and fear. Today it is already possible to say that it has been inscribed in the history of our nations as the social memory of Stalinism. It should therefore be remembered constantly today as, at least, an infamous relic - bearing in mind the development imperative of 'after January: »May this never happen again«.

Consider two insights from more recent social psychology. If a nation is unable to give something its name, then that thing is not worthy of mention-442

née ou alors elle mérite une telle attention que l'on ne doit pas en parler. Et ensuite: dès que l'expérience est déformée par les conflits, par les pressions et la peur, la langue se déforme.

La plupart des déclarations et des caractéristiques dans les documents de cadres constituent un langage dont les notions devraient paraître univoques et codifiées le plus rigidelement possible. Cependant, justement cette codification fausse et cet aspect »univoque« découvrent automatiquement ce langage dans le sens sémantico-logique. Il s'agit d'un vocabulaire dont chaque mot est lié à un complet de principes qui les appuient de façon inadmissible (et insensée, par là même) car ils impliquent des significations tout à fait arbitraires. C'est un vocabulaire de nonsens, car leurs contenus ne sont jamais exactement délimités, mais apparaissent comme réellement éphémères.

Comment peut-on, aujourd'hui, évaluer la déclaration qu'un citoyen des années cinquante avait une »attitude positive« vis-à-vis de notre système, qu'il lui a été »complètement dévoué«, et d'autres? Cette appréciation peut-elle être saisie comme »bonne« ou »positive«?

Toute caractéristique de cadre peut, sans aucun doute, illustrer mieux que le roman du réalisme socialiste le langage stalinien, dont Roland Barthes a fait une analyse sémantique. C'est un »langage« dominé par la stricte séparation du bien et du mal. Parallèlement, il est dominé par des *tautologies* qui ne concernent pas seulement une caractéristique de cadre déterminée, mais présentent la réalité selon un mode de valeur préconçu. Que se passe-t-il alors? Lors de tout revirement politique, il apparaît que l'ancienne valorisation de la réalité avait été fausse. Saisir la simple facticité, c'est-à-dire ce quelque chose qui constituait notre ancien »ordre«, d'après lequel une personnalité déterminée était appréciée comme »positive«, pourrait dans le revirement politique actuel recevoir un signe de valeur »négatif«. Il y a encore la possibilité que cette caractéristique soit un témoignage de quelque chose d'autre: un témoignage du mimétisme civique. Là déjà, nous nous débrouillons difficilement; comme tant d'autres choses de l'époque en question cela demeure aussi un problème de la conscience privée. Cependant, la monstruosité incontestable de la pratique de cadres a été confirmée grâce à la limite spirituelle des exécuteurs. Tout était réduit à quelques formules stéréotypées pratiques. Les méthodes valorisantes et le vocabulaire des caractéristiques étaient d'un esprit extrêmement pauvre. De simples fonctionnaires se comportaient comme s'ils savaient davantage de la personnalité humaine que l'ensemble de la psychologie sociale. Cette dernière n'étant, en effet, pas en mesure de décrire en quelques mots la personnalité de quel homme que ce soit.

Bien que nous ne nous occupions pas ici de l'analyse sémantique des notions de cadres, nous ne pouvons ne pas nous rappeler l'entropie totale de la signification et de la non-détermination des valorisations énoncées dans la plupart des caractéristiques. Ceci se produisait vraisemblablement sous l'influence des opinions que l'on appelle »opinions en complexe« dans la pathopsychologie. Par conséquent il faut traduire le langage des cadres: »L'ancien rapport positif vis-à-vis de l'ordre« dans la simple logique des chefs des départements de cadres, en tenant compte de leur »réflexion en complexe« qui permet des con-

nee or else it deserves such attention that we should not talk about it. And then: as soon as the experience is deformed by conflicts, by pressures and by fear, language becomes deformed.

Most of the statements and characteristics in the framework documents constitute a language whose notions should appear unambiguous and codified as rigidly as possible. However, precisely this false coding and this »univocal« aspect automatically de-mess this language in the semantic-logical sense. It is a vocabulary in which each word is linked to a set of principles which support them in an inadmissible (and senseless, by the same way) way because they imply completely arbitrated meanings. It is a vocabulary of nonsense, because their contents are never exactly delimited, but appear to be truly ephemeral.

How can we, today, evaluate the statement that a citizen of the fifties had a "positive attitude" towards our system, that he was "completely devoted" to it, and others?

Can this appreciation be entered as »good« or »positive«?

Any framing characteristic can, without a doubt, better illustrate the Stalinist language, of which Roland Barthes has made a semantic analysis, better than the novel of socialist realism. It's a "language"

dominated by the strict separation of good and evil. At the same time, it is dominated by tautologies which do not only concern a determined frame characteristic, but present the b a lite according to a preconceived mode of value. What happens then? During any political reversal, it appears that the old valuation of reality had been wrong. Grasping simple facticity, that is to say that something which constituted our old "order", according to which a determined personality was apprehended as "positive", could in the current political reversal receive a sign of "negative" value. ". There is still the possibility that this characteristic is a testimony to something else: a testimony to civic mimicry. The already, we manage with difficulty; like so many other things of the time in question it also remains a problem of private conscience. However, the indisputable monstrousness of the practice of frames was confirmed thanks to the spiritual limit of the executors. Everything was reduced to a few practical stereotyped formulas. The valuing methods and the vocabulary of characteristics were extremely poor in spirit. Mere functionaries behaved as if they knew more about human personality than all of social psychology. The latter, in fact, not being able to describe in a few words the personality of any man whatsoever.

Although we are not concerned here with the semantic analysis of the notions of frames, we cannot fail to recall the total entropy of the meaning

and the non-determination of the valuations stated in most of the characteristics. This presumably occurred under the influence of the opinions which are called "complex opinions" in pathopsychology. Consequently, it is necessary to translate the language of executives: »The old positive relation vis-a-vis order« into the simple logic of the heads of executive departments, taking into account their »reflection in complex" which allows con443

nexions entre le différent et ne cherche pas les causes de l'existant, signifiait quelque chose comme »véritable rapport de camarade« ce qui est d'autre part une étiquette habituelle des époques qui ne disent rien. Cependant, il s'agit peut-être d'un cryptogramme pour une attitude représentée par l'illusion fausse et la fausse confiance.

Quand nous songeons, par exemple, à l'état d'esprit de l'époque quand Gottwald employait le slogan *Croyez au parti, camarades!*, c'est-à-dire à la situation des grands procès contre les communistes, nous saisissons un des mythes politiques: le mythe de la confiance dans le parti, et cette confiance les responsables des cadres – comme ils le disaient eux-mêmes – »conservevaient comme la pupille de l'œil». C'est au nom de cela que dans la politique de cadres on a connu de véritables orgies de vérifications et de changements. Toutes les »erreurs« commises par les fonctionnaires du parti étaient justifiées comme des »erreurs de foi« et des »péchés d'amour« ... Il s'agissait cependant d'un jésuitisme bien conçu. Au nom de la tactique, tous moyens étaient bons pour la défense. Et ce par quoi on envenimait les rapports inter-humains était pire que »La Peste« de Camus: contre celle-ci on pouvait lutter en effet par honnêteté personnelle.

Dans le parti du type stalinien on ne peut pas mener une lutte en s'appuyant sur l'honnêteté personnelle. Par conséquent, nombre de communistes qui désiraient et avaient la possibilité de voir plus nettement étaient tombés dans la résignation et la passivité. La passivité était motivée par l'expérience affreuse et la conscience du *moral de parti absolu*. La lutte contre le mal crée un autre mal, de sorte qu'elle devient superflue et vaine. Cette résignation était punie, dans le contexte de la pratique de cadres, par »le camarade est passif« ou »le camarade est un défaitiste«.

Indépendamment de la volonté individuelle, étant donné que la mentalité bureaucratisée exerçait une influence sur la psychologie des citoyens, on voyait apparaître un autre mécanisme caractéristique. Chez des citoyens simples se créait un jésuitisme, bien que sous forme naïve et subconsciente. Non seulement les personnes qui travaillaient pour la sécurité d'Etat secrète, mais même des gens agréables et honnêtes étaient capables, dans leur vie privée, de faire des choses des plus affreuses au nom de l'»idée supérieure». Les formes de pression dans leur forme symbolique et objectivée mettaient à profit et abusaient du phénomène déjà pérçu selon lequel la masse qui n'a pas de fondements démocratiques n'accumule pas seulement le mal et la cruauté, mais on relève chez elle, avant tout, la réduction du quotient de la maturité spirituelle.

C'est ainsi qu'il est arrivé que la deuxième évaluation de cadres »membre honnête du parti« ne signifie, en Tchécoslovaquie, rien d'autre qu'une présentation succincte de la constitution psychique d'un membre du parti moyen (et enfin de compte, du simple citoyen). D'après les »critères actuels« de parti, cela aurait vraisemblablement une autre appellation.

C'était, en effet, un homme sans personnalité, anonyme, et, pour reprendre les paroles d'Ortega y Gasset, un homme »de masse«. C'est un homme plutôt faible que responsable. La libre prise de décision était pour lui dans chaque moment de sa vie quelque chose de terrible

confidence.

When we think, for example, of the state of mind of the time when Gottwald used the slogan Believe in the party, comrades! , we will grasp one of the political myths: the myth of confidence in the party, and this confidence the leaders of the cadres - as they said themselves - "kept like the pupil of the eye". It is in the name of this that in the policy of executives we have experienced veritable orgies of checks and changes. All »errors«

committed by party functionaries were justified as

»errors of faith« and »sins of love« . . . It was, however, a well-conceived Jesuitism. In the name of tactics, all means were good for defence. And what poisoned inter-human relations was worse than Camus's "The Plague": against it one could indeed fight through personal honesty.

In the party of the Stalinist type one cannot wage a struggle based on personal honesty. Consequently, many Communists who wanted and had the opportunity to see more clearly had fallen into resignation and passivity. The passivity was motivated by awful experience and an awareness of absolute party morale. The struggle against evil creates another evil, so that it becomes superfluous and vain. This resignation was punished, in the context of executive practice, by "the comrade is passive" or "the comrade is a defeatist".

Apart from the individual will, since the bureaucratized mentality exerts an influence on the psychology of the citizens, another characteristic mechanism appears.

Among simple citizens a Jesuitism was being created, although in a naive and subconscious form. Not only people who worked for secret state security, but even nice and honest people were able, in their private lives, to do the most awful things in the name of the "superior idea. The forms of pressure in their symbolic and objective form took advantage of and abused the already perceived phenomenon that the mass which has no democratic foundations does not only accumulate evil and cruelty , but we note in her, above all, the reduction in the quotient of spiritual maturity.

This is how it happened that the second management evaluation

"honest party member" in Czechoslovakia means nothing more than a succinct presentation of the psychic constitution of an average party member (and ultimately, of an ordinary citizen).

According to the »current criteria« of the party, it would probably have another name.

He was, indeed, a man without personality, anonymous, and, to use the words of Ortega y Gasset, a "mass" man. He is a man who is weaker than responsible. Free decision-making was something terrible for him in every moment of his life.

et d'impossible. C'est l'homme qui ne peut pas vivre sans le pouvoir. Dans sa mentalité d'esclave il reconnaît aux gouvernants un certain »monopole du mal« vu qu'il accepte, s'il est en mesure de penser, la théorie de Machiavel selon laquelle aucun leader ne peut l'être sans ses méthodes inévitables qui eveillerait l'effroi si elles eurent été appliquées dans la vie privée.

Un homme pareil serait plutôt *personne* qu'une personnalité, il serait philistine. Cela veut dire, entre autre, qu'il fermait les yeux devant la réalité politique en éliminant des idées déterminées (critiques) de sa conscience comme »non gratae«. Au lieu, par exemple, de permettre la possibilité de la libre décision, il déclarait que l'homme est gouverné par des »lois« de l'histoire et de la société. Plus tard – dans la deuxième phase de son développement – il a coupé son lien ombilical avec l'explication officielle de la réalité politique, et il commençait à ressentir la »déception«, mais toujours »confronté à l'acte accompli«, il continuait apparemment à tout accepter, tout en le rejetant en réalité.

Ceci n'est pas facile, mais le mimétisme philistine était couronné de succès: il continuait d'être en service. Car le sentiment de futilité de la vie, de frustration et de désillusion devant le slogan *Ayez confiance dans le parti, camarades!* – est toujours compensé chez le philistine par la nécessité de servir, déjà dépassée et extérieurement conforme.

Outre la détermination plus large, et avant tout la détermination fataliste et de classe, la pratique de cadres avançait comme l'idéal »du travailleur politiquement conscient« certains faits primitifs de la personnalité: *l'insignifiance* (contre l'originalité), *mediocrité* (contre l'extraordinaire) et *obéissance* (contre l'initiative critique et créatrice). Ces trois caractéristiques, réelles ou jouées, non seulement qu'elles ont détruit l'image que le sociologue Emanuel Chalupný s'est faite du peuples tchèque et slovaque, lors qu'il soulignait dans les années trente ses capacités d'anticipation et d'originalité, mais sont devenues en plus des normes civiques ayant signifié *conditio sine qua non* pour tout poste ou position responsable.

D'autres expressions de cadres telles que, par exemple, le »camarade conscient« ou »peu conscient« perdent, elles aussi, leur premier sens sémantique car elles définissent la conscience comme préjugé-fidéiste et stéréotypé et non pas comme une position critique ou rationnelle. »Inconscients« étaient les travailleurs qui apprirent sur la base de leurs expériences que leurs droits sont limités et qu'ils sont mis à profit par la »nouvelle classe« de bureaucrates »conscients«. »Inconscients« étaient les intellectuels qui ironisaient les mythes et les manières du parti de l'époque.

La haine que les responsables des cadres et les fonctionnaires représentaient vis-à-vis des intellectuels n'est pas seulement prouvée par le complexe, cliniquement évident, d'inferiorité et d'immaturité spirituelle. Dans la psychologie des responsables des cadres, nous pouvons procéder de ces traits originaires, cependant que le respect inférieur vis-à-vis de l'éducation et la culturelle personnelle, n'étaient pas les motifs uniques de l'aversion à l'égard des intellectuels. Il y a eu aussi des motifs non personnels: disons, des motifs »politiques«. L'esprit

and impossible. He is a man who cannot live without power.

In his slave mentality, he recognizes in rulers a certain

»monopoly of evil« since he accepts, if he is able to think, Machiavelli's thesis that no leader can be without his inevitable methods which would arouse dread if they had been applied in life private.

Such a man would rather be a person than a personality, he would be a philistine. This means, among other things, that he closed his eyes to political reality by eliminating certain (critical) ideas from his conscience as »non gratae«. Instead, for example, of allowing the possibility of free decision, he declared that man is governed by the »laws« of history and society. Later - in the second phase of his development - he cut his umbilical link with the official explanation of political reality, and he began to feel "disappointment", but still "confronted with the deed done", he continued apparently to accept everything, while in reality rejecting it.

This is not easy, but Philistine mimicry was crowned with success: it continued to be in use. Because of the sense of futility of life, of frustration and disillusionment with the slogan *Have confidence in the party, comrades!* - is always compensated in the philistine by the need to serve, already outdated and outwardly conforming.

In addition to the broader determination, and above all the fatalistic and class determination, the practice of cadres advanced as the ideal.

"of the politically conscious worker" certain primitive facts of personality: insignificance (against originality), mediocrity (against the extraordinary) and obedience (against critical and creative initiative).

These three characteristics, real or acted out, not only destroyed the image that the sociologist Emanuel Chalupny had of the Czech and Slovak peoples, when he underlined in the 1930s their capacities for anticipation and originality, but have also become civic norms having signified a *sine qua non* condition for any responsible post or position.

Other framework expressions such as, for example, the »conscious comrade« or »little conscious« also lose their first critical or rational. »Unconscious« were the workers who learned on the basis of their experiences that their rights are limited and that they are taken advantage of by the »new class« of »conscious« bureaucrats.

»Unconscious« were the intellectuals who ironized the party myths and manures of the time.

The hatred that the managers of cadres and civil servants felt towards the intellectuals is not only proven by the clinically evident complex of inferiority and spiritual immaturity. In the psychology of managers, we can proceed from these original traits, while the inferior respect for education

and personal culture were not the sole reasons for aversion to intellectuals. There were also non-personal motives: say, "political" motives. Spirit 445

bureaucratisé de l'appareil est très conscient du danger qui découle des doutes antidiogmatiques et des dangers provenant des armes intellectuelles, telle que l'ironie.

Le scepticisme et l'ironie étaient toujours en défaveur chez tous les destructeurs des capacités humaines – évidemment, non seulement comme des catégories (épistémologiques) de la connaissance (de la vérité) – mais aussi comme des caractéristiques marquantes et rationnelles qui se manifestent dans le contact social. Le jugement de cadres que le »nommé est ironique« ou qu'il »ironise les événements politiques contemporains« (actions, réunions etc.) pouvait mettre un terme définitif sur la destiné d'un homme.

De l'ambiance dans laquelle pendant vingt ans décidaient des fonctionnaires qui croyaient que tout était déterminé par les forces de production et qui jasaient des slogans sur la révolution scientifico-technique, pouvait facilement émerger et se maintenir le monstrueux terme de cadre »l'inclusion«. Pour eux, ce terme avait plus de valeur que des notions humaines, telles que: honneur, vérité, responsabilité personnelle, conscience, courage, bonne conduite, et était incomparablement plus important que les signes philosophico-existentiels de la solitude et de l'essence tragique du conditionnement de l'homme.

Même en octobre 1967, le comité du parti de la direction centrale d'une certaine institution culturelle tchécoslovaque a écrit de son employé: »qu'il est politiquement peu actif, qu'il ne s'inclut pas«. L'intention était évidente: atteindre au profil de cadre de l'employé en question. Seul Kafka aurait été en mesure de saisir réellement cette grotesque, si l'on tient compte que la notion de l'activité humaine – à l'époque – dans la conscience du responsable des cadres était déterminée par un conformisme stupide et avant tout d'autrui. Comment allons nous le valoriser aujourd'hui? Le citoyen demande: Quelle sera l'appréciation que je recevrai aujourd'hui après m'avoir »inclus« ou après ne pas m'avoir »inclus«?

Revenons aux reflexions du commencement. De tout ce qui a été exposé, il s'en suit que le caractère de l'organisation sociale est toujours déterminé par le caractère de la mémoire de ses membres. Est-ce que cela veut dire – comme nous pouvons le constater on a très peu parlé de la mémoire sociale du stalinisme – que l'organisation sociale elle-même n'a pas changée (y compris les manipulations politiques)? Oui, car il est un fait que chez nous, en Tchécoslovaquie, on n'a pas encore liquidé les dossiers de cadres. Personne n'a publié, de façon compétente, la destruction des archives civiques de la sécurité d'Etat secrète dans lesquelles se trouvent des tonnes d'accusations d'hier et d'avant-hier. Ce monument des désastres de jadis se projette aussi dans l'incertitude de l'époque contemporaine.

anti-dogmatic doubts and the dangers arising from the intellectual years, such as irony.

Skepticism and the ironic were always in disfavor with all the destroyers of human capacities - of course, not only as (epistemological) categories of knowledge (of truth) - but also as salient and rational characteristics which manifest in social contact. The judgment of executives that the "name is ironic" or that he "ironizes contemporary political events" (actions, meetings etc.) could put a definitive end to a man's destiny.

From the atmosphere in which for twenty years civil servants who believed that everything was determined by the forces of production and who never knew slogans about the scientific-technical revolution decided, could easily emerge and Maintaining the monstrous framework term "inclusion". For them, this term had more value than human notions, such as: honor, truth, personal responsibility, conscience, courage, good conduct, and was incomparably more important than philosophical signs. of loneliness and of the tragic essence of man's conditioning.

Even in October 1967, the party committee of the central leadership of a certain Czechoslovak cultural institution wrote of his employee: "that he is politically not very active, that he does not include himself". The intention was obvious: to achieve the executive profile of the employee in question. Only Kafka would have been able to really grasp this grotesqueness, if one takes into account that the notion of human activity - at the time - in the consciousness of the manager of the executives was determined by a conformism stupid and above all other people's. How are we going to value it today? The citizen asks: What will be the appreciation that I will receive today after having "inclusus" me?

or after not having "included" me?

Let us return to the reflections of the beginning. Despite everything that has been exposed, it follows that the character of the social organization is always determined by the character of the memory of its members. Does this mean - as we can see very little has been said about the social memory of Stalinism - that the social organization itself has not changed (including the political manipulations)?

Yes, because it is a fact that at home, in Czechoslovakia, we have not yet liquidated the executive files. No one has competently published the destruction of the civic archives of secret state security in which there are tons of accusations from yesterday and the day before. This monument to the disasters of yesteryear is also projected into the uncertainty of the

DISCUSSION

SOCIALISM WITHOUT SOCIALISTS: THE PROSPECT
FOR AMERICA

Donald Clark Hodes

Tallahassee

Is a conscious movement for socialism likely to succeed in the United States? Or should we expect a bureaucratic or specifically technocratic move towards socialism without the leadership of self-conscious socialist, in view of America's affluence and potential for coping with mass discontent? Are there not economic tendencies within contemporary corporate capitalism, for example, effectively undermining the privileges of individual stockholder independently of any socialist ideology? Is not the new technology bringing about more far-reaching changes in American life than the comparatively futile attempts by the Old and New Left to accomplish the same objective?

That the most likely prospect for America is a transition to socialism in which socialists do not play a prominent role must be a bitter pill for most socialists. But what Marx and Engels did not foresee was that salaried managerial and professional strata might take the initiative in establishing a new order under nonsocialist and even anticommunist auspices. *Socialist projections* are especially vulnerable owing to an exaggerated emphasis on the social, political, and pre-eminently subjective conditions of social transformation. Also, they take for granted an ideal type of socialism undistorted by capitalist survivals. And this prospect is highly unrealistic in view of the strong currents of bureaucracy flourishing not only in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but also in those countries with social democratic and labor governments.

We cannot pause here to elaborate the various possibilities of a transition to a distinctive and native form of American socialism. It is sufficient to note that socialists are increasingly committed to a plurality of styles and methods of transition on the supposition, however, that socialism will come about under exclusively or at least predominantly socialist leadership. While granting the possibility of socialism through a socialist or communist victory at the polls or by

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revolutionary armed struggle from below, socialist have been generally silent concerning the prospect of a nonsocialist transition through imperceptible organizational changes in the economy. Moreover, most socialist employ a conceptual framework which, although increasingly polycentric, is nonetheless too narrow to encompass all the relevant data. What we need is a more catholic perspective placing the social democratic road at the center instead of on the right-wing of modern socialism, thereby opening the possibility not only of a transition by a revolutionary left-wing, but also by a right-wing that includes non-socialists. In effect, we need a category of unwitting socialists or socialists in spite of themselves.

I

Having criticized the projections of polycentric socialism for being insufficiently pluralistic, let us see what evidence there is for a bureaucratic road to socialism. The bureaucratic assimilation of the planning for economic growth through full employment and control of the trade cycle, has been indispensable in warding off the threat of permanent recession. But these are the more obvious aspects of creeping socialism that have been commented on in the press. Less obvious but just as significant is a major shift in the composition of capital from predominantly corporeal to incorporeal, i. e., from labor congealed in things to the accumulated scientific, technical, managerial and professional skills embodied in human beings. The gradual shift of control from the owners to the functionaries of capital has been reinforced by a corresponding change in the character of capital from physical means of production owned by joint-stock companies to capital invested in the so-called knowledge industries, increasingly subsidized by the state. Whereas in the 19th century capital was considered for the most part as plant, in the 20th century intellectual capital is comparatively more important. What railroads were to the first half of the 20th century, the knowledge industries are likely to become for at least the next fifty years.

Unlike the railroad and automobile industries, two-thirds of all research in the United States is currently financed by the federal government, and the results technically belong to the government or agency which contracts for it. At the same time, the work cannot be separated from the scientific and technical workers who performed it. For the most part, the results are at the disposal of students and colleagues, and stored in libraries and files available to the public. Furthermore, the application of this new knowledge is not limited to the original contracting parties. Although government agencies and the research-and-development departments of the great corporations are usually the only groups with sufficient funds to apply this knowledge, they must share decision-making powers and control with the scientific community. Hence the conclusion that the locus of decision-making under contemporary capitalism is increasingly diffused among scientists and professionals, who are not proprietors in the traditional sense. Since intelligence and information are so much less capable

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than physical plant of falling under private ownership, the ascendancy of the knowledge industries including the universities provides a major boost to socializing tendencies within the United States.

As capital itself has become increasingly incorporeal, so has the composition of the class of employees shifted in favor of white-collar workers who manipulate symbols instead of manufacturing things. A century ago, there was a privileged stratum of workers consisting chiefly of highly skilled craftsmen in production. On top of this stratum we find today an even more privileged segment consisting of scientific and technical workers, and also unproductive office workers in salaried professional and managerial positions. In fact, the beneficiaries of latest stage capitalism include not only passive recipients of income, but also administrative and professional employees in general.

The most compelling argument for a nonsocialist and bureaucratic road to socialism is provided by Department of Commerce statistics concerning the changing mix of national income in the United States. These statistics indicate that so-called unearned income from profits, dividends, interest and rent contribute a steadily diminishing proportion of total income, whereas the compensation of employees in wages and salaries accounts for a rapidly growing share. In a Bureau of the Census publication on *How Our Income is Divided* (1963), we note that, contrary to popular socialist mythology, most of the high income families in the top 5 percent do not make their living by clipping coupons. In 1960, within this top group only one family in a hundred belonged in the category of absentee capitalists, while approximately 33 families out of every hundred reported no income at all from investments. Whereas in 1950, 42 percent of these families were generally dependent on income from businesses, a decade later this figure had fallen to 26 percent. On the other hand, during that same period the percentage of family heads with salaried professional and managerial jobs rose from 28 to 48 percent within this top income group.

That the relative share of passive rentiers and active entrepreneurs in the national income has been changing in favor of that going to wage and salary earners is also abundantly evident from the Bureau of the Census *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (1965). In the statistics on national income from 1929 to 1964 (Table No. 444), we find that proprietors' income and the income from investments in 1929, as a percentage of wage and salary disbursements, was 72 percent. In 1964, however, it had fallen to 41 percent. During this period the composition of the work force shifted from a blue-collar majority to a white-collar one. In income terms the chief beneficiaries have been engineers, technicians, managers, officials and other professionals whose relative share within the top 5 percent of high-income families has approximately doubled during the past fifteen years.

In the light of these figures we may forecast that the time is not far off when the number of salaried employees in the top income group will almost completely overshadow the number of coupon clippers and owners of unincorporated businesses. Within top 5 percent,

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That the relative share of passive rentiers and active entrepreneurs in the national income has been changing in favor of that going to wage and salary earners is also abundantly evident from the Bureau of the Census Statistical Abstract of the United States (1965). In the statistics on national income from 1929 to 1964 (Table No. 444), we find that proprietors' income and the income from investments in 1929, as a percentage of wage and salary disbursements, was 72

percent. In 1964, however, it had fallen to 41 percent. During this period the composition of the work force shifted from a blue-collar majority to a white-collar one. In income terms the chief beneficiaries have been engineers, technicians, managers, officials and other professionals whose relative share within the top 5 percent of high-income families has approximately doubled during the past fifteen years.

In the light of these figures we may forecast that the time is not far off when the number of salaried employees in the top income group will almost completely overshadow the number of coupon clippers and owners of unincorporated businesses. Within top 5 percent, 449

the relative share of administrative and professional workers may eventually exceed the share of entrepreneurial profits, interest, dividends and rents. Corporate profits have already reached and surpassed the share of independent proprietors' income, which indicates that the regime of individual capitalist ownership has given way to managerial and professional control of the bulk of American industry. Thus in the table already cited from the *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, we find that corporate profits and inventory adjustments as a percentage of total corporate and noncorporate business earnings rose from 40 percent in 1929 to 52 percent in 1964. The crucial year was 1955 when, for the first time in U. S. history, corporate profits and inventory adjustments exceeded income from unincorporated enterprises. If the present trend continues, a hundred years from now the relative share of corporate earnings will have increased an additional 34 percent, which means that the share of self-employed, active capitalists will have fallen to barely 14 percent. Since this figure is an indirect index of the political influence of independent businessmen, we may surmise that a continuation of present trends will witness the ultimate displacement of both private capitalists and independent businessmen from positions of authority in American life.

In these projections we have ignored the increasing share of net interest as a percentage of proprietors' income, a share which has represented for some time the principal form of passive rentier power in the United States. This percentage rose from barely 15% in 1950 to 52% in 1964. In absolute figures net interest rose during this period from 5.5 billion dollars to 26.8 billion, an increase of almost 500 percent. But this trend is far from compensating individual capitalists for their loss of decision-making power. On the contrary, the increasing share of interest as a percentage of proprietors' income is a sign of capitalist weakness rather than strength.

In reviewing the prospects of socialism in America, something can be learned from earlier peaceful transition from feudalism to capitalism, especially in England. Capitalist societies emerged in the 19th century as a result of what historians like to call the dual revolution: peacefully within the Anglo-Saxon world in response to the Industrial Revolution, and violently elsewhere through the French Revolution and the revolutions which followed. Technological innovation was the mainspring in the former instance; social and political radicalization in the latter. The question is which was more decisive. At the outset of the 19th century it may have seemed that the French Revolution represented the greatest impetus towards bourgeois society. In retrospect, however, it was an industrial nonpolitical revolution that turned out to be the decisive factor in capitalist development.

On the analogy of the English experience it is hardly far-fetched to assume that capitalists may become pensioners of the state and the corporations just as descendants of a feudal nobility retained their absentee claims to rents from landed estates not only in England, but throughout other parts of Europe. Absentee landowners evolved into a predominantly capitalist stratum through a combination of political pressures and the lure of private profit. So today there is a

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noticeable tendency for the scions of rentier-capitalists to merge with the directors and managers of large corporations. By adjusting to the tendency for proprietary power to be superseded by managerial and political authority, capitalists in the United States are thus able to preserve some, if not all, of their former privileges. Moreover, just as the impact of the Industrial Revolution on the structure of feudal society was more influential than the French Revolution in transforming English society, so the changes effected by automation and cybernation may be superficially less drastic than those of the Russian Revolution, even though in the long run more profound.

The example of the peaceful imposition of capitalist institutions from above by a relative handful of commercially-minded landlords during the Enclosure Acts (1760–1830) suggests that growth-minded, forward-looking capitalists may collaborate with a bureaucratic and technocratic elite in accelerating the demise of propertied control over American society. In fact, we are rapidly moving in the direction of an organized capitalism managed by noncapitalists, itself a stage in the evolutionary transition to a socialist society without the direction of a socialist party. Already in the mixed economy of the United States, power is shared between the traditional moneyed interests and a new power elite of industrial managers and political bureaucrats who are on the road to assuming still greater authority.

As an instance of peaceful transition to socialized ownership there is the oft-cited case of Sears, Roebuck & Company, which has become a model of the American way of socializing property without a revolution. Its pension trust fund has kept abreast of inflation by investing its funds, representing a fraction of the salaries of all Sears, Roebuck employees collected during the years of their tenure, not in a diversified list of first-rate common stock but in Sears, Roebuck stock. As a result, this company is in process of socializing itself by buying up stock through its pension trustees, who are not only closely allied but also interlocked with the directors of Sears, Roebuck. In effect, the major stockholder of Sears, Roebuck is no longer an individual or bloc of individual stockholders, but an institution directed by professional managers some of whom are also managers of Sare, Roebuch. Actually, it is immaterial whether the pension fund has a controlling interest in Sears, Roebuck or the latter controls its own pension fund through an interlocking directorate. Individual stockholders have been bought up and displaced by institutional stockholders in either case, while the professional managers of both organizations are responsible only to each other.

The investments by pension trust funds in the United States in 1964 approached 31 billion dollars and are bound to increase as compulsory savings are extended to other segments of the nonfarm labor force, only half of which are currently covered. About 15 or 16 billions are in the hands of insurance companies, while the remaining half is almost entirely in eight or nine New York banks. Since the anticipated levelling off of these compulsory savings is estimated in the vicinity of 70 to 80 billion dollars, the pension trusts are on the road to controlling 20 to 30 percent of the strong equities of American industry. The old passive-receptive individual stock-

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holder is gradually being displaced not only by pension funds, but also by collective capitalists who are not people at all, but rather such fictitious persons under law as banks, investment houses, and insurance companies. Imperceptibly, the large corporations are approaching a phase in the development of the American economy which can be characterized as the most advanced stage of capitalism, although virtually without capitalist control.

The question is how an economy of this sort might be expected to evolve into socialism independently of socialist leadership. Since there are no historic instances of this transition, we can only make projections on the basis of current tendencies. In any case, effective opposition to peaceful transition is likely to come chiefly from the gradually disappearing group of capitalists. Pension funds and such related nonprofit institutions as foundations and universities are unlikely to intervene politically on behalf of individual stockholders. According to the courts, managers have no property rights in pension funds or other institutional monies held in trust. Nor, for that matter, do prospective retired employees have any current rights of ownership over that portion of their salaries retained in these funds. In effect, pension funds are not owned by anybody nor are the corresponding equities. Since their trustees are in a similar position to trustees of foundations and universities, their organization cannot be classified as capitalist even in a collective sense. Should Sears & Roebuck Company be completely bought up by its own pension fund, it would at that point become a quasi-public or socialized corporation. In fact, there would be little to distinguish it from a Yugoslav collective in which the State rather than a quasi-private enterprise, in the sense of a typical U. S. corporation, is the trustee.

Resistance to collectivization is likely to come neither from non-financial institutions nor from investment houses, banks and insurance companies. Although the latter undoubtedly perpetuate the passive-recipient and capitalist-rentier functions of individual shareholders, they do so only in a collectivized form. The capitalist relationship also survives in the partial ownership of corporations by one another, but again in a form independent of the activities of actual capitalists.

The managers are gradually abandoning their role as simple functionaries of capitalists, becoming instead a self-perpetuating oligarchy with almost unlimited control over collective property. There lies the rub. For the political trustees or state-bureaucrats have increasingly resented the informal power and privileges enjoyed by the managers of American business, and are unlikely to tolerate for long such public unaccountability on the part of fellow professionals. The bureaucratic elite is not only divided against, but also in competition with, itself. And we may prophesy that the rights without duties enjoyed by corporation executives will hardly survive the public pressures of rival political and governmental elites deprived of similar advantages.

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of quasi-private properties owned by corporate rather than individual stockholders. Private property and private irresponsibility were never as remotely objectionable to public authorities as the anomaly of property held in trust combined with public irresponsibility. As a result, an increasingly influential group of bureaucrats in government and other nonprofit institutions and trusteeships has begun to investigate methods of extending the control of public agencies over giant quasi-private collectives. Partial nationalization through government purchases of common stock and the formation of mixed enterprises would undoubtedly help to cope with this problem. But even this quite moderate proposal for guaranteeing responsible stewardship is generally considered to be extreme. Instead, it has been proposed that legislation be enacted for ensuring the public accountability of corporation executives by specifying their duties as well as rights.

Even without partial nationalization, the effect of such legislation would be to transform the present capitalist-rentier relations between financial and corporate enterprises into relations of trusteeship, thereby abolishing their capitalist character. At a single stroke, the partial property of one corporation in another would be transformed into a relation of stewardship, which is to say that property would be socialized *de facto*, if not *de jure*. There would be little to distinguish the behavior of managers under this system and that of managers of industrial collectives in present-day Yugoslavia. By the above legislation Western capitalist societies would have successfully accomplished the transition to socialization without those internal disturbances and economic dislocations invariably produced by more extreme methods. In this way socialism may be achieved by a path that denies to socialist and other left-wing parties any significant role of leadership. And in this event it will have been accomplished by the dual operation of unconscious organizational tendencies inherent in capitalism and by competition between managers and political bureaucrats themselves.

II

The foregoing thesis of a bureaucratic road to socialism is at variance not only with traditional and current socialist projections of a peaceful transition in advanced capitalist countries, but also with the most recent theories of convergence towards a bureaucratic new order. Socialist projections are especially vulnerable owing to an exaggerated emphasis on the social, political and pre-eminently subjective conditions of transition. At the same time, most models of bureaucracy so overrate the technological factors, such as industrialization, the stages of economic growth and the organizational role of management, that current differences in social regimes and modes of distribution are passed over as insignificant.

Bureaucratic models are a recent creation, but have a noble ancestry. The concept of an industrial society governed by salaried managers and professional workers is traceable to the works of Saint-Simon at the beginning of the 19th century. His writings, which pit the professional intelligentsia against an idle rich class of properties,

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clearly reflect a Jacobin influence. With Auguste Comte the perspective of this new class was given philosophical expression in the anti-metaphysical and antitheological formulations of positivism. By the turn of the 20th century the influence of Saint-Simon had found fruition in the works of at least two men of genius, Thorstein Veblen and Silvio Gesell, who defended the economic interests of the technocrats or productive wing of the bureaucracy against absentee and parasitic landowners and rentiers. In fact, Veblen's *The Engineers and the Price System* (1921) became a kind of manifesto for the Technocracy movement founded by Howard Scott a decade or so later.

Howard Scott's movement fizzled out in the United States partly owing to its abstruse and highly technical character, its comparatively narrow basis of appeal, and a general honesty irrelevant to political life. It remained for a second generation of technocrats to represent the same fundamental interests, although free of the doctrinaire trap-pings, the engineer's approach, energy charts, and mathematical formulas of the original Technocracy group. Unlike their forerunners, moreover, contemporary technocrats are not monetary cranks, but have made their peace with the price system and the paper economy.

Contemporary models of a bureaucratic new order are basically of two kinds. First, there are those models, whether directly or indirectly traceable to James Burnham's *The Managerial Revolution* (1941), which contends that a communist society in Marx's sense is an irrelevant utopia rather than a concrete possibility. In managerial models of a new order the successor to capitalism is not socialism, but rather a managerial society governed by a new class, the managers, who would run society on the basis of technical rather than financial operations. Under the influence of Technocracy, Stuart Chase had called this potentially new ruling class the technical class, while Harold Lasswell had stressed a skill revolution representing the emergence and hegemony of a middle-income skilled group. If Burnham's approach is more realistic, it is because it focuses not only on managerial and technical skills, but also on a new form of property consisting of *de facto* as distinct from *de jure* ownership of the means of production.

The second perspective on bureaucracy conceives of capitalism and socialism as different species of a new order of industrial society rather than in the course of being superseded. Its chief spokesman and theorist of long standing is Adolf Berle, who coauthored with Gardiner Means *The Modern Corporation and Private Property* (1932), and since then has written a series of works elaborating on earlier themes. For Berle, the fundamental institutional conflict of our times is between propertied power and power without property, i. e., the power of intelligence and managerial skills. The latter is directed to economic growth rather than mere profit-making.

Not unlike the first generation of Technokrats, who classified modern civilization into low-energy and high-energy societies with the Industrial Revolution as the watershed, the exponents of the foregoing models tend to follow W. W. Rostow in interpreting the dividing line in terms of a take-off to self-sustaining growth. Within this technocratic framework socialism is not a successor to capitalism, but in-

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stead a substitute for it in economically underdeveloped countries. In effect, it is taken to be a disease of the transition period under conditions of backwardness. Where socialism has succeeded in industrializing a backward economy as in the Soviet Union, capitalism and socialism are seen as converging, if not by Rostow himself, at least by a second generation of technocrats, who have been influenced by him.

Most of the exponents of a bureaucratic perspective for America are committed to the corporate-liberal traditions of the New and Fair Deals, subsequently represented by Kennedy's Alliance for Progress and Johnson's Great Society. They stand fairly close to the position of social democrats and self-styled democratic socialists in Europe, who have for some time renounced the maximum program of socialism in word as well as deed. Like the latter, they are for the most part hostile to revolutionary socialism or communism because of its allegedly totalitarian tendencies. At the same time, they are strongly opposed to the unregulated character of the old capitalism, to the vagaries of the business cycle, unemployment, the waste of underutilized plant and industrial capacity, and the threat of secular stagnation. By political preference they are moderates committed to economic planning for growth and full employment in the United States, while favoring decentralization and the New Economics of Libermanism in the U. S. S. R. and Eastern Europe. Thus the may be said to practice convergence or at least to encourage it, while at the same time projecting such a tendency as the wave of the future.

Like bureaucratic models of industrial society, communist and socialist projections for the twentieth and twenty-first centuries also admit to converging tendencies. One difference, of course, is that the point of convergence is on a socialist regime. Another difference is that bureaucratic models picture the future societies of mass manipulation in terms of an end of ideology whereas socialist theory postpones the advent of a nonideological society to a communist stage, prior to which the ideological struggle between capitalism and socialism is expected to become fiercer than ever. Instead of interpreting capitalism and socialism as superseded by managerialism, or otherwise as different roads to the common goal of an industrial society, socialist theory interprets them as mutually exclusive or antagonistic regimes in process of diverging even further. *Although* the transition to socialism may be so interpreted that it does not have to culminate in the complete nationalization or collectivization of the means of production, for socialists it involves the eventual liquidation of the capitalists as a class.

Most models of the transition to a socialist new order of society border on dogmatism in expecting a monolithic revolutionary outcome achieved by narrow revolutionary means. Consequently, their projections are being superseded by a polycentric vision of a plurality of forms of socialism as well as methods of transition. This model finds supporters in the new-style European communist parties of structural reform, which the Chinese communists have criticized as revisionist, as also in New Left circles representing a new generation of socialists disinterested in the in-group squabbles and narrow factional quarrels divisive of socialists in the past. However, a major

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limitation of polycentric socialism is that it conceives the transition under exclusively or at least predominantly socialist leadership. While granting the possibility of socialism established by the mass of workers themselves, this perspective is silent concerning the possibility of a nonsocialist transition to socialism, whether as a result of imperceptible organizational changes throughout the economy or through creeping socialism at the top.

We should consider next those crucial differences in the revolutionary socialist and bureaucratic roads to socialism, which point to future sources of divergence between different socialist societies. That a socialism developed from on top would most likely differ in several important respects from the socialism of left-wing parties achieved through mass struggles might seem too obvious for comment. But the fact remains that socialists have yet to take seriously the very real possibility of conflict and antagonism between different types of socialism at different stages of economic and political development.

The American road to socialism, for example, is more than likely to remain bureaucratic. It may well be liberal in the parliamentary sense, but neither liberalism nor parliamentarism are synonymous with democracy. By virtue of its continuity with capitalism, a bureaucratic socialism is likely to preserve old market relationship along with steep income differentials. Whereas revolutionary socialism involves a radical break with the past, the bureaucratic road is unlikely to develop a democratic form of socialist exchange and distribution. The latter will tend to retain the markets for labor-power, real estate, and perhaps even the stock exchange. But the survival of individual capitalists in the role of pensioners of the corporations is in principle not much different from interest payments on state bonds in existing socialist countries. Similarly, survivals of stock ownership in quasi-public collectives is not inimical to socialist relations of production as long as there are no voting rights or effective means of exercising control by stockholders.

Left-wing socialism is also bureaucratic during its initial phase of development, but the rupture with capitalist traditions helps to prepare it for an eventual transition to a democratic stage. Concentration of political power in the hands of a Party bureaucracy may even assist, in some instances, the development of democracy in economically backward countries. In contrast, the bureaucratic model is too closely tied to existing institutions to unleash the forces of popular initiative. Moreover, it has been traditionally antidemocratic as a matter of principle, and opposed to worker's self-management of both industry and government.

Countries that have made the transition to socialism through revolution rather than evolution have yet to eliminate bureaucracy, but have done more than is usually credited in curtailing irresponsible power. Despite the exalted positions of Soviet managers and Party bureaucrats both today and under Stalin, opportunities to acquire economic privileges have been comparatively restricted. In no instance have Soviet executives obtained even roughly the high salaries and corresponding income differentials enjoyed by their U. S. counterparts. If the United States managerial power is allied to the interests

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of a capitalist class; in the U. S. S. R. it is responsive to a political party of labor. The Party is committed in principle, if not yet in practice, to introducing a quasi-egalitarian form of distribution based on socially necessary work, i. e. rewards proportional to labor-time rather than the present system of payments according to qualifications. And the progressive application of this principle, which presupposes the increasing influence of labor on industry and government, points to the gradual reduction of bureaucratic privileges and the emergence of a more democratic society.

Since a distinctively Marxist society has yet to be realized anywhere, many left-wing socialists and a minority of dissident communists have concluded that productive and property relations in the U. S. S. R. are still a long way from being socialist. However, their approach to the question of transition is rationalistic instead of empirical, doctrinaire rather than scientific. Their criterion of socialism is taken from Marx's works instead of from the unfolding of actual events. For them a peaceful transition to a new order, such as the one we have contemplated, turns out to be not a form of creeping socialism, but rather a series of reforms leading in the direction of state capitalism. The implication is clear though factually unwarranted, namely that the socialization or deprivatization of capital can be achieved only under the leadership or guidance of a socialist party.

We have rejected this projection as unrealistic in view of the organizational changes within American capitalism resulting from the non-political revolution in technology. In addition, we must also dismiss as unrealistic the traditional expectation of socialists that the advent of world socialism will mean the end of wars among civilized nations. The prospect of wars between socialist states at different stages of development should not be discounted until the present socialist bureaucracies have been effectively displaced by communist democracies. Just as a split developed in the capitalist world between the socially and politically advanced French model and the socially and politically retrograde but economically advanced English example, so we may prophesy a comparable split resulting from the differences between the revolutionary road to socialism in the underdeveloped countries and the bureaucratic road typical of the advanced ones. Issues of war and peace involve national disputes and rivalries as well as differences in social organization. Moreover, the initial phase of socialism in the Soviet Union and elsewhere has yet to overcome the survivals of bureaucratic exploitation traceable to earlier modes of production. Since exploitation is predicated on legalized aggression, it is unlikely that states will hesitate from using violence against one another when they continue to apply it against their own citizens.

Specifically, we have to face up to the possibility of socialist as well as capitalist forms of imperialism, especially on the part of those economically advanced powers which are the last to shed their capitalist integuments. Is it at all likely, for example, that U. S. corporations, once they have become public trusts, will abdicate control over their foreign markets and investments? Profits will have been abolished only in a capitalist sense, which suggests that they will continue to function as indicators of economic performance. That the So-

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Far from challenging the traditional socialist thesis that world socialism is a precondition of universal peace, the foregoing discussion merely qualifies it. In view of an evolutionary road to socialism peculiar to nations that are at once economically more powerful but socially and politically retrograde, socialism in our time will continue to be characterized by uneven development and corresponding sources of international tensions. For Lenin, as for Marx, the transition to communism is not complete without both the deprivatization of capital and the debureaucratization of industry and government. Actually, the latter condition remains to be realized, which suggests that it may take literally centuries for the development of socialism along the evolutionary path. As events have turned out, debureaucratization is not necessary to the complete deprivatization of capital. Accordingly, efforts to achieve world peace through a more advanced stage of socialism may be expected to involve a long and protracted struggle against bureaucracy.

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SUR LA »REVOLUTION SEXUELLE«

Kostas Axelos

Paris

DIALOGUE ENTRE KOSTAS AXELOS ET UN ÉTUDIANT

Et. – Comment, lorsque la Sorbonne était occupée par les étudiants, avez-vous été amené à animer un débat concernant »la lutte contre la répression sexuelle«?

K. A. – Cela fait un moment, déjà, que je m'intéresse au secteur érotique de la problématique générale de l'homme moderne. Dans mon livre *Vers la pensée planétaire*, j'avais déjà consacré un chapitre à »L'errance érotique«. Dans la revue »Arguments«, nous avions publié un numéro spécial – très discuté – sur »L'amour-problème«. Au congrès mondial des intellectuels à Cuba, en 1968, j'ai présenté, entre autres, une communication sur le problème de l'émancipation érotique. Ainsi, il a été tout à fait naturel que je me trouve présent pour animer un débat, qui était le débat du premier soir même de la Sorbonne occupée, sur le problème de la lutte contre la répression sexuelle.

Et. – »Répression sexuelle«: l'expression est souvent utilisée aujourd'hui, mais quant a-t-elle commencé d'apparaître?

K. A. – Le terme même, sans pouvoir donner la date exacte – jour, mois, année – de son apparition, remonte à peu près aux années vingt, quand s'est faite la jonction entre le marxisme et la psychanalyse. Freud lui-même, dans ses œuvres de maturité, notamment dans *Malaïse dans la civilisation*, avait insisté sur la répression que fait subir la civilisation aux deux pulsions fondamentales de l'homme: les pulsions libidinaires, pulsions érotiques, et les pulsions mortuaires, pulsions destructrices. À la suite de Marx et de Freud, ce furent surtout des sociologues-psychologues tels que Wilhelm Reich et Herbert Marcuse qui ont approfondi cette notion de répression sexuelle. Ils pensaient que la société capitaliste, héritant de la société féodale et de la société esclavagiste, héritant en même temps de la double morale juéo-chrétienne, d'une part, et bourgeoise, de l'autre, fait exercer une répression des instincts vitaux de l'homme en les canalisant, en les prenant en charge, en les réprimant brutalement là où ils semblent être une force excédente. Aussi, je crois qu'aujourd'hui tout débat sérieux sur – c'est-à-dire contre – la répression sexuelle doit commen-

P aris

D I A L O G U E E N T R E K O S T A S A X E L O S E T U N E T U D I A N T

And. - How, when the Sorbonne was occupied by students, did you lead a debate on "the fight against sexual repression"?

*K. A. - I have been interested in the erotic sector of the general problematic of modern man for some time now. In my book *Vers la thought planétaire*, I had already devoted a chapter to "Erotic wandering". In the magazine »Arguments«, we had published a special issue - much discussed - on »Love-problem«. At the World Congress of Intellectuals in Cuba in 1968, I presented, among other things, a paper on the problem of erotic emancipation.*

Thus, it was quite natural that I find myself present to animate a debate, which was the debate of the very first evening of the occupied Sorbonne, on the problem of the fight against sexual repression.

And. - »Sexual repression«: the expression is often used today, but when did it begin to appear?

K. A. - The term itself, without being able to give the exact date - day, month, year - of its appearance, dates back approximately to the 1920s, when the junction between Marxism and psychoanalysis was made.

*Freud himself, in his mature works, particularly in *Malaise dans la civilisation*, had insisted on the repression that civilization inflicts on the two fundamental drives of man: the libidinal drives, erotic drives, and the mortuary drives, drives destructive. Following Marx and Freud, it was above all sociologists-psychologists such as Wilhelm Reich and Herbert Marcuse who deepened this notion of sexual repression. They thought that capitalist society, inheriting feudal society and slave society, inheriting at the same time the double Judeo-Christian morality, on the one hand, and bourgeois, on the other, exerted a repression of the vital instincts of man by channeling them, by taking charge of them, by repressing them brutally where they seem to be an excess force. Also, I believe that today any serious debate on - that is to say against - sexual repression must begin-459*

cer par effectuer un double retour aux sources: à Marx et à Freud, d'une part, et, de l'autre, à leurs épigones éclairés, c'est-à-dire à Reich à Marcuse... Ce qui fait aujourd'hui surgir le problème dans toute son acuité, c'est que la répression sexuelle n'est pas seulement exercée par les régimes capitalistes, mais aussi par les régimes qui se disent socialistes. Ainsi, à Cuba, où un certain socialisme – je dis bien »un certain socialisme« – est à l'œuvre, où le problème de la ségrégation raciale est en voie de solution, le problème de la ségrégation sexuelle reste entier, et un tollé indescriptible, un tollé de protestations unanimes a couvert mon exposé sur la nécessité de lutter contre cette répression sexuelle, fût-elle de type socialiste. Ce que j'appelle la répression sexuelle de type socialiste, c'est que même là où les conditions économiques, politiques et sociales d'une libération du citoyen, du travailleur et de l'homme existent, on persévère dans la voie de la sacro-sainte morale judéo-chrétienne, bourgeoise et socialiste. La morale socialiste est la simple héritière des morales précédentes: elle maintient l'esclavage de la femme, elle maintient la loi de la monogamie comme une loi que l'homme a le droit de transgresser de temps à autre – pas trop ostensiblement – mais où la femme doit être et rester la propriété privée de l'homme.

Et. – Vous semble-t-il possible, cependant, d'établir des nuances entre répression de type socialiste et répression de type capitaliste?

K. A. – En Occident capitaliste, la répression sexuelle est peut-être plus idéologisée. Elle n'est pas pour autant à l'état nu dans les pays socialistes. Quand j'ai parlé dans des congrès ou des colloques socialistes du besoin de socialiser non seulement les forces productives, non seulement les biens de consommation, mais aussi les forces érotiques des humains, qu'ils soient hommes ou femmes, cette socialisation des forces érotiques, c'est-à-dire le dépassement de la monogamie obligatoire soit pour l'homme soit pour la femme, a toujours soulevé la plus grande indignation philistine et puritaine.

Et. – On cite souvent comme exemple les pays scandinaves, ou la répression sexuelle est peut-être moins évidente...

K. A. – Dans les pays industriels avancés tels que, par exemple, les pays scandinaves, qui vivent sous un régime que l'on pourrait appeler capitalo-socialiste – qui préfigure peut-être le régime futur de la planète ou de ses parties techniquement les plus avancées –, on peut constater un certain assouplissement des règles qui régissent le jeu de l'amour-érotisme-sexualité. Néanmoins, le poids de l'idéologie est aussi fort, le poids du péché est aussi fort. Les affres de la sexualité s'y donnent à cœur joie – c'est-à-dire dans la tristesse – et il suffit de voir les films de Bermann pour découvrir qu'érotisme signifie, là aussi, tristesse.

Et. – Cette notion de faute, de péche, qui en Occident semble être indissociable de l'érotisme, ne correspondrait-elle pas à un désir de revaloriser le plaisir sexuel?

K. A. – Jusqu'à maintenant, dans la lignée d'une certaine mystique et surtout de la religiosité chrétienne, l'amour ou l'acte sexuel a été considéré comme quelque chose qui enfreint l'interdit: le péché. Ainsi

cer by carrying out a double return to the sources: to Marx and to Freud, on the one hand, and, on the other, to their enlightened epigones, that is to say to Reich to Marcuse... What brings up the problem today in all its acuteness is that sexual repression is not only exercised by capitalist

regimes, but also by regimes that call themselves socialist. Thus, in Cuba, where a certain socialism - I say "a certain socialism" - is at work, where the problem of segregation r à d à le is in the process of being solved, the problem e of sexual segregation remains intact. , and an indescribable outcry, an outcry of unanimous protests covered my presentation on the need to fight against this sexual repression, even of a socialist type. What I call socialist-type sexual repression is that even where the economic, political and social conditions for the liberation of the citizen, the worker and the man exist, we persevere in the way of the sacrosanct Judeo-Christian, bourgeois and socialist morality. Socialist morality is the simple heir to previous moralities: it maintains the slavery of women, it maintains the law of monogamy as a law which man has the right to transgress from time to time - not too much. ostensibly - but where the woman must be and remain the private property of the man.

And. - Does it seem possible to you, however, to establish nuances between repression of the socialist type and repression of the capitalist type?

K. A. - In the capitalist West, sexual repression is perhaps more ideologized. It is not at all in the naked state in the socialist countries. When I have spoken at congresses or socialist colloquies of the need to socialize not only the productive forces, not only consumer goods, but also the erotic forces of human beings, whether men or women, this The socialization of erotic forces, that is to say the overcoming of obligatory monogamy either for the man or for the woman, has always aroused the greatest philistine and puritan indignation.

And. - The Scandinavian countries are often cited as an example, where sexual repression is perhaps less obvious. . .

K. A. - In the advanced industrial countries such as, for example, the Scandinavian countries, which live under a regime which one could call capitalo-socialist - which perhaps prefigures the future regime of the planet or its most technically advanced parts - we can see a certain relaxation of the rules that govern the game of love-erotism e-sexuality. Nevertheless, the weight of ideology is just as strong, the weight of sin is just as strong. The pangs of sexuality are indulged in there to their heart's content - that is to say in sadness - and it is enough to see the films of Bergman to discover that eroticism also means sadness.

And. - Doesn't this notion of fault, of sin, which in the West seem to be inseparable from eroticism, correspond to a desire to revalorize sexual pleasure?

K. A. - Until now, in line with a certain mysticism and especially Christian

religiosity, love or the sexual act has been considered as something that breaks the taboo: sin. so 460

croyait on lui donner du piment. Mais les études psychanalytiques le montrent: on n'a fait qu'accroître le nombre des inhibitions, on a contribué plutôt à lui enlever même ce qu'il restait de plaisir.

Et. – Donc certaines conceptions de l'amour telles qu'elles sont expri-mées en Occident ne seraient que d'autres moyens de répression sequelle?

K. A. – Oui, certainement. Même les sociétés occidentales les plus avancées persistent dans la voie de la répression sexuelle. Elle ne devient que plus raffinée; son visage le plus raffiné est l'indifférence qui couvre les rapports érotiques. J'ai souvent l'impression que ce qu'on appelle »amour-érotisme-sexualité« est en train d'accomplir une mue, d'atteindre le seuil d'un certain dépassement. Ce dépassement doit être préparé... Les formes bourgeoises et capitalistes et les formes bureaucratiques et collectivistes sont profondément insatisfaisantes et n'arrivent pas à libéraliser le problème. Les gens crient tout de suite: casse-cou. Il ne s'agit cependant pas de libérer totalement les puissances de l'amour-érotisme-sexualité, de pousser cette puissance à la fois trinitaire et unitaire jusqu'à son achèvement, fût-il son éclatement.

Et. – La conception actuelle de »l'amour bourgeois« ne serait-elle pas, en fait, fort proche de la conception médiévale de »l'amour courtois«?

K. A. – La comparaison est assez juste. De même que l'amour dit »courtois« devait disparaître pour laisser sa place à »l'amour bourgeois« – c'est-à-dire à la conjonction, soit synthétique soit antithétique, de l'intérêt sordide et de la sexualité –, l'amour bourgeois et, je le repète, sa succession historique qui est l'amour dit socialiste sont actuellement au seuil d'un changement, bien que nous n'envisagions pas encore de manière assez claire de quel type sera ce changement.

Et. – Pouvez-vous cependant imaginer dans quel sens se fera ce dépassement que vous présentez?

K. A. – Le caractère individualiste de l'amour, de l'érotisme et de la sexualité est en train d'accomplir une mue. Pour les anciens Grecs, l'amour était une affaire de *physis*; pour les Chrétiens, c'était une affaire de *divinité*; pour les bourgeois européens, c'était l'affaire de *l'homme individuel*. Peut-être l'amour, l'érotisme et la sexualité cessent-ils d'être l'affaire de l'homme individuel. Peut-être, même, cessent-ils d'être l'affaire de l'homme en tant que tel, de l'homme qui marche vers son dépassement..., pour réintégrer, d'une part, le circuit cosmique dont ils émanent et pour, d'autre part et conjointement, s'inscrire dans la marche historique de la collectivité humaine.

Et. – De cette mutation, peut-on dire qu'elle a un caractère révolutionnaire, ou plutôt »évolutionnaire«?

K. A. – Pour le moment, on ne voit que l'aspect évolution de cette mutation parce que même la révolution est en continuité avec ce qui la précède. Il se pourrait qu'un jour une quantité suffisante de mutations de type évolutionnaire nous conduise à une révolution, même dans ce chapitre-là. Mais pour le moment, au risque d'être taxé de prophétisme inoffensif, on ne peut pas prévoir quelle sera, par exemple, la

we have only increased the number of inhibitions, we have rather contributed to taking away even what remained of pleasure.

And. - So certain conceptions of love as they are expressed in the West would only be other means of sequel repression?

K. A. - Yes, definitely. Even the most advanced Western societies persist in the path of sexual repression. It only becomes more refined; its most refined face is the indifference that covers erotic relations. I often have the impression that what is called "love-eroticism-sexuality" is undergoing a transformation, reaching the threshold of a certain overcoming. This overrun must be prepared. . . The bourgeois and capitalist forms and the bureaucratic and collectivist forms are deeply unsatisfactory and fail to liberalize the problem. People shout right away: daredevil. However, it is not a question of totally liberating the powers of love-eroticism-sexuality, of pushing this power, which is both Trinitarian and unitary, to its completion, even if it is to burst.

And. - Isn't the current conception of »bourgeois love«, in fact, very close to the medieval conception of »courtly love«?

K. A. - The comparison is fair enough. As love says

"courtly" had to disappear to make way for "bourgeois love" - that is to say, the conjunction, either synthetic or antithetical, of sordid interest and sexuality - bourgeois love and, I repeat, its historical succession, which is so-called socialist love, are currently on the threshold of a change, although we do not yet envisage clearly enough what type of change this will be.

Et. —

However, can you imagine in what direction this will take place?

overshoot that you foresee?

K. A. - The individualistic character of love, eroticism and sexuality is undergoing a transformation. For the ancient Greeks, love was a matter of physis; for the Christians, it was a matter of divinity; for the European bourgeois, it was the affair of the individual man. Perhaps love, eroticism and sexuality cease to be the business of the individual man. Perhaps, even, they cease to be the affair of man as such, of the man who walks towards his overcoming. . . , to reintegrate, on the one hand the c*r"*

cosmic cooking from which they emanate and, on the other hand and jointly, to be part of the historical march of human collectivity.

And. - Of this mutation, can we say that it has a revolutionary character, or rather »revolutionary«?

K. A. - For the moment, we only see the evolutionary aspect of this mutation because even the revolution is in continuity with what precedes it. It could be that one day a sufficient amount of evolutionary type mutations will lead us to a revolution, even in this chapter. But for the moment, at the risk of being accused of harmless prophecy, we cannot predict what will be, for example, the 461

forme de l'amour dans deux mille ans. Je ne pense même pas qu'il soit inscrit quelque part que les humains doivent continuer de faire l'amour, ne serait-ce que pour procréer.

Et. - Il y a déjà eu, cependant, quelques tentatives de socialisation des rapports sexuels. En Union Soviétique, par exemple.

K. A. Les tentatives de socialisation de certaines formes d'amour, en Union Soviétique, au début de la révolution, ont été extrêmement intéressantes. Elles ont été faites sous l'égide du marxisme et de la psychanalyse, mais le mouvement révolutionnaire s'est montré, à ce sujet, particulièrement réactionnaire. Lénine lui-même considérait la psychanalise comme un caprice à la mode. Ces tentatives ont toujours été faites sous l'égide de l'*individu* socialisé, et non pas de l'*homme* socialisé. Ainsi, cela aboutissait, d'une part, à une anarchie complète et d'autre part, à un individualisme socialisé qui restait enfermé dans les limites de sa propre individualité.

Et. - Peut-on espérer, à l'encontre de certaines affirmations bourgeoisées et pessimistes, atteindre un réel dépassement en évitant l'anarchie?

K. A. - L'anarchie est inévitable au sens où d'autres règles de jeu amoureux, érotique et sexuel peuvent être établies – non pas par les humains mais au milieu des humains – qui donneraient plus grande satisfaction à ces mêmes humains, sans leur éviter néanmoins dissatisfaction et insatisfactions. Aujourd'hui, l'une des sources de l'insatisfaction dans ce domaine, c'est la contradiction flagrante entre ce qui est dit et ce qui est fait. Les gens se proclament »A« et font »B«, les bourgeois comme les révolutionnaires. Je ne connais pas de personnes plus réactionnaires dans le domaine de l'amour, de l'érotisme et de la sexualité que celles qui se *prétendent* révolutionnaires, parce qu'elles continuent de charrier la même tradition, parfois même dans ses formes les plus aveugles, les plus restrictives. Il faut viser un plus grand accord – fût-il discordant – entre la théorie et la pratique, entre ce qu'on dit et ce qu'on fait dans le domaine de l'amour-érotisme-sexualité.

Et. - L'importance actuelle de l'érotisme au cinéma ou dans la publicité, par exemple, serait donc proportionnelle à la violence de la répression sexuelle?

K. A. - Justement, la société produit aujourd'hui de l'érotisme comme une marchandise réifiée pour contrecarrer, ou en contrecarrant, la poussée érotique elle-même. Les gens vont au cinéma et, là, vivent sous forme de masturbation mentale ce qu'ils ne vivent pas dans leur vie effective.

Et. - Dans un des premiers tracts du Mouvement du 22 mars, on trouve cette phrase, qui est extraite d'un texte de Wilhelm Reich: »Le chaos sexuel c'est punir les jeunes pour délit d'autosatisfaction . . . « La défense de la masturbation participe-t-elle de la répression sexuelle bourgeoise?

K. A. - La défense de la masturbation relève de la morale bourgeoisie, entre autres. Il n'est pas question de prôner la masturbation, mais de prôner le droit à remplacer, pour ceux qui le veulent, la masturbation par l'amour effectif, avec ses avantages et toutes ses contradictions. Cela n'aboutirait pas à une anarchie – je crois que le Mouve-

shape of love in two thousand years. I don't even think it's written anywhere that humans should continue to make love, if only to procreate.

And. - There have already been, however, some attempts to socialize sexual

relations. In the Soviet Union, for example.

K. A. The attempts to socialize certain forms of love in the Soviet Union at the beginning of the revolution were extremely interesting. They were made under the aegis of Marxism and psychoanalysis, but the revolutionary movement has shown itself to be particularly reactionary on this subject. Lenin himself considered psychoanalysis a fashionable whim. These attempts have always been made under the aegis of the socialized individual, and not of the socialized man. Thus, it resulted, on the one hand, in complete anarchy and, on the other, in a socialized individualism which remained enclosed within the limits of its own individuality.

And. - Can we hope, contrary to certain bourgeois and pessimistic affirmations, to achieve a real overcoming by avoiding anarchy?

K. A. - Anarchy is inevitable in the sense that other rules of amorous, erotic and sexual play can be established - not by humans but among humans - which would give greater satisfaction to these same humans. This, without, however, avoiding their dissatisfaction and dissatisfaction. Today, one of the sources of dissatisfaction in this area is the flagrant contradiction between what is said and what is done. People call themselves "A" and say "B", the bourgeois as well as the revolutionaries. I don't know people who are more reactionary in the field of love, eroticism and sexuality than those who claim to be revolutionary, because they continue to carry the same tradition, sometimes even in its blindest, most restrictive forms. We must aim for greater agreement - however discordant - between theory and practice, between what is said and what is done in the domain of love-eroticism and sexuality.

And. - Is the current importance of eroticism in cinema or in advertising, for example, proportional to the violence of sexual repression?

K. A. - Precisely, today society produces eroticism as a reified commodity to thwart, or by thwarting, the erotic push itself. People go to the cinema and, there, experience in the form of mental masturbation what they do not experience in their actual life.

And. - In one of the first leaflets of the Movement of March 22, we find this sentence, which is taken from a text by Wilhelm Reich: "Sexual chaos is to punish young people for crimes of self-satisfaction . . . "Is the defense of masturbation part of bourgeois sexual repression?

K. A. - The defense of masturbation is part of bourgeois morality, among other things. It is not a question of advocating masturbation, but of advocating the right to replace, for those who want it, masturbation with

effective love, with its advantages and all its contradictions. This would not result in anarchy - I believe that the M ouve-462

ment du 22 mars met trop souvent l'accent sur l'anarchie – mais à d'autres règles de jeu, car l'humanité elle-même – en tant qu'ensemble de petits enfants, c'est-à-dire d'adultes – ne peut pas vivre dans l'anarchie sexuelle, comme elle ne peut pas vivre dans l'anarchie tout court. Il s'agit, en fait, de règles plus productives, plus ouvertes, plus combinatoires.

Et. – Mais la répression sexuelle n'est-elle pas, pour la société capitaliste et bourgeoise, un élément positif dans la mesure où elle canalise l'énergie érotique dans d'autres directions?

K. A. – La répression sexuelle est un élément »positif« pour la société capitaliste, mais aussi pour la société socialiste. En refoulant la libido, elle permet l'investissement de cette libido dans des œuvres sociales de type capitaliste ou socialiste. Il s'agit donc de dépasser cette contradiction entre l'individu et la société pour permettre un plus riche déploiement de l'énergie. Il ne pourra jamais être total, mais sera peut-être plus multiple et plus combiné.

Et. – Pour qu'un tel déploiement devienne possible, il faudrait aussi que le rythme de vie, dans une société capitaliste ou socialiste, soit transformé... .

K. A. – Naturellement, cela exige le dépassement des primats de rendement économique et une plus grande ouverture. Cela demande peut-être même l'abandon de tous les idéaux et la conception de la vie humaine, indistinctement individuelle et historique, plutôt comme une recherche du jeu que comme une recherche du sens.

Et. – La Grèce antique, pourtant, semblait – à l'inverse de Rome – s'être déjà engagée dans la voie d'une libéralisation.

K. A. – La Grèce antique a peut-être été la seule civilisation connue jusqu'à maintenant qui ait laissé fleurir l'amour-érotisme-sexualité jusqu'aux extrêmes limites de ses possibilités. Dans ce sens, il n'est peut-être pas inutile de remarquer que c'est la Grèce qui a donné naissance à la démocratie et à la philosophie. Un Grec libre – naturellement, l'ombre de l'esclavage n'a cessé de peser sur cette société – pouvait faire l'amour avec une femme, avec un homme, avec un adolescent, avec un cheval, avec une chèvre, avec une prostituée ou avec une cruche, sans qu'un interdit trop prononcé vienne frapper ces activités. C'est après le légalisme de l'Empire romain et la réification que Rome a introduite, que l'amour s'est trouvé frappé d'interdits. Ces interdits ont été ensuite mythifiés, et mystifiés, par le judéo-christianisme.

Et. – Toujours dans la Grèce antique, la prostituée avait un statut privilégié, presque »divinisé«... .

K. A. – La prostituée étant celle qui se donnait à tous les hommes était, de ce fait, celle qui transgressait l'ordre laïque, devenant ainsi un aspect de la physis divine. Elle était au dessus du commun des mortels qui avait femme, enfants, chiens et canaris et non pas au-dessous d'eux comme dans les sociétés postérieures.

Et. – Après une transformation de la société dans laquelle nous vivons aujourd'hui, que pourrait devenir la prostitution?

K. A. – Dans une société qui ne serait plus basée sur l'exploitation de l'homme par l'homme et sur la propriété – que cette propriété soit de type individuel ou étatique – la prostitution organisée disparaîtrait

play, because humanity itself - as a whole of little children, that is to say of adults - cannot live in sexual anarchy, just as she cannot live in anarchy at all. They are, in fact, more productive, more open, more combinatorial rules.

And. - But isn't sexual repression, for capitalist and bourgeois society, a positive element insofar as it channels erotic energy in other directions?

K. A. - Sexual repression is a "positive" element for capitalist society, but also for socialist society. By repressing the libido, it allows the investment of this libido in social works of the capitalist or socialist type. It is therefore a question of overcoming this contradiction between the individual and society to allow a richer deployment of energy. It can never be total, but will perhaps be more multiple and more combined.

And. - For such a deployment to become possible, it would also be necessary for the rhythm of life, in a capitalist or socialist society, to be transformed... .

K. A. - Naturally, this requires going beyond the primates of economic return and greater openness. This perhaps even requires the abandonment of all ideals and the conception of human life, indistinctly individual and historical, rather as a search for play than as a search for meaning.

And. - Ancient Greece, however, seemed - unlike Rome -

have already embarked on the path of liberalisation.

K. A. - Ancient Greece was perhaps the only civilization known until now that allowed love-crotism-sexuality to flourish to the extreme limits of its possibilities. In this sense, it is perhaps worth noting that it was Greece that gave birth to democracy and to philosophy. A free Greek - of course, the shadow of slavery has never ceased to weigh on this society -

could make love with a woman, with a man, with an adolescent, with a horse, with a goat, with a prostitute or with a pitcher, without too pronounced a prohibition coming to hit these activities. It was after the legalism of the Roman Empire and the reification introduced by Rome that love was struck with prohibitions. These taboos were then mythologized and mystified by Judeo-Christianity.

And. - Still in ancient Greece, the prostitute had a privileged status, almost "divine".

K. A. - The prostitute, being the one who gave herself to all men, was therefore the one who transgressed the secular order, thus becoming an

aspect of the divine physis. She was above ordinary mortals who had wives, children, dogs and canaries and not below them as in later societies.

And. - After a transformation of the society in which we live today, what could become of prostitution.

K. A. - In a society which would no longer be based on the exploitation of man by man and on property - whether this property be of an individual or State type - organized prostitution would disappear 463

d'elle-même. Si, néanmoins, une telle société est possible, car dans ce domaine aussi, il est très difficile de distinguer l'utopie et ce que l'histoire peut effectivement atteindre.

Et. — Au début de cet entretien, vous évoquiez la répression sexuelle de type socialiste telle qu'elle se manifeste à Cuba. Et en Chine communiste?

K. A. — Là, je crois qu'il est très difficile de se prononcer sur la forme que prend la vie sexuelle. Ce qui me frappe, c'est le puritanisme qui déferle aujourd'hui... Ce que l'on appelle le communisme et devenu une forme sacrée et socialisée de ce que l'on appelait naguère puritanisme. Dans ce sens, je pense que la Chine verse dans un énorme — peut-être dans un grandiose — puritanisme collectif, et là règne l'absence de sexualité vécue. Cette étape est peut-être nécessaire, mais il est également nécessaire, aujourd'hui, de privilégier tout ce qui transcende cette étape, tout ce qui fait signe vers une étape postérieure.

Et. — Dans une société qui serait débarassée de tout puritanisme, de toute répression sexuelle, quelle place pourrait occuper une forme d'amour aussi anti-bourgeoise que l'amour collectif?

K. A. — Toutes les possibilités du jeu de l'amour-érotisme-sexualité, sous forme même brutale, sous forme d'amour collectif, d'amour de groupe, sont à expérimenter par toutes les personnes qui désirent participer à ce genre de jeu érotique. Cela peut-être un facteur de libéralisation, à condition que ça ne se formalise pas en un nouveau rituel, que le facteur de libéralisation ne devienne pas un facteur de braquage, d'éloignement.

Et. — Dans une société comme la nôtre, le risque n'est-il pas précisément d'aboutir — pas forcément à l'anarchie — mais à un nouveau système de braquages et d'inhibitions?

K. A. — On aboutira certainement à un autre système, quoi qu'en fasse. Et même l'anarchie est un système, peut-être encore plus systématique et dogmatique que les autres. Mais ce système — si on peut l'appeler nouveau — devra être plus ouvert, plus riche en possibilités combinatoires. Les règles devraient y être envisagées et consenties comme des règles de jeu.

Et. — Dans ce jeu de l'amour, que devient la procréation?

K. A. — La procréation n'est qu'un aspect de l'amour, de l'érotisme, de sexualité. Elle sera maintenue en tant que procréation dite naturelle jusqu'à ce que la procréation artificielle — par des éléments techniques — vienne la relayer.

Et. — Comment les étudiants que vous connaissez, avec lesquels vous travaillez, réagissent-ils face à de tels problèmes?

K. A. — J'ai souvent abordé ces problèmes avec les étudiants, ne serait-ce qu'à la lumière de Marx et de Freud, et j'ai été frappé par leur réticence. Je trouvais chez ces êtres jeunes une attitude sénile à l'égard du problème de la libération érotique. Pour les communistes, c'était asocial; pour les chrétiens, c'était immoral; pour les Noirs, c'était faire comme les Blancs. Chacun avait sa justification, sa rationalisation, pour maintenir la libido, bien reliée comme un cahier d'écolier.

And. - At the beginning of this interview, you evoked the socialist type of sexual repression as it manifests itself in Cuba. And in communist China?

K. A. - Well, I think it's very difficult to comment on the form that sexual life takes. What strikes me is the Puritanism that is surging today. . . What is called communism has become a sacred and socialized form of what was once called puritanism. In this sense, I think that China is pouring into an enormous - perhaps a grandiose - collective puritanism, and the reign is the absence of lived sexuality. This stage is perhaps necessary, but it is also necessary, today, to privilege all that transcends this stage, all that signals a later stage.

And. - In a society that would be rid of all puritanism, of all sexual repression, what place could a form of love as anti-bourgeois as collective love occupy?

K. A. - All the possibilities of the game of love-erotism e-sexuality, even in brutal form, in the form of collective love, of group love, are to be experienced by all people who wish to participate in this kind of erotic game. This could be a factor of liberalization, on condition that \$a does not become formalized in a new ritual, that the factor of liberalization does not become a factor of steering, of distancing.

And. - In a society like ours, isn't the risk precisely of ending - not necessarily in anarchy - but in a new system of robberies and inhibitions?

K. A. - We will certainly end up with another system, whatever we do. And even anarchy is a system, perhaps even more systematic and dogmatic than the others. But this system - if it can be called new - will have to be more open, richer in combinatorial possibilities. The rules should be considered and agreed to as rules of the game.

And. - In this game of love, what becomes of procreation?

K. A. - Procreation is only one aspect of love, of eroticism, of sexuality. It will be maintained as so-called natural procreation until artificial procreation - by technical elements

- come and relay it.

And. - How do the students you know, with whom you work, react to such problems?

K. A. - I have often broached these problems with students, if only in the light of Marx and Freud, and I have been struck by their reluctance. I found in these young beings a senile attitude towards the problem of erotic

liberation. For the communists, it was asocial; for Christians, it was immoral; for the blacks, it was to do as the whites did. Each had its justification, its rationalization, to maintain the libido, well bound like a school notebook.

Et. - Avez-vous senti, cependant, une évolution au fil des années?

K. A. - J'ai senti une plus grande familiarisation avec ce problème, je l'ai senti naître, peu à peu, à l'état de problème, mais en même temps ce qui me frappait c'était la désérotisation des étudiants au niveau de leur vie pratique. Plus ils parlaient de libération érotique, moins ils semblaient la pratiquer. Chaque fois que j'ai à faire cours pendant deux heures, je propose un inter-classe de dix minutes; je dis: »Profitez de cet inter-classe pour bavarder, pour flirter, vous rencontrer pour coucher«, mais très peu semblent utiliser ces dix minutes possibles pour un contact plus libre, en vue d'instaurer un contact plus libre et plus durable... Sans doute sont-ils trop intégrés à la société capitaliste ou sous le poids de l'idéologie socialiste telle qu'elle existe jusqu'à maintenant.

Et. - Pourtant, n'y a-t-il pas eu, récemment, un changement parmi les gens les plus jeunes?

K. A. - Les jeunes me semblent en effet plus ouverts à ce problème, ils veulent bien le discuter, mais là encore ils me semblent trop désérotisés dans leur conduite effective. Dans des assemblées générales, dans des réunions de comités ou de commissions, c'était souvent une jeune fille de vingt ans qui présidait. Cette fille pouvait être très appétissante, très féminine, très inspirante, mais elle s'adressait aux autres comme un garçon manqué et non pas comme une fille. Je crois que cet aspect du féminisme, qui n'est qu'un aspect bourgeois du féminisme du 19ème siècle, doit être dépassé par les filles. Elles doivent accepter d'être en même temps inspiratrices d'une société nouvelles et inspiratrices d'une forme d'amour nouveau et ne pas refuser leur propre sexualité. Les garçons eux-mêmes ne refuseraient pas d'envisager ces filles comme des compagnes érotisées, au lieu de se réfugier auprès de femmes qui ne font que profession de féminité et qui, de ce fait, sont plus rassurantes.

Et. - Ce qui est frappant, c'est que ces garçons manqués, ces filles désérotisées, on les rencontre surtout dans les milieux les plus engagés politiquement, les plus anti-bourgeois.

K. A. - Parce que le domaine où la tradition bourgeoise se perpétue le plus, dans le monde qui se réclame du socialisme, est justement le domaine de l'éthique qui embrasse aussi la conduite amoureuse-érotique-sexuelle. En ce sens, ils est tout à fait naturel - c'est-à-dire historique - que les filles les plus révoltées socialement soient aussi les plus conventionnelles érotiquement. Elles ne se permettent pas ce surplus de libération, parce qu'elles concentrent toute leur activité dans la lutte politique, un seul aspect de la lutte globale.

Et. - En revanche, dans certains milieux chrétiens - et même »hyperchristianisés« - comme la secte des Christs dont faisait partie Rasputine, une extrême érotisation a pu devenir une forme rituelle...

K. A. - Là, il s'agissait de phénomènes particuliers. Justement, le cadre de la secte assurait le phénomène d'une immunité clinique contre tout risque de débordement sur l'ensemble du corps social. Il ne s'agit pas que telle ou telle secte, que tel groupe ou tel mouvement soit »libre«. C'est la société humaine qui doit marcher vers une libéralisation de ses forces vitales.

And. - Have you felt, however, an evolution over the years?

K. A. - I felt a greater familiarization with this problem, I felt it being born, little by little, & the state of problem, but at the same time what struck me

was the de-erotization of the students at the level of their practical life. The more they talked about erotic liberation, the less they seemed to practice it. Each time I have to teach for two hours, I propose a ten-minute inter-class; I say: »Take advantage of this inter-class to chat, to flirt, to meet for sex«, but very few seem to use these ten possible minutes for a freer contact, in order to establish a freer and more lasting contact. .. No doubt they are too integrated into capitalist society or under the weight of socialist ideology as it has existed up to now.

And. - Yet, hasn't there recently been a change among the younger people?

K. A. - Young people seem to me to be more open to this problem, they want to discuss it, but there again they seem to me to be too de-erotic in their effective conduct. In general assemblies, in meetings of committees or commissions, it was often a young girl of twenty who presided. This girl could be appetizing, very feminine, very inspiring, but she spoke to others as a missing boy and not as a girl. I believe that this aspect of feminism, which is only a bourgeois aspect of 19th century feminism, must be overcome by girls. They must agree to be at the same time inspiring a new society and inspiring a new form of love and not refuse their own sexuality. The boys themselves would not refuse to consider these girls as erotic companions, instead of taking refuge with women who only make a profession of femininity and who, for this reason, are more reassuring.

And. - What is striking is that these missed boys, these deserotized girls, we meet them especially in the most politically committed, the most anti-bourgeois circles.

K. A. - Because the domain where the bourgeois tradition is most perpetuated, in the world which claims socialism, is precisely the domain of ethics, which also embraces amorous-erotic-sexual behavior. In this sense, it is quite natural - that is to say historical - that the most socially rebellious girls are also the most erotically conventional. They do not allow themselves this surplus of liberation, because they concentrate all their activity in the political struggle, a single aspect of the global struggle.

And. - On the other hand, in certain Christian circles - and even "hyper-Christianized ones" - like the sect of the Christs of which Rasputin belonged, an extreme eroticization could become a ritual form. ..

K. A. - There, it was about particular phenomena. Precisely, the framework of the sect ensured the phenomenon of a clinical immunity against any risk of overflow on the whole of the social body. It is not a question of this or that sect, that this group or that movement being "free". It is human society that must move towards a liberalization of its vital forces.

Et. - Dans d'autres sociétés chrétiennes - par exemple, l'Espagne au temps de l'Inquisition -, on a vu certains auteurs officiels et populaires présenter des pièces de théâtre où la mise en scène prévoyait de montrer au public une femme nue.

K. A. - Toute société »bien« organisée permettait de temps en temps qu'une femme nue apparaisse sur scène ou que des orgies aient lieu. Il s'agissait d'exutoires, d'échappatoires à la pulsion érotique, pour que, en voyant une femme nue sur scène, on ne la voit pas dans la vie de tous les jours. Alors qu'il s'agit plutôt de permettre à l'amour, à l'érotisme, à la sexualité de devenir des phénomènes quotidiens, dans toute la richesse et la misère de la vie quotidienne, et pas seulement de hauts moments exceptionnels.

Et. - Par rapport à la conception chrétienne de l'amour, comment situez-vous l'œuvre d'un écrivain comme Georges Bataille chez qui l'érotisme et la sexualité tiennent une si large place?

K. A. - L'œuvre de Bataille est extrêmement importante à ce sujet. J'ai d'ailleurs publié son livre sur *L'érotisme dans la collection «Arguments»*. Mais je crois que Bataille, avec sa génialité sauvage, prend le contrepied du christianisme et constitue en quelque sorte une négation abstraite de la conception chrétienne de l'amour. En ce sens, sa conception de l'amour est beaucoup trop douloureuse à mon goût.

Et. - Dans le sens d'une libération ou d'une libéralisation de l'amour, des solutions précises ont-elles déjà été proposées?

K. A. - En dehors de Charles Fourier et de son système phalanstérien, conçu encore de manière trop rationaliste (il ne faut pas oublier que Fourier, bien que socialiste, est un grand rationaliste bourgeois), tous les systèmes proposés jusqu'à maintenant péchaient par un excès de rationalisme, par une rigidité dans les solutions et les formules, ou par l'envers abstrait, également dogmatique, de ce rationalisme: l'anarchisme vide.

Et. - Faut-il pour autant renoncer à chercher et à proposer d'autres systèmes?

K. A. - L'action des hommes fait partie de la marche des choses et les hommes doivent proposer des ouvertures. Ainsi, en tant que penseur, comme on dit, et non pas en tant que philosophe ou en tant que professeur, je propose un type d'ouverture plus grande face au problème sexuel.

Et. - Les événements de mai 68 n'ont-ils pas, dans ce domaine, favorisé une plus grande confusion?

K. A. - Ces événements ont plutôt contribué à un accroissement de la confusion dans le sens où le problème était mis entre parenthèses. On ne visitait pas en même temps une libéralisation érotique; on était obnubilé par le politique, en tout cas par un aspect du politique, et on ne voyait pas que la lutte devait se mener sur tous les fronts à la fois, donc également sur le front érotique qui n'est ni plus ni moins important que les autres.

Et. - De plus, de telles tentatives n'ont fait que souligner les réticences bourgeoises...

K. A. - Que les bourgeois soient braqués est tout à fait inévitable. La réaction a naturellement souligné le caractère un peu chaotique de certaines exigences, mais ces exigences doivent continuer d'être

we have seen certain official and popular authors present plays where the staging planned to show the public a naked woman.

K. A. - Every "well" organized society would occasionally allow a naked woman to appear on stage or orgies to take place.

They were outlets, escapes from the erotic drive, so that when you see a naked woman on stage, you don't see her in everyday life. Whereas it is rather a question of allowing love, eroticism, sexuality to become daily phenomena, in all the richness and misery of daily life, and not only in high moments exceptional.

And. - In relation to the Christian conception of love, how do you situate the work of a writer like Georges Bataille in whom eroticism and sexuality hold such a large place?

K. A. - The work of Bataille is extremely important in this regard.

I have also published his book on eroticism in the collection »Arguments«. But I believe that Bataille, with his wild geniality, takes the opposite view of Christianity and constitutes in a way an abstract negation of the Christian conception of love. In this sense, his conception of love is far too painful for my taste.

And. - In the sense of a liberation or a liberalization of love, have precise solutions already been proposed?

As the systems proposed until now have sinned by an excess of rationalism, by a rigidity in the solutions and formulas, or by the abstract, equally dogmatic reverse side of this rationalism: the empty anarchism.

And. - Should we at the same time give up looking for and proposing other systems?

K. A. - The action of men is part of the way things work and men must offer openings. Thus, as a thinker, as they say, and not as a philosopher or as a teacher, I propose a type of greater openness to the sexual problem.

And. - Didn't the events of May 68, in this area, promote greater confusion?

K. A. - These events have rather contributed to an increase in confusion in the sense that the problem was put in parentheses.

We were not aiming at an erotic liberalization at the same time; we were obsessed with politics, in any case with an aspect of politics, and we did

not see that the struggle had to be waged on all fronts at the same time, therefore also on the erotic front which is neither more or less important than the others.

And. - Moreover, such attempts have only underlined bourgeois reluctance.

..

K. A. - That the bourgeois are robbed is absolutely inevitable.

The reaction naturally underlined the somewhat chaotic nature of certain requirements, but these requirements must continue to be 466

formulées – mieux: d'être vécues –, parce que même ceux que l'on appelle bourgeois sont sous la pression de leurs propres pulsions qui, elles aussi, aspirent à une plus grande libéralisation.

Et. – Que pourraient être les rapports de cette libéralisation et de l'homosexualité?

K. A. – L'homosexualité est une des dimensions du jeu érotique qui doit être secoué par cette libéralisation. Elle doit être aussi une activité libérée, à condition – néanmoins – de ne pas être une activité réactionnelle, névrotique, une conduite de refus ou un refuge, mais plutôt une conduite pleinement consentie. En ce sens, elle a droit de cité comme tout autre possibilité érotique que les humains voudront, c'est-à-dire pourront, inventer. Dans ce domaine, il faut plutôt craindre un trop peu qu'un beaucoup... Dans la mesure où il y a une homosexualité normale, elle devrait pouvoir s'exprimer librement.

Et. – Outre la répression sexuelle contemporaine, de type capitaliste ou socialiste, existe-t-il d'autres types de répression, liés aux sociétés primitives ou archaïques?

K. A. – Les sociétés archaïques étaient réprimées sexuellement tout autant que les autres. Elles étaient réprimées par les forces qu'elles envisageaient comme divines et par les forces sociales: magicien, prétre, roi. La liberté sexuelle n'est pas quelque chose qui a déjà existé et qu'il s'agirait de retrouver – comme un certain marxisme et un certain freudisme naïf nous le font parfois croire –, c'est une chose à conquérir pour la première fois dans l'histoire de l'humanité, une ouverture qu'il s'agit de conquérir ou de rater, car il se peut que cette expérience de libéralisation extrême des règles du jeu érotique aboutisse à une autre forme de répression.

called bourgeois are under the pressure of their own impulses which also aspire to greater liberalisation.

And. - What could be the relationship between this liberalization and homosexuality?

K. A. - Homosexuality is one of the dimensions of the erotic game which must be shaken up by this liberalization. It must also be a liberated activity, on condition - nevertheless - of not being a re-actional, neurotic activity, a behavior of refusal or a refuge, but rather a fully consented behavior. In this sense, it has the right to be cited like any other erotic possibility that humans will want, that is to say be able, to invent. In this area, it is better to fear too little than too much.. . To the extent that there is normal homosexuality, it should be able to express itself freely.

And. - Besides contemporary sexual repression, of the capitalist or socialist type, are there other types of repression, linked to primitive or archaic societies?

K. A. - Archaic societies were sexually repressed just as much as others. They were suppressed by forces they saw as divine and by social forces: magician, priest, king. Sexual freedom is not something that has already existed and that it would be a question of rediscovering - as a certain naive Marxism and a certain naive Freudianism sometimes lead us to believe - it is something to be conquered for the first time in the history of humanity, an opening which it is a question of conquering or missing, because it is possible that this experience of extreme liberalization of the rules of the erotic game leads to another form of repression.

SUPPLEMENT SPECIAL

Milan Kangrga

E T H I K U N D F R E I H E I T

Aus dem Serbokroatischen ins Deutsche übertragen von † Roland Knopfmacher
(Zagreb)

Milan Kangrga

E T H I K U N D F R E I H E I T

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1) ZUGANG

Vorliegende Schrift stellt es sich zur Aufgabe über die Ethik zu sprechen, d. h. eine Einführung in die Ethik zu geben. Es geht also um die Erörterung eines Gegenstandes, der einfach Ethik oder sog. praktische Philosophie genannt wird.

Indes bringt die einmütige Annahme und Einfachheit der Allgemeinbezeichnung, die zur Benennung eines Phänomens in Anwendung kommt bzw. durch die ein Sondergebiet der Forschung oder seine spezifische Bestimmung abgegrenzt wird, nicht gleichzeitig dieselbe Einfachheit oder Leichtigkeit des Zugangs zum betreffenden Phänomen mit sich, geschweige denn, daß sie sie im voraus gewährleistet oder bedingt, was im Hinblick auf das Gebiet der Ethik in seiner ganzen geschichtsphilosophischen Kompliziertheit und systematischen Realitätsunbestimmtheit noch besonders in die Waagschale fällt.

Was diesen unseren konkreten Fall betrifft, sollte vielleicht der Zugang allein nicht schon allzu sehr zum Problem gemacht werden. Man könnte sich dessen bewußt sein, daß eine wahrhaftig große Anzahl der verschiedensten Zugänge zu dem wieder vor uns liegenden Gegenstand, das heißt zu dem Gebiet der Ethik, Rückhalt gewährt und daß die Aufgabe ganz selbstverständlich, weitgehend dadurch erleichtert würde, daß man einen bereits erprobten und begannten Weg beschritte und an das ethische Phänomen in einer der bekannten, d. h. aus der Geschichte der Philosophie entnommenen und mehr oder minder akzeptierten Weisen heranginge.

a) Die einfachste Art der Darlegung des – mag er so genannt sein – ethischen Stoffes wäre die *historisch-chronologische*, die durchaus üblich ist. Die Aufgabe bestünde einfach darin, daß die Grundlagen der ethischen Lehre, Theorie, Doktrin und die Systeme der ethischen Idee von den ersten Anfängen an zur Darstellung gelangten.

b) Eine zweite Möglichkeit besteht darin, daß die *grundlegenden ethischen Probleme* dargelegt, erklärt und gedeutet werden, was auf die Weise bewerkstelligt werden kann, daß aufgezeigt wird, wie bei den einzelnen Denkern und Ethikern in geschichtlicher Abfolge gewisse Probleme aufgestellt, ins Auge gefaßt und gelöst wurden.

Diese beiden Arten des Herangehens und der Darstellung könnte man ganz allgemein und bedingt als die *deskriptiven* bezeichnen. Bei diesen ginge es nämlich lediglich darum, das für die einzelne ethische Theorie einerseits und das bestimmte Problem andererseits Relevante und Bedeutsame herauszubringen.

1) TO G AND G

The present writing sets itself the task of speaking about ethics, i. H. to give an introduction to ethics. So it is about discussing a subject that is simply

called ethics or so-called practical philosophy.

However, the unanimous acceptance and simplicity of the general term used to name a phenomenon or by which a special field of research or its specific destination is delineated does not at the same time entail the same simplicity or ease of access to the phenomenon in question, let alone because it guarantees or conditions them in advance, which is particularly important with regard to the field of ethics in all its historical-philosophical complexity and systematic indeterminacy of reality.

As far as our specific case is concerned, perhaps access alone should not be made too much of a problem.

One could be aware of the fact that a truly large number of the most diverse approaches to the subject lying before us, that is, to the field of ethics, were backed and that the task would be quite natural, largely facilitated by the fact that one tread a path that has already been tried and tested and approached the ethical phenomenon in one of the well-known, i. H. approaches taken from the history of philosophy and more or less accepted.

a) The simplest way of presenting the - may it be called that -

ethical material would be historical-chronological, which is quite common. The task would simply be that the foundations of ethical teaching, theory, doctrine and the systems of ethical idea should be presented from the very beginning.

b) A second possibility is that the fundamental ethical problems are set out, explained and interpreted, which can be done in such a way that it is shown how in the individual thinkers and ethicists in historical succession certain problems are raised, envisaged and turned yellow.

These two ways of approaching and presenting could generally and conditionally be called descriptive. With these, it would only be a question of bringing out what is relevant and significant for the individual ethical theory on the one hand and the specific problem on the other.

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c) Da aber der Begriff des Ethischen bekanntlich, zum Unterschied von den übrigen Gebieten der Philosophie und der Wissenschaft, außer seinem positiven theoretischen Moment auch ein bestimmtes *Wollen* in sich schließt und sich somit auch von seiner sogenannten *praktischen* Seite her aufdrängt, die zur Erfüllung gewisser Lebensaufgaben und zur Verwirklichung bestimmter Ideale aufruft, die von der Ethik meistens selbst aufgestellt werden, indem sie sie zu einem System von Normen und Regeln des Verhaltens, Tätigseins, Benehmens, Handelns und Vorgehens abrundet, so ergibt sich aus dem Spezifikum dieses ethischen – sei es philosophisch, sei es wissenschaftlich fundierten – Gebietes noch eine Möglichkeit des Zugangs zum ethischen Phänomen. Diese bestünde dann darin, sich selbst der Mühe zu unterziehen, eine neue, mehr oder minder originelle Ethik im Sinne eines abgerundeten ethischen Systems zu schaffen, worin, philosophisch oder wissenschaftlich argumentiert, neue oder gar bereits alte »Wertstufungen« zur Aufstellung gelangten, die dann in dieser Form ihrerseits durchaus darauf prätendierten, daß nach ihnen gelebt und gehandelt werde. Dies wäre also eine eigene ethische Konzeption als *normative* Disziplin. Sie steht aber als solche auf ihre Art in engster Beziehung zu jenem deskriptiven Moment, wie die weiteren Ausführungen noch zeigen sollen.

Dennoch sind wir der Ansicht, daß ein Beschreiten irgendeines der angeführten Wege nicht sogleich möglich ist. Nicht etwa darum, weil wir die Überzeugung hegten, daß ihnen keine Berechtigung zukommt. Im Gegenteil. Ein jeder der angeführten Wege in der Darstellung der ethischen Lehre ist begehbar. Damit aber die angeführten Zugangsweisen ihre Berechtigung haben, müssen sie doch wohl auch *philosophisch* begründet sein. Dies aber ist erst durchführbar, nachdem versucht worden ist zu erklären, was das Wesen des ethischen Phänomens ausmacht.

Hier beginnt bereits das Problem. Dieses Problem ergibt sich für uns implizite aus der schon erwähnten Dualität des ethischen Phänomens, das, wie wir gesehen haben, einerseits unter seinem deskriptiven, andererseits unter seinem normativen Aspekt auftritt. Dieses Spezifikum des ethischen Phänomens trägt die gesamte sogenannte ethische Problematik in sich. Wenn nämlich diese Dualität des ethischen Gegenstandes nicht respektiert wird oder man sie gar schon beim Herangehen an den Gegenstand nicht sieht, dann wird ein solcher Zugang früher oder später während der Durchführung ganz gewiß zu unlösbaren Schwierigkeiten und Widersprüchen führen. Denn diese Dualität entspringt der eigenen inneren Widersprüchlichkeit des ethischen Phänomens, welches sich gerade auf diesem Widerspruch konstituiert, darin sein wahres Wesen findet. Das ethische Phänomen tritt nämlich einerseits als die Faktizität eines realen gesellschaftlichen und menschlichen, also geschichtlichen Geschehens, oder besser gesagt, als dessen gedanklicher Ausdruck in die Erscheinung, andererseits aber gleichzeitig, und hier liegt gerade der Schwerpunkt des Problems, als ein Transzendentieren, und zwar ein ideales Transzendentieren dieses faktischen Geschehens. Beide Momente sind im ethischen Medium miteinander unauflösbar verknüpft und bedingen und konstituieren sich gegenseitig. Nur eines dieser Momente der

theoretical moment but also a specific will and thus also differs from its so-called pre-tischcn page that calls for the fulfillment of certain life tasks and the realization of certain ideals, which are usually set up by ethics itself, making them into a system of norms and Rules of conduct, being active, behaving, acting and proceeding, the specifics of this ethical area - be it philosophical or scientifically based - result in another possibility of access to the ethical phenomenon. This would then consist in subjecting oneself to the trouble of creating a new, more or less original ethics in the sense of a well-rounded ethical system, in which, philosophically or scientifically argued, new or even already old "Value classifications" were established, which then in this form, for their part, recommended that people live and act according to them. This would be a separate ethical conception as a normative discipline. But as such, in its own way, it stands in the closest relationship to that descriptive moment, as the further explanations are intended to show.

Nevertheless, we are of the opinion that following any of the paths mentioned is not immediately possible. Not because we were convinced that they had no justification.

On the contrary. Each of the paths in the presentation of the ethical teaching is walkable. However, in order for the approaches listed to be justified, they must also be philosophically justified. But this can only be done after an attempt has been made to explain what constitutes the essence of the ethical phenomenon.

Here the problem begins. For us, this problem arises implicitly from the already mentioned duality of the ethical phenomenon, which, as we have seen, appears under its descriptive aspect on the one hand and under its normative aspect on the other. This specific of the ethical phenomenon contains the entire so-called ethical problematic. If this duality of the ethical object is not respected or if you do not see it even when approaching the object, then sooner or later such access will be granted implementation will certainly lead to insoluble difficulties and contradictions. Because this duality arises from the inherent contradictory nature of the ethical phenomenon, which is constituted precisely on this contradiction, where it finds its true essence. The ethical phenomenon appears on the one hand as the factual quote of a real social and human, i.e. historical event, or rather as its intellectual expression, but on the other hand at the same time, and this is precisely the focus of the problem, as a transcending, and indeed an ideal transcending of this factual occurrence. Both moments are inextricably linked in the ethical medium and mutually condition and constitute one another. Just one of those moments of the 472

ethischen Phänomenalität für sich gesondert und getrennt einer Erwägung zu unterziehen, hieße den Kern selbst des ethischen Phänomens verfehlten. Das kommt jedoch sehr oft, um nicht zu sagen fast immer vor, so daß Ausnahmen, historisch gesehen, ganz vereinzelt sind (hier denken wir, zwecks Klarstellung, vor allem an Hegel und in einem gewissen Sinn auch an Aristoteles).

2) DIE FRAGESTELLUNG

Versuchen wir zunächst einen solchen – nennen wir es so – methodischen Fehlgriff beim Zugang (obwohl seine Wurzeln viel tiefer liegen und viel folgenreicher sind als die bloße Methodenfrage) an einem Beispiel anzudeuten, das gerade als Extremfall, das heißt wegen seiner völligen Unangemessenheit dem Ethischen als solchen gegenüber, zur Illustrierung des Vorerwähnten am geeignetsten scheint.

Eine der geradezu dominanten Zugangsarten zum ethischen Gebiet, die sich unter spezifischen geschichtlichen und geistigen Bedingungen und Umständen ganz besonders und auf eigene Weise bei der Erforschung und Deutung des ethischen Phänomens eingeführt und eingebürgert hat, indem sie ausschließlich den erwähnten deskriptiven Weg ging, und in deren Spur, in deren Geist und Gedankengut sich seit hundert Jahren die Hauptmasse der ethischen Anliegen und Richtungen bewegt (was insbesondere und potenziert bei dem sogenannten »Schulphilosophien« zum Ausdruck kommt), geht von der Voraussetzung *der Ethik als einer Wissenschaft aus*. Um ein Mißverständnis in bezug auf den Terminus Wissenschaft zu vermeiden, ist sogleich zu betonen, daß hierher auch diejenigen Richtungen, Bemühungen und Einstellungen gehören, die an das ethische Problem auch von einem philosophischen Standpunkt aus herantreten oder herantreten möchten, wobei aber ihre Vertreter zutiefst davon überzeugt sind, daß hier unter dem Begriff »philosophisch« ohne weiteres die einzige mögliche, das heißt gerade die »wissenschaftliche Philosophie« zu verstehen sei.

Von diesem Standpunkt aus erscheint die Aufgabe auf den ersten Blick hin sehr einfach, fügt sie sich doch in gedankliche und methodische Rahmen ein, die auf den festen Bau fast tausendjährigen Erfahrungen, Methoden und Prinzipien der Naturwissenschaften, deren Ergebnisse auf eigenem Gebiet niemand ableugnen noch ignorieren kann, zurückblicken und ihn sich zu eigen machen. Desgleichen kann nicht verneint werden, daß auch die Philosophie selbst in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung ihrerseits viel dazu beigetragen hat, daß der wissenschaftliche Zugriff sich über alle Gebiete des Seins ausbreitet hat in der unaufhaltsamen denkerischen Anstrengung, die Welt geistig zu bewältigen, wofür auch gerade die größten unter den Philosophen ihren Beitrag geleistet haben (erwähnt seien nur Aristoteles, Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, ja teilweise sogar Marx, obwohl bei ihm das selbständige wissenschaftliche Moment bereits in den wesentlichen Voraussetzungen seines Philosophierens überwunden ist, insbesondere aber in seiner Kritik der Philosophie Hegels).

To subject ethical phenomenality to consideration separately and separately would be to miss the very core of the ethical phenomenon. However, this happens very often, not to say almost always, so that historically speaking, exceptions are quite isolated (here, for the sake of

clarity, we think primarily of Hegel and, in a certain sense, also of Aristotle).

2) THE QUESTION

Let us first try to indicate such a - let's call it that - methodological error in access (although its roots lie much deeper and are far more consequential than the mere question of method) with an example that is considered an extreme case, that is, because of its complete inappropriateness to the ethical as such opposite, for the illustration of the aforesaid seems most suitable.

One of the almost dominant ways of accessing the ethical field, which, under specific historical and intellectual conditions and circumstances, has been introduced and established itself in a very special way and in its own way in the study and interpretation of the ethical phenomenon, by exclusively taking the descriptive path mentioned, and in whose footsteps, in whose spirit and body of thought the main mass of ethical concerns and directions has been moving for a hundred years (which is particularly evident and exponential in the case of the so-called

"School philosophies" is expressed), proceeds from the presupposition of ethics as a science. In order to avoid a misunderstanding with regard to the term science, it should be emphasized at once that this also includes those tendencies, efforts and attitudes that approach the ethical problem from a philosophical point of view or would like to, but with their representatives are deeply convinced that the term "philosophical" is to be understood here without further ado as the only possible philosophy, that is to say precisely the "scientific philosophy".

From this point of view, the task seems very simple at first glance, as it fits into a conceptual and methodological framework that is based on the solid structure of almost a thousand years of experience, methods and principles of natural sciences, the results of which nobody in their own field denies or ignores can, look back and make it your own. Likewise, it cannot be denied that philosophy itself in its historical development has contributed a great deal to the fact that scientific access has spread over all areas of being in the unstoppable intellectual effort to master the world intellectually, for whatever reason It was precisely the greatest of the philosophers who made their contribution (just mention Aristotle, Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, yes even Marx to some extent, although with him the independent scientific element has already been overcome in the essential presuppositions of his philosophizing, but especially in his critique of Hegel's philosophy).

Indem sie diesen oder einen ähnlichen Weg begeht, hat die Ethik als Wissenschaft also vor allem den konkreten *Gegenstand* ihrer Untersuchung und andererseits die *Methode* zu bestimmen, die diesem spezifischen besonderen Forschungsgegenstand entspricht. Wie dies jede Einzelwissenschaft tut, so hat auch die Ethik hier eine Grundtatsache oder einen ganzen Tatsachenkreis herauszufinden, zu bestimmen und davon auszugehen, das heißt von einer bestimmten *Gegebenheit*, und diese Tatsachen mit eigener Methode maximal ausführlich zu beschreiben, zu erklären, zu deuten, zu ordnen, zu klassifizieren und zu systematisieren. Im Falle der Ethik ist dies, generell genommen, eine ethische oder sogenannte *moralische Tatsache*. Freilich schließt dies einen ganzen Komplex von Erscheinungen, Begriffen und Problemen ein, was alles zusammen in bestimmter Hinsicht den Bereich des Ethischen oder allgemein das ethische Phänomen an sich bildet oder zu bilden hat. Seine wissenschaftliche Erfassung und Deutung resultiert notwendig in einem bestimmten System der Ethik, das dann je nach dem bestimmten Ausgangspunkt, das heißt je nachdem wie und auf welche Weise diese moralische Tatsache aufgefaßt wird, das Attribut einer wissenschaftlichen Einstellung erhält. So spricht man von einer allgemeinen wissenschaftsphilosophischen Ethik, von einer empirischen Ethik, Moraltheorie, oder soziologisch aufgefaßten Ethik, von einer psychologisch oder biologistisch konzipierten Ethik, ferner von einer Kultur- oder Persönlichkeitsethik, oder aber von einer anthropologisch fundierten Ethik oder Werttheorie oder materallen Wertethik usw.

Das, was uns hier gestattet und ermöglicht, alle erwähnten ethischen Konzeptionen im wesentlichen auf ihren gemeinsamen Nenner zu bringen trotz ihren offensichtlichen und oft wirklich großen Unterschieden sowohl in der Grundlegung wie in der Durchführung, Reichweite und in den Ergebnissen, ist etwas, was sie tatsächlich vereinigt, und das ist, generell genommen, die implizite oder explizite Annahme, daß sich ihr Gegenstand, das heißt diese sogenannte wesentliche moralische Tatsache in der Sphäre des *Gegebenen* befindet, ohne Rücksicht darauf, ob als das Gegebene ein faktisches gesellschaftlich-morales Verhältnis des Alltags verstanden wird oder dies etwa das Reich der Werte an sich oder aber ein moralisches Urteil oder eine moralische Aussage ist. Oder, andersherum gesagt, geht eine jede wissenschaftliche Ethik von der an sich verständlichen Tatsache aus, daß das ethische Problem auf rein wissenschaftlichen Wege gelöst werden kann, das heißt, daß sich das ethische Phänomen im theoretischen Bereich erschöpft und löst. Damit widerspricht sie sich unmerklich selbst gerade als Ethik, die in ihrem Wesen darauf gerichtet ist, den rein theoretischen Horizont der Fragestellung zu transzendieren, jegliche wie auch immer und welche auch immer bereits bestehende und gegebene Tatsache zu überschreiten und sich im praktischen Bereich zu realisieren und niederzulassen. Das, was nämlich unter dieser und einer solchen Voraussetzung meistens vergessen wird – und dies ist eigentlich das paradoxeste Moment in dieser ganzen wissenschaftlichen Wendung –, ist dies, daß, wenn schon von einer Tatsache oder moralischen Tatsache die Rede ist, dies nicht mehr diese oder jene eine beliebige andere wissenschaftliche Tatsache ist,

the method that corresponds to this specific, particular object of research. As every individual science does, ethics has to find out a basic fact or a whole circle of facts, to determine and to start from it, that is, from a certain given, and these facts with its own method to describe, explain, interpret, order, classify and systematize in maximum detail. In the case of ethics, this is, generally speaking, an ethical or so-called moral fact. Of course, this includes a whole complex of phenomena, concepts and problems, all of which together in a certain respect forms or has to form the area of the ethical or the ethical phenomenon in general. Its scientific recording and interpretation necessarily results in a specific system of ethics, which then, depending on the specific starting point, i.e. depending on how and in what way this moral fact is understood, that Atribut of a scientific attitude. One speaks of a general scientific-philosophical ethics, of an empirical ethics, moral theory, or sociologically conceived ethics, of a psychologically or biologically conceived ethics, furthermore of a culture or personality ethics, or of an anthropologically founded one Ethics or value theory or m aterall value ethics etc.

That which allows and enables us here to essentially bring all the ethical conceptions mentioned down to their common denominator, despite their obvious and often really great differences, both in terms of their foundations and how in performance, scope, and results, is something that actually unifies them, and that is, generally speaking, the implicit or explicit assumption that their object, that is, this so-called essential moral fact is in the sphere of the given, regardless of whether the given is understood as a factual social-moral relationship of everyday life or as the realm of values per se or a moral judgment or a moral statement is. Or, to put it the other way around, every scientific ethics starts from the fact, which is understandable in itself, that the ethical problem can be solved in a purely scientific way, which means that the ethical phenomenon is exhausted in the theoretical area and lost. Thus it imperceptibly contradicts itself as ethics, which in its essence is aimed at transcending the purely theoretical horizon of the question, any one whatsoever and which ones already to transcend existing and given fact and to realize and settle in the practical field. What is usually forgotten under this and such a prerequisite

- and this is actually the most paradoxical moment in this whole scientific turn - is that, when there is talk of a fact or moral fact, it is no longer this or that one other scientific fact is 474

sondern, wenn wir bei diesem Begriff bleiben wollen, eben eine *menschliche Tatsache*, die als solche in keinerlei fertige und vollen-de Systeme, Theorien oder Schemen eingeordnet werden kann, weil sie von ganz anderer Natur ist.

Das, was heutzutage fast keine wissenschaftstheoretische Ethik sieht, hat sehr wohl der Philosoph gesehen, der sie als erster gerade theoretisch zu begründen und zu systematisieren suchte, nämlich bereits Aristoteles. In seiner *Nikomachischen Ethik* sieht Aristoteles und formuliert dieses wesentliche Moment des Ethischen genau, wenn er schreibt:

»Da nun die Untersuchung, die uns hier beschäftigt, nicht wie die anderen sonst zu rein theoretischem Zweck angestellt wird (denn nicht um bloß zu wissen, was sittliche Trefflichkeit ist, behandeln wir den Gegenstand, sondern in der Absicht dadurch zur Tüchtigkeit zu gelangen, da wir uns sonst durch sie nicht gefördert fühlen würden), so ist es geboten die Frage nach der Art und Weise des Handelns ins Auge zu fassen und zu sehen wie man diese einzurichten hat. Denn wie wir dargelegt haben, übt sie eine entscheidende Wirkung auch darauf, welcher Art die befestigten Beschaffenheiten werden, die wir uns aneignen.«¹

Wir sehen hier, wie Aristoteles, des Wesens des Ethischen ein-sichtig werdend, auf die Notwendigkeit eines Transzendierens des ausschließlich theoretischen Bereichs hinweist und behauptet, daß die Ethik nicht die theoretische Erkenntnis zum Ziele hat, sondern die Art und Weise des Handelns, also die Praxis selbst. Nun könnte man aber einwenden, daß dies ganz richtig ist und daß eigentlich keine Ethik etwas anderes möchte, als was Aristoteles wünscht und worauf er hinweist. Denn die Ethik zielt ja angeblich gerade darauf ab, die allgemeinen theoretischen Prinzipien festzustellen, nach denen, wenn sie in den Bereich des Praktischen übertragen und darin angewendet werden, ein jeder Einzelne sich zu richten, zu leben und zu wirken hat. Demnach müßte auch weiterhin die wesentliche Aufgabe der Ethik darin bestehen, jene Normen, Prinzipien und Werte theoretisch zu begründen, genau zu fixieren und zu systematisieren, die für jede mögliche menschliche Einzelhandlung zu gelten hätten. Darin liegt aber gerade die Kernfrage, daß dies für eine jede so begriffene theoretisch-wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis einer ihrem Wesen nach unlösbare Aufgabe ist. Denn sie verbleibt innerhalb des Horizonts des Gegebenen, postuliert aber gleichzeitig Werte und Normen, die dieses Gegebene überschreiten und transzendentieren sollen.

Deshalb ist im Zusammenhang mit der angeführten Bemerkung über die Ausschließlichkeit des theoretischen Charakters der Ethik vielleicht von noch größerer Wichtigkeit, was Aristoteles gleich dahinter sagt:

»Wir haben sogleich im Eingang bemerkt, daß man die Anforde-
rung an die Behandlung jedesmal nach der Eigentümlichkeit des Ge-
genstandes bemessen muß. Die Erscheinungen des praktischen Lebens
und die Frage nach dem Nützlichen lassen ebensowenig eine ein für

¹ Aristoteles, *Nikomachische Ethik*, ins Deutsche übertragen von Adolf Lasson, Verl. bei Eugen Diederichs, Jena, 1909, II. Buch, 2, S. 27 f.

What almost no epistemological ethics sees today was seen very well by the philosopher who was the first to attempt to justify and systematize it theoretically, namely Aristotle. In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle sees and formulates this essential element of the ethical precisely when he writes:

"Since the investigation that concerns us here is not, like the others, undertaken for a purely theoretical purpose (for we are not treating the subject merely in order to know what moral excellence is, but with the intention of attaining efficiency through it, since we would otherwise not feel challenged by them), it is necessary to consider the question of the way of acting and to see how this should be set up. For, as we have shown, it also has a decisive effect on the nature of the fixed qualities that we acquire.«1

We see here how Aristotle, gaining insight into the essence of the ethical, points to the need to transcend the exclusively theoretical realm and asserts that ethics does not aim at theoretical knowledge, but at the way of acting, i.e. practice itself. But one could object that this is quite correct and that actually no ethics wanted anything other than what Aristotle desires and to which he points. For ethics is said to aim precisely at establishing the general theoretical principles according to which, when they are transferred to the realm of the practical and applied there, every individual has to direct himself, live and work. Accordingly, the essential task of ethics should continue to be to theoretically justify, precisely fix and systematize those norms, principles and values that should apply to every possible individual human action. But therein lies the core question, that this is an essentially insoluble task for any theoretical-scientific knowledge conceived in this way. For it remains within the horizon of the given, but at the same time postulates values and norms that are intended to exceed and transcend this given.

Therefore, in connection with the above remark

Perhaps of even greater importance about the exclusivity of the theoretical character of ethics is what Aristotle says immediately afterwards:

"We remarked at the outset that the treatment required must always be measured according to the peculiarity of the object. The phenomena of practical life and the question of what is useful allow just as little for 1 Aristoteles, N ikom achischc E thik, translated into German by A d o lf Lasson, Verl. by Eugen Diederichs, Jena, 1909, II. Book, 2, p. 27 f.

allelmal gültige Bestimmung zu, wie die Frage nach dem was gesund ist. Gilt dies von der Behandlung der allgemeinen Fragen, so schließt die Behandlung der Einzelfälle in noch entschiedener Weise begriffliche Genauigkeit aus. Sie fällt weder unter den Begriff der Kunstretheorie noch unter den einer herkömmlichen Überlieferung; der Handelnder selber vielmehr muß jedesmal das der augenblicklichen Lage Entsprechende herausfinden, geradeso wie es auch bei der Tätigkeit des Arztes und des Steuermanns der Fall ist.^a

Es ist ein Glückssfall, daß Aristoteles wegen des erwähnten Satzes bisher nicht auch schon -- zum existentialistischen Philosophen ernannt worden ist.

Die Größe des Aristoteles liegt darin, daß er einsieht, daß die menschlichen Handlungen von solcher Art sind, daß keine Theorie, in diesem Falle keine ethische Theorie, sie im voraus zu bestimmen und in festgelegte theoretische Rahmen, Schemen, Prinzipien, Vorschriften oder Systeme einzuordnen vermag, die ein hinreichender Grund für eine mögliche menschliche Tätigkeit wären, weil gerade dies der menschlichen Natur widersprechen würde, die in ihrem Wesen universell ist. Wie Aristoteles dasselbe bei Gelegenheit der Erörterung des Schöpferischen noch tiefgehender formuliert hat, werden wir später sehen.

In diesem Sinne erfährt die theoretische wissenschaftliche Ethik etwas, worauf hier sofort hingewiesen werden muß, da es von entscheidender Wichtigkeit für ihre Aufrechterhaltbarkeit ist. Der Gegenstand ihrer Untersuchung selbst ist nämlich, wie wir schon hervorgehoben haben, eine sehr komplizierte und in ihrem Spezifikum nicht so leicht erfaßbare »Tatsache«, die bereits bei einem ersten solchen Zugriff außer ihrer auf den ersten Blick hin einfachen Vorderseite alsbald auch ihre sehr komplizierte Kehrseite vorweist, die immer von neuem alle dahin orientierten Ethiker in Verlegenheit und dann ganz sicher auch in einen offensichtlichen Widerspruch zu ihrem Ausgangspunkt und festbestimmten wissenschaftlichen Methoden bringt.

Die Schwierigkeit und Verlegenheit besteht nämlich einerseits darin – und dies geschieht besonders bei der Voraussetzung eines konsequenten Durchhaltens in der wissenschaftlichen Interpretation des ethischen Phänomens –, daß sich am Ende herausstellt, daß das Phänomen seinem Wesen nach fast unberührt geblieben ist und daß bei dieser ganzen, zuweilen gewaltigen und mit viel Kenntnis und Ehrgeiz durchgeführten Untersuchung und Erklärung von allem anderen die Rede war, nur nicht von dem, was man zur Aufgabe gemacht hatte, das heißt – vom Wesen des ethischen Phänomens. Auf jeden Fall wirkt es bedrückend, sich in einer solchen undankbaren Lage und Situation zu befinden.

Andererseits kann und muß oft notwendig aus dem Charakter des Untersuchungsgegenstandes (das heißt des ethischen Phänomens) selbst ein Ergebnis hervorgehen, das für den wissenschaftlich Untersuchenden sowohl unerwartet als auch vielmehr unerwünscht ist. Es kommt nämlich dazu, daß sehr häufig aus der ganzen mühsamen

^a Ebenda, II. Buch, 2, S. 28.

Rather, the patient himself must always find out what is appropriate to the current situation, just as is the case with the activities of the doctor and the helmsman.«2

It is a stroke of luck that Aristoteles has not already -- become an existentialist philosopher em an n t because of the sentence mentioned.

The greatness of Aristotle lies in the fact that he recognizes that human actions are of such a nature that no theory, in this case no ethical theory, can predetermine them and fit them into fixed theoretical frameworks, schemes, principles , regulations or systems that would be a sufficient reason for possible human activity, because precisely this would contradict human nature, which is universal in its essence. We will see later how Aristotle formulated the same thing in greater depth when discussing the creative.

In this sense, theoretical scientific ethics experiences something that must be pointed out immediately here, that it is of decisive importance for its sustainability. The object of their investigation itself is, as we have already emphasized, a very complicated and in its specifics not so easily ascertainable "fact" that is already apparent with a first such access to the At first glance, the simple front side soon also shows its very complicated reverse side, which again and again embarrasses all ethicists who are oriented in that direction and then certainly also in an obvious contradiction to their starting point and fixes it scientific m ethods.

The difficulty and embarrassment consists on the one hand in the fact that - and this happens particularly if a consistent perseverance in the scientific interpretation of the ethical phenomenon is assumed - that in the end it turns out that the P h a nomen has essentially remained almost untouched and that in this whole, at times colossal and carried out with a great deal of knowledge and ambition, investigation and explanation, there was talk of everything else, just not of that which one had taken as a task, that is to say - of the essence of the ethical phenomenon. In any case, it is depressing to find oneself in such a thankless position and situation.

On the other hand, the character of the object under investigation (i.e., the ethical phenomenon) itself can and must often necessarily lead to a result that is both unexpected and much more undesirable for the scientific investigator. It comes about that very often from the whole laborious

systematischen, wissenschaftlich-methodischen Untersuchung im Bereich der ethischen Wissenschaft, also der sogenannten »moralischen Tatsache«, zuletzt als Ergebnis ganz unbemerkt eine – *normative Ethik* ausgebrütet wird, die auch im Gegensatz zu ihrem wissenschaftlichen Grundprinzip und ihrer Methode am Ende oder im Laufe der Untersuchung, manchmal sogar für den Untersuchenden ganz unbemerkt, bestimmte moralische Aufgaben, Normen und Postulate aufstellt, oder aber Werte, Ideale und Ziele der menschlichen Tätigkeit festlegt. Es ist völlig einleuchtend, daß dann allen diesen Postulaten nicht mehr zugeschrieben werden kann, daß sie einfach schon Wert und Geltung haben im Sinne der bestehenden Tatsache (denn dann wären dies weder ethische Postulate noch Normen usw.), sondern es geht aus ihrem Charakter selbst hervor, daß sie erst Wert und Geltung zu bekommen haben für jede mögliche ethische bzw. moralische Tätigkeit, und demgemäß sein und gelten sollen. Damit haben wir, was wohl offensichtlich ist, den rein wissenschaftlichen Bereich verlassen und sind darauf eingegangen, was vom Standpunkt der Wissenschaft – »bloßes Moralisieren« genannt wird.

Das Ungemach oder wenigstens die große Schwierigkeit liegt darin, daß dies dann leider wirklich ein durch nichts motivierter und sich auf nichts wirklich gründender bloßer Moralismus, eine blaße Morallehre oder eine papierene, graue, lebenslose und abgequälte akademische Abstraktion ist und bleibt, die in dieser Gestalt nur noch ein neuer Beitrag zu dem Mißerfolg ist, aus dem Labyrinth abstrakter ethischer Philosophie, das heißt eigentlich aus den menschlich aktuellen und akuten Dilemmata und Krisen nicht mehr herauszufinden, in denen so tief verflochten und oft verloren der von einem Extrem zum anderen irrende Mensch von heute sich befindet.

3) DER AUSSERETHISCHE CHARAKTER DES OBERSTEN ETHISCHEN PRINZIPS

Wie sollten wir uns also in keiner solchen oder ähnlichen Lage befinden (und deshalb haben wir dieses Beispiel auch herangezogen), die, wenn es sich bloß um die Methode handelt, größtenteils das Ergebnis eines ad-hoc-Herangehens an das Ethische von einer aus einem anderen Bereich übernommenen Voraussetzung aus ist und somit das Spezifikum des eigenen Untersuchungsgegenstandes nicht beachtet. Was, wie wir hervorgehoben haben, gerade in bezug auf das Ethische in höchstem Maße erforderlich ist, so daß wir uns, wenn wir ein Umherirren oder ein bloßes Gleiten über die Oberfläche unserer Aufgabe vermeiden wollen, schon beim Herangehen an dieses Phänomen nach seiner philosophischen Berechtigung und Begründtheit fragen müssen. Mit anderen Worten gesagt, heißt das hier: Wenn wir in die Ethik einführen wollen, muß uns vor allem klar sein, in was wir einführen. Sonst wäre dies eine Einführung in etwas Unbekanntes oder zumindest Unbestimmtes. Und dies »Etwas« ist nicht einfach die Ethik, unter welchem Begriff mancherlei verstanden werden kann,

systematic, scientific-methodical investigation in the field of ethical science, i.e. the so-called "moral fact", in the end quite unnoticed as a result a - normative ethics is hatched, which also in contrast to its basic scientific principle and its method at the end or in the course of the investigation ,

sometimes even without the observer noticing, establishes certain moral tasks, norms and postulates, or defines values, ideals and goals of human activity. It is completely plausible that then all of these postulates can no longer be attributed, that they simply already have value and validity in the sense of the existing fact (because then these were neither ethical postulates nor norms, etc.), but it goes out their character shows that they first have to be given value and validity for every possible ethical or

moral activity, and accordingly should be and apply. With that, as is probably obvious, we have left the purely scientific realm and entered what is called from the scientific point of view - "mere moralizing".

The inconvenience, or at least the great difficulty, lies in the fact that this is and remains a mere moralism that is not motivated by anything and is not really based on anything, a mere moral doctrine or a papery, gray, lifeless and weary academic abstraction that in this Gestalt is only a new contribution to the Mifi success, from the labyrinth of abstract ethical philosophemes, which means actually from the humanly current and acute dilemmas and crises, in which so deeply intertwined and often lost the human being wandering from one extreme to the other from today is located.

3)

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So how should we not find ourselves in a situation like this (and that's why we used this example) which, if it's just a matter of method, is largely the result of an ad hoc approach to the ethical of a taken from another area and thus does not take into account the specifics of the subject of investigation.

which, as we have emphasized, is of the utmost importance precisely in relation to the ethical, so that if we wish to avoid straying or merely skimming over the surface of our task, even in approaching this phenomenon we should look for his philosophical justification and justification. In other words, what this means here is that if we want to introduce ethics, we must above all be clear about what we are introducing. Otherwise this would be an introduction to something unknown or at least vague. And this "something" is not simply ethics, under which many different concepts can be understood, 477

sondern das, was uns primär interessieren muß und womit wir uns auf eine wie auch immer geartete Weise auseinanderzusetzen haben, das heißt – das Wesen des ethischen Phänomens.

Bei der Bestimmung oder nur der Ergründung des Wesens des ethischen Phänomens müssen wir jedoch ebenso vorsichtig vorgehen, damit uns nicht bei dieser Untersuchung wieder eine Tatsache auf Abwege führt. Diese Tatsache, von der wir sogar ohne Gewärtigung aller erwähnten oder ähnlichen Folgen ausgehen könnten, könnte diese sein, daß wir bei der Untersuchung des Wesens des Ethischen davon ausgingen, wie und worin einer der Philosophen oder Ethiker in seiner Ethik oder ethischen Theorie das Wesen des eigenen ethischen Systems erfaßt, begriffen und festgestellt hat. Wir dürfen nicht außer acht lassen, daß dann da im Grunde ein bestimmtes ethisches Credo vorliegt, ein bestimmtes menschliches Wollen, eine mehr oder minder klare Weltanschauung, eine konkrete Bemühung des Menschenwesens, in einem bestimmten geschichtlichen Augenblick der eigenen Existenz jetzt und hier einen Sinn zu geben, die Wege des eigenen menschlichen Geschehens denkend zu erhellen und ihm seine humanen Koordinaten abzustecken, innerhalb derer – trotz allen in Wirklichkeit bestehenden Unzulänglichkeiten des Lebens – ein sinnvolles Menschendasein überhaupt möglich wäre. Was in einem jeden solchen menschlichen Bemühen, das nach der Festlegung seiner eigenen humanen Voraussetzung trachtet, dann dabei notwendig und unumgänglich ist, ist vor allem die Grundlegung und Fixierung eines fundamentalen oder obersten ethischen Prinzips. Ohne diese humane Voraussetzung würde sich der Einzelne nicht nur in ein sinnloses und zielloses Vakuum versetzt fühlen, sondern sich auch faktisch darin befinden, aus dem um jeden Preis herauszugelangen wäre. Aus diesem Wollen entspringt dann das Bestreben und das Ringen um die Gestaltung einer Ethik, die durch ihre Mittel den Bestand und die Sinnträchtigkeit eines eminent menschlichen Bereiches gewährleisten und rechtfertigen würde, in dem sich dann trotzdem und noch immer menschlich leben ließe. Eine jede Ethik fragt daher und muß sich nach diesem ihren höchsten Prinzip fragen, sie muß es herausfinden, suchen, feststellen, bestimmen. Und wenn sie es findet und feststellt, ist alles andere, also die Durchführung und Begründung bzw. die begründete Abrundung und Systematisierung einer Morallehre mehr oder minder Sache der gedanklichen Folgerichtigkeit, der Tiefgründigkeit, des Scharfsinns, der Klarheit in der Darbietung und des überzeugenden Argumentierens, also, allgemein gefaßt, das Werk einer Theorie, einer theoretischen Betrachtung und Ausführung.

Das, worauf wir hier vor allem hinweisen möchten, ist dies, daß gerade dieses und ein so geartetes oberstes Prinzip, das einer jeden Ethik, einem jeden ethischen System zugrunde liegt, *das Wesen einer bestimmten ethischen Konzeption ausmacht*. Oder, einfacher gesagt, *was* eine Ethik will und *wonach* sie trachtet, oder *was* oder *wie* gewollt werden soll, ist bereits in ihrem allgemeinen, grundlegenden, höchsten oder obersten Prinzip enthalten. Während jedoch dieses und ein solches besonderes Prinzip das *innere Wesen* eines in einem be-

but what must primarily interest us and with which we have to deal in any way whatsoever, that is to say - the essence of the ethical phenomenon.

However, in determining, or even just discerning, the nature of the ethical

phenomenon, we must proceed with equal caution lest another fact lead us astray in this inquiry. This fact, from which we could proceed even without entitlement to all the consequences mentioned or similar, could be that, in investigating the essence of the ethical, we proceeded from how and wherein one of the philosophers or ethicists has grasped, comprehended and established the essence of his own ethical system in his ethics or ethical theory. We must not lose sight of the fact that there is basically a certain ethical credo, a certain human will, a more or less clear worldview, a concrete effort by human beings in a certain way to give meaning to the historical moment of one's own existence here and now, to enlighten the paths of one's own human occurrences and to stake out its humane coordinates within which - despite all the shortcomings of life that actually exist - a meaningful one human existence would be possible at all. What is then necessary and unavoidable in any such human endeavor that seeks to establish its own human condition is, above all, the establishment and establishment of a fundamental or supreme ethical principle . Without this human condition, the individual would not only feel transported into a meaningless and aimless vacuum, but would actually find themselves in it, from which one could get out at any cost. From this will then arises the endeavor and the struggle to shape an ethics, which through its means would guarantee and justify the existence and the meaningfulness of an eminently human area, in which then nevertheless and still live human liefe. Every ethic therefore asks and must ask itself about this, its highest principle, it must find out, seek, determine, determine. And when it finds and establishes it, everything else, i.e. the implementation and justification or the justified outline and systematization of a moral doctrine is more or less a matter of intellectual consistency, profundity, ingenuity , the clarity of the performance and the convincing argumentation, i.e., generally speaking, the work of a theory, a theoretical consideration and execution.

What we would like to point out here is that precisely this and a supreme principle of this kind, which underlies every ethic, every ethical system, is the essence of a certain ethical concept matters. Or, to put it more simply, what an ethic wants and what it strives for, or what or how it should be wanted, is already contained in its one general, fundamental, highest or supreme principle. However, while this and such a special principle the inner essence of one in a be-478

stimmten ethischen System realisierten und in der ethischen Theorie abgeleiteten moralischen Wollens ist, ist es *nicht zugleich auch das Wesen des ethischen Phänomens selbst*.

Wenn man nun diesen *ersten wesentlichen Unterschied* zwischen dem Wesen (also dem obersten Prinzip) eines bestimmten ethischen Systems und dem Wesen des ethischen Phänomens als solchen nicht erkennen würde, und dies hat schon beim Herantreten an dieses Phänomen zu erfolgen, und wenn man diese beiden unterschiedlichen Wesenhaftigkeiten, das heißt zwei im Grunde verschiedene Positionen identifiziert oder beständig miteinander verwechselt, dann erhält man unter der Voraussetzung ihrer Identifizierung im besten Falle als Ergebnis die eigene ethische Lehre, der das übernommene und durch die eigene Theorie abermals begründete oberste ethische Prinzip zugrunde liegen wird. Das wäre also eine neue oder andere ethische Konzeption. Unter der Voraussetzung aber einer nichtreflektierten, das heißt philosophisch nicht zu Ende gedachten Verwechslung und gegenseitigen theoretischen Vermengung des Wesens des ethischen Systems und des Wesens des ethischen Phänomens wird man sich in einer inneren Widersprüchlichkeit verfangen, die am allgemeinsten dadurch gekennzeichnet ist, daß das ethische Postulat, das seiner Natur nach erst die Festsetzung von Art und Weise oder Zweck einer möglichen Tätigkeit verlangt, der Behandlung von etwas bereits Gegebenem, von einer moralischen Tatsache, unterliegt, also von etwas, was *a priori* theoretisch bestimbar ist. Das Ergebnis entspräche also dem unter der Voraussetzung einer Ethik als Wissenschaft Angeführten.

Um dies noch mehr klarzustellen, soll hier gleich auch auf einen *anderen wesentlichen Unterschied* hingewiesen werden, der implizit und fast immer in der Grundlage eines bestimmten ethischen Systems enthalten ist und auf seine Weise den grundlegenden Widerspruch einer jeden ethischen Lehre ausmacht. Es handelt sich nämlich um den Charakter des allgemeinen oder obersten Prinzips der Ethik selbst. Der besseren Verständlichkeit wegen sollen gleich einige möglichen ethischen Allgemeinprinzipien angeführt werden, auf Grund derer eine ethische Theorie oder ein System der Ethik aufgebaut und gestaltet wird. Das kann folgendes sein: Gott oder das höchste Wesen, die Idee des Guten, das höchste Gut oder die Güte, die Gerechtigkeit, ferner die Glückseligkeit (eudaimonia), der allgemeine Weltgeist, das tugendsame Leben oder die Tugend selbst, die Ungetrübtheit der Seele, die Vollkommenheit, das allgemeine Wohlergehen oder das des Einzelnen, die Nützlichkeit, der kategorische Imperativ, die Pflicht, die Gleichheit, die Solidarität, die gegenseitige Hilfeleistung, die Werte usw., usf.

Wenn man nun alle diese angeführten möglichen Allgemeinprinzipien, die den einzelnen ethischen Konzeptionen oder Lehren zugrunde liegen, einer etwas näheren Betrachtung unterzieht, gelangt man zu einer auf den ersten Blick hin überraschenden Einsicht und notwendigen Schlußfolgerung, die da lautet:

Kein einziges von diesen höchsten, obersten oder allgemeinsten ethischen Prinzipien, die, wie wir gesehen haben, das Wesen einer bestimmten ethischen Sonderlehre ausmachen, ist seinem Wesen nach

*If one were not to recognize this first essential difference between the essence (i.e. the supreme principle) of a certain ethical system and the essence of the ethical phenomenon as such, and this has to be done when approaching this phenomenon, and if one recognizes these two different essentialities, i.e. two fundamentally different positions are identified or constantly confused with one another, then, assuming their identification, one obtains, at best, one's own ethical teaching as a result, which will be based on the supreme ethical principle that has been adopted and once again established by one's own theory . So that would be a new or different ethical conception. Assuming, however, a non-reflected, i.e. philosophically not thought through, confusion and mutual theoretical understanding of the essence of the ethical system and the essence of the ethical phenomenon, one will get caught up in an inner contradiction, which is most generally characterized by the fact that the ethical Postulate, which by its very nature first requires the determination of the manner or purpose of a possible activity, requires the treatment of something already given, of a moral fact, i.e. of something that is theoretically determinable *a priori*. The result corresponded to what was stated under the assumption of ethics as a science.*

To make this clearer, it is important to note at once another essential distinction which is implicit and almost always inherent in the basis of a particular ethical system and which in its own way constitutes the fundamental contradiction of every ethical doctrine. It is about the character of the general or supreme principle of ethics itself. For the sake of better understanding, a few possible general ethical principles should be mentioned right away, on the basis of which an ethical theory or a system of ethics is constructed and designed. This can be the following: God or the highest being, the idea of the good, the highest good or goodness, justice, furthermore happiness (eudaimonia), the general world spirit, the virtuous life or virtue itself, the serenity of the soul, perfection, general well-being or that of the individual, utility, the categorical imperative, duty, equality, solidarity, mutual assistance, values, etc., etc.

If one now takes a closer look at all of these possible general principles that underlie the individual ethical conceptions or teachings, one arrives at an insight that is surprising at first glance and a necessary conclusion, which reads:

None of these highest, supreme, or most general ethical principles, which, as we have seen, constitute the essence of a particular ethical doctrine, is essentially 479

selbst von theoretischer Natur, bzw. kein einziges von ihnen ist theoretisch strukturiert. Um hier nicht gleich auf die ganze Breite und den Sinn dieser These einzugehen, was ohnehin unsere weiteren Ausführungen erhellten werden, genügt es, zum Verständnis dieses Begriffes des »Theoretischen« nur anzuführen, daß sich keines der angeführten Prinzipien, erstens, *inhaltlich bestimmen*, zweitens, *beweisen* läßt, und dies ist gerade die Grundforderung und Voraussetzung einer jeden Theorie bzw. eines theoretischen Mediums als solchen. Ob Gott existiert und was er ist, ob das höchste Gut existiert und was es ist, was die Glückseligkeit, das Wohlergehen, die Nützlichkeit, die Werte usw. sind, alles dies läßt sich weder inhaltlich bestimmen noch theoretisch beweisen, noch auf diesem Wege begründen. Deshalb sind alle Allgemeinprinzipien der ethischen Lehre *atheoretische oder aussertheoretische Allgemeinvoraussetzungen*, deren Wesen darin liegt, daß sie lediglich als solche angenommen oder abgelehnt werden können, weil sich ihre eigene Grundlegung *außerhalb des Bereichs der theoretischen Begründung, Bestimmung und Beweisführung* befindet.

Um nicht den Anschein bloßer Behauptungen zu erwecken und andererseits dem möglichen Einwand zu begegnen, daß sich diese Thesen nicht auf die ethische Lehre selbst oder den ethischen Bereich überhaupt beziehen oder beziehen müssen, wollen wir uns ansehen, wie dieselbe These lautet, wenn sie auf Grund der eigenen ethischen Erfahrung ausgeschritten, ausgeführt, formuliert und erlebt wird und wenn sie gleichsam von »innen« heraus, aus der ethischen Materie und ihrer theoretischen Gestaltung hervorgeht. Mögen uns dazu die Meinungen dreier wirklich kompetenter ethischer Denker aus drei ganz verschiedenen und voneinander entfernten geschichtlichen Zeiträumen dienen, damit sich auch von dieser Seite her die Einsicht ergibt, daß es sich nicht um augenblickliche, äußerliche oder zufällige Schwierigkeiten eines besonderen ethischen Systems handelt, sondern um eine wesentliche und permanente Grenze und Widersprüchlichkeit der *theoretischen Grundlegung* der Ethik als solcher. Diese Denker sind: Aristoteles, Kant und Nicolai Hartmann.

Über das angeführte Problem sagt Aristoteles in der *Nikomachischen Ethik* folgendes:

»*Wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis*, sahen wir, ist gedankliche Auffassung des Allgemeinen und des Notwendigen. Für alles nun was Gegenstand eines Beweises ist, und mithin für alle Wissenschaft, gibt es Prinzipien, aus denen es stammt; denn Wissenschaft stützt sich auf Gründe. Der letzte Grund für das, was Objekt der Wissenschaft ist, kann also weder der Wissenschaft selber noch der Kunstfertigkeit noch der praktischen Einsicht zugehören. Denn was Objekt der Wissenschaft ist, das muß sich beweisen lassen; die beiden anderen aber haben es mit dem zu tun, was sich auch anders verhalten kann. Aber auch in der idealen Geisteskultur haben jene letzten Gründe nicht ihren Platz. Denn es bezeichnet gerade den hochgebildeten Mann, daß es so manches gibt, wofür er imstande ist einen Beweis zu führen.«³

³ Ebenda, VI, 6, S. 128.

themselves of a theoretical nature, or rather not a single one of them is theoretically structured. In order not to go into the full breadth and meaning of this thesis here, which our further explanations will elucidate anyway, it is sufficient to state in order to understand this concept of the

"theoretical" that none of the principles cited, first , to determine the content, secondly, to prove, and this is precisely the basic requirement and prerequisite of every theory or of a theoretical medium as such. Whether God exists and what he is, whether the highest good exists and what it is, what happiness, well-being, usefulness, values, etc. are, all of this can neither be determined in terms of content nor proven theoretically , still based on this same path. Therefore, all general principles of ethical teaching are atheoretical or extra-theoretical general assumptions, the essence of which lies in the fact that they can only be accepted or rejected as such, because their own foundation lies outside of the area of theoretical justification, determination and proof.

In order not to give the impression of mere assertions and on the other hand to meet the possible objection that these theses do not refer to the ethical teaching itself or the ethical field in general, we want to see how the same thesis reads when it is stepped out, carried out, formulated and experienced on the basis of one's own ethical experience and if it emerges from »inside«, as it were, from the ethical matter and its theoretical formation. Let us use the opinions of three really competent ethical thinkers from three completely different and distant historical periods, so that from this side, too, the insight arises that it is not about momentary, external or accidental difficulties of a particular ethical system, but an essential and permanent limit and inconsistency of the theoretical foundation of ethics as such. These thinkers are: Aristotle, Kant and Nicolai Hartmann .

Aristotle says the following about the problem mentioned in the Nicomachian Ethics:

»Scientific cognition, we saw, is an intellectual apprehension of the general and the necessary. Now for everything that is the subject of proof, and consequently for all science, there are principles from which it springs; because science is based on reasons. The ultimate reason for what is the object of science can therefore belong neither to science itself, nor to artistry, nor to practical insight. For what is an object of science must be capable of being proved; the other two, however, have to do with things that can also behave differently. But even in the ideal spiritual culture those ultimate reasons have no place. For it indicates precisely the highly educated man that there are many things for which he is able to provide evidence.«3

¹ Ende, VI, 6, S. 128.

Soweit Aristoteles. Und nun hören wir uns Kant an, der, indem er die implizite in der Grundlage seiner Ethik enthaltene Frage aufwirft, das heißt, *wie der kategorische Imperativ möglich ist, also das Grundprinzip seiner Moraltheorie*, und daraus antwortet, daß jener nur unter der Voraussetzung der Idee der Freiheit möglich sei, schreibt:

»Die Frage also: wie ein kategorischer Imperativ möglich sei, kann zwar so weit beantwortet werden, als man die einzige Voraussetzung angeben kann, unter der es allein möglich ist, nämlich die Idee der Freiheit, imgleichen als man die Notwendigkeit dieser Voraussetzung einsehen kann, welches zum *praktischen Gebrauche* der Vernunft, d. i. Überzeugung von der *Gültigkeit dieses Imperativs*, mithin auch des sittlichen Gesetzes hinreichend ist, aber *wie diese Voraussetzung selbst möglich sei, läßt sich durch keine menschliche Vernunft jemals einsehen.*«⁴

An derselben Stelle sagt Kant auch folgendes:

»Wie nun aber reine Vernunft, ohne andere Triebfedern, die irgend woher sonsten genommen sein mögen, für sich selbst praktisch sein, d. i. wie das bloße *Prinzip der Allgemeingültigkeit aller ihrer Maximen als Gesetze*, (welches freilich die Form einer reinen praktischen Vernunft sein würde), ohne alle Materie (Gegenstand) des Willens, woran man zum voraus irgendein Interesse nehmen dürfe, für sich selbst eine Triebfeder abgeben und ein Interesse, welches rein *moralisch* heißen würde, bewirken oder mit anderen Worten: *wie reine Vernunft praktisch sein können, das zu erklären, dazu ist alle menschliche Vernunft gänzlich unvermögend, und alle Mühe und Arbeit, hievon Erklärung zu suchen, ist verloren.*«⁵

Zuletzt sei noch Hartmann angeführt, der in seiner umfangreichen *Ethik* nach einer ausführlichen Behandlung derselben Frage, das heißt der inhaltlichen Bestimmung des Begriffs des Guten, das für ihn der höchste ethische Wert ist, sagt:

»Gerade hier, im inhaltlichen Zentrum der Ethik, versagen alle Methoden. Es bestätigt sich, was in anderen Zusammenhange bereits klar wurde: *wir wissen noch nicht, was das Gute ist*. Weder die positive Moral weiß es, noch die philosophische Ethik. Man muß erst danach suchen. Ja, man muß für dieses Suchen erst noch den Weg finden.«⁶

Was ergibt sich also aus alledem? Aristoteles spricht explizite von der erwähnten These, und da ist jeder Kommentar überflüssig. Wenn Kant dagegen einsieht, daß alle seine Mittel zur theoretischen Grundlegung des kategorischen Imperativs als des ethischen Grundprinzips nicht ausreichen, dann spricht er, unter Verwendung der Idee der Freiheit, die bekanntlich nicht das konstitutive Prinzip der Erkenntnis sondern das regulative Prinzip des Handelns ist, lediglich vom Hinreichen dieses Prinzips für den »praktischen Gebrauch« und bleibt bei der bloßen *Überzeugung* von dessen Gültigkeit stehen, aber seine Voraussetzung selbst ist theoretisch und erkenntnistisch unfaßbar.

⁴ Kant, *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, Immanuel Kants Werke Bd. IV, Bruno Cassirer, Berlin 1913, S. 321.

⁵ Ebenda, S. 321 f.

⁶ Nicolai Hartmann, *Ethik*, Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin und Leipzig 1926, S. 340 f.

freedom is possible, writes:

*"So the question: how a categorical imperative is possible can be answered so far. than one can state the only premise under which cr alone is possible, namely the idea of freedom, at the same time as one can see the necessity of this premise, which for the practical use of reason, i. i. conviction of the validity of this imperative, and consequently also of the moral law, is sufficient, but no human reason can ever see how this assumption itself is possible."**

In the same place Kant also says the following:

But how pure reason, without other motives that may have come from somewhere else, can be practical for itself, i. i. how the mere principle of the universal validity of all its maxims as laws (which would certainly be the form of a pure practical reason), without any matter (object) of the will, in which one may take any interest in advance, furnishes a motive for itself and to bring about an interest which would be called purely moral, or in other words: how pure reason can be practical, to explain that, all human reason is completely unable to do this, and all effort and work to seek an explanation of this is lost. «5

Finally, Hartmann should be mentioned, who in his extensive ethics, after a detailed treatment of the same question, i.e. the determination of the content of the concept of the good, which for him is the highest ethical value, says:

»It is precisely here, in the center of ethics content, that all methods fail. It confirms what has already become clear in other contexts: we do not yet know what the good is. Neither positive morality knows it, nor philosophical ethics. You have to look for it first. Yes, one must first find the way for this search.«6

So what comes out of all this? Aristotle speaks explicitly of the thesis mentioned, and any comment is superfluous. If, on the other hand, Kant realizes that all his means for the theoretical foundation of the categorical imperative as the basic ethical principle are not sufficient, then he speaks, using the idea of freedom, which, as is well known, is not the constitutive principle of knowledge but the regulative principle of action, only of the sufficiency of this principle for "practical use" and stops at the mere conviction of its validity, but its assumption itself is theoretically and cognitively incomprehensible.

4 Kant, Groundwork on the Metaphysics of the Sitting, Immanuel Kants Work Bd. IV, Bruno C assirer, Berlin 1913, p.321.

* E things, S. 321 f.

- Nicolai Hartmann, Ethik, Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin and Leipzig 192b, p. 340 f.

Mithin bleibt die Grundfrage, wie das Prinzip der Allgemeingültigkeit aller seiner Maximen als Gesetze praktisch, das heißt moralisch wirksam sein kann, oder mit anderen Worten, wie das allgemeine ethische Prinzip die Basis und der Grund des sittlichen Handelns sein kann, bleibt also diese Frage für die theoretische Erörterung offen, und hier ist die Theorie unfähig, eine Antwort zu geben.

Hartmann kann seinerseits wieder nicht die Grundfrage seiner Wertethik beantworten, das heißt: was das Gute als höchster Wert ist, und läßt die Bestimmung des Wertbegriffs ebenso als offene und unbeantwortete ethisch-theoretische Frage zurück, obwohl er ein objektives Reich der Werte an sich feststellt (nach dem Muster der Platonischen Ideen), baut jedoch trotzdem auf dieser unbewiesenen Grundvoraussetzung seine bis zu den geringfügigsten Einzelheiten ausgearbeitete ethische Theorie auf.

In allen drei Fällen haben wir einerseits eine tiefe Einsicht in die Sache selbst vor uns liegen, die bis zu ihren letzten denkerischen Konsequenzen geführt wird, wobei sich allenfalls eine große und offensichtliche denkerische Redlichkeit ausweist, weil die theoretische Wahrheit hier ihre eigenen Grenzen zeigt, andererseits aber ist der Beweis des außertheoretischen Charakters der Grundlagen einer jeden ethischen Theorie, erprobt an der ethischen Materie selbst, vor uns am Werke. Wenn wir aber sagen »der Beweis am Werke«, so ist das freilich kein theoretischer Beweis mehr, sondern nur die wirkliche Wahrheit der theoretischen Grenzen und Unzulänglichkeiten, also eine Einsicht, die aus der durch die Theorie erreichten Grenze und Beschränkung selbst heraus auf einen neuen möglichen Weg der Lösung nicht nur des ethischen Bereichs, sondern auch des ethischen Phänomens als solchen verweist. Hier befinden wir uns an der Grenze, an der sich die ethische theoretisch-kontemplative Praxis in das Medium der wirklich menschlichen Geschichtspraxis verwandelt, die der ersten, das heißt der ethischen zugrunde liegt und sie ermöglicht. Doch darüber etwas später.

Daß aber eine jede ethische Lehre, um dies zu sein, das heißt um keine bloße Meinung oder kein willkürliches subjektives Wollen zu bleiben, dies sowohl für ihren eigenen Urheber wie für jeden anderen, an den sie sich wendet und an den sie appellieren möchte, theoretisch expliziert, ausgeführt und argumentiert sein muß, um überhaupt auf Begründbarkeit, Überzeugungskraft und allgemeine Akzeptabilität prätendieren zu können, gelangen wir somit zu einem offensiven Widerspruch in ihr selbst, wenn sie es unternimmt, sich auf Grund ihres atheoretischen oder außertheoretischen Allgemeinprinzips theoretisch zu konstituieren.

Diese Widersprüchlichkeit der ethischen Lehre wird jedoch übergangen, um aus ihr herauszukommen, doch erfolgt dies dergestalt, daß die ganze Schwierigkeit umgangen und das ganze *Problem in die theoretische Sphäre* hineinverlegt wird, und mit diesen Mitteln wird dann die Lösung versucht, wodurch die Ethik nur noch tiefer in einen Widerspruch verfällt, der ihr dann ihre eigenen Wurzeln abschneidet. Da, wie wir sahen, das oberste oder allgemeine Prinzip der Ethik für sie als Theorie eine unerklärbare und ungeklärte, man könnte sagen: nicht-ethische Allgemeinvoraussetzung ist, so fragt die ethische Lehre

open for theoretical discussion, and here the theory is unable to give an answer.

For his part, Hartman again cannot answer the basic question of his value ethics, i.e.: what the good is as the highest value, and allows the definition of the concept of value to be open and open unanswered ethical-theoretical question, although he establishes an objective realm of values in themselves (on the model of the Platonic ideas), nevertheless builds on this unproven fundamental

presupposition on his ethical theory worked out to the smallest detail.

In all three cases, on the one hand, we have a deep insight into the matter itself, which is taken to its ultimate intellectual consequences, whereby at most a great and obvious intellectual honesty is shown, because the theoretical truth is here shown to its own limits, but on the other hand the proof of the extra-theoretical character of the foundations of every ethical theory, tested on the ethical matter itself, is at work before us. But if we say "the proof at work," then this is of course no longer a theoretical proof, but only the actual truth of the theoretical limits and inadequacies, i.e. an insight that comes from the through the The theory reached the limit and limitation itself points to a new possible way of solving not only the ethical realm but also the ethical phenomenon as such. Here we are at the borderline where ethical, theoretical-contemplative practice is transformed into the medium of truly human historical practice, which underlies the former, that is, the ethical and they allows. But more about that later.

But that every ethical teaching, in order to be this, i.e. not to remain a mere opinion or arbitrary subjective will, this both for its own author and for everyone else to whom it is attached turns and to whom it would like to appeal, has to be theoretically explained, carried out and argued in order to be able to pretend at all to justifiability, persuasiveness and generally an acceptability, we thus arrive at an obvious contradiction in itself when it undertakes to constitute itself theoretically on the basis of its atheoretical or non-theoretical general principle.

However, this contradictoriness of the ethical teaching is passed over in order to get out of it, but this is done in such a way that the whole difficulty is bypassed and the whole problem is transferred into the theoretical sphere, and by these means w The solution is then attempted, whereby ethics only falls deeper into a contradiction that then cuts off its own roots.

Since, as we have seen, the supreme or general principle of ethics for them as a theory is an inexplicable and unclear, one could say: non-ethical

nicht weiter nach ihr, sondern geht einfach von ihr aus, wodurch sich diese Allgemeinvoraussetzung stillschweigend in eine *theoretische Voraussetzung* verwandelt, das heißt in etwas *in vorhinein Gegebenes*, also in eine bloße theoretische *Tatsache*. Wenn wir daran denken, daß diese Allgemeinvoraussetzung der ethischen Lehre ihr oberstes oder höchstes Prinzip ist, das heißt ihr inneres *Wesen*, dann kommt das darauf hinaus, daß die ethische Lehre ihr eigenes ungeklärtes Wesen als fertige Tatsache genommen hat. Sie beginnt so mit einer Widersprüchlichkeit und wird notwendig in der Widersprüchlichkeit auch enden. Und diese gibt sich darin kund, daß das oberste Prinzip einer jeden Ethik primär als das *Sein-Sollende* gedacht und aufgestellt wird, als das durch das Handeln erst zu Erreichende und zu Realisierende, damit das Handeln selbst den Charakter und das Attribut des *moralischen Handelns* erhalte, während im Gegensatz dazu dieser Charakter des ethischen Postulats mit der Notwendigkeit der theoretischen Grundlegung und Einsicht gleichzeitig zur bloßen Gegebenheit und zu etwas Fertigem herabsinkt. Es ergibt sich das paradoxe Resultat, daß die Ethik etwas erst zu Realisierendes postuliert, und dieses Etwas besteht zu gleicher Zeit bereits irgendwo und auf irgendeine Weise als Gegebenes, das heißt als irgendwie bereits Realisiertes (also: Gott besteht, es besteht die Idee des Guten, es besteht ein moralisches Gesetz, es besteht ein Reich der Werte usw.). Wenn zum Beispiel die Idee des Guten bereits an sich besteht, so braucht sie einerseits nicht erst realisiert zu werden, andererseits kann aber dieses ihr Bestehen ebenso ganz irrelevant für die menschliche Tätigkeit sein. Dies hat schon Aristoteles in seiner Kritik der Lehre Platons eingesehen, wenn er schreibt:

„Und ebenso steht es auch mit der Idee des Guten. Denn gesetzt auch, es gäbe ein einheitliches Gutes, was gemeinsam von allem einzelenen Guten ausgesagt würde oder als ein abgesondertes an und für sich existierte, so würde es offenbar kein Gegenstand sein, auf den ein menschliches Handeln gerichtet wäre und den ein Mensch sich aneignen könnte. Was wir aber hier zu ermitteln suchen, ist ja gerade ein solches, was diese Bedingungen erfüllen soll.“⁷

Diesen Bedingungen hat später auch Kant nachgespürt und hat in einer scharfen Kritik der so konzipierten Ethiken, die er *heteronom* nennt, da ihr Grundprinzip des moralischen Handelns schon im voraus durch etwas anderes gegeben und bestimmt ist (wodurch die Freiheit des moralischen Handelns bereits entweder eingeschränkt oder völlig aufgehoben ist), seine *autonome Ethik* begründet, worin das Attribut des Guten nichts anderem als dem Willen selbst zugeschrieben werden kann, der nach seinen eigenen Vernunftgesetzen wirkt.

Damit wurde das ethische Problem in seiner klarsten Formulierung aufgestellt, da in der Kantschen Ethik alle jene Momente zu vollem Ausdruck gelangten die in den bis dahin bestehenden verschiedenartigen ethischen Lehren implizite oder explizite in ihren Grundlagen enthalten sind.

⁷ Aristoteles, ebenda, I., 12, S. 8 f.

that is, into something given in advance, that is, into a mere theoretical fact. If we think that this general presupposition of the ethical doctrine is its supreme or supreme principle, that is, its inner essence, then it amounts to the ethical doctrine having taken its own unclear essence as a finished fact. It begins with an inconsistency and will necessarily also end in inconsistency. And this is expressed in the fact that the supreme principle of every ethics is primarily conceived and set up as what should be, as what can only be achieved and realized through action, so that action itself has the character and attribute of the moral action, while in contrast to this, this character of the ethical postulate sinks simultaneously with the need for theoretical foundation and insight into mere fact and something finished. The paradoxical result is that ethics postulates something that has yet to be realized, and at the same time this something already exists somewhere and in some way as something given, that is, as something already realized in some way (i.e.: God exists, the idea of the good exists, there is a moral law, there is a kingdom of values, etc.). If, for example, the idea of the good already exists in itself, on the one hand it does not have to be realized first, but on the other hand its existence can also be quite irrelevant to human activity. Aristotle saw this in his criticism of Plato's teachings when he wrote:

“And so it is with the idea of the good. For supposing also that there were a unitary good, which was jointly predicated of all individual good, or existed as a separate good in and of itself, it would evidently not be an object to which human action was directed and which a human being appropriated could. But what we are trying to find out here is precisely what is supposed to fulfill these conditions.»'

Kant also traced these conditions later and, in a sharp critique of the ethics conceived in this way, which he calls heter onom, since their basic principle of moral action is already given and determined in advance by something else (through which the freedom of moral action is already either limited or totally abolished), establishes its autonomous ethics, in which the attribute of good can be ascribed to nothing other than the will itself acting according to its own laws of reason.

The ethical problem was thus posed in its clearest formulation, since in Kant's ethics all those moments found full expression that were contained in the foundations of the various ethical teachings that had existed up to that point, implicitly or explicitly.

7 Aristotle, ebenda, I., 12, S. 8 f.

Doch ehe wir fortfahren, ist nebenbei zu bemerken, daß wir uns hier auf keine tiefere Analyse und keine kritische Würdigung der inneren Schwierigkeiten und Widersprüche der Kantschen Ethik einlassen wollen, da wir dies an einem anderen Ort bereits ausführlicher versucht haben,⁸ so daß eine Wiederholung desselben überflüssig ist. Deshalb wollen wir bei diesem Problem unter einem Aspekt verweilen, der es uns ermöglicht, durch Bestimmung des Wesens des ethischen Phänomens vor allem *Begriff und Problem der Freiheit* einer Erwägung zu unterziehen, was sich schon bei Aufstellung des ethischen Problems unabweisbar aufdrängt und das konstitutive und wesentliche Moment einer jeden Ethik bzw. die Voraussetzung einer möglichen Fundierung und Gestaltung gleich welcher ethischen Lehre bildet.

4) DIE KANTISCHE KLASSISCHE FORM DER ETHIK – DAS PHILOSOPHISCH-GESCHICHTLICHE KRITERIUM DES ETHISCHEN ALS SOLCHEN

Halten wir uns nun ganz kurz bei den Grundzügen der Kantischen Aufstellung des ethischen Problems auf. Der Bruch, der sich hier im Verhältnis zur Fragestellung vollzieht, wie wir sie in den bis dahin bestehenden ethischen Lehren vorfinden, die man allesamt unter die gemeinsame Bestimmung der Güterethik subsummieren kann, da eine jede von ihnen von der Frage nach dem höchsten Gut ausgeht, dieser Bruch entsteht bei Kant dadurch, daß er das Ganze auf den Menschen und seine Tätigkeit stellt. Dies hat zwar vor ihm bereits Aristoteles getan, wie dies aus dem eben angeführten Zitat gut zu entnehmen ist, aber Aristoteles führte seine These, die er sich durch die Kritik der Platonischen Fragestellung errang, nicht konsequent weiter, sondern ging den Weg einer empirischen Erforschung des höchsten Gutes, das er in der Glückseligkeit (*eudaimonia*) fand, so daß sich in dieser Hinsicht die Kantische Kritik der Ethik des höchsten Gutes nicht nur ebenso, sondern vielleicht gar in erster Linie gerade auf die Aristotelische Ethik bezieht. Das Verdienst Kants liegt nicht nur darin, daß er die Grundlegung der Ethik aus dem Rahmen der sogenannten empirischen Sphäre herau hob, die für ihn bekanntlich nur eine Sphäre der *Legalität* ist, sondern die Bedeutung dieses Umschwungs liegt darin, daß auf Grundlage dieser Voraussetzung in der Geschichte der Philosophie theoretisch zum ersten Male eine wirklich radikale und zugesetzte Stellung der Frage nach der *Freiheit des Menschen* möglich war. Mit seinem Autonomiebegriff, das heißt der Autonomie der Ethik, stellt sich, in einem kritischen Verhältnis zur Ethik des höchsten Gutes, dieses Problem der Freiheit wie folgt:

Wenn man irgend etwas schon in vorhinein das Attribut des Guten oder des höchsten Gutes beilegt, was sich dann freilich auch theoretisch bestimmen läßt, dann ist auch das moralische Handeln des Menschen schon im voraus als solches bestimmt, so daß auch die Prin-

⁸ In: M. Kangrga, »Etički problem u djelu Karla Marxa«, (»Das ethische Problem im Werke von Marx«), Naprijed, Zagreb 1969.

superfluous.

Therefore, we want to dwell on this problem from an aspect that enables us, by determining the essence of the ethical phenomenon, to consider the concept and problem of freedom, which is already evident in A The establishment of the ethical problem is inevitably imperative and forms the constitutive and essential moment of any ethics or the prerequisite for a possible foundation and design, regardless of which ethical teaching.

4)

D E C A N T I S C H E C L A S S S F O R M D E R E T H I K -

D A S P H I L O S O P H I S C H - G E S C H I C H T L I C H E K R I T E R I U M

D E S E T H I S C H E N A L S S O L C H E N

Let us now dwell briefly on the fundamentals of the Kantian formulation of the ethical problem. The break that takes place here in relation to the question as we find it in the ethical teachings that have existed up to that point, all of which can be subsumed under the common determination of the ethics of goods, that one each of them proceeds from the question of the highest good, this break arises with Kant because he places the whole thing on the human being and his activity. Aristotle had already done this before him, as can be seen from the quote just given, but Aristotle carried out his thesis, which he achieved by criticizing the Platonic question, did not continue consistently, but went the way of an empirical investigation of the highest good, which he found in happiness (eudaimonia), so that in this respect the Kantian critique of the ethics of the highest good did not only just as well, but perhaps even primarily to Aristotelian ethics. Kant's merit lies not only in the fact that he lifted the foundation of ethics out of the framework of the so-called empirical sphere, which for him is known to be only a sphere of equality, but in the meaning of this Around -

The swing lies in the fact that on the basis of this prerequisite in the history of philosophy, a really radical and pointed position on the question of human freedom was theoretically possible for the first time. With its concept of autonomy, i.e. the autonomy of ethics, this problem of freedom arises as follows, in a critical relationship to the ethics of the highest good: If one already has the attribute of the good or the highest good, which then of course can also be determined theoretically, then the moral action of man is already determined as such in advance, so that the principle

8 In : M . K a n g r g a , » E tičk i p ro b le m u d je lu K a r la M a rx a « , (»D as eth isc h e P ro b le m im W e rk e v o n M a rx «), N a p r ije d , Z

zipien des moralischen Handelns, das heißt die praktische Vernunft selbst, in Abhängigkeit von etwas anderem außerhalb ihr Liegendem, bereits Gegebenem und Bestimmtem, gebracht werden. Demzufolge würde der Mensch, wenn er moralisch handelt, nicht aus sich selbst heraus, sondern von etwas anderem bestimmt handeln, was ein offensichtlicher Gegensatz zur Idee seiner Freiheit wäre. Hier bricht deshalb jede Metaphysik mit ihrer prästabilisierten und vorbestimmten Ordnung, die schon an sich eine hinreichende Gewähr für die Tätigkeit als einer menschlichen bzw. für ein moralisches Handeln böte, in sich zusammen. Folglich ist der Mensch, und dies bedeutet für Kant als moralische Persönlichkeit, durch nichts anderes bestimmt als durch sich selbst im Moralgesetz. In diesem Sinne überschreitet, wenn wir in Kantischer Weise sprechen, die reine Selbstbestimmung des Vernunftswillens, und allein dieser ist gut an sich, alle Schranken der empirischen Sphäre, in der, vom praktischen Standpunkt aus betrachtet, nur praktische oder technische Regeln und Vorschriften der bloßen Schicklichkeit, Umsicht und Fidigkeit, sowie auch die uns aus der täglichen Lebensweise zukommenden Ratschläge, möglich sind, nicht aber auch das *Gesetz des Moralischen* oder die *Moralität*.

Schon aus dieser und einer solchen Fragestellung in der Kantischen Ethik geht eine sehr bedeutsame und fast entscheidende Bestimmung des Menschen hervor, in deren Bahn sich späterhin eine jegliche ernsthaftere philosophische Untersuchung und Bestimmung des menschlichen Wesens vollziehen soll, und diese lautet etwa, wie folgt:

Was der Mensch ist, das hat er erst zu werden.

Dies ist freilich keine Formulierung Kants, da sie von ihm in dieser Gestalt, die auch eine anthropologische Bestimmung des Menschen enthält, nicht formuliert wurde und von seinem Standpunkt aus auch nicht formuliert hätte werden können, doch ist sie in seinem ethischen Rahmen *sinngemäß* durchaus schon vorhanden, da in ihm alle für sie wesentlichen Elemente bereits gegeben sind.

Nach der Kantischen Bestimmung des Menschen, wie diese nämlich aus seiner ganzen Moralphilosophie, also praktischen Philosophie hervorgeht, ist gerade die Moralität das Wesen des Menschen. Das bedeutet, daß der Mensch nicht gleich allen anderen Dingen und Wesen dem Kausalitätsgesetz gemäß bestimmt werden kann, das heißt durch Kategorien, die in der theoretischen Vernunft als Erfahrungsgegenstände (und Gegenstände ihrer Erkenntnis) gelten und die Erkenntnis des natürhaften Seins ermöglichen, sondern seine Selbstbestimmung wird durch die Kausalität der Freiheit bestimmt, die nichts anderes ist als das besondere Vermögen oder die Spontaneität, durch eigenen Akt neue, von der Kausalität der Natur völlig unabhängige Ordnung und Kette von Bedingtheiten zu beginnen. Doch vollzieht sich der Akt des freien Ansetzens von etwas Neuem unter der Voraussetzung der Moralität, das heißt dem Handeln aus Achtung des Moralgesetzes gemäß, und das bedeutet aus Achtung der reinen Pflicht. Aber das Moralische und die reine Pflicht sind nicht etwas bereits Gegebenes. Sonst würde die Forderung des kategorischen Imperativs selbst (Handle stets so, daß du wollen darfst, daß die Maxime deines Handelns zum Allgemeingesetz werde) überflüssig und hinfällig sein, da gefordert würde, was bereits ist. Deshalb sollen sie erst sein. Dieses

cipient of moral action, that is, practical reason itself, must be brought into dependence on something else that is already given and determined beyond it. Accordingly, when man acts morally, he would not act of his own accord, but would act in accordance with something else, which would be an apparent contradiction to the idea of his freedom. Here, therefore, all metaphysics collapses with its preestablished and predetermined order, which in itself would already offer sufficient certainty for action as a human or moral action. Consequently, man, and this means for Kant as a moral personality, is determined by nothing other than himself in the moral law. In this sense, if we speak in Kantian terms, the pure self-determination of the will, and this alone is good in itself, transcends all the limits of the empirical sphere, in which, viewed from the practical point of view, only practical or technical rules and regulations of the mere Propriety, prudence and resourcefulness, as well as the advice that comes to us from everyday wisdom, are possible, but not the law of morality or morality.

Already from this and a similar question in the Kantian ethics emerges a very significant and almost decisive determination of the human being, in the course of which any more serious philosophical investigation and determination of the

of human nature should be carried out, and this reads something like this: What the human being is, that he has to become first.

Admittedly, this is not a formulation of Kant's, since it was not formulated by him in this form, which also contains an anthropological determination of man, and from his point of view it could not have been formulated either, but it is already present within his ethical framework , since all essential elements are already given in it.

According to the Kantian definition of man. as this emerges from his entire moral philosophy, i.e. practical philosophy, morality is precisely the essence of man. This means that man cannot be determined like all other things and beings according to the law of causality, i.e. by categories which theoretical reason counts as objects of experience (and objects of its knowledge) and which enable knowledge of natural being, but his self-determination is determined by the causality of freedom, which is nothing other than the special ability or the spontaneity to begin, through one's own act, a new order and chain of conditions that are completely independent of the causality of nature. But the act of freely initiating something new takes place under the premise of morality, that is, acting out of respect for the moral law, and that means out of respect for pure duty. But the moral and the pure duty are not already given.

Otherwise the requirement of the categorical imperative itself (always act

in such a way that you may want the maxim of your action to become general law) would be superfluous and invalid, since what would already be required would be what already is. That's why they should be first. This

Sollen wird in der Kantischen Ethik in *absoluten Gegensatz* zu dem bereits Seienden gestellt. Folglich soll der Mensch, da er mit einem seinem Teil Angehöriger des Naturreichs und dessen Kausalitätsge-setz und nur als solcher bereits gegeben ist (und schon in Übereinstimmung mit seiner Maxime, die sein subjektives Prinzip der faktischen Tätigkeit ist, handelt) und sich mit seinem triebhaften Naturmoment völlig in die empirische Sphäre einfügt, die ihn immer noch nicht als Menschen, das heißt als ein moralisches Wesen bestimmt, soll er also als Menschenwesen erst sein. Dieses Sollen ist nur dem kategorischen Imperativ unterworfen, der ihm als Menschen, bzw. als beschränktem, aber vernünftigen Wesen, aufgibt, anbefiehlt, als Mensch zu handeln, das heißt also aus Achtung des Moralgesetzes, das seine einzige Bestimmung bzw. seine eigene Selbstbestimmung als Persönlichkeit ist. Folglich ist der Mensch erst dasjenige, was er nach seiner eigenen Selbstbestimmung des reinen Vernunftwillens sein soll, aber noch nicht ist. Denn das was erst sein soll, ist noch nicht, so daß auch Mensch sein oder frei sein oder moralisch sein oder eine moralische Person sein oder Persönlichkeit sein oder moralisch tätig sein (was hier alles identische Ausdrücke sind) für Kant *nur ein Postulat der praktischen Vernunft und nicht die existierende Wirklichkeit oder bereits eine Realität* ist.

Erst hier und darin liegt das geradezu klassisch ausgedrückte Wesen des Moralischen, das heißt das Wesen des ethischen *Phänomens*. Es besteht in dem *absoluten Gegensatz zwischen dem Sein und dem Sollen*.

Wenn wir uns hier nebenbei des Marxschen methodischen Gedankens entsinnen, zu dem er im Verlaufe der Untersuchung darüber gelangte, daß »die Anatomie des Menschen ein Schlüssel zum Studium der Anatomie des Affen« sei, womit er feststellen wollte, daß erst die höheren und ausgeprägteren Gestaltungen und Erscheinungen eine klarere Einsicht und Detung der im Prozeß einer bestimmten Entwicklung vorhergehenden und niedereren gestatten, so können wir uns hier in demselben oder einem zumindest ähnlichen Sinne unter Zuhilfenahme der Kantischen klassischen und bis zu ihren letzten Konsequenzen geführten ethischen Position der Bestimmung des Wesens einer jeden ethischen Lehre annähern. Dasselbe geschieht bei Marxens Studium des Warencharakters, wo die Ware im kapitalistischen Gesellschaftssystem ihre höchstentwickelte und gleichzeitig auch widersprüchlichste Form annimmt, die erst dann in ihren primitiven Ansätzen ins Auge gefaßt und in ihrer noch nicht hinreichend ausgeprägten Gestalt als faktisch vorhanden verfolgt werden kann.

In diesem Sinne wagen wir es im Hinblick auf das Wesen des Ethischen zu behaupten, daß erst mit Hilfe der Ethik Kants eine jede ethische Konzeption von den ersten Anfängen in der Entwicklung des ethischen Gedankens bis ins Letzte erfaßt werden kann. Wenn wir also, um es so auszudrücken, mit den wesentlichen Voraussetzungen der Kantischen Ethik philosophisch fertig werden, erst dann vermögen wir den rechten Sinn und die grundlegenden inneren Widersprüche nicht nur einer jeden ethischen Theorie, sondern selbst der ethischen Fragestellung als solcher genau abzusehen.

and with his impulsive natural moment completely fits into the empirical sphere, which still does not define him as a human being, i.e. as a moral being, he should therefore as be a human being first. This ought is only subject to the categorical imperative that is assigned to him as a human being or as a person.

as a limited but reasonable being, orders him to act as a human being, i.e. out of respect for the moral law, which is his only determination or his own self-determination as a personality. Consequently, man is only what he should be according to his own self-determination of pure rational will, but is not yet. Because what is supposed to be first is not yet such that being a human being or being free or being moral or being a moral person or being a personality or being active in a moral way (all of which are identical expressions here) also suffices Kant is only a postulate of practical reason and not the existing reality or already a reality.

Only here and therein lies the downright classically expressed essence of the moral, that is, the essence of the ethical phenomenon.

It consists in the absolute contrast between being and ought.

If we remember here, by the way, the Marxian methodical idea, which he arrived at in the course of the investigation that "the anatomy of man is a key to the study of the anatomy of the A "Open" is, with which he wanted to establish that only the higher and more pronounced formations and phenomena allow a clearer insight and definition of the preceding and lower ones in the process of a certain development, so we can here in the same or at least one in a similar sense, with the help of Kant's classic ethical position, which was taken to its ultimate consequences, to determine the essence of any ethical teaching. The same happens in Marxen's study of the character of commodities, where the commodity in the capitalist social system assumes its most highly developed and at the same time its most contradictory form, which only then catches the eye in its primitive beginnings and can be pursued as factually present in its not yet sufficiently pronounced form.

In this sense, with regard to the essence of the ethical, we dare to assert that only with the help of Kant's ethics can any ethical conception develop from the very beginning of ethical thought can be grasped down to the last detail. So if we, to put it this way, philosophically come to terms with the essential presuppositions of the Kantian ethics, only then will we be able to understand the right meaning and the fundamental inner contradictions not only of every ethical theory , but rather to disregard the ethical question itself as such.

Es ist durchaus verständlich, daß sich dieses in der Kantischen Ethik bis zu den letzten Konsequenzen ausgeprägte und geführte Wesen des ethischen Phänomens in dieser Form nicht schon in allen bis dahin gemachten ethischen Versuchen befindet, ja nicht einmal in sehr systematisch aufgebauten ethischen Lehren, wie es beispielsweise die Ethik des Aristoteles ist. Aber darum handelt es sich ja gerade. In allen bis dahin bestehenden ethischen Konzeptionen oder moralischen Willensanstrengungen überhaupt wird dieses Wesen oft entweder durch andere nichtethische Momente verdeckt oder aber in einer theoretisch-philosophische Betrachtung verflochten, welcher schon die ontologische Allgemeinvoraussetzung, aus der heraus sich ein ethisches Wollen herausgestalten möchte, den Horizont der bloßen Möglichkeit einer Fragestellung als ethischer Fragestellung einfach verwischt, wie dies bei Spinoza der Fall ist, oder das eminent Ethische wird wiederum in faktische Bestimmungen natürlicher Eigenschaften, Faktoren und Anlagen hineiverlegt, in der Form von bestehenden oder unmittelbar gegebenen Neigungen, Sinnesarten, Gefühlen oder Empfindungen gefaßt, wie dies in den Lehren der schottisch-englischen Moralphilosophen Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Home, Hume, Smith u. a. geschieht, und dergleichen. Aber in ihnen allen ist nicht nur anwesend, sondern liegt zugrunde jenes Sollen, das, mit dem bereits Gegebenen unzufrieden, einerseits implizite auf eine Negation des Bestehenden und Gegebenen gerichtet ist, andererseits sich aber in dem Bemühen ausprägt, eine andere mögliche Form der menschlichen Existenz, der nachzustreben und die zu realisieren ist, zu erreichen, zu erringen, zu erhellen oder zu finden, was in bestimmten ethischen Idealen und Normen seinen Ausdruck bekommt. Denn eine ethische Lehre, ja selbst eine gewöhnliche moralische Alltagsforderung, die davon ausginge und meinte, daß das, was ist, bereits gut oder im allgemeinsten Sinne moralisch sei, stünde in einem solchen Widerspruch zu sich selbst, daß sie sich im gleichen Augenblick selbst aufhöbe, da dies im ethischen Rahmen und Sinn ihre absurdste mögliche, oder besser gesagt, ganz unmögliche Voraussetzung wäre.

Daß sich indes dieser wesentliche Gegensatz zwischen dem Sein und dem Sollen, auf dem sich das Ethische als solches konstituiert, nicht in allen ethischen Lehren in seiner *absoluten* Form manifestiert wie in der Kantischen Ethik, das ist ebenso richtig und geht aus dem eben Gesagten hervor. Ein Beispiel dafür ist auch die Ethik des Aristoteles, worin das ethische Postulat nachträglich einer realistischen Fragestellung zuliebe in die empirische Sphäre hineiverlegt wird. Nur ist dieser Realismus bei seinem Vorteil zugleich auch ein Nachteil – gerade vom ethischen Standpunkt aus.

Da sich aber dieses Wesen des Ethischen, durch die Ethik Kants einmal ergründet, zugleich als methodischer Wegweiser bei der Herausfindung des rechten Sinnes und Geistes einer ethischen oder moralischen Einstellung erweist, wollen wir versuchen, dies an einem Beispiel aus der Geschichte der Ethik aufzuzeigen.

Wenn man nämlich das Erwachen des ethischen Gedankens bei den einzelnen Denkern, die sich mit dem beschäftigten, was man das Moralproblem nennen könnte, historisch verfolgt, so wird man einer großen Menge und Buntheit der verschiedenartigsten Thesen, Auf-

It is quite understandable that this essence of the ethical phenomenon, which is pronounced and carried out to the last consequences in Kantian ethics, is not already to be found in this form in all ethical attempts made up to that point, not even in very systematically structured ethical

teachings, such as it is, for example, the ethics of Aristotle. But that's the point. In all ethical conceptions or moral will efforts in general that existed up to that point, this essence was often either covered up by other non-ethical moments or was intertwined in a theoretical-philosophical consideration, which was already the ontological general presupposition from which an ethical will could emerge, the The horizon of the mere possibility of posing a question as an ethical question is simply blurred, as is the case with Spinoza, or the eminently ethical is in turn transferred to factual determinations of natural properties, factors and dispositions, in the form of existing or immediately given tendencies, senses, feelings or sentiments, as exemplified in the teachings of the Scottish-English moral philosophers Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Home, Hume, Smith, et al. happens, and the like. But in all of them is not only present, but underlies that ought which, dissatisfied with what is already given, is on the one hand implicitly directed towards a negation of the existing and given, but on the other hand expresses itself in the effort to find another possible form of human existence that is to be pursued and realized, attained, attained, enlightened or found, which finds its expression in certain ethical ideals and norms. For an ethical teaching, even an ordinary moral demand of everyday life, which proceeds from the assumption and means that what is already good or moral in the most general sense, would stand in such a contradiction to itself that at the same moment it abolished that in the ethical framework and meaning this would be their most absurd possible, or rather, quite impossible assumption.

However, the fact that this essential contrast between being and ought, on which the ethical as such is constituted, does not manifest itself in its absolute form in all ethical teachings as it does in Kant's ethics, is just as correct and follows from what has just been said. Another example of this is Aristotle's ethics, in which the ethical postulate is subsequently transferred to the empirical sphere for the sake of a realistic question. But this realism, with its advantages, is also a disadvantage -

especially from an ethical point of view.

However, since this essence of the ethical, once explored through Kant's ethics, proves to be a methodical guide in finding out the right meaning and spirit of an ethical or moral attitude, we want to try to show this using an example from the history of ethics .

If one follows historically the awakening of ethical thought in the individual thinkers who were concerned with what one could call the moral problem, one becomes aware of a large number and variety of the most diverse Ihesen, Aul-14 praxis

fassungen und Begründungen in der Einsichtigwerdung und Grundlegung des Moralischen begegnen, was uns, wenn wir sie so nehmen, wie sie sich darbieten, gerade wegen ihrer widersprüchlichen Formen in großem Maße oder gar völlig unklar bleibt, da wir aus ihnen selbst heraus kaum ihren rechten oder wesentlichen Sinn entdecken werden. Denn gerade unter dem *ethischen Aspekt* ist, zum Beispiel, die in der vorsokratischen Zeit der Entwicklung des griechischen philosophischen Denkens geborene Auffassung, die sehr verbreitet war und auf verschiedenste Weise argumentiert wurde, nicht von selbst verständlich, daß gerade die triebhafte Natur des einzelnen nicht nur der Maßstab, sondern auch die höchste Norm des moralischen Handelns sei und daher die Dignität eines Natur-, also hier des Moralgesetzes erhält. Wenn diesem noch die aus dieser Auffassung hervorgegangene Konsequenz hinzugefügt wird, daß derjenige Mensch gerade frei ist, der seine Triebe, Leidenschaften, Begierden und Gelüste nicht zügelt, und man dieses Moment sogar als Norm des moralischen Handelns postuliert, so wird man sehr leicht die Orientierung verlieren. Noch unsicherer wird man, wenn man sieht, daß eine solche Auffassung explizite gerade gegen die Sittlichkeit selbst gerichtet ist, also gegen eine bestimmte Moralität, die hier kritisch das Attribut bloßer Konventionalität, also der Bedingtheit und Relativität, erhält. Denn hier wird etwas schon auf den ersten Blick hin Nichtethisches gegen das Ethische ausgespielt.

Man wird sich hier nicht gleich bei der Bemühung zurechtfinden, den eigentlichen Sinn einer solchen Haltung zu erfassen, die uns sogar daran zweifeln lassen kann, ob sie überhaupt in den Bereich des Ethischen gehört oder aber als außerethisches Moment auf die Zerstörung des Ethischen ausgeht, wenn man nicht irgendwie sehen würde, worin das Wesen des ethischen Phänomens liegt oder zu liegen hätte. Dieses aber besteht in seinem allgemeinsten Aspekt, wie wir gesehen haben, in dem Sollen, das sowohl durch seine Gestalt wie durch seinen Sinn, also durch seine wesentliche innere Struktur, in einen reinen Gegensatz zu dem Seienden gestellt ist. Es geht also seiner Grundlegung gemäß auf die absolute Negation des Bestehenden aus und hier liegt seine einzige und grundlegende Ausrichtung.

Wenn wir also in dem angeführten Fall der vorsokratischen Auffassung der Moralität einsehen, indem wir dem Wesen des ethischen Phänomens nachgehen, daß es sich hier nicht um die Negation der Moralität handelt, was eine allzu offensichtliche Widersprüchlichkeit selbst für ihre Vertreter sein würde, sondern um einen bereits bestehenden, durch Religion, Tradition, Brauchtum, positive Gesetze, Staatsform, Lebensweisen usw. gefestigten und geheiligten Zustand, der als etwas auftritt, dem der Einzelne zu folgen, sich ihm zu unterwerfen, nach ihm zu leben und zu handeln etc. hat, und in dieser Form derselbe bestehende Zustand gleichzeitig den Charakter und die Würde einer *bestimmten Moralität* annimmt, dann wird klar, daß die Berufung auf den Trieb der *eigenen* Natur als auf das einzige, geradezu *moralische* Gesetz die Forderung nach der Befreiung des Einzelnen von den Fesseln und der Ausgefahrenheit des Bestehenden in sich schließt. Dadurch wird gerade das Triebhafte, was hier das Einzelmenschliche, das durch nichts als durch sein eige-

*them as they present themselves, precisely because of their contradictory forms we will scarcely discover their right or essential meaning from them. Because precisely from the ethical point of view, for example, the conception born in the pre-Socratic period of the development of Greek philosophical thought, which was very widespread and argued in the most varied ways, is not self-evident, that precisely the impulsive nature of the individual is not only the *m afitab*, but also the highest norm of moral action and therefore receives the dignity of a natural, i.e. here the moral law. If the consequence arising from this conception is added to this, that that person is free who does not curb his drives, passions, desires and desires, and one even considers this moment as the norm of the moral *H andelns* postulates, it is very easy to lose orientation. One becomes even more uncertain when one sees that such a view is explicitly directed against morality itself, i.e. against a certain morality, which here critically expresses the attribute of mere conventionality, i.e. conditionality and *R elivity*, conservation.*

For here something that appears non-ethical at first glance is being played off against the ethical.

One will not immediately find one's way around here in the effort to grasp the actual meaning of such an attitude, which can even make us doubt whether it belongs in the realm of the ethical at all or as an extra-ethical moment f the destruction of the ethical proceeds if one does not somehow see where the essence of the ethical phenomenon lies or should lie. But this consists in its most general aspect, as we have seen, in the ought, which is placed in a pure contrast to the existent both through its form and through its meaning, i.e. through its essential inner structure. According to its foundation, it is based on the absolute negation of the existing and here lies its only and fundamental orientation.

If, in the case cited, we see the pre-Socratic conception of morality by investigating the nature of the ethical phenomenon, that we are not dealing here with the negation of morality, which is all too obvious inconsistency even for their representatives, but a pre-existing state, established and sanctified by religion, tradition, custom, positive laws, form of government, way of life, etc., which appears as something to follow that of the individual, to submit to it, to live and act according to it, etc.

and in this form the same existing condition simultaneously assumes the character and dignity of a certain morality, then it becomes clear that the appeal to the drive of one's own nature rather than to the only, almost moral law includes the demand for the liberation of the individual from the shackles and the extremes of the status quo. Through this the impulsive, which here is the individual human, is created by nothing but its own 488

nes Gesetz Gebundene und Geleitete, also die freie Entscheidung bedeutet, zum Träger und zur Grundlage einer echten Moralität, also zu einem anderen und anders Sein-Sollenden, in dem die moralische Forderung nach einer Negation des Gegebenen impliziert ist.

So wird offenbar, wie auch ein auf den ersten Blick hin nichtethisches Element seiner wesentlichen Struktur nach, nachdem es in die Sphäre des Ethischen hineinverlegt ist, zum Allgemeinprinzip oder der Grundvoraussetzung einer neuen Moralität oder einer ethischen Lehre wird oder werden kann, die sich dann in der Durchführung und durch hinreichende Begründung ei eine Moralttheorie oder ein ethisches System verwandelt.

Auf eine ähnliche Weise könnten wir in Ansehung der Kantischen konsequentersten und daher klassischen Aufstellung des ethischen Problems zeigen, wie dieses bis ins Letzte geklärte Wesen des ethischen Phänomens als Kriterium bei der Untersuchung im Bereich der Ethik nicht nur nach hinten, wie in dem angeführten Beispiel, dienen kann, sondern auch nach vorn, das heißt zum Verständnis aller postkantischen ethischen Theorien. Wir können freilich jetzt und hier nicht auf dieses Problem eingehen (von dem wir an anderer Stelle geschrieben haben), denn es erfordert eine ausführliche und systematisch kritische Betrachtung der postkantischen Ethik bis herauf in unsere Tage. Doch was hier vorläufig in Form einer noch unausgeführten Behauptung gesagt werden kann, ist die These, die da lauten würde:

Geschichtlich und philosophisch betrachtet, ist nach Kant keine wie auch immer geartete Ethik als Ethik mehr möglich.

Diese These bezieht sich allerdings ebenso auch auf eine mögliche marxistische Ethik, bzw. auf sie in erster Linie und im größten Maße. Wir werden bei der Betrachtung des Freiheitsproblems, wie es im ethischen Rahmen gestellt wird, wenigstens indirekt auf diesem ethischen Grundbegriff die Richtigkeit der angeführten These aufweisen, aber in Anbetracht einer so radikalen Behauptung sind dennoch ein paar Worte der Erklärung notwendig, damit man begreift, was darunter verstanden wird.

Wenn wir sagen, daß nach Kant keine irgendwie geartete Ethik mehr möglich ist, was mit unserer Auffassung des Problems übereinstimmt, daß in der Kantischen Ethik das Wesen selbst des ethischen Phänomens zum vollen und letzthinigen Ausdruck gekommen ist, so ist damit natürlich nicht gemeint, daß es in der postkantischen Periode der Geschichte der Philosophie keinerlei Ethiken gab oder daß sich kein Denker fand, der sich mit der ethischen Problematik beschäftigte, da dies offenbar den historischen Tatsachen widersprechen würde. Im Gegenteil, es gab der Ethiken, ethischen Lehren, Theorien und Systeme mehr als in der gesamten präkantischen Periode der Entwicklung der Philosophie zusammen. Doch lag dies alles unter dem Niveau der Kantischen sowohl geschichtlichen wie philosophischen und ethischen *Fragestellung und Betrachtungsweise* einerseits wie auch seiner radikal-konsequenter *Lösung derselben Frage* auf der Linie und innerhalb des Horizonts, wir betonen: gerade *der Ethik selbst* andererseits. Deshalb kann nach Kant die Ethik, das heißt ausschließlich die ethische Dimension der Stellung und Lösung der ethischen Frage selbst – um klarer zu sein, die Frage nach dem Menschen,

Thus it becomes clear how an element that at first sight appears to be non-ethical in its essential structure, after it has been transferred to the sphere of the ethical, becomes or can become the general principle or the basic prerequisite of a new morality or an ethical doctrine, which then develops transformed into a moral theory or system of ethics in practice and by sufficient justification.

In a similar way, considering the Kantian most consistent and therefore classical formulation of the ethical problem, we were able to show how this essence of the ethical phenomenon, which has been clarified to the last detail, as a criterion in the investigation in the field of ethics, not only backwards, as in the example given, can serve, but also forward, i.e. to the understanding of all post-Kantian ethical theories. Of course, we cannot go into this problem now and here (which we have written about elsewhere), because it requires a detailed and systematic critical examination of post-Kantian ethics up to our day. But what can be said here for the time being in the form of an as yet unexplained assertion is the thesis that would read: Viewed historically and philosophically, according to Kant no ethics of any kind is any longer possible as ethics.

However, this thesis also refers to a possible Marxist ethic, or to it primarily and to a large extent.

When considering the problem of freedom, as it is posed in the ethical framework, we will at least indirectly demonstrate the correctness of the thesis presented on the basis of this basic ethical concept, but in view of such a radical assertion, a few words of explanation are necessary so that one understand what is meant by it.

When we say that after Kant no ethics of any kind is possible, which agrees with our view of the problem that in Kantian ethics the very essence of the ethical phenomenon has come to its full and ultimate expression, we of course do not mean that that in the post-Kantian period of the history of philosophy there were no ethics whatsoever, or that no thinker was found who dealt with the ethical problem, since this would obviously contradict the historical facts. On the contrary, there were more ethics, ethical doctrines, theories and systems than in the entire prakanten period of the development of philosophy combined. But all this was below the level of Kant's historical as well as philosophical and ethical questioning and Approach on the one hand as well as his radically consistent solution to the same question on the line and within the horizon, we emphasize: precisely ethics itself on the other. Therefore, according to Kant, ethics, that is to say exclusively the ethical dimension of the posing and solution of the ethical question itself - to be clearer, the question about man, 489

nach seiner Autonomie und menschlichen Tätigkeit, Praxis und Freiheit –, nur noch *aufgehoben und verwunden* werden, und zwar auf einer anderen, nicht mehr ausschließlich ethischen Linie im Sinne einer Berichtigung ihrer scheinbaren und angeblichen Mängel und Fehler oder ihrer Vervollständigung (zum Beispiel durch sogenannte materiale Werte, wozu sogar einige Marxisten neigen). Wenn wir sagen »auf einer anderen Linie«, so meinen wir hier gerade auf der Linie Hegels, der die Ethik Kants (und somit auch Fichtes), oder besser, die Voraussetzungen seiner Ethik als erster und einziger philosophisch wirklich aufgehoben hat, indem er *den Weg, die Art und Weise und die Möglichkeit* ihrer Lösung aufzeigte, was dann durch die Marxsche Philosophie auch tatsächlich möglich wurde.

In diesem Sinne ist jede weitere Fortsetzung und Stellung der ethischen Frage in den Bahnen und im Rahmen einer eigenen ethischen Weltanschauung im besten Falle ein Sich-Bewegen unter der Voraussetzung der Kantischen ethischen Theorie, das heißt ein widersprüchliches Sich-Bewegen innerhalb eines geschlossenen theoretischen Horizontes. Denn gerade was das Ethische betrifft, ist in diesem Bereich nach Kant *nichts Wesentlich Neues* gesagt worden noch konnte es gesagt werden. All das Allerpositivste, was hier untersucht und festgestellt wurde –, und oft ist dies mit viel Verstandnis für den ethischen Stoff und mit dem aufrichtig menschlichen und philosophischen Anliegen, aus den Widersprüchen des ethischen Mediums herauszufinden, durchgeführt worden (wie es bei Scheler der Fall ist) – alle diese so minutös durchgeföhrten Analysen des sogenannten Wertebereichs im ethischen Gebiet sind lediglich *Ausarbeitungen* des Kantischen ethischen Koordinatensystems. Wenn aber eine, häufig sogar sehr scharfe, Kritik an den sogenannten Mängeln oder Schranken der Kantischen Ethik geübt wird, stets jedoch zum Zwecke ihrer Verbesserung oder der Schaffung einer neuen, zugleich in die ethische Sphäre eingeschlossenen, so daß es sich um eine *ethische Kritik der Ethik* handelt, so trifft sie vor allem keinesfalls Kant selbst und ist ferner durchaus weder ein Ausbruch aus der Ethik Kants noch aus dem ethischen Horizont überhaupt.

Deshalb kann noch folgendes gesagt werden: Wenn es uns gelingt, die grundlegenden philosophischen, aber nicht nur die philosophischen, sondern auch die geschichtlichen gedanklichen und praktischen Voraussetzungen der Kantischen ethischen Theorie kritisch zu bewältigen, dann ergibt sich schon allein dadurch für uns die Möglichkeit, auch alle Lösungen der postkantischen ethischen Lehre bis zur Gegenwart kritisch zu bewältigen. Daß dies keine leichte und einfache Aufgabe ist, läßt sich am besten an sämtlichen postkantischen ethischen Versuchen erkennen, die sich dessen immer noch nicht bewußt sind noch bewußt sein können, daß sich rein theoretisch, also nur auf theoretische Weise und mit theoretischen Mitteln, die – ganz generell gesagt – Fragen der menschlichen Praxis nicht einmal stellen (wie wir in bezug auf die Frage und den Charakter des obersten oder allgemeinsten ethischen Prinzips bereits gesehen haben), geschweige denn lösen lassen, worauf die Ethik als sogenannte praktische Philosophie oder Theorie (was schon in seiner Bezeichnung widersprüchlich ist) schon immer notwendigerweise prätendierte.

material values, which even some Marxists tend to do). When we say "on a different line," we mean here precisely on the line of Hegel, who was the first and only philosophically really to understand Kant's ethics (and thus also Fichte's), or rather, the presuppositions of his ethics abolished by pointing out the way, the way and the possibility of their solution, which then actually became possible through Marx's philosophy.

In this sense, every further continuation and position of the ethical question in the paths and within the framework of one's own ethical worldview is, at best, all a movement under the assumption of the Kantian ethical theory, i.e. a contradictory one Moving within a closed theoretical horizon. For precisely as far as the ethical is concerned, according to Kant nothing essentially new has been said nor could it be said in this area. All the most positive things that have been examined and found here - and often this is done with a great deal of understanding of the ethical material and with the sincerely human and philosophical concern of finding out from the contradictions of the ethical medium been carried out (as is the case with Scheler) - all these meticulously carried out analyzes of the so-called range of values in the ethical field are merely elaborations of the Kantian ethical coordinate system. If, however, a criticism, often very sharp, is made of the so-called deficiencies or limitations of Kantian ethics, but always with the aim of improving them or creating a new one that is at the same time included in the ethical sphere, so that it is an ethical critique of ethics, it in no way affects Kant himself and is also by no means an escape from Kant's ethics or from the ethical horizon in general.

Therefore, the following can still be said: If we succeed in critically mastering the basic philosophical, but not only the philosophical, but also the historical, intellectual and practical prerequisites of the Kantian ethical theory, then the result will be This alone gives us the opportunity to critically master all solutions of the post-Kantian ethical teaching up to the present. That this is not an easy and simple task can best be seen from all post-Kantian ethical attempts, which are still not conscious and cannot be conscious of it, that it is purely theoretical, i.e. only in a theoretical way and with theoretical means which - quite generally speaking - do not even pose questions of human practice (as we have already seen in relation to the question and the character of the supreme or most general ethical principle), let alone because let loose what ethics as so-called practical philosophy or theory (which is already contradictory in its designation) has always and of necessity pretended.

Wie aber diese Fragen lösen, wenn für die Ethik selbst der *Freiheitsbegriff* permanent völlig ungeklärt bleibt, ein Begriff, ohne den sie als Ethik weder aufgestellt noch konstituiert werden kann, den sie aber in ihren eigenen Grundlagen voraussetzt und enthält?

5) DAS FREIHEITSPROBLEM UNTER DEM ETHISCHEN ASPEKT

Unterziehen wir also diese Grundfrage jeder Ethik einer Betrachtung. Das Freiheitsproblem, wie es sich notwendig schon bei der Grundlegung einer ethischen Lehre, also innerhalb der ethischen Sphäre, aufdrängt, stellt sich in seiner allgemeinsten Form, sei es implizite, sei es explizite, auf folgende Weise:

Ausgangspunkt ist hier stets ein bestimmter bestehender Zustand in dem der Mensch lebt. Er braucht nicht nur die Tätigkeit des Menschen zu umfassen, obwohl diese, wie wir sehen werden, der ganzen Betrachtung, ob wir uns dessen bewußt sind oder nicht, faktisch zugrunde liegt. Deshalb kann das sein: die universelle Weltordnung und die darin oder außerhalb ihrer existierenden Götter, die Natur selbst, die Religion und die religiösen Vorstellungen und Kulte, die Sitten, die Tradition, die Verbote, die Familienverhältnisse, die Staatsformen, die gesellschaftlichen Einrichtungen, die sozialen und menschlichen Verhältnisse, die positiven Gesetze, die Natur des Menschen und sein Wollen usw., mit einem Worte *alles, was ist*. Indes ist der primäre ethische oder moralische Bezug zum Seienden *auf keinen Fall theoretisch*, bzw., das Ethische als solches konstituiert sich nicht in einer erkenntnismäßigen Einstellung dem Bestehenden gegenüber, wie dies, wie wir sahen, bereits Aristoteles genau erkannt und formuliert hat. Damit das Bestehende den Charakter einer *moralischen* Tatsache erhält, genügt ihm keine rein theoretische Qualifikation, die am allgemeinsten in dem Urteil: *Das ist so!* zusammengefaßt werden könnte, da in diesem Urteil dieselbe moralische Tatsache noch gar nicht enthalten und erfaßt wäre. Ein rein erkenntnismäßiges oder theoretisches Urteil (freilich unter der Voraussetzung, daß ein solches überhaupt möglich ist!) wäre ganz neutral in bezug auf die moralische Tatsache, die in dieser Form für es gar nicht besteht. Lassen wir beiseite, daß andererseits ein solches vorausgesetztes rein erkenntnismäßiges oder theoretisches, von seiner praktisch-interessenhaften Bedingtheit und Bezuglichkeit völlig getrenntes Urteil faktisch nicht besteht und niemals bestanden hat, obwohl sowohl die alten wie die modernen Positivisten das Gegenteil voraussetzen und behaupten. Faktisch ist für ein solches Urteil auch diese moralische Tatsache ihrem Wesen nach relevant, nur auf eine andere Weise, wovon noch die Rede sein soll.

Damit also das Bestehende den Charakter einer moralischen Tatsache erhalten, ist es notwendig, daß es *unmittelbar* in die ethische bzw. moralische Sphäre hineinverlegt wird, die nicht bei jenem »*das ist so*« beginnt, sondern es unmittelbar durch eine *Entscheidung und eine ihm gegenüber erhobene Forderung* moralisch qualifiziert, so daß sich ein solcher Bezug zum Bestehenden nun in Form einer bestimmten Stel-

But how can these questions be resolved if the concept of freedom remains completely unclear for ethics itself, a concept without which ethics can neither be established nor constituted, but which it presupposes and contains in its own foundations?

5) THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM UNDER THE ETHICAL ASPECT

So let's consider this fundamental question of all ethics. The problem of freedom, which inevitably arises when laying the foundations of an ethical doctrine, i.e. within the ethical sphere, presents itself in its most general form, be it implicit or explicit, in the following way:

The starting point here is always a certain existing condition in which the human being lives. It need not encompass man's activity alone, although, as we shall see, this in fact underlies the whole consideration, whether we are conscious of it or not. Therefore it can be: the universal world order and the gods existing within or outside of its gods, nature itself, religion and religious ideas and cults, customs.

tradition, prohibitions, family relationships, forms of government, social institutions, social and human relationships, positive laws, human nature and will, etc., in a word, everything that is. However, the primary ethical or moral reference to beings is by no means theoretical, or the ethical as such is not constituted in a cognitive attitude towards the existing, as Aristotle, as we have seen, already recognized and formulated. In order for the above to acquire the character of a moral fact, no purely theoretical qualification is sufficient for it, the most general being the judgment: That is so! could be summarized, since in this judgment the same moral fact was not yet contained and grasped. A purely epistemological or theoretical judgment (provided, of course, that such a judgment is possible at all!) would be completely neutral with regard to the moral fact, which for it does not exist in this form at all. Let us leave aside the fact that, on the other hand, such a presupposed purely epistemological or theoretical judgment, completely separate from its practical-interested conditionality and relationality, does not in fact exist and never has existed, although both the ancient and the modern positivists presuppose and claim the opposite. In fact, for such a judgment, this moral fact is also relevant by its nature, only in a different way, which is still to be discussed.

In order for what already exists to have the character of a moral fact, it is necessary that it be directly related to the ethical or

moral sphere that is not included in the "that's the way it is"

begins, but morally qualifies it directly through a decision and a demand raised against it, so that such a reference to the existing situation now takes the form of a specific position

lungnahme gestalten würde, der da lauten könnte: Das soll oder darf nicht so sein! Daraus folgert sofort auch ein anderes, das heißt: Es soll anders sein!

Schon in dieser und einer solchen einfachsten Form ist nicht nur die gesamte ethische Problematik enthalten, sondern es ist in ihr auch die Frage nach der Freiheit unmittelbar eingeschlossen. Wenn nämlich das Sollen einerseits und das Anderswerden andererseits irgendeinen Sinn enthalten oder ihn enthalten sollen, dann ist ihre innere Beziehung nur durch eines gegeben, nämlich durch das Sein-Können. Sonst bricht die ganze Position als in sich sinnlos, also auch unhaltbar zusammen. Das Sollen und das Anderswerden beruhen, demnach, bereits auf der Voraussetzung der Möglichkeit, bzw. das *Sinnvolle* ihrer Verbundenkeit konstituiert sich auf Grund ihrer Möglichkeit. Damit ist, um gleich darauf hinzuweisen, weil auf dieses entscheidende Moment noch zurückzukommen sein wird, auch gesagt, daß *Sinnhaftigkeit und Möglichkeit innerlich am unmittelbarsten miteinander verknüpft sind.*

Da aber beide Momente, das Sollen und das Anderswerden, gerade als mögliche, miteinander sinnvoll verbunden sind, so ist in dem Sollen jetzt bereits auch das Anderswerden enthalten. Denn, wenn etwas Sein-Sollendes auch sein kann, dann ist darin impliziert, daß es auch anders sein kann, so daß diese *Forderung*, aus der folgt, daß etwas sein soll, sich ihrem Sinne nach auf der Voraussetzung der Möglichkeit gründet. Dadurch findet der Begriff des Möglichen Eingang in die Grundlagen der ethischen Sphäre und ist ihre wesentliche Voraussetzung. *Wenn also etwas sein soll, so soll es zugleich auch möglich sein. Daraus folgt, daß es auch anders, als es ist, möglich sein soll.*

Auf diesen Charakter oder diese Natur des Ethischen hat, wenn wir uns des Erwähnten entsinnen, auch Aristoteles hingewiesen, wenn er, von der praktischen Weisheit (oder von dem moralischen Handeln) sprechend, sagt, daß sie sich an den Dingen bewährt, »die auch anders sein können.« Von der anderen Seite folgt daraus, und eben dies betont Aristoteles an anderer Stelle, daß etwas solches, das notwendig ist oder geschieht, oder aber sich der Natur gemäß vollzieht, hat seinen Grund und sein Prinzip in sich selbst und kann zugleich nicht anders sein, als es ist. Was so ist, wie es ist, besteht und wird bestimmt durch etwas anderes in der endlosen Kausalreihe der Naturbestimmtheit und-Bedingtheit. Wenn also etwas auch anders sein kann, als es bereits ist, so kann es dies *nur durch sich selbst* sein. Was aber durch sich selbst sein oder anfangen kann, ist nicht mehr notwendig, sondern frei. Demnach ist die *Möglichkeit Voraussetzung der Freiheit*.

Deshalb wird durch dieses wesentliche Moment des Sollens, das die ethische Sphäre und das ethische Phänomen und damit eine jegliche darauf gegründete ethische Lehre begründet und konstituiert, die Möglichkeit der Freiheit als ihre wesentliche und unvermeidliche Voraussetzung *postuliert*. Oder andersherum gesagt, die Möglichkeit der Freiheit ist im ethischen *Postulat* des Sollens selbst enthalten. Vergessen wir jedoch nicht, daß gerade darum auch die Möglichkeit der Freiheit hier nur noch ein Postulat ist. Obwohl sich aber das Ethische auf ein Postulat gründet, so wird dieses hier noch immer nicht ausschließlich und nur als ethisches Postulat aufgestellt. Dies wird es

Even in this and such the simplest form not only is the entire ethical problem contained, but the question of freedom is also directly included in it. If the ought on the one hand and the becoming different on the other hand contain or should contain some meaning, then their innermost relationship is only given by one thing, namely by the ability to be.

Otherwise the whole position collapses as senseless in itself, and therefore also unsustainable. The ought and the becoming different are based, according to this, already on the prerequisite of possibility, or the meaningfulness of their connection is constituted on the basis of their possibility.

In order to point this out right away, because we will come back to this decisive moment, it is also said that meaningfulness and possibility are most directly linked internally.

However, since both moments, the ought and the changing, are meaningfully connected with each other, precisely as possible, the ought now already contains the changing. For if something that ought to be can also be, then it is implied that it can also be different, so that this requirement, from which it follows that something ought to be, is based on its meaning the prerequisite of the possibility. As a result, the concept of the possible finds its way into the foundations of the ethical sphere and is its essential prerequisite. So if something should be, it should also be possible at the same time. It follows from this that it should also be possible to be different from what it is.

If we remember what has been said, Aristotle also pointed out this character or this nature of the ethical, if he, from practical wisdom (or from moral action) speaking, says that it proves itself in things "which can also be different." It follows from the other side, and Aristotle emphasizes this elsewhere, that something of the kind that is necessary or happens, or that which takes place according to nature, has its reason and its principle in itself and at the same time cannot be other than what it is. What is as it is exists and is determined by something else in the endless causal series of nature's determination and condition. So if something can also be different from what it already is, it can only be this through itself. But what can be or begin by itself is no longer necessary, but free. According to this, possibility is a prerequisite for freedom.

Therefore, through this essential moment of the ought, which justifies and constitutes the ethical sphere and the ethical phenomenon and thus any ethical teaching based on it, the possibility of freedom as its essential and impossible sworn requirement postulated. Or to put it the other way round, the possibility of freedom is contained in the ethical postulate of the ought

itself. Let us not forget, however, that precisely for this reason the possibility of freedom is only a postulate here. However, although the ethical is based on a postulate, this is still not set up here exclusively and only as an ethical postulate. This will be 492

erst werden. Deshalb macht die Möglichkeit nur in dieser Form und auf diese Weise, als Allgemeinvoraussetzung, das ethische Sollen möglich. Wenn sich aber die ethische Lehre nur darauf gründen wollte, so könnte sie in ihrer eigenen Gestaltung keinen Schritt weiter tun. Aus diesem Grunde hält sie bei dieser Allgemeinvoraussetzung einer postulierten Möglichkeit der Freiheit auch nicht inne, sondern schlägt erst jetzt ihren eigenen, also eben ethischen Weg ein. Denn auf eine, und zwar die wichtigste Frage wurde noch immer nicht geantwortet, und diese drängt sich hier unweigerlich auf. Diese Frage lautet:

Hier ist die Möglichkeit der Freiheit nur eine Voraussetzung, es ist aber zu fragen, ob sie auch wirklich ist, das heißt, ob und wie die Freiheit selbst möglich ist, und wenn sie es ist, worauf sie sich gründet? Diese Frage, wie sie gewöhnlich auch gestellt wird, lautet noch einfacher auch folgendermaßen: *Besteht oder ist überhaupt die Freiheit?*

Dies ist bereits eine *ethisch gestellte Frage*. Deshalb wird auch eine ethische Antwort darauf folgen. Und jetzt folgt auch wirklich eine echt ethisch-theoretische Wendung.

Als wir nämlich vom Begriff des Möglichen sprachen, das in die Grundlagen der ethischen Sphäre eingehet und ihre wesentliche Voraussetzung ist, ergab sich folgender Schluß:

a) Wenn also etwas sein soll, so *soll* es zugleich auch möglich sein.

Die ethisch-theoretische Formulierung lautet nun jedoch anders. Sie ist umgeformt, und zwar scheinbar in einer »Kleinigkeit«, die hinreicht, die ganze Erörterung des Problems ihren spezifischen Weg gehen zu lassen, der die ganze Geschichte einer bestimmten Art der Behandlung und Aufstellung des Problems der Freiheit des Menschen vorzeichnet, wovon noch die Rede sein soll. Die ethische Formulierung des obigen lautet:

b) Wenn also etwas sein soll, dann *ist* es zugleich auch möglich.

In dieser Wendung ist *der Kern des Widerspruchs* enthalten, in dem sich die Ethik bewegen und aus dem sie nicht herausfinden wird, solange sie auch immer als Ethik besteht. Und wirklich befindet sich die ethische Lehre darin bis zum heutigen Tage. Da jenes erstere »*Soll- auch-möglich-sein*« ein letzteres »*Ist- auch-möglich*« geworden ist, so folgt und kann erst jetzt aus dieser zweiten Formulierung die ganze ethisch-theoretische Argumentation folgen, die auf Grund jenes »*Ist-möglich*« vom Möglichen als einem Gegebenen handelt, weil sie es in die Sphäre des Seienden (des Seins) hineinverlegt hat. Damit wollte man natürlich vermeiden, daß die Möglichkeit (der Freiheit), also das Sollen, nur eine Allgemeinvoraussetzung und ein unbestimmtes Postulat bleibe, und erzielte gerade das Gegenteil, nämlich daß sie wirklich nur eine außerethische Allgemeinvoraussetzung und ein bloßes Postulat geblieben ist. Denn auf diese Weise sind gerade Möglichkeit und Freiheit lediglich abstrakte ethische Postulate geworden und geblieben, da sie theoretisch weder abgeleitet noch bewiesen werden können.

Obwohl das Sollen, wie wir gesehen haben, primär und seinem Wesen nach auf den Gegensatz zum Bestehenden gestellt und gegründet wurde, so daß sich auch seine eigene Möglichkeit auf das

only become. That is why the possibility makes the ethical ought possible only in this form and in this way, as a general presupposition. But if the ethical doctrine only wanted to be based on it, it could not go any further in its own formation!

For this reason, it does not stop at this general assumption of a postulated possibility of freedom, but is only now taking its own, i.e. ethical path. Because one, and that is the most important question has still not been answered, and this inevitably comes up here. This question reads: Here the possibility of freedom is only a prerequisite, but it must be asked whether it really is, that is, whether and how freedom itself is possible, and if it is what it is based on? This question, as it is usually asked, reads even more simply as follows: Does freedom exist or exist at all?

This is already a cthic question. Therefore, an ethical response will follow. And now a really ethical-theoretical turn follows.

When we spoke of the concept of the possible, which enters into the foundations of the ethical sphere and is its essential prerequisite, the following conclusion arose: a) So if something is supposed to be, it should also be possible at the same time.

However, the ethical-theoretical formulation is now different.

It is transformed, apparently in a "little thing" that is enough to let the whole discussion of the problem go its own specific way, which outlines the whole history of a certain way of treating and setting up the problem of human freedom, of what else the talk should be. The ethical formulation of the above is:

b) So if something is supposed to be, then it is also possible at the same time.

This turn contains the core of the contradiction in which ethics moves and from which it will not find its way, as long as it always exists as ethics. And indeed the ethical teaching is there to this day. Since that former

"So // -to-be-also-possible" has become a latter "/^ -also-possible", then the entire ethical-theoretical argument follows and can only now follow from this second formulation, which on the basis of that "is-possible « deals with the possible as a given, because it has placed it in the sphere of beings (of being). Of course, one wanted to avoid the possibility (of freedom), i.e. the ought, remaining only a general prerequisite and an indefinite postulate, and the result was exactly the opposite, namely that it really remained only an extra-thical general prerequisite and a mere postulate. For in this way possibility and freedom have become and have remained merely abstract ethical postulates, since they can neither be derived nor proven theoretically.

Although the ought, as we have seen, was primarily and essentially placed and founded on the opposite of the existing, so that its own possibility is

Anderswerden gründet, läßt dieses Postulat seiner eigenen Konstitution in Form einer ethischen Theorie zuliebe jene Fortsetzung weg, anders zu sein, »als es ist«, dergegenüber es überhaupt sowohl als *ethisch* wie auch als Postulat aufgestellt werden kann, so daß das erst Sein-Sollende als ein bereits Seiendes behandelt und gestaltet wird. So ist es später auch Kant selbst unter derselben Voraussetzung ergangen, daß in seiner Ethik die Moralität schon allein durch ihre Postulierung als wirklich und bestehend angesetzt wurde, wodurch umgekehrt das ethische Postulat in seiner reinen Abstraktheit und Subjektivität als etwas Wirkliches angesehen und bestimmt wird, was nur die andere Seite derselben Frage ist.

So gründet sich das Ethische auch fernerhin auf ein Postulat, das das primäre Gegenteil des Bestehenden ist, bleibt aber mit dieser Wendung auch nur ein abstraktes Postulat gerade deshalb, weil es seine eigene Möglichkeit, etwas anderes zu sein, als es ist, in die theoretische Sphäre des bereits Gegebenen hineinverlegt hat. Deshalb ist es auf seiner eigenen Voraussetzung unmöglich, seine eigene wesentliche Frage zu beantworten, deren Formulierung lautet: Besteht oder ist die Freiheit? Denn die Freiheit gründet sich, wie wir gesehen haben, auf die Möglichkeit, anders zu sein, als man ist, so daß für sie nicht die Antwort gilt, daß sie bereits ist oder besteht, da es schon in diesem »ist« keine Freiheit gibt, sondern gerade in dem, was dieses »ist oder besteht« aufhebt, negiert und überwindet und seine Negation als Möglichkeit ist. So erhalten wir auf diese ethisch-theoretische Frage eine für die Ethik paradoxe, aber allein mögliche Antwort: *Die Freiheit besteht oder ist nicht*. Da aber von der Freiheit oder der Möglichkeit der Freiheit wie von ihrer wesentlichen Voraussetzung ausgegangen wurde, die sich bis dahin noch außerhalb der ethischen Sphäre befunden hat, und gleich darauf – jetzt schon innerhalb der ethisch-theoretischen Sphäre – folgt, daß die Freiheit nicht besteht, so wurden im Rahmen einer so gestellten Frage Antworten, Beweise und Gegenbeweise, Gründe und Gegengründe, Argumente und Gelegenargumente, Lösungen und Widerlegungen dieser Lösungen usw. gesucht und gefunden, so daß wir uns bis zum heutigen Tage in der Ethik in einem geschlossenen Kreis von abstrakten theoretischen Gegensätzen, Widersprüchen und Antinomien bewegen, die – nachdem sie aus der ethischen Sphäre sogar in die Naturwissenschaft hineingelangten – unter dem Oberbegriff des *Determinismus und Indeterminismus* auftreten und sich bestätigen.

Als also die ethische Allgemeinvoraussetzung, das Mögliche und das Freie, da theoretisch noch unbegründet und unbewiesen, gerade deshalb im theoretischen Medium selbst aufzustellen, abzuleiten und zu beweisen gewesen wäre, war sie auch in dieser allgemeinen Form einer vorausgesetzten Möglichkeit der Freiheit nicht mehr haltbar, sondern hatte nun ihre sogenannte »konkrete« oder »tatsächliche« Form der Existenz zu erhalten, die gerade der theoretischen Erfassung und Betrachtung angemessen ist, und so deren *Gegenstand* zu werden. Dieser hatte sich jedenfalls schon seinem Charakter nach im empirischen Bereich zu befinden und wurde als ein solcher auch entdeckt, aufgefunden und abgesehen.

is," in contrast to which it can be set up both as a ethical as well as a postulate, so that that which ought to be is treated and shaped as something that already exists.

This is what happened to Kant himself later on, under the same assumption that in his ethics morality was already assumed to be real and existing simply by postulating it, whereby the ethical postulate was reversed in its pure abstractness and subjective itat is taken as something real and determined, which is just the other side of the same question.

So the ethical continues to be based on a postulate that is the primary opposite of what exists, but with this twist it also remains only an abstract postulate precisely because it has its own possibility of being something other than it is, into the theoretical sphere of what is already given. Therefore, on its own premise, it is impossible to answer its own essential question, the formulation of which is: Does freedom exist or is it? For freedom, as we have seen, is based on the possibility of being different from what one is, so that the answer does not apply to it that it already is or exists, since it is already in this "is" gives no freedom, but precisely in what this

"is or exists" annuls, negates and overcomes and its negation as possibility is. In this way we receive an answer to this ethical-theoretical question that is paradoxical but the only possible answer for ethics: Freedom exists or does not exist. Since, however, freedom or the possibility of freedom was assumed as its essential prerequisite, which until then was still outside the ethical sphere, and right after that - now already within the ethical-theoretical one Sphere - follows that freedom does not exist, so within the framework of a question asked in this way, answers, proofs and counter-evidence, reasons and counter-reasons, arguments and counter-arguments, solutions and w explanations of these slogans, etc.

searched and found, so that to this day we move in ethics in a closed circle of abstract theoretical contrasts, contradictions and antinomies which - after they have even moved from the ethical sphere into the natural world science - appear and confirm themselves under the umbrella term of determinism and indeterminism.

So when the general ethical presupposition, that the possible and the free, since theoretically still unfounded and unproven, had to be set up, derived and proven in the theoretical medium itself, it was also in this general one form presupposed possibility of freedom no longer tenable, but now had its so-called "concrete" or "actual"

To receive a form of existence that is precisely appropriate to theoretical

understanding and consideration, and thus to become its object.

In any case, this had to be found in the empirical realm by its very nature and was discovered, found and discarded as such.

6) DER BEGRIFF DER WILLENSFREIHEIT – DETERMINISMUS UND INDETERMINISMUS

Hier war es auf jeden Fall empirisch unwiderlegbar, daß bei einem jeden Sollen, das stets von einem Einzelwollen getragen wird, das nach einer bestimmten Realisation außer sich trachtet, ein besonderes Vermögen oder eine besondere Befähigung vorhanden ist, die sich für oder wider entscheidet, von der also nicht nur das, was gewollt oder nicht gewollt wird, abhängt, sondern ob es ein Wollen, Trachten oder Bestreben überhaupt geben wird. Dieses Vermögen war der *Einzelwille*. Nicht mehr stand also in Frage die *Freiheit als ontische Voraussetzung der Möglichkeit, auch anders zu sein, als es ist, und ihre Situierung im Sein, um auf diese Weise die Dignität des Wirklichen zu erlangen*, sondern diese Rolle übernahm der Wille als ein vorausgesetztes besonderes Vermögen oder die Befähigung des Einzelnen, sich für dieses oder jenes zu entscheiden in bezug auf die Möglichkeit, die für ihn schon etwas im voraus Gegebenes und Bestehendes war. Als etwas ethisch bereits Qualifiziertes und durch Löschung des Horizonts einer Fragestellung nach der Möglichkeit seiner eigenen Begründung und wirklichen Konstituierung wird dieser Wille zum *freien Willen*, der als solcher das ganze Freiheitsproblem in Form einer theoretischen Betrachtung der Willensfreiheit in sich enthält und erschöpft. So wurde das Freiheitsproblem als Problem der Willensfreiheit nun zum *Gegenstand der theoretischen*, was hier bedeutet: einer *empirischen Untersuchung*. In dieser Form und unter dieser Voraussetzung wird es in der ethischen Theorie bis zum heutigen Tage behandelt.

Doch stellt die Freiheit als *empirisches Datum* in Form der Willensfreiheit schon allein durch ihre Aufstellung ihre Erforscher vor unüberwindliche Schwierigkeiten. Da sich nämlich hier die ontologisch-anthropologische oder metaphysische, genauestens gesagt: ontische Dimension der Frage verschiebt und in ethische verwandelt, und wegen des Charakters dieses neuen, auf diese Weise konstituierten und erhaltenen Gegenstandes notwendigerweise sogar in die psychologisch-empirische Sphäre übergeht, wobei, wie wir gesehen haben, schon diese Verschiebung in sich widersprüchlich ist, so nimmt es kein Wunder, daß auch diese Sphären unter sich in einem Verhältnis des gegenseitigen Widerspruchs stehen. Andererseits wird auch die Willensfreiheit selbst zu einem spezifischen Problem. Da der Wille als ein besonderes Vermögen oder eine besondere Befähigung des Einzelnen etwas Gegebenes und Existierendes ist und sich gleich allen Dingen und Wesen in die endlose Reihe der kausalen Bedingtheit und Bestimmtheit einordnet, so ist es fraglich, ob er überhaupt ist oder frei sein kann. Die Antwort auf diese und eine solche Frage kann nun entweder *deterministisch* oder *indeterministisch* sein. Wie dies schon die Begriffe selbst besagen, wird vom ersten Standpunkt aus die Willensfreiheit gelehnt, da der Wille stets für ein mögliches Handeln im vorhinein durch etwas anderes bestimmt ist und somit nicht zugleich auch frei sein kann, was ein Widerspruch in sich wäre. Vom anderen Standpunkt aus wird aber der Wille durch nichts bestimmt,

DETERMINISM AND INDETERMINISM

In any case, it was empirically irrefutable that with every ought, which is always supported by an individual will that strives beyond itself for a specific realization, there is a special ability or a special ability that decides for or against which therefore not only depends on what is wanted or not wanted, but whether there will be a willing, striving or striving at all. This ability was the individual will. Freedom was no longer in question as an ontic prerequisite for the possibility of also being different than it is, and its situating in being, in order to attain the dignity of the real in this way, but the will took over this role as a presupposed special ability or ability of the individual to choose this or that in relation to the possibility which was for him something already given and existing. As something that is already technically qualified and by clearing the horizon of a question about the possibility of its own justification and actual constitution, this will becomes free will, which as such contains and exhausts the entire problem of freedom in the form of a theoretical consideration of free will. Thus the problem of freedom as a problem of free will now became the subject of a theoretical, which here means an empirical investigation. In this form and under this assumption it is treated in ethical theory to this day.

But freedom as an empirical datum in the form of freedom of will presents its researchers with insurmountable difficulties simply by setting it up. Because here the ontological-anthropological or metaphysical, to be more precise: ontic dimension of the question is shifted and transformed into an ethical one, and because of the character of this new object, constituted and preserved in this way, necessarily even transitions into the psychological-empirical sphere, where As we have seen, this displacement is already contradictory in itself, so it is no wonder that these spheres are also in a relationship of mutual contradiction. On the other hand, free will itself becomes a specific problem. Since the will, as a special ability or ability of the individual, is something given and existent and, like all things and beings, fits into the endless series of causal conditionality and determination, it is questionable whether it is at all or whether it is free can. The answer to this and such a question can now be either deterministic or indeterministic. As the concepts themselves indicate, freedom of will is denied from the first point of view, since the will is always determined in advance by something else for a possible action and can therefore also be free at the same time, which would be a contradiction in terms. From the other point of view, however, the will is not determined by anything, 495

weil dies sonst seiner eigenen Bestimmung als Wille, also als vernunftgemäßes Wollen, widersprechen würde, wonach der Wille also frei ist. So wird diese Frage unter drei besonderen Aspekten gestellt:

1. unter einem metaphysischen
2. einem ethischen und
3. einem psychologischen.

Der metaphysische Aspekt des Problems der Willensfreiheit unterliegt der Betrachtung unter der vorweggenommenen Voraussetzung, daß der Einzelne als beschränktes Wesen mit seinem Willen der universellen Ordnung der Dinge und Vorgänge unterliegt und notwendig in Übereinstimmung mit seinen allgemeinen, allumfassenden und unabwendbaren Bewegungsgesetzen lebt und handelt, worin alle Dinge, Wesen und der Mensch selbst als Teil dieser Ganzheit miteinander kausal verbunden und im voraus bestimmt sind, so daß auch der Wille selbst diesem allgemeinen Weltprinzip unterworfen und von ihm bestimmt ist. Unter diesem Aspekt ist es unmöglich, von einem freien Willen oder einer Willensfreiheit zu sprechen, so daß dieser Standpunkt seinen Grundlagen zufolge in bezug auf das Freiheitsproblem deterministisch ist (auf diesem Standpunkt stehen zum Beispiel die Stoiker und Spinoza).

Von derselben metaphysischen Voraussetzung ausgehend, aber mit dem gleichzeitigen Bestreben, dem Willen dennoch einen Bereich und die Möglichkeit freier Entscheidung zuzugestehen, ist auch eine metaphysischer Indeterminismus möglich, konzipiert in Form des sogenannten psychophysischen Paralellismus oder der prästabilierten Harmonie, wobei eine Gleichzeitigkeit oder Parallellität des kausalen und des willensfreien Nexus behauptet wird (Von dieser Voraussetzung geht Leibniz aus, die Okkasionalisten, zu einem Teil auch Spinoza, aber dem Sinne nach steht ihr auch Kants Lösung des Verhältnisses zwischen der sogenannten noumenalen oder intelligibeln und der phänomenalen oder empirischen Welt nahe).

Im ethischen Bereich wird das Problem der Willensfreiheit in unmittelbarer Beziehung zum psychologischen Aspekt aufgestellt, da die Frage der moralischen Verantwortung für die eigenen Akte, Handlungen, Tätigkeiten und Vorgehen aufs engste sowohl mit der Freiheit der Entscheidung und der Wahl als auch mit der Möglichkeit und Fähigkeit des Willens, sich zwischen verschiedenartigen, psychologisch bedingten inneren Motiven und Triebfedern zu entscheiden, verknüpft wird.

Das psychologische Moment ist innerhalb einer so gestellten Frage allenfalls entscheidend, da unter der empirisch-theoretischen Voraussetzung der Wille ständig mit seinen inneren und äußeren Bindungen und Motivierungen verkettet ist, das heißt mit seinen unmittelbaren, durch die eigene psychische Struktur hervorgerufenen Bedingtheiten. Hier kann noch weiter gegangen werden, wie man dies häufig auch tut, und man kann sogar der Grundlage des Willensmäßig-Psychischen nachspüren, die dann gefunden und bis zu ihrer physiologisch-biologischen Strukturiertheit vertieft wird. Wenn man noch einen Schritt weiter geht, so wird man denselben Willen als Ding unter

2. an ethical and

3. a psychological one.

The metaphysical aspect of the problem of free will is subject to consideration under the anticipated assumption that the individual, as a limited being, is subject to the universal order of things and processes with his/her will and finally lives and acts in accordance with its general, all-encompassing and inescapable laws of motion, in which all things, beings and man himself as part of this wholeness are causally connected and predetermined, so that the will itself is also subject to and determined by this universal one world principle. From this point of view it is impossible to speak of a free will or freedom of will, so that this position is fundamentally deterministic (to stand on this position) with regard to the problem of freedom for example the Stoics and Spinoza).

Starting from the same metaphysical premise, but at the same time striving to allow the will a scope and the possibility of free choice, a metaphysical indeterminism is also possible, conceived in the form of the so-called psychophysical parallelism or the pre-established harmony, whereby a simultaneity or parallelity of the causal and the free-will nexus is asserted (Leibniz, the occasionalists, and to some extent also Spinoza, but dem In terms of meaning, it is also close to Kant's solution of the relationship between the so-called noumenal or intelligible and the phenomenal or empiric world).

In the ethical field, the problem of free will is placed in direct relation to the psychological aspect, since the question of moral responsibility for one's own acts, hands

Elements, activities and procedures are closely related both to the freedom of decision and choice and to the possibility and ability of the will to decide between different, psychologically conditioned inner motives and driving forces , is linked.

The psychological moment is at best decisive within a question posed in this way, since under the empirical-theoretical assumption the will is constantly linked to its inner and outer ties and motivations, i.e. to its immediate ones, through which conditions caused by one's own psychological structure.

Here one can go even further, as one often does, and one can even trace the basis of the will-mitig-psychic, which is then found and up to its physiological-biological. Structuredness is deepened. If one goes one step further, one becomes the same will as a thing under 496

den Dingen auffassen, so daß von seiner Freiheit keine Spur übrig bleibt, da er verflogen ist und verschwunden im universellen Mechanismus des Weltalls.

So hat zum Beispiel Schelling, als er sich zu diesem Problem in seiner Schrift über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit äußerte, die Grundlage von Spinozas Determinismus gerade darin gesehen, daß dieser den Willen zu einem Ding degradiert hat. Deshalb sagt er darüber:

„Der Fehler seines Systems (scil. Spinozas) liegt keineswegs darin, daß er die Dinge in Gott setzt, sondern darin, daß es Dinge sind – in dem abstrakten Begriff der Weltwesen, ja der unendlichen Substanz selber, die ihm eben auch ein Ding ist. Daher sind seine Argumente gegen die Freiheit ganz deterministisch, auf keine Weise pantheistisch. Er behandelt auch den Willen als eine Sache und beweist dann sehr natürlich, daß er in jedem Fall des Wirkens durch eine andere Sache bestimmt sein müsse, die wieder durch eine andere bestimmt ist u. s. f. ins Unendliche. Daher auch die Leblosigkeit seines Systems, die Gemütlösigkeit der Form, die Dürftigkeit der Begriffe und Ausdrücke, das unerbittlich Herbe der Bestimmungen, das sich mit der abstrakten Betrachtungsweise vortrefflich verträgt; daher ganz folgerichtig auch seine mechanische Naturanschauung.“⁹

Was indes die wechselseitige Beziehung zwischen diesen besonderen Aspekten betrifft, unter denen das Problem der Willensfreiheit unter der Voraussetzung des Determinismus und Indeterminismus betrachtet wird, mag das Beispiel angeführt sein, von dem Windelband in seinem *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie* spricht. Es handelt sich um die stoische Lehre, in der Gegensatz zwischen dem sogenannten »metaphysischen Monismus« und dem »ethischen Dualismus« zum Ausdruck kommt, wobei gerade das allgemeine metaphysische System der Möglichkeit widerspricht, in ihm die geforderte Willensfreiheit zu rechtfertigen.¹⁰

Auf solche und ähnliche Beispiele, die ihrerseits auf die innere Widersprüchlichkeit der Fragestellung selbst hinweisen, könnten wir an vielen Stellen und in den verschiedensten Formen stoßen. Aber zu weit würde es uns führen, wollten wir diesen Weg beschreiten, und außerdem ist dies nicht von eigentlichem Interesse.

In bezug darauf muß jedoch noch folgendes festgestellt werden: Sowohl der Determinismus als auch der Indeterminismus in ihrer absoluten Form, bzw. soweit sie überhaupt in sich *konsequent* sind, werden widersprüchlich auch in sich selbst und nicht nur im wechselseitigen Verhältnis ihrer Negation und gegenseitigen abstrakten Entgegengestellung.

Der *ethische Determinismus* ist schon seiner Aufstellung zufolge und dann besonders auch seinem wesentlichen Sinne nach, was also bedeutet auch seiner Problemlösung zufolge, – eine *contradiccio in adiecto*. Wenn nämlich der Wille in gleich welcher Form absolut determiniert ist, dann kann er vor allem auf keinen Fall frei sein. In

⁹ F. W. Schelling, *Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände*, 1834, S. 24.

¹⁰ Vgl. darüber W. Windelband, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie*, 12. Aufl., Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) in Tübingen, 1935, S. 158 ff.

of things so that no trace of his freedom remains, since he has flown and disappeared in the universal mechanism of the universe.

Thus, for example, when Schelling addressed this problem in his essay on

the essence of human freedom, he saw the basis of Spinoza's determinism precisely in the fact that he had degraded the will to a thing. That's why he says about it:

'The error of his system (ie Spinoza's) is by no means that he posits things in God, but that they are things - in the abstract concept of world beings, yes, of the infinite substance itself, which for him is also a thing . Hence his arguments against freedom are entirely deterministic, not at all pantheistic.

He also treats the will as one thing and then very naturally proves that in every case of action it must be determined by another thing, which in turn is determined by another, and so on.

to infinity. Hence the lifelessness of his system, the lifelessness of the form, the meagerness of the concepts and expressions, the inexorable harshness of the determinations, which is excellently compatible with the abstract way of looking at things; hence his mechanical view of nature quite logically."9

However, as regards the interrelationship between these particular aspects, under which the problem of free will is considered under the premise of determinism and indeterminism, the example of which Windelband speaks in his textbook on the history of philosophy may be cited. It is about the Stoic doctrine in which the contrast between the so-called "metaphysical monism" and "ethical dualism" is expressed, whereby the general metaphysical system contradicts the possibility of justifying the demanded freedom of will in it.10

We were able to come across such and similar examples in many places and in the most diverse forms, which in turn point to the inner contradiction of the question itself. But it would take us too far to go that way, and besides, it's not of real interest.

In relation to this, however, the following must be stated: Both determinism and indeterminism in their absolute form, or insofar as they are consistent in themselves at all, are also contradictory in themselves and not only in the mutual relationship of their negation and mutual abstract opposition.

The ethical determinism is already according to its establishment and then especially also according to its essential sense, which also means according to its solution to the problem - a contradictio in adiecto. Namely, if the will is absolutely determined in whatever form, then, above all, it can by no means be free. In

• F.W. Schelling, *Philosophical investigations into the essence of human freedom and the related objects*, 1834, p. 24.

10 V gl. d ariib er W Windelband, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, 12th Aufl., J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Verlag in Tübingen, 1935, pp. 158 ff.

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einem solchen Fall verliert das Sollen jeglichen Sinn, weil ihm jede Möglichkeit, überhaupt gesetzt, geschweige denn realisiert zu werden, genommen wurde und ausgeschlossen ist. Da aber das Sollen, wie wir wissen, das Wesen des Ethischen ausmacht, dem die Möglichkeit als ihre Allgemeinvoraussetzung zugrunde liegt, so wird vom Standpunkt eines konsequenten Determinismus die Möglichkeit der ethischen Sphäre als solcher geleugnet. Da dem so ist, ist es dann überhaupt unmöglich, von einem ethischen Determinismus zu sprechen, im besten Falle nur von einem ausserethischen Determinismus (wie im Falle der Stoiker und Spinozas). Deshalb ist schon der Begriff des ethischen Determinismus in sich unhaltbar.

Der ethische Indeterminismus führt seinerseits ins andere Extrem. Wenn also der Wille als ein freier – dies behauptet und muß der konsequente und absolute Indeterminismus behaupten – gerade um seiner Freiheit willen durch nichts determiniert ist und sein darf, verliert er Charakter eines ethischen Willens, da es durch seine absolute Freiheit, also durch seine absolute Indeterminiertheit, zur bloßen Eigenmächtigkeit, Willkür, Laune, Kaprice, zu einem ganz unbestimmten abstrakten und ziellosen Wollen wird. Und dies würde eben sowohl der ethischen Konstituierung des Wollens als einer vernünftigen und zweckmäßigen in Form des Willens selbst widersprechen, der dazu prädestiniert ist, in seiner Aktivität gewisse ethische Zwecke und Ziele zu realisieren, als auch dem Umstand, daß das Wollen, seinem wesentlichen Charakter nach, sinnvoll auswählt, sich entscheidet und auf seine Aufgaben und die Verwirklichung des Guten einstellt, wodurch es auf seine Weise bestimmt und gestaltet ist. Und darin liegt oder sollte die ethische Willensfreiheit gerade liegen. Daraus geht für den Indeterminismus etwas wesentlich Paradoxes und Widersprüchliches hervor, nämlich daß er, indem er die absolute Willensfreiheit postuliert, gleichzeitig in letzter Konsequenz diese ethische Freiheit leugnet oder unmöglich macht. Deshalb ist auch der absolute oder konsequente Indeterminismus in sich unhaltbar.

Wenn aber als dritte Voraussetzung Determinismus und Indeterminismus als absolute Gegensätze miteinander und wechselseitig zugelassen, erlaubt, ermöglicht und als gültig anerkannt werden, dann hören sie ihrem Charakter nach auf zu sein, was sie sind, nämlich eben ein Determinismus *oder* ein Indeterminismus. Denn ein deterministischer Indeterminismus oder ein indeterministischer Determinismus wären ein allzu offenes – Absurdum!

Daraus folgt also, daß sowohl Determinismus wie Indeterminismus an sich unhaltbar sind.

7) DIE WAHLFREIHEIT

Für uns sind jedoch hier diejenigen Momente von primärem Interesse, die sich aus dieser gesamten Problematik als wesentlich und entscheidend für die ethische Stellung und den Lösungsversuch der Freiheitsfrage herauskristallisiert haben. Was hier aber vor allem von Bedeutung, nicht aber ein Spezifikum dieses oder jenes ethischen Sondersystems oder einer ethischen Einzelkonzeption ist, sondern sich

In such a case, the ought loses all meaning because every possibility of being posited at all, let alone being realized, is taken away and excluded. But since the ought, as we know, determines the essence of the ethical, which is based on the possibility as its general presupposition, so from the

standpoint of a consistent determininism the possibility becomes the ethical Sphere denied as such. Since this is so, it is then not at all possible to speak of an ethical determinism, at best only of an extra-ethical determinism (as in the case of the Stoics and Spinoza). Therefore the very concept of ethical determinism is inherently untenable.

For its part, the ethical indeterminism leads to the other extreme.

If, therefore, the will as a free one - this is maintained and must be maintained by consistent and absolute indeterminism - precisely for the sake of its freedom is not and must not be determined by anything, it loses the character of an ethical will, because through its absolute freedom, i.e. through its absolute indetermination, it becomes mere arbitrariness, arbitrariness, whim, caprice, a completely indefinite, abstract and aimless will. And this would contradict both the ethical constitution of the will as a reasonable and expedient one in the form of the will itself, which is predestined to realize certain ethical purposes and goals in its activity , as well as the circumstance that willing, according to its essential character, makes sensible choices, decides and adjusts to its tasks and the realization of the good, whereby it also f its way is determined and designed. And therein lies or should lie the ethical freedom of will.

From this emerges something essentially paradoxical and contradictory for indeterminism, namely that by postulating absolute free will, it ultimately denies this ethical freedom or makes it impossible. Therefore the absolute or consequent indeterminism is also untenable in itself.

But if, as a third prerequisite, determinism and indeterminism as absolute opposites to each other and mutually are admitted, allowed, made possible and recognized as valid, then they listen to their character be what they are, namely a determinism or an indeterminism. For a deterministic indeterminism or an indeterministic determinism would be too obvious an absurdity!

From this it follows that both determinism and indeterminism are intrinsically untenable.

7) D I E W A H L F R E I H E I T

For us, however, those moments are of primary interest that have emerged from this entire problem as essential and decisive for the ethical position and the attempted solution of the freedom question. What is of primary importance here, however, is not a specific of this or that special ethical system or an individual ethical conception, but 498

fast von den ersten Anfängen der ethischen Idee an bis zur Gegenwart wie ein roter Faden durch eine jede oder fast jede ethische Lehre hindurchzicht und ihr zugrunde liegt, ist gerade die allgemeinethische Bestimmung des Freiheitsbegriffs. Ohne Berücksichtigung vieler der bestehender Varianten würde diese Bestimmung vor allem folgendermassen lauten:

Die Freiheit ist das Vermögen des Willens, zwischen zwei oder mehreren Gegebenheiten auszuwählen.

Was jedoch dieser Bestimmung oder dieser These, um es so zu sagen, auf ihrem Wege des Übergangs von einer ethischen Lehre in eine andere fast auf der Ferse folgt als ihr ununterbrochenes und ständiges Memento, das ist ihre eigene innere und wesentliche *Frage nach der dem Willen zukommenden Möglichkeit*, innerhalb des Gegebenen frei zu wählen. Es fragt sich nun, was für eine Möglichkeit das ist und ob dies überhaupt eine Möglichkeit ist, wenn sie nur darin besteht, eine Auswahl im Bereich des Gegebenen zu gestatten. Wenn etwas bereits gegeben, also bestehend ist, und es wird etwas von diesem Gegebenen gewählt, also dieses und nicht jenes Gegebene, heißt das nicht, daß einerseits der Wille oder die Willensfreiheit oder die Freiheit eben durch dieses Gegebene bestimmt ist und andererseits bei der Voraussetzung der Gegebenheit verbleibt, die gerade durch die sogenannte freie Wahl bestätigt, festgestellt und akzeptiert wird? Was für eine Möglichkeit ist da erforderlich oder überhaupt vorhanden, um einen Beschuß über die Annahme des Seienden zu fassen? Tut man dies nicht schon ohne jegliche Entscheidung, die hier ganz überflüssig wäre? Denn das bedeutet, im Einklang mit dem bereits Bestehenden leben. Und was ist das schließlich schon für eine Wahl, wenn bloß das einzige Verfügbare, also dieses Gegebene gewählt wird! Das gleicht dem Witz, wonach Gott nach Erstellung der Eva zu Adam sagt: Da, wähle dir eine Frau! Adam konnte dabei sowohl über Willensfreiheit verfügen wie den guten Willen zu einer Wahl haben, aber er mußte leider Eva allein akzeptieren und zur Frau nehmen. Als sogenannter mildernder Umstand ist jedoch zuzubilligen, daß er dabei keine Schuld trug. Was ist dies aber für ein mildernder Umstand für die Freiheit, wenn sie nur dadurch bestimmt ist und darin besteht, als ihre eigene Wahrheit und Möglichkeit die bloße Gegebenheit als einziges Medium ihres In-Erscheinung-Tretens zu akzeptieren und anzuerkennen? Bedeutet dies nicht, daß gleichzeitig dieses Bestehende *notwendig* als *frei* anerkannt werden muß? Und diese und eine solche Notwendigkeit ist in der ethischen Freiheitsbestimmung selbst enthalten, wie wir sie angeführt haben. Ist also nicht schon dies in sich selbst widersprüchlich, daß etwas notwendig als frei anzunehmen ist, und zwar in beiden darin enthaltenen Sinngehalten: einmal im Sinne der Notwendigkeit des Aktes, zum anderen in der Annahme und Anerkennung des bereits Seienden oder des Notwendigen als ihrem Wesen nach schon freien! Und schließlich, liegt es nicht gerade im Wesen des Ethischen, daß die Möglichkeit der Freiheit als seine Allgemeinvoraussetzung gerade in der Negation des Bestehenden und Gegebenen in Erscheinung tritt, damit das ethische Sollen überhaupt erst möglich wird!

Almost from the very beginning of the ethical idea to the present day, like a red thread that runs through every or almost every ethical teaching and underlies it, is precisely the general ethical definition of the concept of freedom. Disregarding many of the existing variants, this provision would

primarily read as follows:

Freedom is the ability of the will to choose between two or more circumstances.

What follows, however, almost on the heels of this determination or this thesis, so to speak, on its way of transition from one ethical doctrine to another, as its uninterrupted and constant memento, is its own inner and essential question about the Will be given the opportunity to choose freely within the given. The question now is what kind of possibility this is, and whether it is even a possibility if it consists only in allowing a choice in the realm of the given.

If something is already given, i.e. existing, and something is chosen from this given, i.e. this given and not that given, that does not mean that on the one hand the will or freedom of will or freedom is determined by this given and on the other hand by the presupposition of the fact remains, which is confirmed, determined and accepted precisely by the so-called free choice? What facility is required, or even available, to make a decision on accepting the offender? Isn't this already done without any decision, which would be completely superfluous here? Because that means living in harmony with what already exists. And what kind of choice is that, if only the only thing available, i.e. this given, is chosen! This is similar to the joke that God says to Adam after the creation of Eve: Here, choose a wife! Adam could have both freedom of will and goodwill to make a choice, but unfortunately he had to accept Eve alone and take her as his wife. As a so-called mitigating circumstance, however, it must be admitted that he was not to blame. But what kind of mitigating circumstance is this for freedom if it is only determined and consists in accepting and acknowledging as its own truth and possibility the mere fact as the only medium of its appearance!? Doesn't this mean that at the same time this existence must necessarily be recognized as free? And this and such a necessity is contained in the ethical definition of freedom itself, as we have quoted it. Isn't this in itself contradictory, that something is necessarily to be assumed to be free, and indeed in both senses contained therein: on the one hand in the sense of the necessity of the act, on the other hand in the acceptance and recognition of what already exists or the necessary as its essence after frcien! And finally, isn't it precisely in the essence of the ethical that the possibility of freedom as its general prerequisite appears precisely in the negation of the existing and given, so that the ethical ought becomes possible in the first place!

Demnach ist die Wahl zwischen zwei oder mehreren Gegebenheiten eine Voraussetzung, die die Grundlegung der ethischen Sphäre überhaupt unmöglich macht, und trotzdem wurde diese Bestimmung der Freiheit in dieser Sphäre geboren.

Dieser offensichtliche Widerspruch in der Bestimmung der Freiheit soll jedoch dadurch vermieden werden, daß der Begriff des »Gegebenen« durch den Begriff der »Möglichkeit« ersetzt wird, so daß nun die Bestimmung lauten würde:

Die Freiheit ist das Vermögen des Willens, zwischen zwei oder mehreren Möglichkeiten auszuwählen.

Dies steht jedenfalls im Einklang mit der besagten ethisch-theoretischen Wendung, worin die Möglichkeit mit der Gegebenheit gleichgesetzt wurde, so daß jene hier auch im Sinne des Gegebenen figuriert. Daß dies ein Widerspruch ist, davon war bereits die Rede. Doch hier muß die Frage auch andersherum gestellt werden: Wenn die Möglichkeit darin besteht, daß es anders wird, als es ist, wie kann dann das gewählt werden, was noch nicht ist? Eine Wahl ist nur möglich innerhalb dessen, was bereits ist, und das andere Noch-nicht-Seiende steht ihr nicht zur Verfügung. Dieses andere Anderswerdende oder Noch-nicht-Seiende ist seiner Natur nach so geartet, daß es erst sein *soll*. Aber wie? Damit erweist sich auch diese Formulierung als unhaltbar.

8) DAS MORALISCHE »FREISEIN VON ETWAS« – MÖGLICHKEIT UND GEGEBENHEIT

Hier sind wir wieder, wie wir sehen, zum Ausgangspunkt des Ethischen zurückgekehrt, das im Sollen enthalten ist, für welches die Möglichkeit nur eine Allgemeinvoraussetzung der Freiheit ist. Hier gibt das Ethische für einen Augenblick den Anspruch auf eine *theoretische* Grundlegung dieser seiner Allgemeinvoraussetzung auf und gelangt in seiner höchstentwickelten und sich selbst gegenüber folgerichtigen Form, also bei Kant, zu der Erkenntnis, daß es im eigenen Rahmen gerade auf die Erkenntnis dessen verzichten muß, was Freiheit im *positiven* Sinne ist. Deshalb verbleibt der Ethik nur noch die negative Bestimmung der Freiheit als eines »*Freiseins von*« etwas. Und dieses »Etwas« ist eben das »Gegebene«. Es wird nicht mehr als das Mögliche aufgefaßt noch wird in ihm durch freien Willensakt etwas gewählt, weil dies gerade jenes Gebiet ist, in dem Freiheit, folgerichtig vom Standpunkt des Möglichen als desjenigen, was auch anders sein kann gefaßt, auf keinen Fall besteht. Im Gegenteil, die Freiheit muß in absolutem und reinem Gegensatz zum Gegebenen, Bestehenden, Empirischen stehen. Nur daß nun Schwierigkeiten anderer Art entstehen und sich unweigerlich aufdrängen. Sehen wir uns jedoch vor allem Kants Bestimmung der Freiheit an, die da lautet, daß die transzendentale Freiheit

»... als *Unabhängigkeit von* allem Empirischen und also von der Natur überhaupt gedacht werden muß, sie mag nun als Gegenstand des inneren Sinnes bloß in der Zeit, oder auch äußeren Sinnes im

Accordingly, the choice between two or more givens is a premise that renders the foundation of the ethical sphere altogether impossible, and yet this determination of freedom was born in that sphere.

However, this obvious contradiction in the definition of freedom is to be avoided by using the concept of the »given«

is replaced by the concept of "possibility", so that the determination would now read:

Freedom is the ability of the will to choose between two or more possibilities.

In any case, this is in line with the aforementioned ethical-theoretical turn, in which the possibility was equated with the given, so that that figured here also in the sense of the given. That this is a contradiction has already been mentioned. But here the question must also be asked the other way around: If there is a possibility that it will be different than it is, how can then that which is not yet be chosen? A choice is only possible within what already is, and the other not-yet is not available to it. This other thing that is becoming different or not-yet-being is of such a nature that it should first be. But how? This formulation also proves to be untenable.

8) DAS MORALISCHE »FREIHEIT UND GEGENHEIT

MORALICHE ITUNDGEGENESENHEIT

Here again, as we see, we have returned to the starting point of the ethical, which is contained in the ought, for which the possibility is only a general presupposition of freedom. Here, for a moment, the ethical gives up the claim to a theoretical foundation of this general presupposition of its own and, in its most highly developed and self-consistent form, i.e. with Kant, comes to the realization that that within its own framework it has to do without the knowledge of what freedom is in a positive sense. That is why ethics only has the negative definition of freedom as "being free from" something.

And this »something« is precisely the »given«. It is no longer conceived of as the possible, nor is anything chosen in it by an act of free will, because this is precisely the area in which freedom, logically from the standpoint of the possible as that which may also be different can be fafit, by no means exists. On the contrary, freedom must stand in absolute and pure contrast to the given, existing, empirical. Only that difficulties of a different kind now arise and inevitably arise. Above all, however, let us look at Kant's definition of freedom, which reads that the transcendental freedom

»... must be thought of as independence from everything empirical and therefore from nature in general, it may now be an object of the inner sense only in time, or also of the outer sense in the 500th

Raume und der Zeit zugleich betrachtet werden, ohne welche Freiheit (in der letzteren eigentlichen Bedeutung), die allein a priori praktisch ist, kein moralisches Gesetz, keine Zurechnung nach demselben möglich ist.«¹¹

Ferner steht ebenso an anderer Stelle, wo vom Begriff der Kausalität als der *Naturnotwendigkeit* zum Unterschied von der *Kausalität der Freiheit* die Rede ist, dieser Satz:

»Der Begriff der Kausalität als *Naturnotwendigkeit* zum Unterschiede derselben als *Freiheit* betrifft nur die Existenz der Dinge, sofern sie in *der Zeit bestimmbar* ist, folglich als Erscheinungen im Gegensatze ihrer Kausalität als Dinge an sich selbst. Nimm man nun die Bestimmungen der Existenz der Dinge in der Zeit für Bestimmungen der Dinge an sich selbst (welches die gewöhnlichste Vorstellungssart ist), so läßt sich die Notwendigkeit im Kausalverhältnisse mit der Freiheit auf keinerlei Weise vereinigen, sondern sie sind *einander kontradiktiorisch entgegengesetzt*.«¹²

Während im ersten Falle, im Begriff der freien Wahl, die Freiheit im Gegebenen versunken ist und sich verflüchtigt hat, ist sie im letzteren Falle ihm absolut und kontradiktiorisch gegensätzlich. Doch wird in dem einen wie dem anderen Falle vom *Gegebenen ausgegangen*, und darin liegt die ganze Ungelegenheit. Im letzteren, Kantischen Falle nur scheinbar nicht. Im ersten Falle wird die Möglichkeit auf das Gegebene zurückgeführt und mit diesem identifiziert, im letzteren ist das, was als frei einzig möglich ist, frei nur insofern, als es frei oder unabhängig von der Gegebenheit ist, das heißt von der Kausalität der Natur, so daß sie durch diese *negativ bestimmt* wird, weil es sich nur im Gegensatz zum Gegebenen, also *in bezug* auf das Gegebene und von diesem ausgehend erst als frei zu konstituieren vermag, was hier zugleich bedeutet – *als moralisch*. Dieser Gegensatz ist in seiner Absolutheit, Reinheit und Abstraktheit von solcher Art, daß er das Gegebene darin sein läßt, was es ist und wie es ist, ohne an ihm oder in bezug auf es irgendwelche Änderungen vorzunehmen. Es gibt also im Gegebenen und Bestehenden keine Freiheit, und man kann auch nicht sagen: Die Freiheit ist oder besteht, was bedeuten würde, daß sie schon irgendwie und irgendwo, also in der Gegebenheit selbst ist, so daß sie dann auch theoretisch bestimmt und erkannt werden könnte. Aber dafür soll sie sein, und darum liegt in dieser nun schon rein ethisch-moralischen Forderung ihre eigentliche und einzige Wirklichkeit. Die Freiheit ist also *ein Postulat der praktischen Vernunft*, das von der theoretischen Vernunft auf keinen Fall bewiesen werden kann, da ihre in absolutem Gegensatz zum Seienden (dem Sein) gefaßte Möglichkeit außerhalb der Reichweite theoretischer Erfassung liegt.

Dies ist die eigentliche Wahrheit des Ethischen als solchen, da sein Wesen nur das Sollen ist. Doch dadurch wird lediglich erreicht, daß wir eine *Sonderart* der Freiheit vor uns haben und nicht die Freiheit als solche, das heißt, wir haben – *die Freiheit im Moralischen oder*

¹¹ I. Kant, *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, Immanuel Kants Werke, Bd. V, Bruno Cassirer, Berlin 1914 S. 106.

¹² Ebenda, S. 103.

Furthermore, this sentence is found elsewhere, where the concept of causality as natural necessity is discussed in contrast to the causality of freedom:

"The concept of causality as a natural necessity as opposed to the same as freedom only concerns the existence of things insofar as it is determinable in time, consequently as appearances in contrast to their causality as things in themselves. If one now takes the determinations of the existence of things in time for determinations of things in themselves (which is the most common way of representing things), necessity in the causal relation can in no way be united with freedom, but they are contradictorily opposed to each other.'

While in the former case, in the concept of free choice, freedom has sunk into the given and has evaporated, in the latter case it is absolutely and contradictorily opposed to it. But in both cases the starting point is the given, and that is where the trouble lies. In the latter, Kantian case, only apparently not. In the first case, the possibility is traced back to the given and identified with it; in the latter, what is only possible as free is free only insofar as it is free or independent of the given, i.e. of the causality of nature, so that it is negatively determined by this, because it can only constitute itself as free in contrast to what is given, i.e. in relation to what is given and starting from this, which here also means - as moral. This contrast is such in its absoluteness, purity, and abstractness that it allows the given to be what it is and how it is, without making any changes to it or in relation to it. So there is no freedom in what is given and existing, and one cannot say either: freedom is or exists, which would mean that it is somehow and somewhere, that is, in the given itself, so that it can then also be theoretically determined and recognized could become. But that's what it's supposed to be for, and that's why its actual and only reality lies in this already purely ethical-moral demand. Freedom is therefore a postulate of practical reason, which theoretical reason can under no circumstances prove, since its possibility, conceived in absolute opposition to beings (being), is beyond the reach of theoretical apprehension.

This is the actual truth of the ethical as such, since its essence is only the ought. But this only achieves that we have a special kind of freedom before us and not freedom as such, that is, we have - freedom in the moral or 11 Kant, Critique of practical Reason , Immanuel Kants Werke, Vol. V, Bruno Cassirer, Berlin 1914 p. 106.

11 E thing, S. 103.

eine moralische Freiheit. Ohne vorläufig auf die Betrachtung des Charakters dieser Freiheit einzugehen, mag lediglich festgestellt sein, daß wir es hier mit einer Freiheit von etwas, also vom Gegebenen ist, so daß dieses Gegebene auf keinen Fall von ihr erfaßt oder von ihr durchdrungen ist. Somit ist auch dieses selbst ihr gegenüber – »frei« in seinem Dasein. Da jedoch, wie wir wissen, dasjenige frei ist, was auch anders sein kann, so ginge daraus für die moralische Freiheit selbst etwas völlig Widersprüchliches hervor, nämlich daß auch in dem Seienden oder Gegebenen (hier: in der Kausalität der Natur) die Möglichkeit der Freiheit besteht, was die Konstituierung einer Freiheit im Moralischen selbst von Grund aus zum Einsturz brächte, da diese nur insoweit frei ist, als sie im Gegebenen keine Freiheitsmöglichkeit findet und sich diesem daher absolut entgegenstellt und erst in diesem Gegensatz ihre eigene Möglichkeit sieht.

Wir werden hier einer großen Schwierigkeit gewahr, mit der der Begriff der moralischen Freiheit nicht fertig werden wird, da er hier wieder an die Grenze seiner ethischen Möglichkeit gestoßen ist. Mag hier noch eine vielleicht sogar größere Schwierigkeit für den Begriff der Freiheit im Moralischen angeführt sein und einer Betrachtung unterzogen werden, weil mit ihr das ganze ethische Gebiet berührt und in Frage gestellt wird. In Frage gestellt dergestalt, daß es sich der Freiheitsmöglichkeit ausschließlich für sich selbst bemächtigt hat, indem es darauf Anspruch erhebt, sich als moralische Freiheit auf alle Gebiete des Seins und der Tätigkeit auszudehnen und zu verbreiten, wodurch alles, was ist, was geschieht und was sein soll ausschließlich unter der Voraussetzung seiner totalen Moralisierung möglich wäre.

Kehren wir darum wieder zu Aristoteles zurück, um mit seiner Hilfe zu versuchen, auf die angeführte Schwierigkeit hinzuweisen und irgendwie aus ihr herauszufinden. Wenn nämlich Aristoteles von dem spricht, was auch anders sein kann, so spricht er nicht nur von den Dingen, an denen das Objekt der praktischen Weisheit oder des moralischen Handelns zur Geltung gelangt, sondern ebenso auch das Objekt – *der Kunst*.¹³

Demnach ist auch das Objekt der Kunst dasjenige, worauf das Anderswerden als das, was ist, zur Anwendung kommen kann, was bedeutet, daß sich auch in ihr die Freiheitsmöglichkeit vollzieht. Daraus folgt vorläufig zumindest, daß das ethische Gebiet für sich nicht das Recht beanspruchen kann, daß sich die Freiheit nur unter der Voraussetzung der Moralität konstituiert und vollzieht, sondern ebenso auch beim Kunstschaften. Dadurch bekämen wir, rein formal gesehen, außer der moralischen Freiheit noch eine, also die Freiheit im künstlerischen Schaffen. Wenn wir noch die hinzufügen, die als Schlußfolgerung aus dem widersprüchlichen Charakter der moralischen Freiheit hervorgeht, also die freie Bewegung des von der Moralität weder durchdrungenen, noch berührten, noch veränderten Gegebenen oder Seienden, die von diesem völlig unabhängig und daher diesem gegenüber in derselben Weise frei ist, wie auch die Moralität in bezug auf die Gegebenheit, so haben wir auch eine dritte Freiheit erhalten.

¹³ Vgl. darüber Nikomachische Ethik, ebenda, VI, 3–7, S. 124 ff.

it. Thus this is also itself in relation to it - "free"

in his existence. However, since, as we know, that which can also be different is free, something completely contradictory would result for moral freedom itself, namely that also in what is or is given (here: in causality of nature) the possibility of freedom exists, which caused the constitution of a freedom in the moral itself to collapse from the ground up, since this is only free insofar as it finds no possibility of freedom in the given and itself he opposes this absolutely and sees its own possibility only in this contrast.

We are aware of a great difficulty here, which the concept of moral freedom will not be able to cope with, since here again it has come up against the limits of its ethical possibilities. A perhaps even greater difficulty for the concept of freedom in the moral sphere may be listed here and subjected to consideration because it touches on and calls into question the entire ethical field. Questioned in such a way that it has usurped the possibility of freedom exclusively for itself by claiming to extend and expand it as moral freedom to all areas of being and activity. spread, whereby everything that is, what happens and what should be is only possible under the condition of its total moralization.

Let us therefore return to Aristotle in order to try with his help to point out the difficulty mentioned and somehow find our way out of it. When Aristotle speaks of what can also be different, he not only speaks of the things on which the object of practical wisdom or moral action comes into play, but also above that the object - of art.TM

Accordingly, the object of art is also that to which the change from what is can be applied, which means that the possibility of freedom also takes place in art. From this it follows, at least for the time being, that the ethical field cannot claim for itself the right that freedom is only constituted and carried out under the presupposition of morality, but also in the case of artistic creation. From a purely formal point of view, this gave us another freedom in addition to moral freedom, i.e. freedom in artistic creation. If we add that which follows as a conclusion from the contradictory character of moral freedom, i.e. the free movement of G which is neither permeated nor touched nor changed by morality beings or beings that are completely independent of it and are therefore free in relation to it in the same way as morality is in relation to the given, we have also received a third freedom.

18 Cf. on this Nicomachean Ethics, *ibid.*, VI, 3-7, p. 124 ff.

Und dies wäre auf jeden Fall aburd, denn wenn die Freiheit möglich ist, ist sie dies nur als *eine* Freiheit (obwohl, nebenbei bemerkt, in der Alltagssprache ein Pluralismus ihrer Gebiete, Aspekte, Kundgebungen und Benennungen in Kraft steht, der in dieser Form seine philosophische Begründung und Berechtigung nicht findet).

An einer anderen Stelle spricht Aristoteles noch einmal explizite davon, nämlich:

»Von dem nun was möglicherweise auch anders sein kann, ist das eine Gegenstand der *gestaltenden Tätigkeit*, das andere Gegenstand des *Handelns*.¹⁴

Und gleich etwas weiter folgt, was für unsere Betrachtung jedenfalls von Bedeutung ist:

»Nun ist alle Kunst darauf gerichtet, daß aus ihr ein Gegenstand hervorgeht; sie ist die Betätigung der Geschicklichkeit und das Betrachten, wie wohl ein solches, was möglicherweise sein und auch nicht sein kann, und wofür die Urheberschaft in der gestaltenden Person, nicht in der gestalteten Sache selbst liegt, zum Dasein gelangen kann. Denn die Kunst befaßt sich nicht mit solchem was notwendig ist oder geschieht, und auch nicht mit solchem was sich der Natur gemäß vollzieht; denn dergleichen hat seinen Grund in sich selbst. Ist nun gestaltende Tätigkeit und Handeln zweirlei, so gehört die Kunst notwendig der gestaltenden Tätigkeit und nicht dem Handeln an.¹⁵

Es ist klar, daß künstlerische Hervorbringung und moralisches Handeln zwei verschiedene Dinge sind, aber aus dem Angeführten geht ebenso deutlich hervor, daß das eine wie das andere *aus derselben Quelle* stammt, die in dem möglichen Anderswerden liegt, und dies ist ihr *gemeinsames Allgemeinprinzip*. Andererseits geht zugleich daraus hervor, daß unter dieses Prinzip nicht das Gegebene oder das von Natur aus Bestehende oder Entstehende fällt, da es sein Prinzip schon in sich trägt. Daraus folgt, daß das Gegebene oder Notwendige oder Naturhafte oder Kausale keine Möglichkeit in sich enthält und demnach – *unmöglich ist*. In welcher Hinsicht unmöglich, wird sich später zeigen.

Doch lenken wir unser Augenmerk auf noch ein wichtiges Moment aus dem Angeführten, mit welchem wir nur augenblicksweise unsere weitere Betrachtung vorwegnehmen wollen, weil sie sich gerade hier durch ihren Sinn aufdrängt, der uns einen Schritt weiter verhelfen wird. Wenn Aristoteles an der eben angeführten Stelle über die »... Betätigung der Geschicklichkeit und das Betrachten, wie wohl ein solches, was möglicherweise sein und auch nicht sein kann, und wofür die Urheberschaft in der gestaltenden Person, nicht in der gestalteten Sache selbst liegt ...« usw. spricht, dann bezieht sich dies bei ihm *vor allem auf die Kunst*. Doch erhebt sich die Frage:

Ist nicht *der Mensch selbst* ein Etwas unter den Dingen, die *sein und nicht sein können*? Wenn nämlich seine Tätigkeit, in diesem Falle das künstlerische Hervorbringen, gerade die *seinige*, also eine menschliche ist, bezieht sich dann nicht dasselbe auch auf ihn selbst,

¹⁴ Ebenda, VI, 4, S. 125 f.

¹⁵ Ebenda, VI, 4, S. 126.

And this would be abusive in any case, for if freedom is possible, it is only as a freedom (although, by the way, in everyday language there is a pluralism of its domains, aspects, manifestations, and denominations in force that in this form does not find its philosophical justification and

justification).

A n another place, Aristotle speaks again explicitly about it, namely:

"Of what can possibly also be different, one is the object of creative activity and the other is the object of action."14

And a little further follows, which is in any case of importance for our consideration:

'Now all art aims to produce an object; it is the exercise of skill and the contemplation of how something that may or may not be, and for which the authorship lies in the person creating, not in the thing itself, can come into existence. For art is not concerned with what is necessary or happens, nor with what happens according to nature; for such things have their basis in themselves.

If formative activity and action are two different things, then art necessarily belongs to formative activity and not to action.«15

It is clear that artistic production and moral action are two different things, but from what has just been said it is equally clear that both derive from the same source, which is the possibility of becoming different, and this is their common general principle. On the other hand, it also follows from this that what is given or what exists or arises by nature does not fall under this principle, since it already carries its principle within itself. From this it follows that the given or necessary or natural or causal contains no possibility in itself and is therefore - impossible. Impossible in what respect, we shall see later.

But let us draw our attention to another important point from the above, with which we only want to anticipate our further consideration for a moment, because it is precisely here that it imposes itself through its meaning, which will help us a step further. If Aristoteles in the passage just quoted about the

». . . Exercising skill and contemplating how such things can possibly be and also not be, and for which the authorship lies in the person creating, not in the thing itself. . . « etc., then for him this refers above all to art. But the question arises: Is not man himself something among the things that can and cannot be? If his activity, in this case the artistic production, is his, i.e. a human one, then the same does not refer to himself,

" E benda, V I, 4, S. 125 f.

" E benda, V I, 4, S. 126.

der hier auf seine schöpferische Art tätig ist? Denn auch der Mensch als Mensch (und wir werden später sehen, *gerade nur und einzig und allein er*) kann sein und nicht sein, da er nicht einfach gegeben ist, bzw. seine Tätigkeit selbst vollzieht sich und geschieht *nicht*, wie wir sehen, unter dem Prinzip der Gegebenheit, sondern bereits unter dem Prinzip der Möglichkeit. Wenn er also hervorzu bringen vermag, dann vermag er auch sich hervorzu bringen und kann sein und nicht sein, da sich in diesem Schaffen nur er als Mensch manifestiert, denn die Kunst ist doch sein eigener Akt oder sein Werk.

Das Prinzip der Möglichkeit als Quelle und Ursprung der (hier bei Aristoteles künstlerischen) Hervorbringung bezieht sich also nicht nur auf die Kunst, sondern auch auf den Hervorbringenden, also auf den Menschen, der, wenn er schon hervorbringt, ein hervorbringendes Wesen sein kann, also ein Wesen, das sich in der Möglichkeit befindet.

Aristoteles bestimmt dies noch nicht so, obschon sein eigener Standpunkt dies hier zuläßt und ermöglicht, und es bleibt irgendwie unbestimmt oder zumindest nicht ganz klar, ob sich die Voraussetzung des menschlichen Wesens und seines Seins in der Möglichkeit oder Gegebenheit befindet. In jedem Fall wäre es auch Aristoteles nach ein Widerspruch zu behaupten, daß der Mensch (künstlerisch) hervorbringt oder (moralisch) handelt, indem er auf dem Prinzip des Gegebenen steht oder von diesem ausgeht, was deutlich genug auch aus dem Angeführten hervorgeht. Wenn also seine, die menschliche, wesentliche Voraussetzung oder die Voraussetzung seines Wesens oder Seins eben die Möglichkeit ist, so soll der Mensch wenigstens, wenn hier noch nicht gesagt werden kann, daß er es ist, das sein, was außer den Objekten der künstlerischen Hervorbringung und des moralischen Handelns ebenfalls auch anders sein kann. Und es wird sich noch zeigen, daß dem wirklich so ist.

Außerdem ist hier beim moralischen Handeln selbst noch nicht alles ganz klar. Richtig ist, daß dieses als solches, also *schon als moralisch*, was hier bedeutet, nur von einem besonderen Gebiet und Aspekt aus erfaßt, nicht mit dem künstlerischen Hervorbringen gleichgesetzt werden kann, so daß sich beides eben als künstlerisch und moralisch voneinander unterscheidet. Aber die Frage liegt darin, daß beides, wie laut Aristoteles folgt, aus derselben Quelle hervorgeht und ihr gemeinsames Prinzip in der Allgemeinvoraussetzung der Möglichkeit hat. Betrachten wir nun dieses moralische Handeln in seiner noch nicht oder nicht schon spezifizierten Form, wie es ganz ausgeformt in einer ethischen Systematisierung zum Ausdruck kommt, was zugleich bedeutet: von allen übrigen Gebieten der menschlichen Tätigkeit getrennt und abgesondert, und unterziehen wir es einer Betrachtung von seiten dieser seiner Allgemeinvoraussetzung, dann werden wir sehen, daß es auch hier noch immer eine ebensolche hervorbringende oder gestaltende Tätigkeit ist, weil es die Möglichkeit, dies zu sein oder nicht zu sein, in sich trägt. Als ethisch hat sich diese Tätigkeit in Form des moralischen Handelns zwar bereits nach Maßgabe ihres »Nichtseins« konstituiert, aber ihr liegt zugrunde und ermöglicht sie geradezu jenes andere, also das, »um etwas anderes zu sein.« Das eine wie das andere ist ständig als offene Möglichkeit vorhanden.

who is active here in his creative way? Because man as man (and we will see later, just and only he) can and cannot be, since he is not simply given, or his activity itself takes place and does not happen, as we see, under the principle of givenness, but already under the principle of possibility. So if he is able to produce, then he can also produce himself and can be and not be, since in this creation only he manifests himself as a human being, for art is after all his own act or work.

The principle of possibility as the source and origin of production (here in Aristotle artistic) refers not only to art, but also to the producer, i.e. to the human being who, if he already produces, can be a generating being, i.e. a being that is in the possibility.

Aristotle does not yet determine this in this way, although his own point of view allows and enables this here, and it remains somehow undetermined or at least not entirely clear whether the presupposition of the human being and its being in In any case, it would also be a contradiction, according to Aristotle, to assert that man (artistically) produces or (morally) acts by being on the The principle of the given stands or proceeds from it, which also emerges clearly enough from the above. So if his, the human, essential presupposition or the presupposition of his essence or being is precisely the possibility, then the human being at least, if it cannot yet be said here that it is he, is that be, which apart from the objects of artistic production and moral action can also be different. And it will still be shown that this is really the case.

Moreover, not everything is quite clear here in the case of moral action itself. It is correct that this as such, i.e. already as moral, which here means grasped only from a special area and aspect, cannot be equated with artistic production, so that both can be seen as artistic and moral differs from each other. But the question lies in the fact that both, as follows according to Aristotle, emerge from the same source and have their common principle in the general assumption of possibility. Let us now consider this moral action in its not yet or not already specified form, how it is expressed in an ethical systematization, which at the same time means: from all other areas of human life activity separately and separately, and if we subject it to a consideration on the part of this general assumption, then we will see that here too it is still just such a productive or formative activity, because it carries with it the possibility of being or not being that. This activity in the form of moral action has already constituted itself as ethical in terms of its »non-being«, but it underlies and enables that other thing, i.e. that »in order to be something else .«

The one as well as the other is always present as an open possibility.

Deshalb hat auch die Ethik und das durch sie bestimmte moralische Handeln stets die Chance, aus ihrer – hier können wir es wirklich schon sagen – *entfremdeten Form* des historischen In-Erscheinung-Tretens der authentischen und primären Möglichkeit des Hervorbringens, die in ihm durch die theoretische und wissenschaftliche Einschließung des Gesichtskreises in ihren Ursprung selbst verdeckt ist, umzukehren und in ihren sinnvoll-möglichen Grund, dem sie entstammt, zurückzukehren. Denn dieser wird hier auch aus seiner entfremdeten Form heraus ersichtlich, sonst wäre er spurlos verloren.

Ist denn dann nicht in beiden ihren Erscheinungsformen, also sogar immer noch auch in dieser entfremdeten, eine Möglichkeit am Werke, daß sich der Horizont des Menschlichen immer wieder von neuem bestätigt und erweitert? Ist dann nicht auch dieses moralische Handeln, obwohl seinem eigentlichen und ursprünglichen Ethos als menschlicher Möglichkeit oder Möglichkeit des Menschlichen entfremdet, an sich und in sich selbst ein wirkender *Beweis*, daß in seinem Grund etwas für den Menschen Entscheidendes vorgeht, also seine Wahrheit selbst, die Wahrheit seines eigenen Seins?

Deshalb ist auch diese moralische Tätigkeit *ihrer Möglichkeit nach* ein Hervorbringen. Wenn sich das Hervorbringen, oder besser gesagt: die Möglichkeit der Hervorbringung an den Objekten der Kunst kundgeben kann, die sich in einem sinnvoll-täglichen Verhältnis dem bestehenden Sein gegenüber, also zum Wirklichen als dem Gegebenen realisieren, ist dann nicht oder findet dann nicht das moralische Handeln vielleicht noch einen günstigeren Boden ein entsprechenderes Medium zur eigenen sinnvollen Verwirklichung, wenn in ihm das Verhältnis in der Möglichkeitssphäre des Menschlichen selbst, also zwischen Mensch und Mensch, zustande kommt oder zu stande kommen kann? Ist also nicht, um es so auszudrücken, das gegenseitige Hervorbringen oder Erzeugen oder Gestalten des Menschen durch den Menschen ein ebensolches eminent menschlisches Schaffen? Ist denn nicht gerade hier die menschliche Möglichkeit schlechtin am Werke?

Freilich, wenn Aristoteles vom moralischen Handeln oder der praktischen Weisheit spricht, die dann hier wahrhaftig bloß praktisch im Sinne der umsichtsvollen Führung eines eigenen guten oder tugendhaften Lebens mit den anderen oder eines Zusammenlebens mit anderen ist, damit im allgemeinsten Sinne niemand Schaden nehme, so daß hier der Begriff des rechten Mittelmaßes auf jeden Fall als Kriterium für ein tugendhaftes Leben (oder ein Leben in der Tugend) ganz angemessen ist, wenn er also davon spricht, schwelt Aristoteles diejenige Tätigkeit vor, die sich ihrer Möglichkeit nach bereits empirisch-entfremdet in Form des spezifischen Moralverhältnisses konstituiert hat. Und dieses ist allen seinen Merkmalen, Eigenschaften, Attributen und seinem Sinne, mit einem Wort: seiner Natur nach bereits wirklich weit davon entfernt, das Schaffende allzu leicht in sich erkennen zu lassen. Darum tut dies Aristoteles auch nicht, sondern spricht einen schöpferischen Charakter der Tätigkeit nur der künstlerischen Hervorbringung zu. Man kann sagen, mit Recht, weil im ethischen oder moralischen als einem bereits fertigen und abgerundeten, in sich gestalteten Sondergebiet – das im Widerspruch zu

the historical in-appearance.

- To reverse the appearance of the authentic and primary possibility of production, which is itself concealed in it by the theoretical and scientific confinement of the horizon in its origin, and to return to its meaningfully-possible ground from which it originates. Because this is also evident here from its alienated form, otherwise it would be lost without a trace.

Isn't there then a possibility at work in both of its forms of appearance, that is, even in this alienated one, that the horizon of the human is constantly being confirmed and expanded anew? Isn't this moral action, too, although alienated from its actual and original ethos as a human possibility or possibility of the human, in itself and in itself effective proof that something decisive for the human being is going on at its core, i.e. its truth itself, the truth of his own being?

Therefore this moral activity is also a production in its possibility. If production, or rather: the possibility of production, can manifest itself in the objects of art, which are realized in a meaningful and active relationship to the existing being, i.e. to the real as the given, then it is not or will not be found moral action perhaps even more favorable ground, a more appropriate medium for one's own meaningful realization, if the relationship in the sphere of possibility of the human itself, i.e. between man and man, comes about or can come about? So it's not, to put it that way. the mutual creation or creation or shaping of man by man is just such an eminently human creation?

Isn't it precisely here that human possibility is at work?

Of course, when Aristotle speaks of moral action or practical wisdom, which is really only practical here in the sense of the prudent conduct of one's own good or virtuous life with others or of living together with others, so that in the most general sense nobody harms take, so that here the concept of the right mediocrity is in any case quite appropriate as a criterion for a virtuous life (or a life of virtue), so when he speaks of it, Aristotle has in mind that activity which, as far as possible, is already empirical -alienated in the form of the specific moral relationship. And with all its features, properties, attributes and meaning, in a word: its nature is already really far from allowing the creator to be recognized all too easily. That is why Aristotle does not do this either, but only ascribes a creative character to the activity of artistic production. One can rightly say, because in the ethical or moral as an already complete and well-rounded, self-formed special area - this is in contradiction to 505

sich selbst gerade als ein besonders auf die Erfassung und Erschöpfung des Menschenmöglichen Anspruch erhebt – *die Möglichkeit bereits aufgehört hat, eine solche zu sein*. Aufgehört schon allein dadurch, daß sie sich aus ihrem tätig-sinnvoll-freien Grund heraus, aus dem sie sich *praktisch kundgibt oder nicht kundgibt, offenbart oder verbirgt*, in die *theoretische Frage* nach der Möglichkeit und Freiheit oder der Freiheitsmöglichkeit verwandelt hat. Indem sie so zu einer ethisch-theoretisch-wissenschaftlichen Frage oder zu einem sogenannten *Gegenstand* der Erkenntnis des ethischen oder moralischen Handelns geworden ist, hat die Möglichkeit den Zugang zu sich versperrt und hat sich in die bloß abstrakte Möglichkeit eines »Freiseins von« etwas verwandelt, oder besser gesagt: ist dies geblieben. Denn wie zum Beispiel das beste Zeichen, daß mit der Wahrheit selbst etwas nicht in Ordnung ist, dann vorliegt, wenn sie zum »Gegenstand« einer theoretischen Sonderdisziplin oder wissenschaft wird, das heißt der Erkenntnistheorie oder der formalen Logik oder sogar der sog. Logistik oder mathematischen Logik usw., so ist andererseits dasselbe der Fall bei der Freiheit, wenn diese ebenso zum »Gegenstand« einer besonderen Theorie oder Wissenschaft oder eines Systems usw. in Form einer Ethik wird. Das Höchste, was sich dann hier erfassen läßt, wenn man diese beiden besonderen Sphären nachträglich gewaltsam miteinander in Verbindung bringt, ist die bekannte Formulierung, wonach *die Freiheit als erkannte Notwendigkeit bestimmt wird* (teilweise bereits bei Spinoza, dann besonders bei Hegel in ihrer höchst entwickelten Form, was dann später Engels, Lenin, Plechanow und und die meisten Marxisten übernehmen). Doch darüber etwas später.

Das Bedeutsame in alledem ist der eigentlich sehr offensichtliche und dennoch verdeckte und nichtdurchdachte Widerspruch, der einer jeden derartigen theoretischen Bestimmung zugrunde liegt und ihren Ausgangspunkt bildet, daß nämlich *die Freiheit oder die Möglichkeit der Freiheit vom Standpunkt der Gegebenheit oder der Notwendigkeit aus bestimmt wird* und nicht so, wie dies zu tun wäre, das heißt gerade – *umgekehrt!* Erst aus diesem Grunde und dann schließt sich hier der Kreis, aus welchem es dann schwer, um nicht zu sagen unmöglich ist, herauszufinden. Denn auf diesem Standpunkt ist dann von allem anderen die Rede, nur nicht von der wirklichen Freiheit und Möglichkeit.

Auch Kant selbst, der genau einsah, daß sich auf dem theoretischen Wege die Freiheit weder ableiten noch beweisen läßt, bestimmt diese gerade auf diese Weise, indem er vom Gegebenen und Notwendigen ausgeht, da der Begriff des *Freiseins von etwas* gerade eine solche bloß theoretische Bestimmung ist. Sein Verdienst liegt wenigstens darin, daß er explizite auf dieses Moment hingewiesen und klar bestätigt hat, daß die Freiheit keine ausschließlich theoretische Frage ist und sein kann. Die Bemühung Hegels dagegen, aus diesem abstrakten Begriff des »Freiseins von etwas« herauszugelangen und es dennoch auch in seiner positiven Form als *Freiheit für etwas* zu bestimmen und zu bestätigen, fand ihr Ende dadurch, daß sich dieses Etwas lediglich als die Erkenntnis selbst erwies, so daß sich eine *Freiheit für Erkenntnis* ergab, denn als erkannte Notwendigkeit hat sie nur diesen Sinn. Hegel hatte übrigens, wenn man die Grundvor-

theoretical question of the possibility and freedom or the has changed the possibility of freedom. By becoming an ethical-theoretical-scientific question or a so-called object of knowledge of ethical or moral action, the possibility has blocked access to itself and has entered the mere abstract possibility of "being free from"

something has changed, or rather: has remained so. Because, for example, the best sign that something is wrong with the truth itself is when it becomes the "object" of a special theoretical discipline or science, that is, epistemology or formal logic, or even the so-called logi-stic or mathematic logic, etc., so, on the other hand, the same is the case with freedom, when this likewise becomes the "object" of a particular theory or science or system etc. in the form of an ethic. The highest thing that can be grasped here, if one brings these two special spheres into connection with one another in a violent manner, is the well-known formulation, according to which freedom is determined as a recognized necessity s (partially already in Spinoza, then especially in Hegel in its most highly developed form, which is then later adopted by Engels, Lenin, Plekhanov and most Marxists). But more about that later.

The most significant thing in all of this is the actually very obvious and yet covert and unthought-out contradiction that underlies every such theoretical determination and forms its starting point, namely freedom or the possibility of freedom from the standpoint t is determined from the circumstances or necessity and not in the way that we'd be done, that is to say - vice versa! Only for this reason and then does the circle close here, from which it is then difficult, not to say impossible, to find our way out. Because from this point of view everything else is discussed, just not real freedom and possibility.

Even Kant himself, who saw exactly that freedom can neither be derived nor proven on the theoretical path, determines it precisely in this way, by starting from the given and necessary, that the B The concept of being free from something is just such a mere theoretical determination. His merit lies at least in the fact that he explicitly pointed out this moment and clearly confirmed that freedom is not and cannot be an exclusively theoretical question. Hegel's effort, on the other hand, to get away from this abstract concept of "being free from something" and nevertheless to determine and confirm it in its positive form as freedom for something, came to an end when this something presented itself merely as knowledge itself proved so that there was freedom for knowledge, because as recognized necessity it only has this meaning. By the way, Hegel had, when you think of the Grundvor-506

aussetzung seines philosophischen Systems in Betracht zieht (die absolute Idee und den Weltgeist, das geschichtliche Fortschreiten der Freiheitsidee), eine andere Lösung gar nicht nötig und sie war für ihn auch nicht möglich, denn sie befriedigte diesen äußersten Ausgangspunkt vollends und war ihm im Ergebnis auch genau angemessen. Aber damit ist man aus dem theoretischen Horizont nicht herausgekommen, obwohl schon seine *Phänomenologie des Geistes* auf diese Möglichkeit verwies.

9) DER BEGRIFF DES »GEGEBENEN«

Die Freiheit kann nämlich nicht aus der Sphäre des Gegebenen heraus bestimmt werden, da wir gesehen haben, daß dieses Gegebene sein Prinzip bereits in sich trägt, welches nicht das Prinzip der Freiheit als des Möglichen ist. Schon dieses »Bestimmtein« ist dem Freiheitsbegriff gegenüber widersprüchlich, denn wenn von irgend etwas und irgend jemand und irgendwie gesagt werden kann, daß es bestimmt, das heißt durch ein anderes bestimmt ist, dann kann sich dies auf gar keinen Fall auf den Freiheitsbegriff beziehen. Denn wohl kann man durch die Freiheit bestimmt werden oder der Freiheit nach sein oder in der Freiheit als dem eigenen Prinzip sein, aber umgekehrt läßt sich die Freiheit durch nichts bestimmen. Ihr eigenes Prinzip ist es nämlich, daß etwas ist und nicht ist, also daß es auch anders ist, als es ist, und aus ihm *kann* dann auch alles Übrige hervorgehen. Das Prinzip, hier können wir sagen: das theoretische Prinzip der Gegebenheit ist aber nicht in dem, was sein und nicht sein kann, und im Gegebenen als solchen liegt keine Möglichkeit vor. Damit dieses selbst überhaupt etwas sei, hat es sich in der Nähe des Möglichen zu befinden, in dessen Horizont einzugehen, von diesem durchdrungen und transformiert, verändert zu werden, damit es von dieser Möglichkeit selbst als möglich erhellte werde. Es ist also erst als ein Mögliches gegeben. Deshalb tritt dieses Gegebene als Gegebenes erst seiner Möglichkeit nach in Erscheinung, in der schon die Freiheit selbst ihren Ursprung hat, aus welcher es seinen Sinn, seine Singegebung für etwas und als etwas, empfangen kann. Denn eben auf diese Weise wird es gerade »etwas« als ein Mögliches, sonst ist es an sich noch nicht das, was es ist. Der Möglichkeit nach als dem Ursprung alles dessen, was ist, ist auch das, was nur gegeben ist. Ohne sie oder jenseits von ihr ist es noch nichts, ein reines Sein, eine bloße abstrakte Möglichkeit oder Voraussetzung.

Fragen wir uns trotzdem endlich, was eigentlich dieses »Gegebene« ist. Besteht überhaupt ein solches, was einfach gegeben ist? Ist nämlich etwas gegeben, so ist es gerade als ein Gegebenes, also seiner wesentlichen Bestimmung nach, *für jemand oder etwas, durch jemand oder etwas, oder jemandem gegeben*, und hört schon allein dadurch auf, bloß gegeben zu sein, weil hier schon dieser jemand oder dieses etwas anwesend ist, in bezug worauf es gegeben ist. Das Gegebene tritt nie auf und offenbart sich niemals in Form einer abstrakten Gegebenheit, sondern eben gerade als ein solch konkret Gegebenes. Denn damit etwas überhaupt und demnach auch nur dieses Gegebene ist,

If he takes into account the suspension of his philosophical system (the absolute idea and the world spirit, the historical progression of the idea of freedom), another solution is not necessary at all and it was also not possible for him, because it completely satisfied this extreme starting point

and was also the result for him exactly appropriate. But that didn't get you out of the theoretical horizon, although his phenomenology of the spirit pointed to this possibility.

9) THE CONCEPT OF THE "GIVEN"

Namely, freedom cannot be determined from the sphere of the given, since we have seen that this given already carries within itself its principle, which is not the principle of freedom as the possible. Even this "being determined" is contradictory to the concept of freedom, for if it can be said of anything and anyone else and in any way that it is determined, i.e. determined by something else, then this can in no way relate to the concept of freedom relate. For one can certainly be determined by freedom, or be according to freedom, or be in freedom as one's own principle, but conversely, freedom cannot be determined by anything. Its own principle is namely that something is and isn't, i.e. that it is also different from what it is, and everything else can then proceed from it.

The principle, here we can say: the theoretical principle of the given is not in what can and cannot be, and in the given as such there is no possibility. In order for this itself to be anything at all, it has to be close to the possible, to enter its horizon, to be permeated by it and transformed, changed, so that it can be illuminated as possible by this possibility itself. So it is only given as a possibility. That is why this given only appears as given after its possibility, in which freedom itself has its origin, from which it can receive its meaning, its meaning-giving for something and as something. For precisely in this way it becomes "something" as a possibility, otherwise it is not yet what it is. According to the possibility as the origin of everything that is, that which is only given is also. Without it or beyond it it is still nothing, a pure being, a mere abstract possibility or premise.

Nevertheless, let us finally ask ourselves what this "given" actually is

is. Does such a thing exist at all, which is simply given? Namely, if something is given, then it is given precisely as a given, i.e. according to its essential determination, for someone or something, by someone or something, or given to someone, and it ceases to be merely given because this someone is already here or that something is present in relation to which it is given. The given never appears and never reveals itself in the form of an abstract given, but precisely as such a concrete given. For in order for something to be at all and therefore also only this given, 507

soll es vor allem möglich sein, sich wenigstens im Prisma des Möglichen brechen, wobei wir wissen, daß dieses Gegebene nicht das Prinzip seiner Möglichkeit in sich enthält, da dies überhaupt nicht sein Prinzip ist.

Deshalb kann es nicht an sich sein und nicht sein (was bedeuten würde, das es schon als ein Gegebenes auch frei ist), sondern durch ein Anderes, weil es für dieses Andere eben gegeben ist. Um also zu sein, muß dieses Gegebene in seinem eigenen Prinzip, das das reine Sein ist, *negiert* werden, und es wird dies schon allein dadurch, daß es, wie wir sehen, überhaupt auch nur als etwas für ein Anderes und durch ein Anderes gegeben möglich ist und nur als ein solches in Form dessen, was schon ist, erst auftreten kann. Seine Entstehung und Bestimmung durch ein Anderes ermöglicht und gewährleistet sein eigenes Sein, daß es überhaupt ist.

Nebenbei bemerkt: Schon hier und auf Grund dessen ist eine Erkenntnistheorie unmöglich, die vom unmittelbar Gegebenen ausgeht, weil sie dann eine reine Abstraktion ist und Nichtbestehendes zum Gegenstand hat. Ihr Gegebene ist eine reine Fiktion, denn sie sieht nicht, daß sie *schon* von einem Gegebenen *ausgeht*, das durch ein Anderes gegeben ist, und daß dieses Andere dann als ein Wirkendes anwesend ist. Deshalb ist auch ihre im theoretischen Ergebnis erhaltene Wahrheit eine reine Fiktion und Abstraktion. Doch davon soll noch die Rede sein, fahren wir also fort.

Aus Besagtem geht hervor, daß das Prinzip der Gegebenkeit nicht Prinzip oder Ursprung der Freiheit sein kann, ihr Ausgangspunkt, der die Möglichkeit ist, sondern gerade umgekehrt, wenn das reine Sein oder leere Nichts als Prinzip des Gegebenen zum In-Möglichkeit-Sein wird, das sich am Gegebenen selbst wirksam bestätigt, indem es dieses als seine eigene Negativität aufhebt. Die Negation des Gegebenen durch ein Anderes, das bereits in seiner eigenen Wesensbestimmung enthalten ist, ermöglicht auch dem Gegebenen, das an sich noch unmöglich ist, zu erscheinen und sich als etwas zu offenbaren. Das »Etwas« ist nicht, wie auch Hegel in seiner *Wissenschaft der Logik*^{15a} sagt, einfach gegeben, sondern hat erst als die Negation des Gegebenen hervorzutreten, also als die Negation der Negation, in der bereits die Möglichkeit am Werke ist, daß etwas ist und nicht ist. Als »etwas« ist das Gegebene bereits dem Dunkel, der bloßen Gegebenheit oder reinen Möglichkeit als Negativität entzogen, bleibt aber sonst an sich auch weiterhin unmöglich, weil, als solches genommen, überhaupt noch nicht ersichtlich ist, daß es ist. Also auch als ein Gegebenes *soll es erst sein*, das heißt möglich werden. Deshalb ist die Möglichkeit auch die Voraussetzung der Gegebenheit.

Dies ist für die Sache selbst von großer Bedeutung und fast entscheidend, denn gerade hier liegt die Wurzel des Ganzen. Wenn man nämlich sagt, daß das Gegebene, um überhaupt zu sein, also seinem Sein nach, erst dann und so ist, wenn zugleich oder zunächst sein und möglich werden *soll*, dann ist ersichtlich, daß *schon in seinem eigenen*

^{15a} Vgl.: G. W. F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik I*. Herausgegeben von Georg Lasson, Felix Meiner Verlag, Leipzig 1951 (1934), S. 102 f.

Therefore it cannot be in itself and not be (which would mean that as something given it is also free), but through something else, because it is precisely given for this other. In order to be, this given must be negated in its own principle, which is pure being, and this is already achieved simply because, as we see, it also only exists as something for an A something else and given by something else is possible and can only appear as such in the form of what already is. Its emergence and determination by another makes its own being possible and guarantees that it is at all.

Incidentally, it should be noted: Already here and on the basis of this, a theory of knowledge that starts from the immediately given is impossible, because it is then a pure abstraction and has the non-existent as its object. Its given is a pure fiction, for it does not see that it is already starting from a given that is given by something else, and that this other is then present as an agent. That is why the truth contained in the theoretical result is a pure fiction and abstraction. But that's still to be said, so let's continue.

From what has been said it follows that the principle of givenness cannot be the principle or origin of freedom, its starting point, which is the possibility, but just the reverse, when pure being or empty n Nothing as a principle of the given becomes a possibility that effectively confirms itself in the given by canceling it as its own negativity. The negation of the given by another, which is already contained in its own essence, also enables the given, which in itself is still impossible, to appear and to reveal itself as something. The

"Something" is not, as also Hegel in his science of logic 15*

says, simply given, but first has to emerge as the negation of the given, i.e. as the negation of the negation, in which the possibility is already at work that something is and is not. as "something"

the given is already withdrawn from darkness, from mere givenness or pure possibility as a negative, but otherwise remains impossible in itself because, taken as such, it is not at all evident that it is. Therefore, even as something given, it should first be, that is, become possible. That is why the possibility is also the prerequisite of the situation.

This is of great importance for the thing itself and almost decisive, because it is precisely here that the root of the whole lies. If one says that the given, in order to be at all, i.e. according to its being, is only then and so when at the same time or initially it should be and become possible, then it is evident that already in its own 15a Vgl.: G. W. F. Hegel. *Wissenschaft der Logik*. Published by Georg Lasso, Felix Meiner Verlag, Leipzig 1951 (1934), p. 102 f.

Sein das Sollen vorliegt, das für sein Sein konstituierend ist. So ist schon in dem Gegebenen selbst die innere und wesentliche primäre Einheit des Seins und des Sollens anwesend.

Wenn wir uns nun des Anfangs unserer Ausführungen entsinnen, wo von den sogenannten absolut neutralen reinen theoretischen Urteilen die Rede war, dann sehen wir, wie ihnen in dieser Form ihre eigene unmittelbare Gegenständlichkeit in dem Augenblick völlig abhanden kommt, wenn dieses für das Gegebene konstitutive Moment des Sollens aus dem Horizont seines Seins gelöscht und eliminiert wird. Und da hiermit durch einen gewaltsamen und dem Gegenstande selbst unangemessenen theoretischen Akt gerade jenes Moment des Möglichen eliminiert wird, das in Form des Sollens auftritt, erweist sich dann auch dieses und ein so geartetes reines und neutrales theoretisches Urteil als unmöglich, da es schon in seinem ersten unmittelbaren Akt die Möglichkeit seiner eigenen Grundlegung ausgeschlossen hat. *Darauf errichtet sich und fällt ein jeder Positivismus.*

Darum ist es ein großer Irrtum vorauszusetzen, was auf den ersten Blick so erscheint, daß ihn Aristoteles in seiner Position gerechtfertigt hat, als er über den Gegenstand des Ethischen schrieb, daß der hier behandelte Gegenstand nicht die theoretische Erkenntnis zum Ziele habe, wie dies bei anderen Untersuchungen der Fall ist, d. h. wir beschäftigen uns damit nicht nur, um zu erkennen, was die Tugend ist, sondern um gut zu werden ... usw.¹⁶

Daraus kann der Positivismus schließen, wie er dies eigentlich auch tut, daß schon Aristoteles recht hatte, das Ethische oder Moraleische so zu fassen, daß darüber kein irgendwie geartetes wahres oder objektives theoretisches Urteil gefällt oder eine solche Aussage gemacht werden kann, da es aus der rein theoretischen Sphäre herausfällt, ist es ihr doch völlig unangemessen. Dieser Schluß ist nur deshalb möglich, weil er sozusagen auf den Kopf gestellt ist und seine eigene Voraussetzung, aus der er hervorgeht, nicht berücksichtigt. Denn er geht nicht aus der Sache selbst hervor, sondern schon aus dem Charakter dieser theoretischen Voraussetzung, und wird so auch formuliert, daß nämlich dieses Moraleische dem Theoretischen unangemessen ist. Doch kann und muß die Sache auch umgekehrt und von der anderen Seite her betrachtet werden, nämlich dahingehend, daß diese und eine derartige theoretische Position ihm auch sogar auf ihre Weise – unangemessen ist! Denn sowohl das *Moraleische* einerseits wie das *Theoretische* andererseits sind bereits gegenseitig und miteinander darauf gestellt und festgelegt, daß sie schon aus ihrer Allgemeinvoraussetzung als der Möglichkeit herausgefallen sind, in der Sein und Sollen in ihrer primären und unlösbaren Einheit gegeben sind. Sie werden sich dann auf dieser Linie freilich auch in ihrer wechselseitigen Entfremdung konstituieren, und das Sein an sich wird zum »Gegenstand« der theoretischen, das Sollen an sich zum »Gegenstand« der ethischen Betrachtung werden, und zwar selbstverständlich bis zu den letzten Konsequenzen, deren ein Ergebnis gerade auch dieser Positivismus oder Neopositivismus selbst ist. Da sich aber beide Momente

¹⁶ Vgl. ebenda, II, 2, S. 27 f.

itself.

If we now recall the beginning of our explanations, where we spoke of the so-called absolutely neutral, pure theoretical judgments, then we see how they completely lose their own immediate objectivity in this form at the moment when this is constitutive for the given moment of the ought to be erased and eliminated from the horizon of his being. And since here, through a violent theoretical act that is inappropriate to the object itself, precisely that element of the possible is eliminated which occurs in the form of the ought, this and such a kind of pure and neutral theoretical judgment then also proves to be impossible, since it is already in its first immediate act has excluded the possibility of laying his own foundation. All positivism rises and falls on it.

Therefore it is a great mistake to assume what appears at first sight to be that Aristotle justified him in his position, when he wrote on the subject of the ethical, that the subject treated here does not aim at theoretical knowledge, as is the case with other investigations is the case, d. H. we concern ourselves with it not only in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good . . . etc.¹⁶

From this positivism can conclude, as it actually does, that Aristotle was right to understand the ethical or moral in such a way that no true or objective theoretical judgment of any kind can be made about it or such a statement can be made if you figure it out falls outside the purely theoretical sphere, it is completely inappropriate for it. This conclusion is only possible because it is, so to speak, turned on its head and does not take into account the premise from which it arises. For it does not emerge from the thing itself, but from the character of this theoretical presupposition, and is also formulated in this way, namely that this moral is inappropriate to the theoretical. However, the matter can and must also be viewed the other way around, namely to the effect that this and such a theoretical position is - even in its own way - inappropriate! For both the moral on the one hand and the theoretical on the other are mutually and jointly based and determined on the fact that they have already fallen out of their general presupposition as the possibility in which being and ought are given in their primary and indissoluble unity. They will then of course also be constituted along this line in their mutual alienation, and being in itself will become the "object" of theoretical consideration, and the ought in itself will become the "object" of ethical consideration, and this of course right up to the ultimate consequences, one result of which is precisely this positivism or neopositivism itself. But since both moments

*• Cf. *ibid.*, II, 2, p. 27 f.

schon ihrem Ausgangspunkt nach im Widerspruch befinden, weil dies, wie wir sehen, ein Widerspruch der Sache selbst ist, so daß es einerseits für das Theoretische schon jenes unmittelbar Gegebene, für das Ethische aber das Sollen eine an sich widersprüchliche und verwickelte Tatsache ist, so nimmt es dann kein Wunder, daß auch diese beiden besonderen und auf der Sonderheit verharrenden Gebiete gegenseitig und zueinander in einem ständigen Widerspruch stehen.

Aber, um zurückzugehen, nicht einmal Aristoteles selbst bestätigt schon *diese und eine solche Konsequenz*. Denn er sagt ja gerade: Wir beschäftigen uns damit nicht nur (!), um zu erkennen oder bloß zu wissen, sondern um gut zu werden oder zur Tüchtigkeit zu gelangen, so daß hier noch beide Momente enthalten sind. Aristoteles will gerade das Gegenteil zum Positivismus betonen, das heißt, daß von der Erkenntnis allein die Rede nicht ist und nicht sein kann, sondern gleichzeitig von einem moralischen Praktizieren der Erkenntnis, und geht in seiner Betrachtung auch diesen Weg, nicht um diese beiden Gebiete zu trennen, sondern um sie zu verknüpfen und zu erweisen, wie sich das Moralische auch theoretisch rechtfertigen läßt. Auf welche Weise und ob ihm dies gelungen ist, ist eine andere Frage.

Was aber einen Positivismus irgendwelcher Art schon in seinem Ansatz unmöglich macht, ist gerade sein für ihn selbst ungeklärter Ausgangspunkt, also das Gegebene, das als solches erst möglich sein soll. Denn nur im Horizont des Theoretischen ist es dies schon geworden und wird auch als sogenannte bloß *unmittelbar Gegebenes* genommen, wodurch nicht mehr gefragt wird, ob und wie es möglich ist. Es wird einfach als solches genommen, so daß sich seine eben geschilderte Möglichkeit in der Einheit von Sein und Sollen, das heißt des bewußten Seins, unmittelbar verkehrt und in die reine – *Gegebenheit* verwandelt.

Wir haben schon früher gesehen, wie sich dies um des Theoretischen willen vollzieht. Wenn aber die Frage nach der Möglichkeit des Gegebenen in die unmittelbare Gegebenheit selbst verwandelt und als solche genommen wird, so ist dann schon ganz verständlich, theoretisch verständlich freilich, daß auch die Freiheit vom Standpunkt dieser neuen »Möglichkeit« als reiner Gegebenheit bestimmt werden wird. Und auf diese Weise wird, mit der Notwendigkeit dieser theoretischen Wendung selbst, auch die Freiheit selbst auf dem Prinzip der Gegebenheit als einer rein abstrakten Möglichkeit verbleiben, also in Wirklichkeit ein noch leerer Nichts oder eine bloße Voraussetzung ihrer Möglichkeit.

Bei dem Versuch Kants hat sich dies sehr klar erwiesen. Denn das Sollen, seinerseits wieder dem Ganzen der primären Einheit von Sein und Sollen entzogen, die beide aber nur in dieser Einheit zu etwas wirklich Möglichen und Sinnvollem zu werden vermochten, dieses Sollen als Grundlage des Ethischen hält gerade darum bei der bloßen Voraussetzung seiner Möglichkeit inne und bleibt so seinem Wesen nach nur ein abstraktes Postulat ins Endlose. Die Freiheit ist hier nur ein »Freisein von«, also vom Gegebenen, vor dem sie sich hüten muß, das aber dessenungeachtet oder gerade trotzdem ihr Ausgangspunkt bleibt. Deshalb liegt auch die Realität des Sollens darin, daß es auf der Voraussetzung eines reinen Postulats der Freiheits-

the theoretical it is already that immediately given, but for the ethical the ought is one in itself is a contradictory and complicated fact, then it is no wonder that these two special areas, which persist in their particularity, are also in constant contradiction to one another and to one another.

But, to go back, not even Aristotle himself confirms this and such a consequence. Because he is saying: We are not just (!) concerned with it in order to recognize or just know, but to become good or to attain proficiency, so that both moments are still contained here. Aristotle wants to emphasize precisely the opposite of positivism, which means that we are not and cannot speak of knowledge alone, but at the same time of a moral practitioner of knowledge, and in his consideration he also goes into this A way not to separate these two areas, but to link them and show how the moral can also be justified theoretically. How and whether he succeeded is another question.

But what makes a positivism of any kind impossible in its very beginning is precisely its starting point, which is unclear for itself, i.e. the given that as such should be possible in the first place.

Because only in the horizon of the theoretical has it already become so and is also taken as something so-called merely immediately given -

, which means that it is no longer asked whether and how it is possible.

It is simply taken as such, so that its just-described possibility in the unity of being and ought, i.e. conscious being, is directly reversed and transformed into pure givenness .

We have seen before how this is done for the sake of theory. But if the question of the possibility of the given is transformed into the immediate given itself and is taken as such, then it is quite understandable, theoretically understandable, of course, that the freedom will be determined from the standpoint of this new "possibility" as a pure fact. And in this way, with the necessity of this theoretical turn itself, freedom itself will also remain on the principle of givenness as a purely abstract possibility, i.e. in reality still empty nothing or a mere presupposition of their possibility.

This proved very clearly in Kant's experiment. Because the ought, for its part, is withdrawn from the whole of the primary unity of being and ought, both of which, however, were only able to become something really possible and meaningful in this unity, this ought as the basis For this very reason, the ethical stops short of the mere presupposition of its possibility and thus remains by its essence only an abstract postulate into infinity. The freedom

here is only a “being free from”, i.e. from the given, from which they have to guard themselves, but which, regardless of this, or even in spite of this, remains their starting point. Therefore the reality of the ought also lies in the fact that it is based on the presupposition of a pure postulate of freedom-510

möglichkeit verbleibt. Dieses Postulat hat keine reale Wirklichkeit in sich, weil es der Fühlung mit dem Sein bereits entglitten ist und in sich oder durch sich selbst ein wahres Sein oder die Wahrheit seines Seins gar nicht mehr zu verwirklichen vermag, da es sich auf der bloßen Gegebenheit gründet, die die Möglichkeit zu werden und sich als etwas, als etwas Wirkliches zu bestätigen und zu bestätigen noch nicht oder nicht mehr in sich trägt. Seine eigentliche Wirklichkeit liegt darin, daß es nicht zur Wirklichkeit gelangt, zu ihr nicht hingelangen darf, weil es dies nicht kann, denn damit würde es aufhören zu sein, was es schon ist – ein abstraktes Postulat der Freiheitsmöglichkeit oder eine rein moralische Freiheit.

10) DER DUALISTISCHE CHARAKTER DES ETHISCHEN

Der Dualismus ist hier Ausgangs- und Endpunkt, sein einzig mögliches Erscheinungsmedium. Der Dualismus zwischen dem Sein und dem Sollen. Denn dem Sein-Sollenden ist die Möglichkeit, wirklich zu sein, genommen und abgeschnitten, und es bleibt auch nur dabei, sein zu sollen, da nur noch die bloße Gegebenheit sein Prinzip, sein Ausgangspunkt und seine Möglichkeit ist. Und da es sich nur im Verhältnis des reinen abstrakten Gegensatzes, also des absoluten Gegenstands als das einzige Mögliche zu konstituieren vermag, so erweist sich dieser Widerspruch als das eigene Wesen des Sollens. Die moralische Freiheit oder aber die Freiheit im Moralischen ist also ein Widerspruch in sich und als solcher unhaltbar. Da aber sie die wesentliche Voraussetzung der Möglichkeit der ethischen Sphäre als solcher ist, ergibt sich, daß auch die ethische Lehre, also die Ethik als Ethik ein Widerspruch in sich und unhaltbar ist. Deshalb kann dieses Sondergebiet, das auf der Voraussetzung der Trennung und Spaltung von Sein und Sollen zugunsten des nun schon abstrakten Gesollten verharrt und sich konstituiert, seine Wahrheit nur in seiner eigenen Aufhebung und Überwindung finden, das heißt nach Maßgabe einer neuerlichen Verwirklichung der primären Einheit von Sein und Sollen im – bewußten Sein, bzw. in der geschichtlichen Praxis. (Dies ist gleichzeitig jenes wesentliche Moment, das indirekt unsere vorläufige These bestätigt, daß nach Kant die Ethik als Ethik nicht mehr möglich ist.)

Es ist interessant, in Zusammenhang mit diesem dualistischen Charakter des Ethischen anzuführen, wie zum Beispiel Windelband, der sowohl seiner Überzeugung wie den Voraussetzungen seines Philosophierens nach Kantianer beziehungsweise Neukantianer ist, diesen Dualismus gerade bei Kant selbst nicht bemerkt, wor er sich am plastihesten abzeichnet und worauf so offensichtlich die ganze Kantsche ethische Konzeption beruht. Wenn aber Windelband dies in der Kantschen Ethik nicht sieht, so ist jedenfalls kaum zu erwarten, daß er einsieht, daß eine jede ethische Position, also das Ethische seinem Wesen nach – dualistisch ist. Deshalb bemerkt er nur in bezug auf die stoische Ethik diese Gegensätzlichkeit kritisch, aber nicht einmal in ihr selbst, sondern in ihrem Verhältnis zur eigenen ontologischen Voraussetzung, und sagt:

possibility remains. This postulate has no real reality in itself because it has already lost touch with being and is no longer able to realize a true being or the truth of its being in itself or through itself, since it is based on mere givenness who does not yet or no longer have the possibility of becoming

and confirming and confirming itself as something real. Its actual reality lies in the fact that it cannot reach reality, must not reach it because it cannot, for that would mean that it would cease to be what it already is - an abstract postulate of the possibility of freedom or a pure one moral freedom.

10) THE DUALISTIC CHARACTER OF THE ETHICAL

Here dualism is the starting and ending point, its only possible medium of appearance. The dualism between being and ought. For what ought to be has the possibility of actually being taken away from it and cut off, and the only thing that remains is that it should be, since only the mere given is its principle, its starting point and its possibility. And since it can only be constituted as the only possible in the relationship of pure abstract opposition, i.e. the absolute opposite, this contradiction proves to be the very essence of the ought. Moral freedom, or freedom in the moral realm, is therefore a contradiction in terms and as such untenable. But since it is the essential prerequisite for the possibility of the ethical sphere as such, it follows that ethical teaching, that is, ethics as ethics, is a contradiction in terms and untenable. Therefore this special area, which persists and constitutes itself on the presupposition of the separation and splitting of being and ought in favor of the already abstract ought, can only find its truth in its own abolition and overcoming, i.e. according to the measure of a renewed realization of the prim actual unity of being and ought in - conscious being, or in historical practice. (At the same time, this is the essential moment that directly confirms our preliminary thesis that, according to Kant, ethics as ethics is no longer possible.)

In connection with this dualistic character of the ethical, it is interesting to point out how, for example, Windelband, who is both a Kantian and a Neo-Kantian both in his conviction and in the presuppositions of his philosophizing, does not notice this dualism in Kant himself, which he is most familiar with most obvious and on which the whole Kantian ethical conception is so obviously based. If, however, Windelband does not see this in the Kantian ethics, then it can hardly be expected that he will see that every ethical position, that is, the ethical in its essence, is dualistic. That is why he only critically notes this contrast in relation to Stoic ethics, not even in it itself, but in its relation to its own ontological presupposition, and says:

»Die moralische Grundlehre der Stoiker, wonach der Mensch die Welt in seinen eigenen Trieben durch die Tugend überwinden soll, setzt eine anthropologische Dualität, einen Gegensatz in der menschlichen Natur voraus, wonach der Vernunft die *vernunftwidrige Sinnlichkeit* gegenübersteht. Ohne diesen Gegensatz ist die stoische Ethik hinfällig.«¹⁷

Was hier Windelband sagt, ist durchaus richtig, gilt aber nicht nur für die ethische Lehre der Stoiker. Denn ohne diesen Gegensatz bzw. diese Dualität in ihr selbst ist jede denkbare Ethik unhaltbar. Dies ist nämlich nicht nur eines der bestehenden und zufälligen Kennzeichen dieses oder jenes ethischen Systems, sondern ein geradezu wesentliches Konstituens des ethischen Phänomens. Hier ist jedoch noch etwas zu beachten, was ebensowenig nur für die stoische Ethik typisch ist, sondern fast in allen ethischen Theorien erscheint, sobald man in die sogenannte »Ausarbeitung« hineingerät, wobei man so oft, zuweilen ganz unmerklich und unbeabsichtigt, in ein bloßes – *Psychologisieren* verfällt. Und dies ist dann bestes Zeichen dafür, daß sich das Positivste am ethischen Phänomen bereits völlig zu allen möglichen lediglich psychologischen Voraussetzungen und Mutmaßungen verdünnt hat, das heißt in den Kanälen, Rinnalen und Nervensträngen des psychischen Erlebens verläuft, und daß wir, was das Ethische selbst betrifft, uns in reinen Unbestimmtheiten und in gewaltsamen und willkürlichen Kombinationen oder aber in scheinbar sehr gelehrten Auseinandersetzen im Stile der berühmten Frage, was älter ist, das Huhn oder das Ei, ergehen. Oder etwa darin, ob der Wille durch dieses oder jenes Motiv nur wenig, etwas mehr oder in einem mittleren Maße bestimmt wird, oder ob noch dieser oder jener Faktor zu berücksichtigen wäre usw., und dies alles bis in die geringfügigsten Einzelheiten hinein, bis man zuletzt überhaupt nicht weiß, wovon in diesem sich aufwickelnden und abwickelnden Knäuel eigentlich die Rede war.

Was aber das Windelbandsche Beispiel der stoischen Auffassung der Moralität betrifft, ist zu erkennen, daß hier mit dem Begriff der sogenannten »vernunftwidrigen Sinnlichkeit« nicht nur ein psychologisches Datum gemeint ist, sondern es wird de facto ein realer, bestehender, konkreter Bezug zur Welt, oder besser gesagt, die Haltung des Wertens erkannt und bestimmt, aus der hervorgeht, daß sowohl der Mensch als auch seine Welt in ihm und um ihn herum weit davon entfernt sind, so zu sein, wie sie sein sollten, das heißt eben vernünftig oder menschlich! Die Vernünftigkeit ist hier ein aus einer Welt hervorgegangenes *ethisches Postulat*, in der es noch zu wenig Vernünftigkeit gibt, und diese vernunftlose Welt hat überwunden zu werden, wenigstens oder zum mindesten ethisch, ideal, »vernünftig«. Dieser objektiv-wirkliche und weltliche Gegensatz wird aber hier in der stoischen ethischen Lehre ins »Innere« des Einzelnen, des Individuums, hineinverlegt, also in eine abstrakte Subjektivität, und nachträglich als Gegensatz zwischen vernunftwidriger Sinnlichkeit und Vernünftigkeit in einem rein idealen, also eben *ethischen Sinne* ausgelegt.

¹⁷ W. Windelband, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, ebenda, S. 159.

*contrast, Stoic ethics are useless.«*7*

What Windelband says here is absolutely correct, but it does not only apply to the ethical teachings of the Stoics. Because without this contrast or

this duality in itself makes every conceivable ethic untenable. This is not just one of the existing and accidental characteristics of this or that ethical system, but an essential constituent of the ethical phenomenon. Here, however, something else must be observed that is just as little typical of Stoic ethics, but appears in almost all ethical theories as soon as one gets into the so-called "elaboration," whereby one so often, sometimes quite imperceptibly and unintentionally, falling into a blofies - psycho-logizing. And this is then the best sign for the fact that the most positive thing about the ethical phenomenon has already been completely diluted to all possible merely psychological assumptions and assumptions, i.e. in the channels, rivulets and nerve cords of the psychic of experience, and that, as far as the ethical itself is concerned, we engage in sheer indefiniteness and in violent and arbitrary combinations, or else in apparently very erudite arguments in the style of the famous question, what is older is, the chicken or the egg. Or, for example, whether the will is determined by this or that motive only a little, a little more, or to a medium extent, or whether this or that factor would also have to be taken into account, etc., and all of this down to the smallest details, until in the end you don't know at all what this coiling and uncoiling tangle was actually talking about.

But as far as Windelband's example of the Stoic conception of morality is concerned, it can be seen that the concept of so-called "irrational sensuality" not only means a psychological datum, but de facto, a real, existing, concrete relation to the world, or rather, the attitude of valuing, is recognized and determined, from which it emerges that both man and his world are in him and around him are far from being as they should be?7, that is to say, it is reasonable

tig or m en sneak! Reason is here an ethical postulate that has emerged from a world in which there is still too little reason, and this unreasonable world has to be overcome, at least ethical, ideal, "reasonable." In the Stoic ethical teachings, however, this objectively real and worldly antithesis is relocated to the "inside" of the individual, i.e. to an abstract subjectivity, and subsequently as an antithesis between unreasonable sensuality and reasonableness in designed in a purely ideal, i.e. ethical sense.

17 w . Windelband, *Textbook on the History of Philosophy*, ibid., p. 159.

Aber diese Hineinverlegung ins Innere des Einzelnen derjenigen ethischen und moralischen Aufgaben, die sich primär auch für die bloße Möglichkeit der Konstituierung einer Ethik in der menschlichen Welt und Gesellschaft befunden haben, ist einerseits charakteristisch nicht nur für die stoische, sondern auch für viele andere Ethiken, und verweist andererseits darauf, daß der Einzelmensch in den einzelnen Geschichtsepochen zu der Überzeugung gelangt, daß diese realen Aufgaben des Menschen in der Welt zu schwer zu bewältigen sind nicht nur in ihrer realen, sondern sogar in ihrer idealen, ethischen Form.

Deshalb erhebt sich die Frage, ob sich in einer Welt, der gegenüber die Ethik bzw. eine bestimmte Moralität ihre Aufgaben zu erfüllen hat, auch um ein Haar etwas geändert hat, wenn das Ganze ausschließlich auf die Frage dieser von der Welt bereits völlig getrennten und daher ganz abstrakten Innerlichkeit des Einzelnen zurückgeführt wird. Hier liegt weder die Frage noch eine große Schwierigkeit darin, daß sich da die Trennung zwischen dem Einzelmenschen und seiner Welt auf den sogenannten beiden Ebenen vollzieht, der äußeren und der inneren, die übrigens stets auf engste miteinander verbunden sind. Sonder es stellt sich die Frage, gerade die entscheidende Frage, ob überhaupt und auf welche Weise diese Trennung oder Dualität überwunden werden kann. Denn unter der Voraussetzung des Dualismus ist jedes Menschenwerk unmöglich. Wenn wir jedoch gesehen haben, daß dieser Dualismus die wesentliche Voraussetzung der Möglichkeit einer Konstituierung des Ethischen ist, dann wird offenbar, daß dies sehr schwierig ist oder gar ein Gelingen unmöglich macht, wenn man innerhalb des ethischen Rahmens verbleibt. Das Ethische läßt nämlich das Gegebene in dem, was es ist, es negiert es auch nicht in der Wirklichkeit und ändert es nicht, sondern es transzendierte es nur ideal, das heißt moralisch, bloß im Bewußtsein und bleibt beim Dualismus als seiner wirklichen Voraussetzung stehen.

11) DER MORALISMUS

Hier ist selbstverständlich gleich auch die Gegenfrage möglich: *Wozu* den Dualismus um jeden Preis überwinden, wenn dieser vielleicht schon in der menschlichen Natur selbst liegt und wenn diese Menschennatur bereits ihrem Wesen nach dualistisch und widersprüchlich ist? Worauf gründet sich schließlich die Notwendigkeit oder Unumgänglichkeit, eine solche Forderung oder Aufgabe überhaupt zu stellen? Wo liegt denn überhaupt die Möglichkeit zur Lösung dieser Aufgabe, wenn schon die Ethik selbst daran hängen bleibt? Ist nicht dies allein schon ein hinreichender Beweis dafür, daß die Menschennatur selbst einen unüberwindlichen Widerspruch in sich birgt?

Die Frage kann auch im Sinne einer Kritik nicht nur der Art und Weise, sondern auch des Inhalts unserer gesamten bisherigen Ausführungen ausgedehnt werden. Wir sprechen hier oder sollten von der Ethik, dem Ethischen und Moralischen sprechen, aber unsere ganze Darlegung und Betrachtung geht irgendwie darauf aus, die

But this transfer into the inner being of the individual of those ethical and moral tasks, which were primarily also found for the mere possibility of constituting an ethics in the human world and society, is on the one hand characteristic not only of Stoic ethics, but also of many other ethics , and

on the other hand points out that the individual in the individual historical epochs has come to the conviction that these real human tasks in the world are too difficult to master not only in their real, but even in their ideal, ethical form.

Therefore, the question arises as to whether, in a world in which ethics or a certain morality has to fulfill its tasks, something has changed even a hair's breadth, if the whole thing has already been answered exclusively by the question of this world completely separate and therefore completely abstract inwardness of the individual. Here there is neither the question nor a great difficulty in the fact that the separation between the individual and his world takes place on the so-called two levels, the outer and the inner, which, incidentally, are always very closely connected. Rather, the question arises, precisely the crucial question, whether and in what way this separation or duality can be overcome. For under the assumption of dualism every work of man is impossible. However, when we have seen that this dualism is the essential prerequisite for the possibility of constituting the ethical, it becomes evident that this is very difficult or even impossible to achieve if one stays within the ethical framework. The ethical leaves the given in what it is, it does not negate it in reality and does not change it, but only transcends it ideally, that is to say morally, merely in consciousness and remains with dualism as its real one condition.

11) THE MORALISM

Here, of course, the counter-question is also possible: Why overcome dualism at any price if this is perhaps already in human nature itself and if this human nature is already essentially dualistic and contradictory? After all, on what is the necessity or inevitability to make such a demand or task based? Where is the possibility of solving this task if ethics itself gets stuck with it? Isn't this alone sufficient proof that human nature itself harbors an insurmountable contradiction?

The question can also be extended in the sense of a critique not only of the manner, but also of the content of all of our previous statements. We are talking here, or should be talking, about ethics, the ethical and the moral, but our whole presentation and reflection is somehow aimed at the 513

Widersprüche in der ethischen Sphäre selbst *aufzudecken* oder die Unhaltbarkeit des ethischen Phänomens in ihm selbst aufzuweisen, wodurch ein negativer, aber auch ein nicht positiver Weg zu seiner Lösung gewählt wurde. Damit sind wir nicht weiter gekommen, als schon die Ethik selbst als solche kam. Alles dies kann zwar auch so sein, wie aber steht es schließlich mit dem Menschen selbst, von dem hier die Rede ist und sein soll, wenn wir schon von der Ethik sprechen, das heißt vom moralischen Handeln des Menschen und seiner Stellung gegenüber der Welt, der Gesellschaft und dem Mitmenschen. Wie steht es um den Einzelnen, um das konkrete lebende Individuum und sein Alltagsleben, Dasein, seine Existenz, was hier jedenfalls primär in Frage steht. Sollten wir uns nicht davor hüten, in Schematismen zu verfallen, in denen dieser konkrete Mensch verloren gehen oder verschwinden würde? usw., usw.

Diese Fragen sind durchaus berechtigt. Denn gerade darum geht es hier, um den konkreten Menschen. Diesem und einem solchen Menschen zuliebe wird ja Kritik an diesen abstrakten Widersprüchlichkeiten geübt, um erst dann zu diesem konkreten Menschen und seinem Wesen vorzudringen und vordringen zu können, damit es uns zum Beispiel nicht so ergeht, daß wir gerade die *abstrakt-widersprüchliche* Form seines Daseins, in diesem Falle sein moralisches Verhältnis zur Welt, als sein *konkret-widersprüchliches* Wesen nehmen. Sonst kann es uns sehr leicht widerfahren, wie dies ständig und stets von neuem bis zum heutigen Tage geschieht, daß wir uns, indem wir wirklich das Beste mit vollem Einsatz in dieser Welt und in diesem Leben erstreben, trotzdem nur in den Bahnen – *des bloßen Moralismus* bewegen. Die Gefahr besteht hier jedoch darin, daß er nicht nur als ein vermeintliches Extrem oder eine Übertreibung der Moralität oder des ethischen Standpunkts überhaupt auftritt und sich erweist, sondern als dessen legitim notwendiger Ausgang und sein Produkt. Er ist ein Ergebnis der Abstraktheit und Widersprüchlichkeit der Moralität selbst, des Wesens der ethischen Position, die daher notwendig früher oder später im Moralismus endet.

Der wesentliche Sinn des Moralismus besteht aber in dem *abstrakten Appell* an den Menschen, an sein Gewissen, an sein Pflichtgefühl, sein Verantwortungsbewußtsein, seine Menschlichkeit, Solidarität, Gerechtigkeit usw., was alles zwar auch eine wohlgemeinte Geste und ein wohlwollender Zug sein kann, kann beziehungsweise ein Willensakt, der im gegebenen Augenblick das Gewissen des Menschen entfachen und auf das urgente Erfordernis seiner Menschlichkeit, Einsichtigkeit usw. hinführen kann, wo aber und welcher Art seine eigenen Voraussetzungen und Möglichkeiten dafür sind, was er ist, was er erstrebt und worauf er abzielt, das bleibt dem Moralismus freilich verborgen. Da er also nicht an etwas Wirkliches, an den wirklichen Menschen appelliert, sondern an einen Menschen, den er zuvor, in seinem bereits moralisierten Bilde vom Menschen, denkerisch und gefühlsmäßig in den moralischen Menschen oder die moralische Person verwandelt hat, ist der Moralismus davon überzeugt, daß dies dieser wirkliche Mensch ist und daß er an die richtige Stelle appelliert. Aber nicht einmal der moralische Mensch und noch weniger der Mensch sind hier bereits einfach gegeben und ausgebildet, denn

how does it stand with man himself, of whom we are and should be talking here, if we are already talking about ethics, i.e. about the moral actions of man people and their attitude towards the world, society and their fellow human beings.

What about the individual, about the concrete living individual and his everyday life, existence, his existence, which is at least primarily in question here. Shouldn't we be careful not to fall into schematism in which this concrete human being would get lost or disappear? etc., etc.

These questions are perfectly valid. Because that's what it's all about here, the specific human being. For the sake of this and such a person, criticism is leveled at these abstract contradictions, in order only then to penetrate and be able to penetrate to this concrete human being and his nature, so that it does not happen to us, for example, so we're watching the ab s tr a k t-w d tx -

verbal form of his existence, in this case his moral relation to the world, as his ~~fon&ref~~-contradictory nature. Otherwise it can very easily happen to us, as this is happening all the time and again and again to this day, that we do our best by really doing the best with full commitment in this world and in this life strive for, nevertheless only move in the tracks - of mere moralism. The danger here, however, is that it emerges and proves to be not just a supposed extreme or exaggeration of morality or the ethical standpoint at all, but its legitimately necessary outlet and product . It is a result of the abstractness and contradictoriness of morality itself, the essence of the ethical position, which therefore necessarily ends sooner or later in moralism.

But the essential meaning of moralism consists in the abstract appeal to man, to his conscience, to his sense of duty, his sense of responsibility, his humanity, solidarity, justice, etc., whatever can also be a well-intentioned gesture and a benevolent move or an act of will, which at the given moment can kindle the conscience of man and lead to the urgent need of his humanity, insight, etc., but where and the nature of its own presuppositions and possibilities for what it is, what it strives for and what it aims at remains hidden from moralism. Since he does not appeal to something real, to the real human being, but to a human being whom he previously, in his already moralized image of human beings, thought and felt in the moral human beings or the moral P man, moralism is convinced that this is the real man and that he is appealing to the right place. But not even the moral man and even less the man are already simply given and developed here, because 514

sie müssen dies erst werden, so daß ungewiß bleibt, ob der moralistische Appell hier an den faktisch bestehenden Menschen oder aber an einen, der dies erst zu sein hätte, appelliert. Deshalb widerfährt es dem Moralismus sehr leicht, daß er ins Leere hinein appelliert und Deklamationen und Moralpredigten ausläuft, die eben wegen ihrer Unbestimmtheit, Unfundiertheit und Abstraktheit häufig einen säuerlichen Geschmack zu haben pflegen, da sie sich lediglich in verbalstischen Wiederholungen ergehen, so daß sie schon von Natur aus abgedroschen sind und nicht mehr ernstlich auf den Menschen wirken, der heute schon bis zum Halse im Morast seiner menschlichen Krisen, Widersprüche, Zweifel, Stürze, Aufstiege und des Dilemma steckt und von diesen zerfleischt und unausgesetzt zur Frage nach dem Sinn alles dessen gedrängt wird, was um ihn herum und in ihm selbst vorgeht. Geraade darum muß aus einer solchen undankbaren Position irgendwie herausgefunden werden, wenn schon aus keinem anderen Grunde, so wegen ihrer Unglaubwürdigkeit, die bei Voraussetzung ihrer Aufdringlichkeit sogar langweilig wird.

12) ETHIK UND ANTHROPOLOGIE

Es fragt sich jedoch, wo der Ausweg aus diesem liegt. Wenn wir schon danach fragen und von diesem wirklichen und konkreten Menschen sprechen, so handelt es sich jedenfalls um die unvermeidliche Frage nach seinem Wesen. Und wenn wir nach seinem Wesen fragen, das sich als eine moralische Wesenheit bisher als widerspruchsvoll-unanhaltbar erwiesen hat, so daß wir auf diesem Wege, ausschließlich in der ethischen Sphäre verbleibend und ihm nachspürend, offenbar auf Abwege gerieten, so müssen wir einerseits Vorsicht walten lassen, um uns nicht ganz zu verirren, andererseits aber vor allen Dingen konsequent bleiben. Denn auch diese Frage nach dem Wesen des Menschen, nach seiner menschlichen Natur, ist *keine ausschließlich ethische Frage mehr*, sondern auch schon eine *anthropologische*. Daraus könnte sich im ersten Augenblick ergeben, daß sich auch die Ethik selbst in ihrer Gestalt bewahren ließe, wenn sie nur ihr anthropologisches Moment berücksichtigt, das ihr zugrunde liegt oder zu grunde liegen sollte. Es fragt sich nur, welches und was für ein anthropologisches Moment, oder deutlicher gesagt, welche anthropologische Bestimmung des Menschen?

Wir können zwar das Wesen des Menschen anthropologisch bestimmen, nur fragt es sich, ob dies wirklich sein Wesen sein wird, wenn wir den Ansatz so machen, daß uns durch diese Bestimmung die Aufstellung und Grundlegung des moralischen Postulats oder des Sollens erleichtert wird. Wenn nämlich dieses Sollen nicht schon oder nicht mehr im Wesen und Sein des Menschen selbst enthalten ist, sondern jenes Postulat erst nachträglich eben in ethischer Form auf ihn angewendet wird, so ist dies ein Zeichen, daß wir es vor allen Dingen noch nicht mit dem Wesen und Sein des Menschen zu tun haben, und wir verbleiben andererseits wieder im reinen Dualismus, ohne aus dem Ethischen und allen seinen Konsequenzen herauszukommen. Ferner noch etwas: Entdecken wir hier nicht und fordern

they must first become so, so that it remains uncertain whether the moralistic appeal here appeals to the factually existing human being or to someone who first had to be this. That is why it is very easy for moralism to appeal into emptiness and run out of declamations and moral sermons,

which because of their vagueness, unfoundedness and abstractness often tend to have a sour taste, since they indulge only in verbalistic repetitions , so that they are already hackneyed by nature and no longer have a serious effect on people who are already stuck up to their necks in the morass of their human crises, contradictions, doubts, falls, ascents and dilemmas and are torn to pieces by them and constantly fighting back Ask about the meaning of everything that is going on around him and in himself. It is precisely for this reason that one must somehow get out of such an ungrateful position, if for no other reason than because of its implausibility, which, given its obtrusiveness, even becomes boring.

12)

ETHICS AND ANTHROPOLOGY

The question is, however, where the way out of this lies. If we are going to ask about it and speak of this real and concrete human being, we are dealing with the inevitable question about his nature. And if we ask about its nature, which as a moral entity has so far proved to be contradictory and untenable, so that we obviously went astray on this path, remaining exclusively in the ethical sphere and pursuing it, we must on the one hand be careful let it prevail in order not to get completely lost, but on the other hand remain consistent above all things. Because even this question about the essence of man, about his human nature, is no longer an exclusively ethical question, but also an anthropological one.

From this it could emerge at first glance that ethics itself could also be preserved in its form if it only takes into account the anthropological element on which it is based or should be based. The only question is which and what kind of anthropological moment, or to put it more clearly, which anthropological destiny of man?

It is true that we can determine the nature of man anthropologically, but the question arises as to whether this will really be his nature if we proceed in such a way that this determination makes it easier for us to set up and lay the foundation for the moral postulate or the ought. If this ought is not already or no longer contained in the essence and being of man himself, but that postulate is applied to him only retrospectively in an ethical form, then this is a sign that, above all else, we are not yet aware of it have to do with the essence and being of man, and on the other hand we remain in pure dualism without getting out of the ethical and all its consequences. One more thing: Let's not discover here and demand 515

wir vielleicht nicht etwas, was sich in den Grundlagen der Ethik schon faktisch befindet und vollzieht? Und zuletzt noch eine Frage: Kann uns die Anthropologie zur Auflösung des wesentlichen Widerspruchs des ethischen Phänomens oder zur Lösung des ethischen Problems dienen?

Wenn dies auf diese Weise möglich wäre, wäre dieses Problem bereits gelöst. Denn einem jeden ethischen System und einer jeden ethischen Lehre liegt bereits de facto, implizite oder explizite, eine bestimmte anthropologische (aber nicht nur eine solche, sondern notwendigerweise auch eine ontologische) Voraussetzung zugrunde, das heißt, es liegt vor und ist mehr oder weniger ersichtlich eine bestimmte *Auffassung des Menschen und seines Wesens*. Aber dessenungeachtet, und vielleicht wäre zu sagen: gerade darum, gerieten alle Versuche des Aufbaus und der Durchführung einer ethischen Doktrin, Lehre eines Systems, einer Wissenschaft usw. dennoch in unlösbare Schwierigkeiten, die eben die Schwierigkeiten der Ethik als einer solchen sind.

Schon Aristoteles hat ganz klar dieses unabweisbare Erfordernis einer vorhergehend anthropologischen Fundierung des ethischen Gebietes eingesehen und ist diesen Weg nicht nur gegangen, sondern hat in seiner Ethik damit auch begonnen. So fragt er schon im I. Buch seiner *Nikomachischen Ethik*, als er die Frage stellt, worin die Glückseligkeit (eudaimonia), also das, was wir als das Gute an sich als Ziel unseres *moralischen Handelns* betrachten könnten, zu bestehen hätte, auch nach dem *menschlichen* Charakter dieser Glückseligkeit. Er sieht, daß die Glückseligkeit als das höchste Gut in einer reinen Unbestimmtheit und Abstraktheit verbleiben wird, stellen wir nicht sofort auch die weitere sich daraus unmittelbar ergebende Frage, nämlich: Eine Glückseligkeit für wen oder wessen Glückseligkeit? Da die Antwort auf diese Frage lautet: Für den Menschen oder die menschliche Glückseligkeit, so ergibt sich dann wieder unmittelbar die Frage: Was ist der Mensch, das heißt, *worin liegt und welches ist das Wesen des Menschen*, so daß diese Glückseligkeit eben die seine wäre und nicht die von irgend jemand. Diese Frage nach der menschlichen Wesensbestimmung stellt Aristoteles so, daß er mit ihr, unmittelbar den Kern der Sache trifft. Sie lautet folgendermaßen:

»Darüber nun, daß die Glückseligkeit als das höchste Gut zu bezeichnen ist, herrscht wohl anerkanntermaßen volle Übereinstimmung; was gefordert wird, ist dies, daß mit noch größerer Deutlichkeit aufgezeigt werde, worin sie besteht. Dies wird am ehesten so geschehen können, daß man in Betracht zieht, *was des Menschen eigentliche Bestimmung bildet*. Wie man nämlich bei einem Musiker, einem Bildhauer und bei jedem, der irgendeine Kunst treibt, und weiter überhaupt bei allen, die eine Aufgabe und einen praktischen Beruf haben, das Gute und Billigenswerte in der vollbrachten Leistung findet, so wird wohl auch beim Menschen als solchem derselbe Maßstab anzulegen sein, vorausgesetzt, daß auch bei ihm von einer Aufgabe und einer Leistung die Rede sein kann. Ist es nun wohl eine vernünftige

If it were possible in this way, this problem would already be solved. Because every ethical system and every ethical teaching is already de facto, implicitly or explicitly, based on a certain anthropological (but not only such, but necessarily also an ontological) premise, that is, it is present and is more or less evident a certain conception of man and his being. But regardless of this, and perhaps it could be said: precisely because of this, all attempts to build up and implement an ethical doctrine, teaching of a system, a science, etc. nevertheless ran into insoluble difficulties, which are precisely the difficulties of ethics are as such.

Aristotle already clearly saw the imperative of a prior anthropological foundation of the ethical field and not only went this way, but also started to do so in his ethics. He asks this in Book I of his Nicomachian Ethics when he poses the question of what happiness (eudaimonia) is, i.e. what we consider the good in itself to be the goal of our moral action could consider, had to exist, even after the human character of this happiness. He sees that bliss as the highest good will remain in a pure indeterminacy and abstractness if we do not immediately ask the further question that immediately arises from this, namely: A bliss for whom or whose bliss? Since the answer to this question is: For man or for human happiness, the question immediately arises again: What is man, that is, where lies and what is the essence of man, so that that happiness would be his and not anyone else's. Aristotle asks this question about human nature in such a way that he gets straight to the heart of the matter. It reads as follows:

»About that happiness is to be described as the highest good, there is well-recognized full agreement; what is demanded is that it be shown with even greater clarity what it consists of. The best way to do this is to take into account what constitutes man's actual destiny. How does one look at a musician, a sculptor and at everyone who practices any kind of art, and further in general at all who have a task and a practical profession, the good and equitable values in d if he finds an accomplished achievement, then the same m afitab will probably also have to be applied to man as such, provided that he can also speak of a task and an achievement. Is it a reasonable 516?

Annahme, daß zwar der Zimmermann und der Schuster ihre bestimmten Aufgaben und Funktionen haben, der Mensch als solcher aber nicht, und daß er zum Müßiggang geschaffen sei?«¹⁸

In Beantwortung dieser Frage, nachdem wir vorher das bloße *Dahinleben oder Vegetieren*, das dem Menschen und den Pflanzen gemeinsam ist, und das *sinnliche Leben*, das dem Menschen und den Tieren gemeinsam ist, ausgeschlossen haben, erhalten wir folgende Bestimmung:

»So bleibt denn als für den Menschen allein kennzeichnend nur das tätige Leben des vernünftigen Seelenteils übrig...«¹⁹

Demnach besteht das Wesen des Menschen darin, daß er ein *vernunftgemäß tätiges Wesen* ist. Es erscheint nun ganz normal, daraus zu schließen, und Aristoteles tut dies auch, daß der Mensch, wenn er ein vernunftgemäß tätiges Wesen ist, stets auch *vernunftgemäß handeln* soll, um überhaupt Mensch zu sein, was selbstverständlich zu sein scheint. Indem er so diese vorweggenommene anthropologische Voraussetzung ganz klar und bestimmt formuliert und von ihr ausgeht, baut nun Aristoteles auf ihr seine Ethik auf, also ein ganz detailliert gestaltetes theoretisches System der Ethik.

Doch etwas sehr Wesentliches ist in dieser Schlußfolgerung nicht so selbstverständlich und an sich klar, wie es auf den ersten Blick erscheinen mag, und dies ist etwas, was auch Aristoteles selbst hier nicht ganz klar wird. Daß nämlich gerade diese Schlußfolgerung in einer solchen Wendung – *widersprüchlich* ist!

Wenn nämlich *der Mensch schon seinem Wesen nach* als vernunftgemäß tätiges Wesen bestimmt wird, dann ist die Folgerung, die da lautet: »...dann soll er auch stets vernunftgemäß handeln«, vor allen Dingen *tautologisch*, was bedeutet, auch *überflüssig*, und dann in dieser Form auch *unhalbar*. Denn für ein Wesen, das durch seine faktische und wirkliche Wesensbestimmung *bereits* vernunftgemäß handelt, ist es weder erforderlich noch möglich zu postulieren, daß es *erst* sein soll, wie es schon ist. Die Widersprüchlichkeit besteht hier ganz offensichtlich eigentlich darin, daß diese »Vernünftigkeit« oder »vernunftgemäß Tätigkeit« zunächst im Sinne einer anthropologischen Wesensbestimmung genommen wird, gleich darauf aber sich aus ihrer begrifflich-theoretischen Form unmittelbar in die Form eines ethischen, also moralischen – *Postulats* verkehrt, so daß das eine dem anderen innerlich dem Sinne nach gerade widerspricht.

Der Mensch als vernunftgemäß tätiges Wesen wird stets vernunftgemäß handeln und auch das Ergebnis seiner Handlungsweise wird stets notwendig vernunftgemäß sein. Wenn man aber im Ergebnis oder Ausgehen dieser Handlungsweise die Möglichkeit der *Vernunftlosigkeit* voraussetzt, dann muß ebenso vorausgesetzt werden, daß der Mensch ein Wesen ist, das auch vernunftlos handeln kann, daß es also ein vernunftloses Wesen ist, womit sinngemäß seine Wesensbestimmung völlig zusammenbricht, weil wir dadurch eine völlig neue und andere mögliche Bestimmung seines Wesens bekämen, die nun lauten würde:

¹⁸ Ebenda, I, 7, S. 11.

¹⁹ Ebenda, I, 7, S. 12.

In answer to this question, having previously excluded the mere existence or vegetation common to man and plants, and the sensuous life common to man and animals, we arrive at the following determination:

"So what is left as the only characteristic of man is the active life of the rational part of the soul . . ." 19

Accordingly, the essence of man consists in the fact that he is a rationally active being. It now seems quite normal to conclude from this, and Aristotle also does this, that man, if he is a rationally active being, should always act rationally in order to be human at all, which seems to be self-evident. By formulating this anticipated anthropological assumption quite clearly and definitely and starting from it, Aristotle now builds his ethics on it, i.e. a very detailed theoretical system of ethics.

But something very essential in this conclusion is not so self-evident and clear in itself as it might seem at first glance, and this is something that even Aristotle himself does not quite get clear here. Namely that precisely this conclusion in such a turn - is contradictory!

If the human being is already defined as a rational, active being according to his essence, then the conclusion that reads: » . . . then he should also always act reasonably », above all things tautological, which means also superfluous, and then in this form also untenable. Because for a being that already acts rationally through its factual and real determination of its being, it is neither necessary nor possible to postulate that it should first be as it already is. The contradiction here quite obviously actually consists in the fact that this "reasonableness" or

"reasonable activity" is initially taken in the sense of an anthropological determination of essence, but immediately afterwards it is reversed from its conceptual-theoretical form directly into the form of an ethical, i.e. moral - postulate, so that the one inwardly contradicts the other in terms of the meaning.

Man as a rational, active being will always act rationally and the result of his actions will also be wild

always necessary to be reasonable. If

but in result

or proceeding from this mode of action presupposes the possibility of being unreasonable, then it must also be presupposed that man is a being that can also act unreasonably, that it is therefore a unreasonable being, with which his definition of being essentially collapses completely, because through this

we received a completely new and different possible definition of his nature, which would now read:

» *E thing*, I, 7, S. 11.

" *E benda*, I, 7, S. 12.

»Der Mensch ist ein vernunftgemäß und vernunftlos handelndes Wesen und ist deshalb ein vernünftiges und vernunftloses Wesen«, was in dieser Form ganz widersprüchlich und unhaltbar ist. Damit wäre diese neue mögliche Bestimmung auch der Aristotelischen entgegengesetzt. Wenn nämlich dieses Wesen seiner Natur nach auch vernunftlos ist, dann wäre jedes Postulat einer vernunftgemäßen Tätigkeit seinerseits in ethischer Form völlig unbegründet, abstrakt und in sich unhaltbar, da es etwas fordert, was schon in seinem grundlegenden und wesentlichen Ausgangspunkt und in seiner Voraussetzung, wenn schon nicht ganz unmöglich gemacht, so doch allenfalls in Frage gestellt ist. Sobald er nämlich schon seiner Natur nach auch vernunftlos handelt, was bedeutet, daß er so handeln muß oder aber so handeln kann, bleibt jede Forderung, daß der Mensch *nur vernunftgemäß handeln soll*, ein rein abstraktes ethisches Postulat, das im Ergebnis nicht zuläßt, was es in seiner eigenen Voraussetzung ermöglicht. Denn hier wäre es schon von der menschlichen Natur aus gegeben, daß er auch vernunftlos handelt oder handeln kann, so daß das nur das Gegenteilfordernde ethische Postulat dieser Natur selbst widersprechen würde.

Wenn wir aber nun auch die dritte Möglichkeit einer solchen We-sensbestimmung des Menschen heranziehen, aus der sich ergeben würde, daß der Mensch ein vernunftloses Wesen ist und daher auch notwendig vernunftlos handelt, so würde ein jedes aus dieser Voraussetzung hergeleitete ethisches Postulat nicht nur unhaltbar, sondern auch ganz absurd sein, denn es würde lauten: »Da der Mensch seinem Wesen nach ein vernunftloses Wesen ist, das vernunftlos handelt, so soll er vernunftgemäß handeln!«

Wir sehen also, daß eine bestimmte anthropologische Voraus-setzung der Möglichkeit an sich widerspricht, auf sie eine Ethik zu gründen und sie aufzubauen. Deshalb können wir hier behaupten, daß Aristoteles sich selbst gegenüber nicht folgerichtig vorging, wenn er dennoch auf einer solchen Voraussetzung seine ganze ethische Konzeption aufbaut. *Man fordert nämlich nicht, was schon irgendwie ist*, denn das ist ein Widerspruch in sich, aber Aristoteles tut dies gerade. Wäre er aber seiner eigenen wesentlichen anthropologischen Voraus-setzung gegenüber konsequent verfahren, hätte er aus ihr keineswegs eine Ethik herzuleiten vermocht, sondern hätte lediglich dabei bleiben müssen, daß der Mensch ein vernünftiges Wesen ist, das vernunft-gemäß handelt, woraus nun eine anthropologische Konzeption oder Lehre vom Menschen als einem vernünftigen Wesen hätte entwickelt werden können, die ihre Grundthese theoretisch begründen, argumen-tieren und rechtfertigen würde.

Aber diese Aristotelische Wesensbestimmung des Menschen mittels des Vernunftbegriffs könnte auch anders formuliert werden, womit wir freilich nicht mehr auf seinem Standpunkt verbleiben würden. Sie könnte folgendermaßen lauten:

»Der Mensch ist ein Wesen, das vernünftig sein und vernunftge-mäß handeln soll.«

Dies ist, wie wir sehen, bereits eine *ethische* Formulierung, die den Ansatz ihres Postulates im Vernünftigen *schon* voraussetzt, aber *auch nur* voraussetzt. Sie kann, und will auch nicht, diese geforderte

postulate of a reasonable activity would be completely unfounded in ethical form, abstract and unsustainable in itself, since it demands something that already does in its fundamental and essential starting point and in its presupposition, if not made completely impossible, then at best called into question. As soon as he, by his nature, also acts unreasonably, which means that he must or can act in this way, every demand that man should only act rationally remains a purely abstract ethical postulate, that As a result, it does not allow what it makes possible in its own prerequisite. Because here it would already be given by human nature that he also acts or can act unreasonably, so that the ethical postulate, which only demands the opposite, would contradict this nature itself.

But if we now also use the third possibility of such a determination of the human being, from which it would result that the human being is an unreasonable being and therefore also necessarily acts unreasonably, so w Any ethical postulate derived from this premise would not only be untenable, but also quite absurd, for it would read: "Since man is by his very nature an unreasonable being who acts unreasonably, he should act sensibly afi!«

We see, then, that a certain anthropological premise contradicts the possibility of basing an ethics on it and building it up. We can therefore assert here that Aristotle did not proceed consistently with himself when he nevertheless bases his entire ethical conception on such a premise. You don't demand what already somehow is, because that's a contradiction in terms, but Aristotle is doing exactly that.

But if he had proceeded consistently with regard to his own essential anthropological presupposition, he would not have been able to derive an ethics from it, but would simply have had to stick to the fact that man is a rational being who acts rationally from which an anthropological conception or doctrine of man as a rational being could have been developed, which would theoretically justify, argue and justify its basic thesis.

But this Aristotelian determination of the essence of man by means of the concept of reason could also be formulated differently, which of course would not mean that we would stick to his point of view.

It could read as follows:

"People are creatures that should be reasonable and act reasonable."

As we can see, this is already an ethical formulation that already presupposes the beginning of its postulate in the reasonable, but only

»Vernünftigkeit« behaupten, beweisen und ableiten, sondern nur in Form der ethischen Allgemeinvoraussetzung *postulieren*, was bedeutet, daß sie sich nicht theoretisch aufstellen und fundieren läßt. Das ist also nicht mehr der Aristotelische, aber dafür der *Kantische* Standpunkt. Er hat ihn zugleich auch klassisch formuliert in Form einer scheinbaren Paradoxie in seiner bekannten Sentenz: »Du kannst, denn du sollst!«, was im Hinblick auf den ethischen Begriff des Vernünftigen dann lauten müßte: Du kannst vernünftig sein, denn du sollst vernünftig sein! Eine solche Bestimmung des Vernünftigen macht nun wirklich die ethische Sphäre möglich, da es als solches bereits im voraus begriffen, daß heißt *in Form des ethischen Postulats aufgestellt ist.*

Doch wird in dieser neuen Formulierung, die nicht auf die anthropologische Wesensbestimmung des Menschen im Vernunftgemäßen abzielt, sondern nur auf seine absolute Postulierung, die in dieser Form die Einfügung des Ethischen in die Dimension seiner wesentlichen Spannung oder seiner Entgegenstellung dem Bestehenden gegenüber gestattet, implizite von einer Voraussetzung ausgegangen, in der sowohl der Mensch als auch seine Welt demjenigen zufolge, *was sie schon sind*, etwas Vernunftloses sind. Denn nur auf diese Weise ist es möglich, sich dem Bestehenden ethisch entgegenzusetzen und die Vernünftigkeit des moralischen Handelns zu postulieren. Es wäre nämlich wieder ganz absurd und unmöglich vorauszusetzen, daß das Seiende um des Vernünftigen willen *gerade darum* ethisch negiert und aufgehoben werden *soll*, weil es schon vernünftig, was hier bedeutet, auch menschenmöglich oder sittlich ist. Demnach liegt auch hier auf indirekte Weise eine anthropologische Bestimmung des Menschen und seiner Welt zugrunde und wird vom Ethischen als solchen auch vorausgesetzt, nur schon in einer ethisch transformierten Form. Kant formuliert dieses für seine ethische Lehre wesentliche Moment auch deutlich schon durch seine Bestimmung des Willens als eines vernunftgemäßen Wollens, eines Wollens, das als rein empirisches Datum oder Faktum noch nicht den Charakter der Vernünftigkeit in sich trägt, sondern durch sein vernunftgemäßes Konstituieren zu dem schon an sich vernünftigen Willen erst zu erlangen und zu erreichen ist, was hier bedeutet, daß dieser erst als ein solcher seinen eigenen Vernunftgesetzen gemäß das bloße Wollen ethisch oder moralisch leiten kann und soll. Als eine ethische nimmt dann diese Vernünftigkeit den Charakter der *Zweckmäßigkeit* an und wird in dieser sinnvoll.

Wir sehen also, wie auch hier auf eine spezifische Art und Weise, und zwar umgekehrt als bei Aristoteles, eine gerade in ihrem *negativen Aspekt* anthropologische Voraussetzung zugrunde liegt, die aber ethisch aufgehoben ist, damit sich das ethische Phänomen gerade im Gegensatz zu ihr überhaupt konstituieren kann. Jetzt ergibt sich aber auf demselben Wege zugleich auch etwas Umgekehrtes, nämlich auch eine *positive*, eben ethische, als Ergebnis dieser Gedankenbewegung erzielte neue anthropologische Bestimmung des Menschen. Sie lautet nunmehr:

Der Mensch ist eine moralische Person oder ein moralisches Wesen.

and founded theoretically. So this is no longer the Aristotelian point of view, but instead the Kantian point of view. At the same time, he also formulated it in a classic way in the form of an apparent paradox in his well-known sentence: "You can, because you solist!", which, with regard to the ethical concept of reasonableness, should then read: You can be reasonable, because you should be reasonable! Such a determination of what is reasonable really makes the ethical sphere possible, since it is already understood as such in advance, that is, it is set up in the form of the ethical postidal.

However, in this new formulation, which does not aim at the anthropological determination of the essence of man in the rational sense, but only at his absolute postulation, which in this form allows the insertion of the ethical into the dimension of his essential tension or his opposition to the existing, implicit of a premise in which both man and his world are unreasonable according to what they already are. Only in this way is it possible to ethically oppose the status quo and to postulate the reasonableness of moral action. It would again be quite absurd and impossible to presuppose that beings should be ethically negated and abolished for the sake of reason precisely because they are already reasonable, which means here also humanly possible or moral.

Accordingly, an anthropological determination of man and his world is also based here in an indirect way and is also presupposed by the ethical as such, only in an ethically transformed form.

Kant also clearly formulates this moment, which is essential for his ethical teaching, through his determination of the will as a rational will, a will which, as a purely empirical datum or fact, does not yet bear the character of reason, but through its rational constitution it already does a will that is rational in itself must first be attained and attained, which means here that only as such can and should guide mere willing ethically or morally according to its own laws of reason. As an ethical one, this reasonableness then takes on the character of expediency and becomes meaningful in this.

So we see how here, too, in a specific way, and in fact the opposite of Aristotle, is based on an anthropological presupposition, precisely in its negative aspect, which, however, is ethically abolished so that the ethical phenomenon is precisely the opposite can constitute to it at all. But now, along the same path, something the other way around also arises, namely also a positive, precisely ethical, new anthropological determination of man as a result of this movement of thought. It now reads:

Man is a moral person or being.

Es erhebt sich die Frage, ist nicht gerade dadurch nun endlich die anthropologische Grundlage erreicht, die es gestatten würde, daß auf ihr selbst dieser ethische Knoten aufgelöst wird und daß man aus den ethischen Schwierigkeiten und Widersprüchen herausfindet? Denn wenn überhaupt eine, dann liegt gerade diese Voraussetzung und Bestimmung dem Ethischen am nächsten und ist ihm am meisten angemessen. Deshalb könnte dies vielleicht jene anthropologische Wesensbestimmung des Menschen sein, die es durch sich allein gewährleisten würde, daß das dem Ethischen zugrundeliegende ethische Postulat, also das Sollen, seine wirkliche Situierung im Sein, das heißt dem Sein und Wesen des Menschen zugleich, erhält und aufhört, ein nur rein abstraktes Postulat oder bloßes Sollen zu sein, das sich sonst in seiner idealen Form ständig verschiebt und in die *abstrakte Zeitbestimmung der Unendlichkeit* hineinverlegt. Denn wenn der Mensch seinem Wesen nach ein moralisches Wesen oder moralische Person ist, ist nichts natürlicher als zu folgern, daß er, als solcher handelnd, schon sittlich handelt, also einerseits in völliger Übereinstimmung mit seinem Wesen, andererseits ebenso im Einklang mit seinem eigenen ethischen Prinzip, also eben sittlich, moralisch, vernunftgemäß, zweckmäßig, menschlich und sinnvoll. Damit hätten wir endlich festen Boden unter den Füßen, weil wir jenes feste Wirklichkeitsprinzip bei uns hätten, das schon durch seine eigene Situierung im Sein nicht nur gestattet, sondern auch wirklich gewährleistet und dazu berechtigt, daß wir uns, sittlich handelnd, sowohl in der Freiheit als auch in der sich hier vollziehenden Wahrheit befinden.

Leider ist dies trotzdem nicht jener erwünschte Weg, der uns zuverlässig zu jener Wirklichkeit, der hier nachgegangen wird, führen oder uns ihr näherbringen könnte, einer Wirklichkeit, die ihre beiden wesentlichen Momente: die Freiheit und Vernünftigkeit oder die Wahrheit selbst unwiderrücklich in sich tragen würde und sich durch sie eine wahrhaft menschliche Voraussetzung in Form der *vernunfthaltigen Wirklichkeit* verwandeln könnte. Denn bei diesem ganzen Versuch wurde gerade bei der Wesensbestimmung des Menschen als einer moralischen Person etwas Wesentliches übersehen. Der Begriff der moralischen Person ist nämlich noch kein real existierendes und aus seinem bereits bestehenden Wesen oder Sein heraus handelndes Wirkliches, sondern auch er ist nur ein ethisches Postulat und kann nichts anderes sein, um nicht schon dadurch allein seinem moralischen Wesen bzw. der Moralität zu widersprechen. Die moralische Person ist erst eine Aufgabe, die irgendwo und irgendwie zu verwirklichen und so in der Wirklichkeit unterzubringen wäre, doch wird ihr dies gerade ihrer eigenen Stellung und Bestimmung nach unmöglich gemacht, da sie sich eben als ethisches Postulat derselben Wirklichkeit absolut entgegensetzen und ihr gegenüber im abstrakten Gegensatz stehen muß, damit sie sich überhaupt als ethisches Postulat zu konstituieren vermag. Der Mensch existiert nicht schon als moralische Person, sondern soll dies werden. Sonst wäre das ethische Postulat selbst gegenstandslos, sinnlos und überflüssig. Aber dies ist eine Aufgabe, die eine bloß abstrakte ideale, also eben ethische Aufgabe bleiben muß, da sie unter der Voraussetzung ihrer wirklichen Realisierung in der Wirklichkeit ihr eigenes ethischen We-

knot to be untied and that one can find one's way out of the ethical difficulties and contradictions?

For if there is one at all, then precisely this presupposition and determination is closest to the ethical and is most appropriate to it. For this reason, this could perhaps be that anthropological determination of the human being, which would ensure by itself that the ethical postulate underlying the ethical, i.e. the ought, its actual situating in being, that is, in being and essence of man at the same time, preserves and ceases to be a purely abstract postulate or a mere ought, which otherwise constantly shifts in its ideal form and is transferred to the abstract determination of time of infinity. For if man is essentially a moral being or moral person, nothing is more natural than to conclude that, acting as such, he is already acting morally, that is, on the one hand, in complete accordance with his nature , on the other hand also in accordance with his own ethical principle, i.e. ethical, moral, reasonable, expedient, humane and meaningful. So we finally had firm ground under our feet, because we had that firm principle of reality with us which, through its own situating in being, not only allows, but also really guarantees and entitles that we, acting morally, are both in freedom and in the truth that is taking place here.

Unfortunately, this is still not the desired path that could reliably lead us to the reality that is being pursued here, or bring us close to it, a reality that both of you are essential moments: freedom and reason or the truth itself would uncontradictively carry within itself and through them a truly human prerequisite would transform itself into the form of rational reality could. Because in this whole attempt something essential was overlooked, precisely in the determination of the nature of man as a moral person.

Namely, the concept of the moral person is not yet a real thing that exists and acts out of its already existing essence or being, but it too is only an ethical postulate and cannot be anything else, so as not to justify its claim to contradict oral beings or morality. The moral person is first of all a task that has to be realized somewhere and somehow and thus accommodated in reality, but precisely because of their own position and purpose, this is made impossible for them, since they are just themselves as an ethical postulate of the same reality and must stand in abstract opposition to it, so that it can be constituted as an ethical postulate at all. Man does not already exist as a moral person, but should become so. Otherwise the ethical postulate itself would be irrelevant, meaningless and superfluous.

But this is a task that must remain a mere abstract ideal, i.e. an ethical task, since it has its own ethical value under the presupposition of its actual realization in reality

sen aufheben würde, das da ist ein ewiges und unendliches Sollen, dazu verurteilt, ohne ein wirkliches Sein zu bleiben und ein ideales Sein zu postulieren. Der Mensch hat mithin als moralisches Wesen keine Chance, seiner eigenen im Moralischen liegenden Wesenheit nach ein wirklicher Mensch als Menschenwesen, das heißt als freies und vernunftbegabtes Wesen in seiner ebensolchen Welt zu werden. Und dies ist offenbar eine Kapitulation gerade in dem Wesentlichen, das erreicht werden sollte, so daß sich auch dieser ethisch-anthropologische Standpunkt als eine unangemessene Grundlage für einen möglichen Ausweg aus den genannten Schwierigkeiten und Widersprüchen erwiesen hat. Das bedeutet also, daß die Freiheit in dieser ihrer ethischen Grundlegung, also als eine ethische oder moralische Freiheit, noch einmal und abermals in ihrem Trachten, sich als wirklich möglich zu erweisen, versagt hat und wiederum eine nur allgemeine und abstrakte Voraussetzung als ethisches Postulat bis in die Unendlichkeit verblieben ist. Sie blieb nur das, was am Anfang bestimmt wurde, nämlich – eine *Idee* der Freiheit.

13) DIE FREIHEIT ALS ERKANNTE NOTWENDIGKEIT

Auf diesem Wege des Suchens nach einer Bestimmung der Freiheit haben wir uns also erschöpft, und wenn wir wenigstens einen Schritt weiter kommen wollen, müssen wir einen anderen Weg suchen, der uns vielleicht zu Hilfe kommen und uns auf eine andere Möglichkeit der Fragestellung hinlenken würde. Deshalb müssen wir uns hier auf jeden Fall, wie versprochen, auch mit jener Bestimmung des Freiheitsbegriffs beschäftigen, die mit Hegel in die Grundlagen der Stellung und Erörterung dieser Frage eingegangen ist. Wenn wir dabei noch im Auge behalten, daß sich diese Bestimmung im modernen Marxismus ganz fest eingebürgert hat und darin fast völlig heimisch geworden ist, so daß sie sich in ihm sogar offiziell »wie zu Hause« fühlt, ist dies für uns ein Grund mehr zu prüfen, worauf diese innig-familiäre Beziehung des Marxismus zu dieser Bestimmung der Freiheit eigentlich philosophisch beruht. Diese neue Bestimmung des Freiheitsbegriffs lautet also: »*Die Freiheit ist die erkannte Notwendigkeit.*«

Wenn wir von einer »neuen« Bestimmung reden, so übertreiben wir vielleicht ein bißchen. Die Bestimmung der Freiheit als der erkannten Notwendigkeit oder als des Erkennens der Notwendigkeit ist nämlich gar nicht so sehr neu, wie es vielleicht scheinen könnte. Ihre Wurzeln liegen schon in der griechischen Philosophie, und ihre ersten philosophisch begründeten Anfänge haben ihren Ausdruck konkret bei Sokrates bzw. in seiner sogenannten *intellektualistischen Ethik* gefunden. Es ist allenfalls interessant zu vermerken, wie diese Bestimmung zum ersten Mal gerade in der *ethischen Form* auftritt, die der Sache selbst vielleicht angemessener ist als die moderne, da in ihr noch immer, oder besser gesagt, vor allem vom Menschen die Rede ist. Diese Sokratische Form der Fragestellung hat nämlich in ihrer naiven Biederkeit und der ihr eigentümlichen geschichtlichen Begrenztheit noch nicht alle jene wissenschaftlich erarbeiteten und raffinierten

sen, that there is an eternal and infinite ought condemned to remain without a real being and to postulate an ideal being. Consequently, as a moral being, man has no chance of becoming a real human being as a human being, that is, as a free and rational being in his own world,

according to his own moral essence.

And this is obviously a capitulation in precisely the essential that should be achieved, so that this ethical-anthropological point of view has also proven to be an inappropriate basis for a possible way out of the difficulties and contradictions mentioned. This means, therefore, that freedom in this its ethical foundation, i.e. as an ethical or moral freedom, has failed again and again in its attempt to prove itself to be really possible and again has only a general and abstract presupposition as an ethical postulate remained in infinity. She remained only what was determined at the beginning, namely - an idea of freedom.

13) FREEDOM AS A RECOGNIZED N EQUITY

So we have exhausted ourselves in this way of searching for a definition of freedom, and if we want to go at least a step further, we must look for another way that may come to our aid and direct us to another possibility of asking the question would. Therefore, as promised, we must also deal here with that definition of the concept of freedom that went into the foundations of the posing and discussion of this question with Hegel. If we keep in mind that this definition has become firmly established in modern Marxism and has become almost completely at home there, so that it even officially feels "at home" in it.

feels, this is one more reason for us to examine philosophically what this intimate, familial relationship of Marxism to this definition of freedom is actually based on. This new definition of the concept of freedom reads: "Freedom is recognized necessity."

When we speak of a "ncuen" provision, we may be exaggerating a bit. The determination of freedom as recognized necessity or as recognizing necessity is not so new as it might seem. Its roots already lie in Greek philosophy, and its first philosophically based beginnings found concrete expression in Socrates or in his so-called intellectualistic ethics. In any case, it is interesting to note how this definition appears for the first time precisely in the ethical form, which is perhaps more appropriate to the matter itself than the modern one, since it still, or rather, speaks first and foremost of man.

This Socratic form of questioning, in its naïve conservativeness and its characteristic historical limitations, does not yet have all those scientifically elaborated and refined 521

Konsequenzen gezogen, die in ihr *in statu nascendi* bereits vorlagen, so daß das auf die Möglichkeit der menschlichen Freiheit verlegte Schwergewicht noch im Vordergrund stand, also gerade dasjenige, was später allmählich aus dem Horizont dieser Frage immer mehr schwinden sollte, weil auch der Mensch selbst aus ihr entschwindet. Deshalb ist es geradezu paradox, wenn man hier sieht, wie das erste Erwachen des Menschen aus dem Schlummer der Notwendigkeit und der eingefahrenen Gegebenheit eines Lebens, sowie auch das erste philosophische Sich-auf-eigene-Füße-stellen des Menschen und seine Bewußtwerdung in der Form der Frage auftritt, die ihn später auf der gleichen Linie an diese Gegebenheit und Notwendigkeit in Form des spezialisierten wissenschaftlichen Bewußtseins gänzlich binden sollte. Denn die erkannte Notwendigkeit hat gerade diesen Sinn.

Wenn also Sokrates behauptet, daß die *Einsicht* oder *Erkenntnis* oder das *Wissen* Vorbedingung oder Voraussetzung der Tugendhaftigkeit sind, dann wird darunter die genaue Einsicht und Kenntnis der Sachen verstanden, auf die sich eine Tätigkeit, hier also die moralische, bezieht oder zu beziehen hat. Die Erkenntnis ist also die Grundlage und die einzige Voraussetzung der Moralität. Das bedeutet, daß schon dadurch, daß der Mensch weiß, was sein soll und wie zu handeln ist, damit sein Handeln ein gutes oder moralisches Handeln sei, er schon gut, anständig, brav, tugendsam, moralisch, frei ist. Sokrates gemäß kann nämlich nicht vorausgesetzt werden, daß jemand schlecht handelt, wenn er schon weiß, was gut ist, da er dadurch – so lautet das Argument – gegen sein eigenes Interesse oder seinen eigenen Nutzen handeln würde. Und dies wäre unmöglich.

Wir wollen hier nicht auf die Frage der Haltbarkeit oder Unhaltbarkeit dieses ethischen Intellektualismus eingehen, den schon Aristoteles bekämpft hat, indem er empirisch und logisch auf seine sinn-gemäße Unhaltbarkeit hingewiesen hat. Sie ist in der Tatsache enthalten, daß jemand ganz genau wissen kann, was gut ist, und trotzdem Schlechtes tun kann. Und nicht nur das, er kann sogar sein eigenes Wissen zum Mittel machen und es zur Vollbringung des Schlechten anwenden; demnach ist das *Wissen allein* noch immer keine genügende Garantie und Grundlage der Moralität. Und doch basiert auf derselben Grundlage auch die Bestimmung der Freiheit als der erkannten Notwendigkeit. Daran ändert auch nichts, daß in der Sokratischen Voraussetzung die Erkenntnis nur auf sogenannte moralische Sachen, moralische Gesetze, also auf das Gebiet der Moralität und des moralischen Handelns beschränkt wird und sich nicht auf das Naturgesetz oder die Frage der allgemeinen Strukturiertheit der Welt oder des Universums erstreckt. Vielleicht trifft sie gerade dadurch die Sache selbst, wie wir es schon betont haben. Wichtig und entscheidend ist hier die Voraussetzung, bei der das Gewicht gerade auf die *Erkenntnis selbst* gelegt wird. Deshalb bringt jede folgende und spätere Bestimmung der Freiheit als erkannter Notwendigkeit auch alle Konsequenzen mit sich, die aus Sokrates' Position hervorgehen. Hier können wir nebenbei noch bemerken, daß diesen Standpunkt noch vor Hegel und dem Marxismus Spinoza konsequent bis zum Ende entwickelt hat.

Consequences were drawn, which already existed in it in statu nascendi, so that the emphasis shifted to the possibility of human freedom was still in the foreground, i.e. precisely that which later gradually disappeared from the horizon of this question should disappear because man himself also

disappears from it.

That is why it is downright paradoxical when one sees here how man's first awakening from the slumber of necessity and the entrenched reality of life, as well as the first philosophical self-confidence human beings and their becoming conscious appears in the form of a question, which later, along the same lines, should bind them completely to this fact and necessity in the form of specialized scientific consciousness. Because the recognized necessity has precisely this meaning.

So when Socrates asserts that insight or cognition or knowledge is a precondition or condition of virtue, then what is meant by this is accurate insight and knowledge of the things to which a T activity, i.e. the moral one, relates or has to relate. Knowledge is therefore the basis and the only prerequisite for morality. This means that simply because man knows what his duty is and how to act, so that his action is good or moral action, he is already good, decent, good, virtuous, moral, free is. Namely, according to Socrates, it cannot be assumed that someone acts badly if he already knows what is good, since by doing so - so the argument goes - he would act against his own interest or benefit . And this would be impossible.

We do not want to go into the question of the durability or unsustainability of this ethical intellectualism here, which Aristotle already got by empirically and logically referring to its meaning-based unh altb ark eit pointed out. It is contained in the fact that someone can know exactly what is good and still do bad. And not only that, he can even make his own knowledge a means and apply it to the accomplishment of evil; according to this, knowledge alone is still not genii -

guarantee and basis of morality. And yet the definition of freedom as recognized necessity is based on the same basis. Nothing changes that, in the Socratic assumption, knowledge is limited only to so-called moral things, moral laws, i.e. to the field of morality and moral action does not extend to the law of nature or the question of the general structure of the world or the universe. Maybe that's exactly how she hits the mark, as we have already emphasized. What is important and decisive here is the prerequisite in which the weight is placed on knowledge itself. Therefore, any subsequent and subsequent definition of freedom as a recognized necessity also carries with it all the consequences that flow from Socrates' position. Here we can also remark that Spinoza consistently developed this point of view to the end even before Hegel and Marxism.

Wir wollen nun versuchen, dem wahren Sinn dieser Bestimmung der Freiheit näherzukommen.

Wenn man sagt: Die Freiheit ist die erkannte Notwendigkeit, dann gibt es hier – abgesehen von der Freiheit, die hier noch nicht oder nicht mehr vorhanden ist, was zu erforschen ist – zwei Momente, auf die wir unsere Aufmerksamkeit lenken müssen: 1. *die Erkenntnis* und 2. *die Notwendigkeit*. Schon aus der Formulierung dieser Bestimmung geht hervor, daß es sich hier vor allem um die Erkenntnis handelt, und nicht um die Notwendigkeit. Die Notwendigkeit kann hier nicht das Prinzip der Freiheit sein, sondern eben die Erkenntnis, denn es wäre geradezu widersprüchsvoll, ja fast absurd, die Freiheit in der Notwendigkeit zu suchen. Deshalb wird hier auch nicht über die Notwendigkeit, sondern über die Erkenntnis der Notwendigkeit gesprochen, woraus hervorgeht, daß gerade mittels der Erkenntnis die Notwendigkeit irgendwie in die Möglichkeit der Freiheit verwandelt wird. Da aber die Erkenntnis, um gerade das zu sein, was sie ist, immer die Erkenntnis des Notwendigen oder des *Gegebenen*, *was notwendig ist*, sein muß, so müssen wir hier diese Notwendigkeit als Voraussetzung für die Erkenntnis überhaupt nicht besonders betonen. Denn gerade die Erkenntnis übernimmt da auf sich das Prinzip der Freiheit, weil hier die Freiheit nur mit Hilfe der Erkenntnis auch möglich ist. Oder mit anderen Worten, die Möglichkeit der Freiheit ist in der Erkenntnis oder durch die Erkenntnis gegeben.

Wenn wir nun das ganze Problem lösen wollten, indem wir einen Querweg beschreiten und einfach auf Sokrates' gleichen oder ähnlichen Versuch hinweisen, nämlich auf diese und solche Bestimmung und Lösung der Frage der Freiheit, in der sich die Erkenntnis allein als ungenügend zur Bestimmung der Freiheit erwiesen hat, und daß ihr in dieser Form doch noch etwas abgeht, dann würden wir die ganze Frage als zu einfach, also als ganz vereinfacht auffassen. Das ist sie aber keineswegs. Deswegen müssen wir diese Frage sehr aufmerksam behandeln. Sie enthält mehr Schwierigkeiten, als man annimmt. Wie soll man dieses Problem also anscheiden? Natürlich nur aus der Bestimmung des Begriffs der Freiheit heraus, die die erkannte Notwendigkeit ist.

Wir müssen deshalb vor allem fragen, was die Erkenntnis, weiter, was die Notwendigkeit ist, und endlich, was für eine neue Qualität durch ihr Verhältnis als erkannte Notwendigkeit gewonnen wird, woraus die Freiheit hervorgetreten hat. Wenn wir oben gesagt haben, daß in dieser Formulierung die Möglichkeit der Freiheit in der Erkenntnis oder durch die Erkenntnis gegeben ist, was aus der Bestimmung selbst hervorgeht, dann wäre es allenfalls etwas zu kurz, wenn wir nicht sähen oder nicht sehen wollten, daß sich daran sofort eine neue, viel wesentlichere Frage anschließt, nämlich: *Worin oder wodurch ist die Möglichkeit der Erkenntnis gegeben?* Oder, was ist das, was auch die Erkenntnis selbst ermöglicht? Wenn nämlich in dieser Bestimmung die Erkenntnis die Freiheit ermöglicht oder zu ermöglichen hat, dann ist diese neue Frage auf keinen Fall zu umgehen. Denn gerade das, was die Erkenntnis ermöglicht, würde auch die Freiheit selbst ermöglichen. Deshalb müssen wir uns bemühen, gerade diesen Weg zu gehen.

We will now try to get closer to the true meaning of this definition of freedom.

If one says: Freedom is the recognized necessity, then there are two

moments here - apart from the freedom that does not yet exist or no longer exists here, which needs to be explored - to which we must direct our attention: 1. knowledge and 2. necessity. It is clear from the very formulation of this provision that it is above all a question of knowledge and not of necessity. Necessity cannot be the principle of freedom here, but knowledge, because it would be downright contradictory, almost absurd, to look for freedom in necessity. That is why we are not talking about necessity here, but about the knowledge of necessity, which shows that it is precisely by means of knowledge that necessity is somehow transformed into the possibility of freedom. But since knowledge, in order to be precisely what it is, must always be knowledge of what is necessary or of what is given, which is necessary, we need not here particularly emphasize this necessity as a prerequisite for knowledge at all.

For precisely knowledge takes on the principle of freedom, because here freedom is only possible with the help of knowledge. Or in other words, the possibility of freedom is given in knowledge or through knowledge.

If we now wanted to solve the whole problem by taking a crossroads and simply pointing to Socrates' same or similar attempt, namely to this and such determination and solution of the question of freedom, in which knowledge alone is insufficient for determination of freedom, and that something is still missing in this form, then we would see the whole question as too simple, that is, as completely simplified. But she isn't. That is why we must treat this question very carefully. It contains more difficulties than one might think. So how to address this issue? Of course, only from the definition of the concept of freedom, which is the recognized necessity.

We must therefore ask above all what knowledge is, and what necessity is, and finally what new quality is gained through their relationship as recognized necessity, out of which freedom has to emerge. If we said above that in this formulation the possibility of freedom in knowledge or through knowledge is given, which emerges from the determination itself, then it would at most be a bit too short if we did not see or did not want to see that which is immediately followed by a new, much more essential question, namely: Wherein or by what means is the possibility of knowledge given? Or, what is that which also makes knowledge itself possible? If, in this determination, knowledge makes freedom possible or has made it possible, then this new question cannot be avoided under any circumstances. For precisely what makes knowledge possible would also make freedom itself possible. That is why we must strive to go this way.

Hier müssen wir also unsere frühere Betrachtung fortsetzen, wo über die Möglichkeit des Gegebenen als des Gegebenen gesprochen wurde, weil sich schon dort der Kern der ganzen Sache befindet, die wir nun von neuem aufrollen. Um das bereits Gesagte nicht zu wiederholen, wollen wir nur unsere Deduktion und den Schluß anführen, damit wir die ganze Ausdehnung dieser Frage überblicken könnten. So wurde unter anderem gesagt:

Die Negation des Gegebenen durch ein Anderes, das bereits in seiner eigenen Wesensbestimmung enthalten ist, ermöglicht auch dem Gegebenen, das an sich noch unmöglich ist, zu erscheinen und sich als etwas zu offenbaren. . . Also auch als ein Gegebenes *soll es erst sein*, das heißt möglich werden. Deshalb ist die Möglichkeit auch die Voraussetzung der Gegebenheit.

Nur, jetzt stellt sich die Frage, was ihrerseits diese Möglichkeit ist, oder wenigstens, wie sie sich manifestiert. Wir wollen uns hier einer Anführung aus Aristoteles bedienen, die sich am Anfang dieser Betrachtung als lehrreich, anregend und fruchtbar erweisen wird.

Am Anfang des zweiten Buches der *Nikomachischen Ethik* sagt Aristoteles Folgendes:

»Alles was in uns als natürliche Mitgabe ist, besitzen wir zuerst als bloße Anlage und bringen es erst nachher zur Verwirklichung. Man sieht das schon an der sinnlichen Wahrnehmung. Das Vermögen der Wahrnehmung haben wir nicht etwa durch häufiges Sehen oder Hören erworben, sondern umgekehrt: weil wir das Wahrnehmungsvermögen schon hatten, haben wir von ihm Gebrauch gemacht; wir haben es nicht erst durch den Gebrauch erlangt.«²⁰

Aus dem ersten Satz entnehmen wir, daß das, was uns von der Natur aus gegeben ist, schon verschiedene Möglichkeiten sind, und daß sich das Gegebene in Form von Möglichkeiten manifestiert. Wir *verwirklichen erst später* das Gegebene als bestimmte Möglichkeit, woraus hervorgeht, daß das Gegebene als Möglichkeit nur noch *reine Möglichkeit* ist. Das aber, was in dem nächsten Satz folgt, in dem von unseren Sinnen gesprochen wird, scheint an sich so deutlich zu sein, daß es fast unwiderlegbar ist. Denn, gibt es etwas *Natürlicheres* als vorauszusetzen, daß wir zuerst den Hörsinn oder das Hörorgan, also das Auge haben müssen, um sehen zu können, das Ohr, um hören zu können usw. Und gerade davon und nur davon spricht Aristoteles. Aber das ist nicht des Pudels Kern und wir haben nicht wegen dieser trivialen Tatsache Aristoteles zitiert, denn das hätten wir auch ohne ihn wissen können. Und doch ist nicht einmal in dieser trivialen Tatsache alles klar. Denn obwohl Aristoteles von den Sinnen als von *unseren Sinnen* spricht, ist es doch nicht sicher, ob er hier von den menschlichen oder, sagen wir, von den tierischen Sinnen spricht. Wenn er von den gegebenen Sinnen als rein abstrakten Möglichkeiten spricht (also des Sehens, des Hörens usw.), dann gehören dazu auch die *tierischen Sinne*. D. h., wenn auf diese Weise die Sinne in Form von abstrakten Gegebenheiten als reine Möglichkeit behandelt werden, dann handelt es sich noch immer nicht um die eben *menschlichen Sinne*. Es handelt sich noch nicht einmal um die Objekte dieser Sinne,

²⁰ Ebenda, II, 1, S. 26.

to give our deduction and conclusion so that we could survey the whole extent of this question.

Among other things, it was said:

The negation of the given by an other already contained in its own essence also enables the given, which in itself is still impossible, to appear and reveal itself as something . . Therefore, even as something given, it should first be, that is, become possible. That is why the possibility is also the prerequisite of the situation.

Only, now the question arises as to what in turn this possibility is, or at least how it manifests itself. We want to use a guide from Aristotle here, which will prove to be instructive, stimulating and fruitful at the beginning of this discussion.

At the beginning of the second book of the Nicomachian Ethics, Aristotle says the following:

“Everything that is in us as a natural gift, we first possess as a mere disposition and only later bring it to fruition.

You can already see that in the sensory perception. We have not acquired the ability to perceive through frequent seeing or hearing, but vice versa: because we already had the ability to perceive, we have I made use of it; we did not first acquire it through use».20

From the first sentence we infer that what is given to us by nature are already various possibilities, and that what is given manifests itself in the form of possibilities. Only later do we realize the given as a definite possibility, from which it follows that the given as a possibility is only pure possibility. But what follows in the next sentence, in which our senses are spoken of, seems to be so clear in itself that it is almost irrefutable. For is there anything more natural than assuming that we must first have the sense of hearing or the organ of hearing, i.e. the eye in order to be able to see, the ear in order to be able to hear etc. And precisely of this and only of this speaks Aristotle. But that's not the point and we didn't quote Aristotle because of this trivial fact, because we could have known that without him. And yet not even in this trivial fact everything is clear. For although Aristotle speaks of the senses as our senses, it is not certain whether he is speaking here of the human senses or, say, of the animal senses.

If he speaks of the given senses as purely abstract possibilities (that is, of seeing, hearing, etc.), then the animal senses also belong to this. That is, if the senses are treated in this way in the form of abstract facts as a pure possibility, then we are still not dealing with the human senses. It is not

even about the objects of these senses,

*^o *Ibid.*, II, 1, p. 26.

oder genauer gesagt, eben deshalb, weil es sich noch nicht um diese Objekte handelt, handelt es sich auch nicht um *menschliche* oder unsere Sinne. Das betonen wir deshalb, weil es ohne diese Objekte der Sinne auch noch keine menschlichen Sinne gibt, genauso wie andererseits ohne die Sinne, die *schon* menschlich sind, auch ihre Objekte nicht vorhanden sind. Wenn wir also bei der Gegebenheit der Sinne als der bloßen Voraussetzung für das Sehen, Hören usw. blieben, dann würden diese Sinne *nie auf menschliche Weise* anfangen zu sehen, zu hören, zu schmecken usw. Denn auch der gegebene Sinn und das, was ihm gegeben ist, wenn es bei dieser abstrakten angenommenen Gegebenheit bliebe, (die im Grunde schon unwirklich ist, weil sie tatsächlich keine Abstraktion ist), stehen miteinander in gar keiner außer noch in tierischer gegenseitiger Verbundenheit, und deshalb handelt es sich hier weder um die menschlichen Sinne, noch um das, was ihnen als Objekt der Empfindung oder der Perzeption gegeben sein könnte. Denn hier gibt es noch nicht das *Medium* ihrer Wechselbeziehung, oder präziser, die Möglichkeit dieser Beziehung. Wir haben bereits gesagt, daß das Gegebene nur dann schon gegeben ist, wenn es möglich ist, oder als Gegebenes ermöglicht wird, und deshalb müssen auch die gegebenen Sinne erst ermöglicht werden, um menschliche Sinne zu sein. Deswegen muß beides die Grenze der abstrakten Gegebenheit überwinden und sich als etwas Mögliches erst *bestätigen*. Also, die bloß vorausgesetzte Möglichkeit muß sich tätig als wirkliche Möglichkeit bestätigen.

Deshalb kann sich, wenn Aristoteles in diesem Sinne sagt: ... wir haben nicht durch häufiges Sehen oder Hören den und den Sinn erworben, sondern umgekehrt: wir haben diesen Sinn besessen und deshalb haben wir ihn angewandt – nicht aber, daß wir ihn angewandt hätten und dadurch erworben . . . , – das nur auf Tiere und ihre Sinne beziehen, sowie auf ihren allgemeinen und wesentlichen Status in der Natur, aber wenn sich das auf die menschlichen Sinne zu beziehen und für sie zu gelten hat, dann verhält sich das Ganze gerade umgekehrt als Aristoteles annahm. Denn der Mensch bringt nicht seine *menschlichen* Sinne mit sich, sondern er muß sie zuerst erwerben, wofür ihm das Naturorgan nur als Vorbedingung oder reine Voraussetzung dient.

Wenn wir die Sache näher betrachten, werden wir merken, daß Aristoteles entweder darunter etwas ganz anderes versteht oder sich selbst widerspricht. Nämlich das, was dem Gesagten unmittelbar folgt, widerlegt es seiner Bedeutung nach:

»Unsere inneren Eigenschaften dagegen gewinnen wir auf Grund vorhergehender Tätigkeiten. Es ist damit, wie mit dem übrigen technischen Fertigkeiten auch. Was wir erst lernen müssen, um es auszuüben, das erlernen wir, indem wir es ausüben. So wird man ein Baumeister dadurch daß man baut und ein Zitherspieler dadurch daß man die Zither spielt. So nun wird man auch gerecht dadurch daß man gerecht handelt, besonnen dadurch daß man besonnen handelt, und tapfer dadurch daß man sich tapfer benimmt.«²¹

²¹ Ebenda, II, 1, S. 26 f.

not exist. So if we stuck to the givenness of the senses as the mere premise of seeing, hearing, etc., then those senses would never begin to see, hear, taste, etc. in a human way. For even the given sense and that what is given to him if it remained with this abstract assumed given (which is basically already unreal because it is in fact pure abstraction) are in no way related to each other except in animal mutual connection, and that is why we are dealing here neither about the human senses nor about what could be given to them as an object of sensation or perception. For here there is not yet the medium of their interrelationship, or more precisely, the possibility of this relationship. We have already said that the given is only given when it is possible or made possible as a given, and therefore the given senses must first be made possible in order to be human senses. Therefore, both must overcome the limit of abstract givens and first confirm themselves as something possible. So, the merely presupposed possibility must be actively confirmed as a real possibility.

Therefore, when Aristotle says in this sense: . . . we have not acquired such and such a sense through frequent seeing or hearing, but vice versa: we possessed this sense and therefore we used it - but not because we had used it and thereby acquired it. . . , - which only refer to animals and their senses, and to their general and essential status in nature, but if that has to refer to and apply to the human senses, then the whole is just the opposite of Aristotle assumed. For man does not bring his human senses with him, but he must first acquire them, for which the natural organ serves him only as a precondition or pure prerequisite.

If we look at the matter more closely, we will notice that Aristotle either means something completely different or contradicts himself. Namely, what immediately follows what has been said refutes it in terms of its meaning:

»On the other hand, we acquire our inner qualities on the basis of previous activities. It is the same with it as with the rest of the technical skills. What we have to learn in order to practice, we learn by practicing. Thus one becomes a master builder by building and a zither player by playing the zither. So now one becomes just by acting justly, prudently by acting prudently, and bravely by being brave. "21

« Ibid., II, 1, p. 26 f.

Wenn das eben Genannte Aristoteles selbst mit dem von den Sinnen Besagten vergleicht, dann dürfen wir es auch tun, nur geht dann das Gegenteil davon hervor, als was Aristoteles zu behaupten scheint. Denn – wenn wir das oben Gesagte auf die Sinne anwenden – nämlich, daß wir vorher erlernen müssen zu schauen, um zu sehen, das lernen wir auf die Weise, daß wir gerade das tun, d. h. wir wenden den Sinn tätig an, um sehen und schauen zu erlernen. Demgemäß verwandelt sich erst durch das Schauen als Tätigkeit, der Sinn als körperliches Organ oder als Sehfähigkeit in den wahrhaftigen menschlichen Sinn, den wir also *gerade erworben haben*, da der Mensch nicht so wie ein Tier sondern menschlicherweise schaut. So eröffnet sich die wirkliche Möglichkeit für ein menschliches Schauen, Hören, Schmecken usw.

Aristoteles selbst macht explizite die wesentliche Distinktion zwischen der sgn. reinen Möglichkeit und der tätigen Möglichkeit, wenn er sagt:

»So bleibt denn als für den Menschen allein kennzeichnend nur das tätige Leben des vernünftigen Seelenteils übrig, und dies teils als zum Gehorsam gegen Vernunftgründe befähigt, teils mit Vernunft ausgestatten und Gedanken bildend. Wenn man nun auch von diesem letzteren in zweifacher Bedeutung spricht als von dem bloßen Vermögen und von der Wirksamkeit des Vermögens, so handelt es sich an dieser Stelle offenbar um das Aktuelle, die tätige Übung der Vernunftanlage. Denn die Wirksamkeit gilt allgemein der bloßen Anlage gegenüber als das höhere.«²²

So kommen wir zu dem, was für unsere Sache *das Wichtigste* ist. Wir sehen, daß Aristoteles diese andere Form der Möglichkeit als »etwas Höheres« bezeichnet, und obwohl das zweifellos auch höher ist, bestimmt er dadurch nur den *quantitativen* Unterschied zwischen ihnen. Wenn wir sogar auch zugeben, daß mit jenem »höher« auch an einen wesentlichen qualitativen Unterschied angespielt wird, dann ist noch immer das Wesentlichste, das daraus hervorgeht, in der Luft hängen geblieben und ist nicht voll ausgesprochen, wenn es auch singgemäß vorzufinden ist. Es handelt sich darum, daß wir ohne diese andere, also tätige Möglichkeit überhaupt nicht für die erste, also reine Möglichkeit wüßten noch wissen könnten, was bedeutet, daß jene erste reine Möglichkeit erst später als möglich erscheint, wenn die andere schon in Erscheinung getreten war und tätig gezeigt hat, ob es überhaupt eine reine Möglichkeit gegeben hat. Daraus folgt, daß die tätige Möglichkeit durch die Tat ihre eigene reine Möglichkeit bestätigt, die vorher nur als rein abstrakte Voraussetzung oder eine einfache Gegebenheit war. Demzufolge bestätigt und ermöglicht die tätige Möglichkeit oder die Tat als Möglichkeit sowohl sich selbst als auch anderer als möglich oder unmöglich.

Wenn wir jetzt wieder auf die Sinne zurückkommen, dann können wir sagen, daß erst die tätigen, in unserem Falle die menschlich tätigen Sinne die Sicht auf den gegebenen Sinn als wirklich existent freigeben und daß sie gleichzeitig durch ihre menschliche Tätigkeit d. h. sinnliche Tätigkeit sowohl sein Sein als auch das eigene Sein bestätigen.

²² Ebenda, I, 7, S. 12.

Because - if we apply what has been said above to the senses - namely that we must first learn to look in order to see, we learn that in the way that we do just that do, i.e. H. we actively use the sense in order to learn to see and look. Accordingly, it is only through seeing as an activity that the sense as a physical organ or as the ability to see changes into the true human sense, which we have just acquired, that man is not like an animal but human looks. This opens up the real possibility of human seeing, hearing, tasting, etc.

A ristotle himself makes explicit the essential distinction between the sgn. pure possibility and actual possibility when he says:

"So what remains as the sole characteristic of man is the active life of the rational part of the soul, and this partly as capable of obedience to rational reasons, partly equipped with reason and forming thoughts. If one now also speaks of this latter in a double meaning as of mere wealth and of the effectiveness of wealth, then at this point we are obviously dealing with the actual, the active Exercise of reason. Because the effectiveness is generally considered to be higher than the mere investment.«22

So we come to what is most important for our cause.

We see that Aristotle calls this other form of possibility "something higher," and while that is undoubtedly higher too, he is thereby only determining the quantitative difference between them.

If we even admit that the word "high" also alludes to an essential qualitative difference, then the most essential thing that emerges from it is still hanging in the air and is not pronounced in full if it is also to be found analogously. The point is that without this other, i.e. active possibility, we would not know at all for the first, i.e. pure possibility, which means that that first pure possibility only appears as possible later, w when the other had already appeared and actively shown whether there was a pure possibility at all. It follows that the active possibility confirms through the act its own pure possibility, which was previously only as a purely abstract supposition or a simple given. Accordingly, the actual possibility, or the act as a possibility, affirms and enables both itself and others as possible or impossible.

If we now come back to the senses, then we can say that only the active senses, in our case the human active senses, release the view of the given sense as actually existing and that they at the same time through their human activity d. H.

sensual activity confirm both his being and his own being.

Aber das ist nicht alles. Aristoteles hat nicht grundlos gerade auf diese Weise den Charakter der menschlichen Sinne bestimmt. Er ist faktisch von der Voraussetzung der bereits menschlich-tätig gebildeten und in ihrer Möglichkeit bestätigten menschlichen Sinne ausgegangen und hat unmerklich diese Möglichkeit in eine Gegebenheit umgewandelt, denn sonst könnte er selbst über diese Sinne aber auch gar nichts sagen, nicht einmal das, daß sie gegeben sind. Hier liegt der Ausgangspunkt und der wesentliche Charakter der ganzen abendländischen Metaphysik, in der die Möglichkeit, nach der schon historisch faktischen, menschlich praktizierten Bewußtwerdung der Möglichkeit als wirklich tätigen menschlichen Möglichkeit, dieselbe ausschließlich historisch-praktizierte menschliche Möglichkeit durch eine metaphysisch-theoretische Wendung in *das Ding selbst*, in das Gegebene, das Seiende, in das reine Sein hineinverlegt wird, in Form der materiellen Naturmöglichkeit (*Dynamis, Potentia*). Deshalb haben auch die Sinne, – sogar für Aristoteles selbst widersprüchsvoll – schon als gegeben den Charakter der menschlichen Sinne annehmen müssen, weil in ihnen als den gegebenen die schon gestaltete menschliche Möglichkeit erblickt wurde. Die Sinne hingegen können, aber sie müssen keinesfalls menschliche Sinne werden, und sind als solche keineswegs gegeben. Im Gegensatz zu Aristoteles' Behauptung müssen sie zuerst angewendet werden, d. h. sich and den Dingen selbst immer wieder bestätigen, damit sich auf diese Weise diese Dinge in ihre Objekte verwandeln könnten, was wiederum sagen will in ihr Bedeutungsverhältnis, bzw. damit sie als solche erworben werden können, und dann noch können sie, aber sie müssen sich nicht zu eminent menschlichen Sinnen gestalten, da man auch in dieser menschlichen Voraussetzung unmenschlich praktizieren und sie anwenden kann.

Jetzt können wir uns erst auf Marx berufen und wir werden eine längere, obzw. sehr bekannte Stelle ausziehen und anführen, die uns in unserer Untersuchung einen Schritt weiterbringen wird:

»Andererseits und subjektiv gefaßt: Wie erst die Musik den musikalischen Sinn des Menschen erweckt, wie für das unmusikalische Ohr die schönste Musik *keinen Sinn hat*, (kein) Gegenstand ist, weil mein Gegenstand nur die Bestätigung einer meiner Wesenskräfte sein kann, also nur für mich sein kann, wie meine Wesenskraft als subjektive Fähigkeit für sich ist, weil der Sinn eines Gegenstandes für mich (nur Sinn für einen ihm entsprechenden Sinn hat) grade so weit geht, als mein Sinn geht, darum sind die *Sinne* des gesellschaftlichen Menschen *andere Sinne* wie die des ungesellschaftlichen; erst durch den gegenständlich entfalteten Reichtum des menschlichen Wesens wird der Reichtum der subjektiven *menschlichen* Sinnlichkeit, wird ein musikalisches Ohr, ein Auge für die Schönheit der Form, kurz, werden erst menschlicher Genüsse fähige *Sinne*, Sinne, welchen als *menschliche* Wesenskräfte sich bestätigen, teils erst ausgebildet, teils erst erzeugt. Denn nicht nur die *Sinne*, sondern auch die sogenannten *geistigen* Sinne, die *praktischen* Sinne (Wille, Liebe etc.), mit einem Wort der *menschliche* Sinn, die Menschlichkeit der Sinne wird erst durch das *Dasein seines* Gegenstandes, durch die *vermenschlichte* Natur. Die *Bildung* der fünf Sinne ist eine Arbeit der ganzen bisherigen Weltgeschichte. Der unter dem rohen praktischen Bedürfnis

But that's not all. It is not without reason that Aristotle determined the character of the human senses in this way. In fact, he proceeded from the presupposition of human senses that had already been developed in a humanly active manner and whose possibility was confirmed, and imperceptibly transformed this possibility into a fact, because otherwise he could not say anything about these senses, not even that they are given. Here lies the starting point and the essential character of the whole of Western metaphysics, in which the possibility, after the already historically factual, humanly practiced awareness of the possibility as really active human possibility, the same exclusively historically practiced human possibility through a metaphysical-theoretical turn into the thing itself is placed in the given, the being, in pure being, in the form of the material natural possibility (*dynamis, potentia*). That is why the senses - contradictory even for Aristotle himself - had to assume the character of the human senses as given, because the already formed human possibility was seen in them as given. The senses, on the other hand, can, but they do not have to become human senses, and as such are by no means given. Contrary to Aristotle's claim, they must be applied first, i. H. confirm themselves again and again in the things themselves, so that in this way these things could be transformed into their objects, which in turn means in their relationship of meaning, or so that they could be acquired as such, and then they can still, but they do not have to develop into eminently human senses, since one can also practice and apply inhumanly in this human condition.

Now, for the first time, we can refer to Marx, and we shall excerpt and cite a longer, albeit well-known, passage which will take us a step further in our investigation:

»On the other hand and subjectively understood: How only music awakens the musical sense of the human being, how the most beautiful music has no meaning for the unmusical Ohi, is (not) an object, because my object can only be the confirmation of one of my essential powers, so it can only be for me how my essence is as a subjective ability for itself, because the meaning of an object for me (it only has a meaning for a meaning corresponding to it) goes just as far as my meaning goes, therefore the senses of the social people have other senses than those of the unsocial; only through the objectively unfolded richness of the human being wild the richness of the subjective human sensuality becomes a musical ear, an eye for the beauty of form, in short, only senses capable of human pleasures become senses, senses which as human beings confirm themselves, partly only trained, partly created. Because not only the senses, but also the so-called spiritual senses, the practical senses (will, love, etc.), in a word the human sense, the humanity of the senses only comes about through the existence of its object, through the

Nature. The formation of the five senses is a work of the whole previous history of the world. The under the rohcn practical Bcduijm.

befangene *Sinn* hat auch nur einen *bornierten* Sinn. Für den ausgehungerten Menschen existiert nicht die menschliche Form der Speise, sondern nur ihr abstraktes Dasein als Speise: eben so gut könnte sie in ihrer rohsten Form vorliegen, und es ist nicht zu sagen, wodurch sich diese Nahrungstätigkeit von der *tierischen* Nahrungstätigkeit unterscheide. Der sorgenvolle, bedürftige Mensch hat keinen Sinn für das schönste Schauspiel, der Mineralienkrämer sieht nur den mercantilistischen Wert, aber nicht die Schönheit und eigentümliche Natur des Minerals; er hat keinen mineralogischen Sinn; also die Vergegenständlichung des menschlichen Wesens, sowohl in theoretischer als in praktischer Hinsicht, gehörte dazu, sowohl um den *Sinn* des Menschen *menschlich* zu machen, als um für den ganzen Reichtum des menschlichen und natürlichen Wesens entsprechenden *menschlichen Sinn* zu schaffen.²³

Diese Deduktion von Marx ist so klar, präzis und fast klassisch, daß wir vorläufig auch ohne Kommentar wenigstens das feststellen können, daß sich hier in Bezug auf die Auffassung Aristoteles' eine ganz neue Sicht eröffnet und die Grundlagen der alten Metaphysik in Frage gestellt werden.

Denn das ist ein Standpunkt, der radikal den Horizont der Dinge als Dinge und ihre absolut unabhängige und für sich selbst genügende Bewegung und Abwicklung in Form von angeblicher Freiheit überschreitet, und es wird die Frage gestellt nach einem neuen Horizont, der hier im Entstehen ist und in dem diese abstrakte Bewegung stehenbleibt, um die wesentliche Frage ihrer Möglichkeit selbst zu stellen. Aber das wird nicht wegen der Dinge als Dinge getan, sondern wegen desjenigen, der hier in Frage kommt – wegen des Menschen und der Frage nach der Sinnhaftigkeit dieser ganzen, nur scheinbar abstrakten Bewegung. Denn gerade der Mensch ist ihr Grenzpfahl und ihr Maß, da er sie in seine eigene menschliche Welt eingeführt hat, in der und durch die sie erst ein mögliches *Etwas* und dann auch für den Menschen selbst etwas *Mögliches* werden. Deshalb ist auch dieser Begriff des Möglichen, bzw. die Möglichkeit selbst, nach Marx, in einem von Grund auf anderen Sinne als in der gesamten bisherigen und heutigen Metaphysik aufgefaßt. Die Möglichkeit ist hier nämlich keine primär ontologische Kategorie, die eine Modalität des Seienden als des Seienden bestimmt, sondern sie meldet sich als die immer wieder gestellte Frage nach dem Ursprung, der Quelle oder dem Heimatboden der menschlichen Welt und des Menschen selbst, nach dem Ursprung und dem Nährboden der Geschichte als der Zukunft und Sinnhaftigkeit, in der erst die Wesen und Dinge ihren eigenen Sinn sowohl für den Menschen als auch für sich selbst bekommen. Und als Mögliches, Sinnvolles und Zukünftiges ist es nie bloß gegeben, sondern durch die menschliche Tätigkeit erkämpft und als Mögliches immer aufs Neue durch Taten bestätigt. Dieses *tätig Mögliche* liegt in dem *Grund der Welt des Menschen*, die, um ein menschlich-sinnvolles Etwas zu sein oder um überhaupt zu sein, schon durch diesen

²³ Karl Marx: Oekonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 1844, – Marx-Engels: Gesamtausgabe, Erste Abteilung, Bd. 3, Marx-Engels Verlag G. m. b. H., Berlin 1932, S. 120 f.

a biased sense also only has a limited sense. For starved people, the human form of food does not exist, but only its abstract existence as food: it could just as well exist in its rawest form, and it is not possible to say how this activity of nourishment differs from that of animals. Not status differ. The anxious, needy man has no sense for the most beautiful spectacle, the mineral junker sees only the mercantile value, but not the beauty and peculiar nature of the mineral; he has no mineralogical sense; i.e. the objectification of the human being, both theoretically and practically, belonged to it, both to make the sense of man metic and to create human sense corresponding to the whole richness of human and natural beings.

This deduction by Marx is so clear, precise and almost classic that for the time being we can state at least that, even without comment, that a completely new perspective opens up here in relation to Aristotle's conception and the foundations of the old metaphysics are called into question.

Because that is a standpoint that radically transcends the horizon of things as things and their absolutely independent and self-sufficient movement and development in the form of alleged freedom, and the question is asked of a new one Horizon that is emerging here and in which this abstract movement stops in order to ask the essential question of its possibility itself. But that is not done because of the things as things, but because of those who are in question here - because of the human being and the question of the meaningfulness of this whole, only seemingly abstract movement. For precisely the human being is its limit post and its measure, since he has introduced it into his own human world, in which and through which it is first a possible something and then also something possible for the human being himself become. Therefore, this concept of the possible, or the possibility itself, according to Marx, is conceived in a fundamentally different sense than in the entire previous and present-day metaphysics. The possibility here is namely not a primary ontological category that determines a modality of beings as beings, but it announces itself as the repeatedly asked question about the origin, the source or the homeland of the human world and of man himself, according to the origin and breeding ground of history as the future and meaningfulness in which all beings and things first find their place own meaning both for humans and for oneself. And as something possible, meaningful and future, it is never just given, but fought for through human activity and confirmed as possible again and again through actions. This actively possible lies in the ground of the world of man, which, in order to be something humanly meaningful or to be at all, already through this Ilosophic manuscript from 1844, -

Marx -Erges:

G c sa m ta u sg a b e ,

E rs te

A b te ilu n g , B d.

3, M a rx -E n g e ls V e rla g

G . m. b. H , B e rlin 1932, S. 120 f.

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Grund von ihren Anfängen an aufgehört hat, eine bloße Gegebenheit zu sein. Deshalb kann das, was ist, nicht einmal erscheinen in dem, was nur ist, sondern zugleich und primär als das, was sein soll. Und das haben wir schon an dem Begriff des Gegebenen gezeigt. Denn auch das Gegebene selbst, um ein mögliches Etwas zu sein, erscheint schon als sinnvolles Etwas oder könnte das zumindest sein, weil es vorher in den Kreis einer durchleuchteten, gesehenen und möglichen Sinnhaftigkeit einbezogen wurde. Es besitzt sie nicht durch sich selbst, sondern durch etwas anderes. Von allen Wesen ist der Mensch das einzige Wesen, das die Möglichkeit hat, zu sein und nicht zu sein, also auch anders zu sein als es ist, und deshalb kann nur er allein alle anderen Wesen und Dinge in den Horizont der von ihm geöffneten und betätigten Möglichkeit, durch die auch die anderen Wesen und Dinge etwas anderes sein können, als sie sind, einbeziehen. Marx hat dasselbe auf seine Weise formuliert:

»Aber der Mensch ist nicht nur Naturwesen, sondern er ist *menschliches* Naturwesen; d. h. für sich selbst seidendes Wesen, darum *Gattungswesen*, als welches er sich sowohl in seinem Sein als in seinem Wissen bestätigen und betätigen muß. Weder sind also die menschlichen Gegenstände die Naturgegenstände, wie sie sich unmittelbar bieten, noch ist der *menschliche* Sinn, wie er unmittelbar ist, gegenständlich ist, *menschliche* Sinnlichkeit, menschliche Gegenständlichkeit. Weder die Natur – objektiv – noch die Natur subjektiv ist unmittelbar dem *menschlichen* Wesen adäquat vorhanden. Und wie alles Natürliche entstehen muß, so hat auch der Mensch seinen Entstehungsakt, die *Geschichte*, die aber für ihn eine gewußte und darum als Entstehungsakt mit Bewußtsein sich aufhebender Entstehungsakt ist. Die Geschichte ist die wahre Naturgeschichte des Menschen.«²⁴

Uns muß aber unserer Frage zuliebe vor allem interessieren, was das heißt, das die Natur weder subjektiv noch objektiv dem menschlichen Wesen adäquat vorhanden ist, denn das, was Marx hier so entschieden negiert, ist gleichzeitig auch der Ausgangspunkt und die einzige Prätention und echte Überzeugung von solch einer Möglichkeit jeder Erkenntnis als Erkenntnis, in erster Linie der theoretisch-wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis. Das muß uns gerade deshalb interessieren, weil wir über die Freiheit als erkannte Notwendigkeit diskutieren, und im Zusammenhang damit: wie und wodurch auch die Erkenntnis möglich ist.

Wenn Marx über die Natur *objektiv* und die Natur *subjektiv* spricht, sehen wir, daß er keinesfalls über die »objektive Natur« und die »subjektive Natur« spricht, was hier von größter Bedeutung ist, ja geradezu wesentlich unterschiedlich. Er selbst stellt die Frage in einer Dimension und von einem Standpunkt aus, die nicht mehr – theoretisch sind! Denn Bestimmungen, wie z. B.: »objektive Natur« und »subjektive Natur« wären schon ihrem Charakter nach ausschließlich erkenntnistheoretisch, in dem sgn. Erkenntnisverhältnis der subjektiven und objektiven Dialektik, und gerade das würde ihn daran hindern, die ganze Frage von Grund auf anders zu stellen. Deshalb sagt er keinesfalls, wie wir gesehen haben, daß die Natur nicht

²⁴ Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik und Philosophie überhaupt, cbd. S. 162.

already appears as something meaningful, or at least could be because it was previously included in the circle of a scrutinized, seen and possible meaningfulness. It does not possess them by itself, but by something else. Of all beings, man is the only being that has the possibility of being and not being, i.e. also of being different than it is, and therefore only he can bring all other beings and things into the horizon of the open and activated possibility by which the other beings and things can also be something other than what they are. Marx put the same thing in his own way:

»But man is not only a natural being, he is a human natural being; i.e. H. being for itself, therefore species being, as which it must confirm and operate both in its being and in its knowledge. Human objects are therefore neither natural objects as they immediately present themselves, nor is human sense as it is immediate, objective, human sensibility, human objectivity. Neither nature - objectively - nor nature subjectively exists directly and adequately for the human being. And just as everything natural has to come into being, so too does man have his act of creation, history, which for him is a known act of creation and therefore an act of creation that cancels itself out with consciousness. History is the true natural history of man.«²

However, for our question, we must above all be interested in what it means to say that nature is neither subjectively nor objectively adequate for the human being, because what Marx so decisively negates here is at the same time the starting point and the only pretension and genuine conviction of such a possibility of every cognition as cognition, primarily of theoretical-scientific cognition. This must interest us precisely because we are discussing freedom as a recognized necessity, and in connection with this: how and by what means knowledge is also possible.

When Marx talks about nature objectively and nature subjectively, we see that he is by no means talking about 'objective nature' and 'subjective nature', which is of great importance here, indeed essentially different. He himself poses the question in a dimension and from a point of view that is no longer -

are theoretical! Because provisions such as E.g.: "objective nature" and "subjective nature" were by their very nature mostly epistemological, in the so-called. Knowledge relationship of the subjective and objective dialectic, and that would prevent him from posing the whole question from CT to another. De®-

at no rate does he say, as we have seen, that nature does not

unmittelbar der menschlichen *Erkenntnis*, sondern dem *menschlichen Wesen* adäquat vorhanden ist, und unterstreicht dieses »*menschlich*«. Hier ist nicht nur davon die Rede, daß »sich Mensch in der gegenständlichen Welt nicht nur mit Hilfe seines Denkens, sondern auch mit Hilfe aller seiner Sinne bestätigt,« was Marx an einer anderen Stelle sagt, denn das könnte man immer noch auch im theoretischen Sinne interpretieren, obwohl dann für das Erkenntnisverhältnis die offene Frage bliebe, wohin mit den geistigen praktischen Sinnen, wie z. B. dem Willen, der Liebe usw., um die es sich hier ebenfalls handelt. Man könnte das nämlich auf folgende Weise interpretieren: die »objektive Natur« wäre das gegebene und bestehende Objekt der »subjektiven Natur« als gegebenes und bestehendes Subjekt in einem rein erkenntnismäßigen, also erkenntnistheoretischen Verhältnis. Aber wenn es dem so wäre, dann wäre alles, was Marx hier ausführt und was er sagen will, völlig überflüssig. Er will jedoch dadurch gerade etwas Entgegengesetztes feststellen. Der Sinn dieses »Entgegengesetzten« liegt gerade darin, daß ein derartiges Erkenntnisverhältnis nicht einfach als möglich vorausgesetzt wird, als gegeben und an sich klar und verständlich, sondern man bemüht sich, dasjenige festzustellen, wodurch die Erkenntnis selbst, d. h. das theoretische Element überhaupt möglich ist und worauf sie fußt. Jede theoretische Erkenntnis gründet sich nämlich ihrerseits auf dem unmittelbar Gegebenen als für sie schon Möglichen, was also für sie nicht in Frage gestellt wird, und Marx stellt gerade das in Frage. Nur, um das überhaupt tun zu können, steht er schon auf dem Standpunkt der Antwort auf diese Frage, weil er seine eigene und für die theoretische Erkenntnis von sich selbst so klare Voraussetzung in Frage gestellt hat.

Dieser »Standpunkt der Antwort« besteht darin, daß sich sowohl die Natur objektiv als auch die Natur subjektiv, um überhaupt sowohl das eine als auch das andere zu sein, vorher schon in einem Medium befinden, das sie als solche ermöglicht. Deshalb sind also weder die *menschlichen Gegenstände* natürliche Gegenstände, wie sie sich *unmittelbar* (!) bieten, noch sind die *menschlichen Sinne*, so wie sie *unmittelbar sind*, gegenständlich, also die *menschliche Sinnlichkeit* ist, nicht die menschliche Gegenständlichkeit. Wenn sich also die Gegenstände unmittelbar – nicht bieten, und wenn der menschliche gegenständliche Sinn nicht das ist, was er unmittelbar ist, dann müssen sie sich doch im Gegenteil gerade – mittelbar oder vermittelt bieten. Wenn also die Mittelbarkeit oder Vermittlung jenes Medium ist, das diese beiden Momente ermöglicht, aufstellt und eröffnet, dann sind sie noch nicht wirklich vorhanden in dem und durch das, was sie an sich sind. Sie sind also ihrem eigenen Sein nach noch nicht, was bedeutet, daß sie noch nicht als etwas Wirkliches möglich sind. Daraus folgt, daß sie erst in einem möglichen *Akt* und durch ihn – werden können und sollen. Da auch die Natur objektiv und die Natur subjektiv erst werden soll, um zu sein, so besteht sie in ihrer unmittelbaren oder unvermittelten Gegebenheit überhaupt noch nicht, weil sich ihr wirkliches Sein schon im Medium des Vermittelns befindet. Weil aber gerade die unmittelbare Gegebenheit sowohl der Natur objektiv als auch der Natur subjektiv der Ausgangspunkt, das Medium und der Gegenstand eines theoretischen Verhältnisses ist, geht daraus hervor,

immediately available to human cognition, but to the human being ad a quatuor, and underlines this »human«.

Here we are not only talking about the fact that "man confirms himself in the material world not only with the help of his thinking, but also with the help of all his senses," which Marx says elsewhere, because this could still be interpreted in a theoretical sense, although the question would then remain open as to what to do with the intellectual practical senses, such as e.g. B. the will, love, etc., which are also at issue here. You could interpret that in the following way: the

»objective nature« would be the given and existing object

"subjective nature" as a given and existing subject in a purely epistemological, i.e. epistemological, relationship. But if that were the case, then everything that Marx is doing here and what he wants to say would be completely superfluous. However, he wants to establish something exactly the opposite. The meaning of this "opposite" lies precisely in the fact that such a cognitive relationship is not simply presupposed as possible, as given and in itself clear and understandable, but one endeavors to establish that by which the knowledge itself, i. H. the theoretical element is even possible and what it is based on. Every theoretical knowledge is in turn based on what is immediately given as what is already possible for it, which is therefore not called into question for it, and this is exactly what Marx calls into question. Only in order to be able to do that at all does he already have the standpoint of the answer to this question, because he has questioned his own assumption, which is so clear for theoretical knowledge of himself.

This "point of view of the answer" consists in the fact that both nature objective and nature subjective, in order to be at all both one and the other, are already in a medium which they as such allows. For this reason, human objects are neither natural objects as they present themselves directly (!), nor are the human senses, as they are directly, object-like, i.e. human sensibility is, not human sensibility objectivity. Therefore, if objects do not present themselves directly, and if the human objective sense is not what it is immediately, then they must, on the contrary, present themselves directly - indirectly or mediated.

So if mediation or mediation is the medium that makes these two moments possible, sets them up and opens them up, then they are not yet really there in and through what they are in themselves. They are therefore not yet in their own being, which means that they are not yet possible as something real. From this it follows that they can and should only become in a possible act and through it. Since nature is also supposed to become

objective and nature subjective in order to be, it does not yet exist at all in its immediate or unmediated givenness, because its real being is already in the medium of the exchange is located. But because precisely the immediate givenness of both nature objectively and nature subjectively is the starting point, the medium and the object of a theoretical relationship, it follows that 530

daß sich das Theoretische und das Erkenntnismäßige ihrem Sein und Wesen nach, das die reine Unmittelbarkeit ist, auf bloßer Abstraktion gründen! Daraus geht auch noch Folgendes hervor: Wenn die mögliche Wahrheit oder die Möglichkeit der Wahrheit dieser beiden Momente nicht in ihnen selbst enthalten ist, sondern erst im Medium ihrer gegenseitigen Vermittlung, d. h. Anderswerden als es ist, dann ist die Wahrheit des Theoretischen und des Erkenntnismäßigen – insofern sie als solche, d. h. im Verhältnis der reinen Unmittelbarkeit überhaupt möglich wären, – gerade darin, daß sie an sich *wesentlich unwahr* sind.

Sie sind auf jene Weise unwahr, über die Marx in seiner Kritik an Feuerbach als *Theoretiker* spricht, da er, Feuerbach, nach Marx, »in letzter Instanz nicht mit der Sinnlichkeit fertig werden kann, ohne sie mit den »Augen«, d. h. durch die »Brille« des *Philosophen* zu betrachten.«²⁵ Hier sagt also Marx das, was eigentlich jede Theorie als Theorie umwirft, die nicht einmal mit ihrem Ausgangspunkt fertig werden kann, d. h. mit der Sinnlichkeit (und wie soll sie dann mit der *Freiheit* fertig werden?). Wir zitieren Marx:

»Feuerbach spricht namentlich von der Anschauung der Naturwissenschaft, er erwähnt Geheimnisse, die nur dem Auge des Physikers und Chemikers offenbar werden; aber wo wäre ohne Industrie und Handel die Naturwissenschaft? Selbst diese »reine« Naturwissenschaft erhält ja ihren Zweck sowohl, wie ihr Material, erst durch Handel und Industrie, durch sinnliche Tätigkeit der Menschen. So sehr ist diese Tätigkeit, dieses fortwährende sinnliche Arbeiten und Schaffen, diese Produktion die Grundlage der ganzen sinnlichen Welt, wie sie jetzt existiert, daß, wenn sie auch nur für ein Jahr unterbrochen würde, Feuerbach eine ungeheure Veränderung nicht nur in der natürlichen Welt vorfinden, sondern auch die ganze Menschenwelt und sein eigenes Anschauungsvermögen, ja seine eigne Existenz sehr bald vermissen würde.²⁶

Damit ist also alles Wesentliche für unseren Ausgangspunkt gesagt, wodurch auch die Erkenntnis selbst möglich ist. Das Geheimnis dieses radikalen Auswegs aus dem verzauberten Kreise der Theorie, Philosophie, Erkenntnis und des Erkenntnisverhältnisses entdeckte Marx in den Grundlagen von allem, was ist, also in der Umkehrung des sgn. »sinnlichen Gegenstandes«, danach immer wieder aufs Neue jede Theorie greift wie ein Ertrinkender nach dem Strohhalm, in die »sinnliche Tätigkeit«, in der sich das unmittelbar Gegebene schon bei seinem Erscheinen als Etwas in einen *menschlichen* Gegenstand verwandelt, und so ist in ihm schon vorher tätig-sinnhaltig jene Möglichkeit vorhanden, die den Horizont öffnet sowohl der *vermenschlichten Natur* als auch der eminent *menschlichen* Welt die die *Geschichte selbst als Praxis ist*. Da sich nur in ihr alles was ist eröffnet, schafft, enthüllt, erzeugt, und durch sie erscheint, so ist die *Praxis als geschichtliches Geschehen das Sein der menschlichen Welt und das heißt zugleich auch das wirkliche Sein der Natur und des Menschen*.

²⁵ K. Marx-F. Engels: *Die deutsche Ideologie* – (1845–1846), herausgegeben von V. Adoratskij, Verlag für Literatur und Politik, Wien–Berlin, 1932, S. 32.

²⁶ Ebenda, S. 33.

that the theoretical and the cognitive are based on mere abstraction according to their being and essence, which is pure immediacy! The following also follows from this: If the possible truth or the possibility of the truth of these two moments is not contained in them themselves, but only in

the medium of their mutual mediation, i. H. Becoming different than it is, then the truth of the theoretical and the cognitive -

insofar as they as such, i. H. were at all possible in relation to pure immediacy - precisely in that they are essentially untrue in themselves.

They are untrue in the way that Marx talks about in his critique of Feuerbach as a theoretician, since he, Feuerbach, according to Marx, ultimately cannot deal with sensuousness without dealing with it with the 'eyes', i. H. to be looked at through the "glasses" of the philosopher. H. with sensuality (and then how are they to cope with freedom?). We quote Marx:

»Feuerbach speaks specifically of the view of natural science, he mentions secrets that are only revealed to the eyes of the physicist and chemist; but where would science be without industry and trade? Even this "pure" natural science obtains its purpose and its material only through trade and industry, through the sensuous activity of human beings. So much is this activity, this ongoing sensuous working and creating, this production, the basis of the whole sensuous world as it now exists, that even if it were interrupted for even a year, Feuerbach would see an enormous change, not only in the natural world earth, but would also very soon miss the whole human world and his own ability to perceive, indeed his own existence. 20

With that, everything that is essential for our starting point has been said, whereby knowledge itself is also possible. Marx unearthed the secret of this radical way out of the enchanted circle of theory, philosophy, knowledge and the relationship to knowledge in the foundations of everything that is, i.e. in the reversal of the so-called. "sensuous object," after which again and again each theory grasps at straws like a drowning man

"sensual activity" in which what is immediately given is already transformed into a human object when it appears as something, and so that possibility is already active and meaningful in it beforehand -